As the title says
As the title says
PLEASE RESPECT MY ETHNICITY AND RELIGION! -Hunyadi
There was no victory to had at Thermopylae... The land forces were a blocking force to provoke the decisive sea action at Artemisium.
So I take you to mean say Leonidas manged his troops a bit better. He sent a spartan commander and some reliable hoplites to give the Phocians some backbone.
Thus the Persian flanking attempt was tossed back and the pass held for another day.
That means who knows...
On balance the Greeks are still in a tricky situation. Leonidas has a real problem he has two passes to cover and not enough troops to do it with and they are really to far to use one reserve for. I guessing he needs to immediately sent for more troops but I doubt he could hold both passes for yet another day against a coordinated assault on both all day. At sea the Greeks had a hard fight on the 3rd go around but if the reserves closer to Athens came they could mange another day or two certainly, but by the same token unless Xerxes made a mistake (as he did at Salamis) the Greek fleet could inflict no defeat just stop the Persians.
The naval balance was close enough and the position good enough the Greeks could hold indefinitely, but unless Sparta sent more troops I don't see Leonidas holding for more than another day or two until his force was absolutely exhausted. Its possible the fleet could have sent manpower as a stopgap but that would risk the navy side of the equation.
Last edited by conon394; June 29, 2011 at 12:33 PM.
IN PATROCINIVM SVB Dromikaites
'One day when I fly with my hands - up down the sky, like a bird'
But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place; some swearing, some crying for surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left.
Hyperides of Athens: We know, replied he, that Antipater is good, but we (the Demos of Athens) have no need of a master at present, even a good one.
I don't think they could have won. They could perhaps have delayed the Persian Army for longer and demoralized it more, but I doubt they could make the Persians withdraw from the field.
Yep short of deploying HMGs or taking out Xerxes himself with a well aimed spearthrow.
In the end I'm not sure if it'd matter too much if Xerxes did significantly better or significantly worse.
Greece was just another border area for Persian Kings to beat their heads against. Like the Arabian desert or the Skythian steppes, Yunanistan could be conquered but I think it'd be pretty hard to hold.
Once taken it'd revolt again (and again and again) so throwing a little money around to keep the locals too disorganised to raid the core provinces was a smarter long term policy, like the British in central asia or the Byzantines in the Crimea.
Jatte lambastes Calico Rat
oops I meant to say no victory above.
IN PATROCINIVM SVB Dromikaites
'One day when I fly with my hands - up down the sky, like a bird'
But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place; some swearing, some crying for surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left.
Hyperides of Athens: We know, replied he, that Antipater is good, but we (the Demos of Athens) have no need of a master at present, even a good one.
Due to heavy losses the Persians decide to pull back rather than press the attack?
As for what changes, I'd say not much. Perhaps the Persian wars end a bit sooner.
Well not really since that policy had nasty blow back effects if it broke down and Persia did not have a plan B. Whenever one of the Greek powers had the chance it turned on Persia. If Athens had been a tad more lucky or less distracted circa 450 BC Egypt and Cyprus might had been lost to Persia. If Athens remained hostile and with Egypt free Asia Minor would likely go and than what? Of course the Persian policy you cite failed dramatically at the end of the 4th century when Philip succeed in making Macedonia the undisputed master of Greece - than the supposed nominal backwater of Greece liquidated the Persian State.Once taken it'd revolt again (and again and again) so throwing a little money around to keep the locals too disorganised to raid the core provinces was a smarter long term policy, like the British in central asia or the Byzantines in the Crimea.
IN PATROCINIVM SVB Dromikaites
'One day when I fly with my hands - up down the sky, like a bird'
But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place; some swearing, some crying for surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left.
Hyperides of Athens: We know, replied he, that Antipater is good, but we (the Demos of Athens) have no need of a master at present, even a good one.
Yeah there was that, although I'd say it was Cyrus the younger who started the rot, marching Dorians into Mesopotamia and giving them a look at Persians killing Persians.
The series of succession crises leading up to Darius III meant Greece was relatively neglected (along with other even more important areas like Egypt). Had Little Cy managed to keep himself javelin-free at Cunaxa, I suspect a centralised Persian admin would have spent more time making trouble for the neighbours than cutting their own throats.
Imagine Phillip trying to face down Thebes, Athens and the two western Satraps at once. Might be a little less hegemonic then.
Jatte lambastes Calico Rat
What's the reason for proposing this alternate scenario? The Persians were eventually defeated anyway and the casualties suffered by the Greeks in Thermopylae were too few. Even as a tactical defeat, it was probably a strategic and a morale victory for the Greeks.
Under the patronage of Emperor Maximinus Thrax
"Steps to be taken in case Russia should be forced out of war considered. Various movements [of ] troops to and from different fronts necessary to meeting possible contingencies discussed. Conference also weighed political, economic, and moral effect both upon Central and Allied powers under most unfavorable aspect from Allied point of view. General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of purely defensive attitude on all secondary fronts and withdrawing surplus troops for duty on western front. By thus strengthening western front [those attending] believed Allies could hold until American forces arrive in numbers sufficient to gain ascendancy."
~General Pershing, report to Washington, 26 July 1917
There's a school of thought that sees battles as turning points in history, "sliding door" moments. While I take a more socialist/materialist view and think battles and wars are usually symptoms of deeper forces at work, its still worth chewing on these chesnuts.
EG if Sparta led Hellas to victory at Thermopylae it would rob Athens of some credit among Hellenes as an alternative leader.
The Delian League/Athenian empire in part grew out of Athenian leadership at Salamis. While Athens was the "natural leader" at sea, without a famous victory to gild their laurels the Delian League might have never really congealed, and the Hellenes remained focussed on the Peoloponesian League as the principle federal structure.
I can see Athens Medising more readily without a hateful occupation of the Acropolis. Maybe a *Peloponesian war would follow with a Spartan superpower challenged by a Persian funded Ionian challenger as in the post-Peloponessian war period.
This one is more about tweaks and nuances, and the first premise is a very unlikely one, but its an intellectual exercise just worth the candle.
Jatte lambastes Calico Rat
But not at Thermopylae. The Greeks just did not have enough troops and as far as we know no Spartan reinforcements were on the way. The only place really for a true different outcome is on the sea and thus Athens still gets the glory. The Spartan moment was after Plataea where the hoplite won and Sparta was still in the lead.There's a school of thought that sees battles as turning points in history, "sliding door" moments. While I take a more socialist/materialist view and think battles and wars are usually symptoms of deeper forces at work, its still worth chewing on these chesnuts.
IN PATROCINIVM SVB Dromikaites
'One day when I fly with my hands - up down the sky, like a bird'
But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place; some swearing, some crying for surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left.
Hyperides of Athens: We know, replied he, that Antipater is good, but we (the Demos of Athens) have no need of a master at present, even a good one.
i love how these threads give 300 fanboys a chance to spout a lot of BS about Sparta when in reality the Spartans where won of the most overrated war machines of the ancient world. even if the greeks had "Won" at thermoplylae as in making the Persians retreat. they would have come back again next year with a bigger army and would have avoided the pass completely and probably landed closer to Athens. resulting in sacking the city and heading for sparta itself.
as the saying goes, some defeats are more triumphant than victories and in this sense it gave the Persians enough false courage to press on and be defeated totally thus ending persia's want to invade Greece.
THAT'S my point. if the Greeks had won at Thermopylae(Impossible) the Persians would have just tried again during the next campaign season, hopefully learning from their mistake of marching troops across the Hellespont and attempting a sea invasion (Risky i know with the Greek fleet but the Persian fleet outnumbers the Greeks 3 to 1) thus the victory would have turned into a defeat for the Greeks instead of the defeat turning into victory. because the Persians stayed on the same course and did not have to adjust their plan.Thermopylae did nothing to end Persian ambitions in Greece. Salamis however did.
Just real quick for now, everybody; I've been scouring the boards often, but lately, and sadly for em, haven't had the wherewithal for my standards of posting. But this is irresistible!
Originally Posted by conon394
If you don't mind, could you deviate from your usual hearsay-delivered-as-fact? You want to shed some light as to why that would manage Leonidas' troops better? This is absurd, primarily due to your usual self-righteous and arrogant attitude.
I never called you a liar; amid disagreements over the surviving ancient literature on Philip II (some of you guys never acknowledge there was quite a lot on him which didn't survive) you claimed Chester Starr put forth something which backed your arguments in refuting Plutarch, and after you never produced it (I and others always do right away!), I clearly wrote, "conon394 is lying, or, more likely, Starr wrote something that conon394 has 'smoothed over' to conform to the theory imputed to Starr, and perhaps has conditioned himself to argue what Starr's words 'really mean', should it come up. But if he produces it, and it does read as is claimed, I will still disagree." Who do you think you're fooling with such twists? You have yet to produce Starr's opinions regarding Plutarch and/or Polyaenus (actually, I believe he wrote an article regarding the credibility of early Spartan history, which may be what sparked your claim; it's from the 1960s in the German journal Historia). But now I am stating you are indeed a liar with that remark on your signature, as well as a hypocrite - you seem to retort to others with bravura comments of 'where's your basis and evidence', yet you never seem to back up your own arguments, which is in stark contrast to your constant sanctimoniousness. But I guess that's what pseudo-pundits do. Think before you lash back - you've already used the old chestnut which rings, "you're just re-arranging things to suit your needs...". "Spartan JKM is telling a story, but it's not history...". Talk is cheap, tough guy, hence you might for once let a thread know what you've actually read and understood. There's more hypocrisy, if I may, albeit this is a generalized statement - these 'unreliable' Phocians were the forefathers of those led by Onomarchus who 'handed Philip II his ass', relaying your sophomoric parlance from some time ago.
Now, the above opinions are legion among a Greek apologia over Leonidas' conduct, specifically in not placing the 1,000 Phocians under a Spartan officer, or at least consigning a Spartan officer to lead them along with 'reliable hoplites'. I feel this arbitrarily presupposes extant elements in the Greek army - of there and then at the famed defense of Thermopylae - which are false. Firstly, there seems to be common opinion that the Phocians displayed cowardly behavior at a very imbalanced rate: they came under archery fire, thus naturally retired before the Persian advance to a nearby ridge to improve their capacity to defend themselves. Does it not occur to some that it didn't occur to them that the more numerous enemy would just march past them in focusing on their real objective? If so, this an indication of 'professionalism' amid the Persian ranks after firing a couple volleys, and one of 'amateurishness' among the Greeks at the time. But no 'professional' Spartans could have made any difference, IMHO.
Leonidas could not just whistle up a reserve of Bataillons Alpins de Chasseurs when he was apprised of the Anopaia Path, and even if he assigned Spartan officers and 'reliable hoplites', how could that help? They may have been adept at chasing helots in rugged Laconia, but here they knew far less about the terrain than the indigenous and volunteering Phocians (years earlier, a force of Thessalians had been guided by Malians on a march into Phocis, thus the path must have been quite familiar to these Phocians; cf. Herodotus, The Histories, Book 7.215.1), not to mention less about what 'mountain warfare' per se would entail at this backdrop. Moreover, it was far from assured that the Phocians would take orders smoothly from 'Spartan officers',. What can be noted is that Spartans could also be surprised with, seemingly, a similar lack of 'professionalism' - in their beds, no less! (cf. Thucydides, History of the Peloponneisan War, Book 4.32.1; Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 7.1.16). Interestingly, judging by the deliberate action undertaken, the Persians followed Ephialtes' notifying data that this force did not comprise Spartans; did the lambda already appear on Spartan shields, we could entertain with wonder?
The Persian turning movement utilized no more men than was needed (while the main Greek force was busy with Xerxes' preponderance of attacking at the Hot Gates) to prevent any impediments to their celerity; thus about 2-3,000 or so of the Immortals turned Leonidas' force, surely not all of 10,000 of them. It was effectuated well primarily, IMHO, because of the poise and order shown by the Persians picked for the task, not due to a unilateral verdict based on cowardly behavior of local Greeks who scampered up the mountain (I think they were ready to fight a tough clash, at the very least), and/or that Leonidas lacked some foresight under the conditions he faced. However, had the Phocians stood their ground from their initial positions - a suicidal one which can hardly have been a charge expected of them - a delay to the Persian turning movement was imminent. Thus posting pickets would have been negligible, no more no less than the presence of any Spartan officers or other Greek hoplites, all of whom Leonidas needed with him at the Gates. Had a couple officers and more seasoned hoplites been there, they would have numbered too little to preclude the same course which was taken - they would have surely retired with the Phocians in the face of the same tactical course undertaken by the Persian archers.
Sorry and thanks, James![]()
Last edited by Spartan JKM; July 03, 2011 at 07:38 PM. Reason: Grammar, contrite remark
"A ship is safe in the harbor; but that's not why ships are built"
Under the patronage of the revered Obi Wan Asterix
Calvin and Osceola, may you both henceforth remain in everlasting tranquility
Yes its a long shot. Just drawing the long bow a few inches further, there are a few "...suddenly the leader just fell down dead!" moments that do seem to swing campaigns. Would Barbarossa's drowning in Cilicia and maybe the assasination of Perdiccas on his way to crush Ptolemy be examples we could work off?
If Xerxes foolishly exposed himself to danger (say going to the battle line wearing only ear and nose piercings like in that absurd movie) and got himself skewered then the army might well pause and rush home to focus on the succession. So there is an absurdly remote possibility this might play out.
Most likely, hard to see the Persians losing it on land while they had a fleet supplying the mega-army of death.
If any more major poleis had medised (especially Athens) then Plataea may not have been possible and Xerxes may have got his earth and water...for a while. So the way it plays out its hard to see Spartans winning without Athens winning too, and harder to see Athens losing without Sparta getting a walloping.
Jatte lambastes Calico Rat
How do you figure they are going to avoid the pass??? A defeat at Thermopylae kind means the Greek navy is fine and thus no going around.and would have avoided the pass completely and probably landed closer to Athens. resulting in sacking the city and heading for sparta itself.
IN PATROCINIVM SVB Dromikaites
'One day when I fly with my hands - up down the sky, like a bird'
But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place; some swearing, some crying for surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left.
Hyperides of Athens: We know, replied he, that Antipater is good, but we (the Demos of Athens) have no need of a master at present, even a good one.
You know SpartanJKM your post is so overwrought, so baffling that I am not quite sure if you are not just having a joke. But considering you’re lofty opinion of your own posts I suppose you’re actually serious.
What? This is relevant how exactly? So yes almost 150 years after the Battle of Thermopylae Onomarchus a good general lead a Phocian army that was heavily (if not predominantly) composed of mercenaries and did do some fine fighting in the Third Sacred War. But I’m at a loss to understand what that says about the reliability or quality of Phocian contingent at Thermopylae. Do you mean to imply that the average Phocian general was usually as good as Onomarchus? That the Phocian army and large scale use of mercenaries was typical and normal (institutional in Phocis that is) such we can assume many of 1000 at Thermopylae were professional mercenaries.There's more hypocrisy, if I may, albeit this is a generalized statement - these 'unreliable' Phocians were the forefathers of those led by Onomarchus who 'handed Philip II his ass', relaying your sophomoric parlance from some time ago.
I really fail to see why a hissy fit laced with sarcasm and personal attacks was required in reply to a short comment on ‘What If’ thread in an Alternative History sub form of a site that exists because of computer war game.
I suppose you might not like my tag line comment, but than again I don't like the way you insist on cross posting stuff into threads (the argument over Philip and Chaeroneae into as I recall a Hannibal one) quite without a pm or some such. I am sorry this is a hobby for me not a job I do sometimes just fail to check on threads and or never get around to a reply because of I dunno an other thing called real life.
In any case I will add another post here since you brought it up her to address the OT issues in the quote at the end of the this post (*).
Self-righteous, Hearsay-derived-as-fact? I suggest you look in a mirror.If you don't mind, could you deviate from your usual hearsay-delivered-as-fact? You want to shed some light as to why that would manage Leonidas' troops better? This is absurd, primarily due to your usual self-righteous and arrogant attitude.
You have a source for this logic, Something Xerxes put in an inscription maybe? Did Xerxes have any idea how large the Greek army was, if there was guard on the pass, if there were reinforcements? All of his best troops had been handled roughly; defeat in the night is also an impediment to celerity.The Persian turning movement utilized no more men than was needed (while the main Greek force was busy with Xerxes' preponderance of attacking at the Hot Gates) to prevent any impediments to their celerity;
Really, surely according to whom - to you SpartanJKM. Let’s be clear, you are of course waving away the sources since at minimum Herodotus (7.216) implies Hydrarnes and his all of his men are sent and Diodorus (11.8.5) allows for 20,000 men. But no matter when the great SpartanJKM detects a mistake or error in the sources his view is surely correct.thus about 2-3,000 or so of the Immortals turned Leonidas' force, surely not all of 10,000 of them.
But I admit I am unclear where your quote of my text shows hearsay-delivered-as-fact? What I see is my opinion that yes Leonidas mishandled his defense.
???hearsay
I was unaware of that History was a religion with a dogma?
But whatever, let’s move along to my opinion, and that of Spartan JKM
So first to restate:
I think there is sufficient evidence to argue Leonidas made a mistake in leaving the Phocians by themselves watching the ‘goat path’.
I would also say there is a sufficient amount of multiple events and conflicting or questionable stories in Herodotus alone, not to mention actual period inscriptions and all manor of later sources such that any number of imaginative narratives can be constructed. The scope gets even greater depending on what you decide was the logical thing X individual would have done, or whether or not Ephorus was right or wrong, or Herodotus, Plutarch etc.
As an aside here what seems to bother Spartan JKM is I’m simply willing to make the point that since we do not have the personal journals of Leonidas and Xerxes and no transcripts of their staff meeting and no lost David Frost interviews with them etc. its always deceptively easy to assert a fill in from silence cloaked under words like ‘its logic’ to make your argument. The fact is there was not even in Herodotus a canonical version of events and certainly not in the body of classical literature and even less so in modern stories (oops I mean historians writing about what the Greek strategy was and why it was or was not a failure). Apparently we have all just been waiting for Spartan JKM to provide the orthodox narrative from which we must not stray.
Umm how would that have improved their capacity for defense? Have you considered your own logic by the way at worst according to you the Phocians faced nothing that Athens did not face at Marathon in terms of odds why not charge?Firstly, there seems to be common opinion that the Phocians displayed cowardly behavior at a very imbalanced rate: they came under archery fire, thus naturally retired before the Persian advance to a nearby ridge to improve their capacity to defend themselves.
And when the Persians marched away? Why not follow – but no Phocians arrived to attack the Immortals in the rear did they?
Beside the point the question is what exactly happened to them after they Immortals walked away.Does it not occur to some that it didn't occur to them that the more numerous enemy would just march past them in focusing on their real objective?
Or maybe it’s a sign of cowardice or unreliability combined with stupidity in that the Phocians ran away after putting up no fight and being caught off guard. The amateur Athenians managed to deal with archery at Marathon.If so, this an indication of 'professionalism' amid the Persian ranks after firing a couple volleys, and one of 'amateurishness' among the Greeks at the time.
But no 'professional' Spartans could have made any difference, IMHO.Ahh see here you done a couple things. First you have turned a ‘standing force’ of equivocal nature into a ‘professional force’ with all of its modern connotations. No matter how standing/long service the Immortals rank and file was their officers were simply Persian aristocrats who made plenty of mistakes in the Persian Wars, in fact more than the Greeks and thus they lost. Second professional or amateur is beside the point I’m not saying Spartans were always perfect, even the Prussians got surprised (sometime and they really were professional).What can be noted is that Spartans could also be surprised with, seemingly, a similar lack of 'professionalism' - in their beds, no less! (cf. Thucydides, History of the Peloponneisan War, Book 4.32.1; Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 7.1.16). Interestingly, judging by the deliberate action undertaken,
The real point here is that the best source we have Herodotus and according to it Leonidas was not caught by surprise in his position, he had scouts out sufficiently far so that he had time for conference after they confirmed the report of deserters from the Persian army (7.219).
On balance had a Spartan been sent to inspect the Phocians and report hey you know those jokers have got no scouts out, at minimum it would have meant the Immortals could have be surprised, or that Leonidas might have had time to receive a credible report of attack and send more troops. Would that stretch him thin on the main pass sure, but it was an incredibly strong position and Xerxes had already kind of committed the A team to the turning movement.Leonidas could not just whistle up a reserve of Bataillons Alpins de Chasseurs when he was apprised of the Anopaia Path, and even if he assigned Spartan officers and 'reliable hoplites', how could that help?
Red herring – Mountain warfare? The Immortals were experts I take because they were ‘professional’. In any case the fact that the Immortals could not distinguish the Phocians from Spartans implies they were hoplites so not exactly equipped for mountain warfare. Maybe the fact the Phocian failed to guard the pass before might have tipped off Leonidas a better option should have been found to garrison it.They may have been adept at chasing helots in rugged Laconia, but here they knew far less about the terrain than the indigenous and volunteering Phocians (years earlier, a force of Thessalians had been guided by Malians on a march into Phocis, thus the path must have been quite familiar to these Phocians; cf. Herodotus, The Histories, Book 7.215.1), not to mention less about what 'mountain warfare' per se would entail at this backdrop.
Why not; everyone else did. Leonidas was in command. The Phocian force was hardly as impressive as the Athenian fleet, and yet even Themistocles choked down his pride.Moreover, it was far from assured that the Phocians would take orders smoothly from 'Spartan officers',
Why? Neither the Athenians at Marathon not the Tegeans at Plataea did.they would have numbered too little to preclude the same course which was taken - they would have surely retired with the Phocians in the face of the same tactical course undertaken by the Persian archers.
Maybe it was just the running away part that tipped him off.the Persians followed Ephialtes' notifying data that this force did not comprise Spartans; did the lambda already appear on Spartan shields, we could entertain with wonder?
-----------
*Too be addressed shortly.I never called you a liar; amid disagreements over the surviving ancient literature on Philip II (some of you guys never acknowledge there was quite a lot on him which didn't survive) you claimed Chester Starr put forth something which backed your arguments in refuting Plutarch, and after you never produced it (I and others always do right away!), I clearly wrote, "conon394 is lying, or, more likely, Starr wrote something that conon394 has 'smoothed over' to conform to the theory imputed to Starr, and perhaps has conditioned himself to argue what Starr's words 'really mean', should it come up. But if he produces it, and it does read as is claimed, I will still disagree." Who do you think you're fooling with such twists? You have yet to produce Starr's opinions regarding Plutarch and/or Polyaenus (actually, I believe he wrote an article regarding the credibility of early Spartan history, which may be what sparked your claim; it's from the 1960s in the German journal Historia). But now I am stating you are indeed a liar with that remark on your signature, as well as a hypocrite - you seem to retort to others with bravura comments of 'where's your basis and evidence', yet you never seem to back up your own arguments, which is in stark contrast to your constant sanctimoniousness. But I guess that's what pseudo-pundits do. Think before you lash back - you've already used the old chestnut which rings, "you're just re-arranging things to suit your needs...".
Last edited by conon394; August 17, 2011 at 02:22 PM.
IN PATROCINIVM SVB Dromikaites
'One day when I fly with my hands - up down the sky, like a bird'
But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place; some swearing, some crying for surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left.
Hyperides of Athens: We know, replied he, that Antipater is good, but we (the Demos of Athens) have no need of a master at present, even a good one.
Well I think a bit of background might be in order here. It seems I have hurt poor SpartanJKM’s feelings back a year or two or three ago by objecting to the standard very detailed reconstruction you find for the Battle of Chaeronea. He does seem to want to keep cross posting the particular argument OT in thread after thread... In this case a rather bizarre hissy fit of finally replying to my reference to Chester Starr in a completely different context in a different thread about the Punic WarsI never called you a liar; amid disagreements over the surviving ancient literature on Philip II (some of you guys never acknowledge there was quite a lot on him which didn't survive) you claimed Chester Starr put forth something which backed your arguments in refuting Plutarch, and after you never produced it (I and others always do right away!), I clearly wrote, "conon394 is lying, or, more likely, Starr wrote something that conon394 has 'smoothed over' to conform to the theory imputed to Starr, and perhaps has conditioned himself to argue what Starr's words 'really mean', should it come up. But if he produces it, and it does read as is claimed, I will still disagree." Who do you think you're fooling with such twists? You have yet to produce Starr's opinions regarding Plutarch and/or Polyaenus (actually, I believe he wrote an article regarding the credibility of early Spartan history, which may be what sparked your claim; it's from the 1960s in the German journal Historia). But now I am stating you are indeed a liar with that remark on your signature, as well as a hypocrite - you seem to retort to others with bravura comments of 'where's your basis and evidence', yet you never seem to back up your own arguments, which is in stark contrast to your constant sanctimoniousness. But I guess that's what pseudo-pundits do. Think before you lash back - you've already used the old chestnut which rings, "you're just re-arranging things to suit your needs...".
Apparently its ‘hearsay’ to point out that in fact the nearest sources in time more or less say almost nothing about the nature of that particular battle except that it was long, hard, and close. The modern reconstruction one finds [I would suggest Warry’s figures and narrative are typical of what one encounters in most books and certainly on TV (and in fact informs most any and every war game version of said battle I have ever seen); based in turn on Hammond (but with some odd omissions)] are almost totally made up and dependent on a huge does of assumption and ‘logic’ that is really not any more defensible than hundreds of others. In particular what seems to rub Spartan the wrong way is my hesitation to trust late Hellenistic and Roman ‘sources’ of dubious credibility.
Why not ask if I have stopped beating my wife? You called me either lying or a manipulator; but I am neither and if you want me to make the argument I’m happy to. But again why not ask that on the actual thread?I clearly wrote, "conon394 is lying, or, more likely, Starr wrote something that conon394 has 'smoothed over' to conform to the theory imputed to Starr, and perhaps has conditioned himself to argue what Starr's words 'really mean', should it come up. But if he produces it, and it does read as is claimed, I will still disagree." Who do you think you're fooling with such twists? You have yet to produce Starr's opinions regarding Plutarch and/or Polyaenus (actually, I believe he wrote an article regarding the credibility of early Spartan history, which may be what sparked your claim; it's from the 1960s in the German journal Historia)
Wow does that mean you now realize Starr wrote more than the one book that you read?(actually, I believe he wrote an article regarding the credibility of early Spartan history, which may be what sparked your claim; it's from the 1960s in the German journal Historia)
In any case you get prize, but I like the sophistic way you suggest I am misusing Starr apparently; nobody ever makes general comments of the craft of history in an article that might otherwise speak to a specific topic.
So let’s see what I meant to reference:
From: The Credibility of Early Spartan History Chester G. Starr Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Jul., 1965), pp. 257-272
‘In our reconstruction of early Spartan history, however, let us never assume that any ancient source was impeccable; the farther we move from the seventh century, the more cautious we must be. In the urge to give detailed accounts of ancient societies there is far too great a tendency nowadays to rely upon secondary sources because they are fuller forgetting that they are such because the ancients too wished "to know more" as they passed from classic to Hellenistic times. Credulity, in truth, seems to be rising in reaction to the overly skeptical attitude of nineteenth century scholars; and, like Isis revivifying Osiris, historians are busily engaged in pumping air into ancient fictions. Moses has become virtually a historical character; Lycurgus has been resuscitated; soon, no doubt, Romulus will again stride across the pages of Roman history.
But we are historians, seeking to restore past reality. Historical work must always be judged on that basis, not on the intellectual skill and rhetorical dexterity with which an author may manipulate and combine miscellaneous, inadequately criticized bits into a towering edifice of gossamer. True, the results of a genuinely historical approach to any ancient problems may have regrettable limitations as to completeness of detail, but this we must accept.‘
Now before Spartan can object that I have “smoothed over” things using a discussion Starr presented in context of just Sparta to ancient battle reconstruction or Hannibal or whatever. I would point out that in the above statement Starr notes (n 50 Starr warmly welcomes the views of Hignett, and Pritchett specifically in the realm of reconstructing ancient battle and wars.) In fact it is the noted comments that recalled the article to my mind back when this tiff with SpartanJKM started. So Spartan you see those little numbers are linked to ‘n-o-t-e-s’ perhaps the lack of blue color made it difficult for you to follow that.
So what did Starr happily recognize in the notes attached to his quoted statement above:
Starr cites Hignett Xerxes Invasion of Greece "alarming tendency to re-examine the secondary sources, even the least trustworthy of them for fresh illumination “ Starr also cites Hignett’s reference to the Pritchett article below for this rejection of the attempt to “treat all items in the ancient evidence whatever their date, as complimentary parts of a single whole”
And W. K. W. K. Pritchett, on Salamis: (a sample from pg 260 Toward a Restudy of the Battle of Salamis: W. Kendrick Pritchett American Journal of Archaeology, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Jul., 1959), pp. 251-262)
“The matter of our attitude toward the ancient sources is so fundamentally important that I shall again quote from Hammond: "The details, which are supplied by Ctesias, Diodorus, Plutarch, Aristodemus, and others, were probably derived ultimately from contemporary or nearly contemporary accounts. For it is most unlikely that new details or indeed new plans of the battle, which was more famous in Greek history than the defeat of the Spanish Armada in English history, were 'invented' by subsequent historians and in particular by as reputable historians Ephorus, who was probably the immediate source of Diodorus' narrative. In this paper these details are accepted as correct.” This is equivalent to saying that all of our sources agree equally valid, a statement which is demonstrably false (my emphasis).”
But why be perhaps a little worried about Roman sources – because they often just made stuff.
For example see the discussion in this article:
Euripides and Macedon, or the Silence of the "Frogs"
Scott Scullion The Classical Quarterly New Series, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Nov., 2003), pp. 389-400
You can find the same sorts of invention in the biography of Generals as well as poets. Spartan’s defense here is to show some of the content of Polyaenus is obviously based on credible historians. That’s fine but since some of stuff is also clearly BS one is faced with the problem of what to make of stories that have no source? Oh and just to head off one vectorr of argument I seem to recall Spartan has used is that the Athenian excuted a general after Chaeronea. Sure and the Athenian democracy also fined and or executed victorious generals while ignoring those defeated on many occasions (Embata and Arginusae anyone?). On balance I'm doubtful of using post battle Athenian politics to say much of anything about a battle won or lost.
Now more generally on the problems of Ancient battle reconstruction especially in trying to fill in with logic the gaps of even reasonable described events I have cited before and will do so now Whatly’s famous article:
On the Possibility of Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles
The Journal of Hellenic StudiesVol. 84, (1964), pp. 119-139
http://www.jstor.org/pss/627699
So the original problem I have anytime someone gets to the point of Philip and Alexander at Chaeronea. Spartan is quite content to make a wonderful victory for smart Alexander and Dad over dumb Greeks based on gap filling with whatever evidence suits his purposes and then use that reconstruction to support larger statements about Alexander and or Philip.
I would say one would do well to consider a rarity the description by Thucydides of the two victories of Phormio in 428 BC
I am assuming the wiki link should be sufficient but before you throw a cow Spartan I will add the reference to T.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phormio
The thing is his first victory is everything Historians want to ascribe to Chaeronea. A good leader, great navy, experienced, professional, etc. – and the victory was exactly what Phormio planned and executed.
The second was still a victory, but in every way it was not the same narrative as the first. Phomio was skillfully pushed out of position, he was defeated initially, and frankly saved by only the most fantastic of lucky events that the last fleeing ship made what should have been a suicidal last stand turned the tide of the battle. The basic facts are the same experienced crews (even gasp professionals) against less well trained opponents, unified command vs. committee, and excellent commander vs. average (if that) talent. Sure the quality of the Athenian navy means one ship was willing to turn a fight before being sunk and also probably speaks to the fact the others could still race back to port and than be ready counter attack. I have never ever said that Philip did not the equivalent advantages at Chaeronea, but they don’t mean his enemies were dumb or that they never maybe came close to winning.
So really how would Diodorus or Polyaenus describe the battle if we lacked T and they were not favorable toward Athens?
Last edited by conon394; August 17, 2011 at 02:21 PM.
IN PATROCINIVM SVB Dromikaites
'One day when I fly with my hands - up down the sky, like a bird'
But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place; some swearing, some crying for surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left.
Hyperides of Athens: We know, replied he, that Antipater is good, but we (the Demos of Athens) have no need of a master at present, even a good one.
Um, could you two (Spartan and Conon) take your personal issues with each other to PMs please?
@OP: If the Greeks won at Thermopylae history likely would have gone the same way since the Persians lost anyway.