Skepticism - Can we know anything?

[Marechal Ney]

A while ago I got the idea of writing a short little treatise on Skepticism, a topic that I adore. I planned to explore the few things that humans could know and explain why. While many may laugh at it and say that it is a pointless idea, it is an important one, which is almost impossible to argue with. Thing is, while writing/researching it, I had an epistomelogical crisis and realized that I REALLY couldn't know ANYTHING.

Using Descartes' Cogito Ergo Sum as a basis, I went out to try to prove some other things. I concluded that, since I existed, the universe existed. In addition, since my perception changed, I existed, and the universe existed, that (even if my perception was wrong if I was in a dream) the universe must have changed when my perception changed (not a menial realization, as it actually philsophically disproves Block Universe Theory and the pre-Socrates philosopher Parmenides).

Then I started reading a premier work on Skepticism, "Deliverance from Error" by medieval Islamic philosopher/religous thinker Al-Ghazali. I agreed with it, and found that it agreed with my own beliefs, until I got to one part that suddenly, while I was reading a book about an epistomelogical crisis, caused me to have my own epistemlogical crisis.

Al-Ghazali talks of three "Judges", or ways to gain knowledge. The first, and least advanced, judge is Authority; AKA someone tells you something. The second, and more advanced, is Sense; simply you sensing things. The third, and most advanced, is Reason; AKA 2+2=4. An obvious flaw with Authority thinking is that the person could be lying. Al-Ghazali points out a flaw with Sense thinking, that senses may be wrong. He gives the example of a person looking at a star and reasoning it to be the size of a coin.

I accepted all this; then he presented something shocking. He reasoned this: Just as a person who entirely trusted senses, and thought that the coin was the same size as the star, would find it absurd for a person to claim otherwise using reason, it might be the case that there is a FOURTH, higher judge, that overrode reason and showed that 2+2=7, for example. If you think this is absurd, remember that you think on the Reason Judge level; a person on the Sense level would find Reason absurd, just as people with Reason might find the 4th Judge absurd (and for that matter, could there be a Fifth, or a Sixth?). Suddenly even things like Cogito Ergo Sum could be doubted, and I was really confused.

With advances in quantum mechanics, such counter intuitive answers may actually be correct. So, I ask you, in the place that Al-Ghazali was in the 11th century, can we know anything?

[The Dude]

A while ago I got the idea of writing a short little treatise on Skepticism, a topic that I adore. I planned to explore the few things that humans could know and explain why. While many may laugh at it and say that it is a pointless idea, it is an important one, which is almost impossible to argue with. Thing is, while writing/researching it, I had an epistomelogical crisis and realized that I REALLY couldn't know ANYTHING.

Well, Immanuel Kant would start beating you over the head with your own brains for saying this, but very well

Using Descartes' Cogito Ergo Sum as a basis, I went out to try to prove some other things.

Difficult quest then, considering this is one of the most fatal misunderstandings of Descartes.

Sum Res Cogitans: I am a thing that thinks. This is the only conclusion that he drew out of his meditations, and this was that "one specific, unshakable thing" that he thought he could know for sure.

Cogito Ergo Sum was never specifically formulated as such, except in one response to contemporary criticism and even then it has to be read in the context of his words. But if we systematically browse through his Meditations we will find the phrase Cogito Ergo Sum occuring not once.

Suddenly even things like Cogito Ergo Sum could be doubted, and I was really confused.

Well, this could be doubted long before and since I am not familiar (yet) with this Al-Ghazali, I trust that you could've settled this question yourself. "I think, therefore I am." What does that even mean? What is that supposed to mean? What are the implications here, if it is true? And how would Descartes back it up? Well, he wouldn't and he didn't. It's a strange line of reasoning at any rate, that Being would be a causal effect of Thinking.

But to not be entirely useless as to your enquiry, I'm gonna link you to the English translation of Kant's Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, which I think is an excellent work that deals with the matter of skepticism quite effectively.

EDIT: Contrary to my earlier statements I'm editing this post to provide some quotes as an appetizer nevertheless, mostly because I think they're interesting statements about the nature of a skeptic attitude:

Indeed, the very attempts to create a science of metaphysics were the first cause of early scepticism—a way of thinking in which reason attacks itself so violently that it could never have arisen except in complete despair about our ability to carry out reason’s most important designs. Men began to investigate reason itself, long before starting methodically to investigate nature ·in the physical sciences. Even at that stage, reason had already been employed in connection with ordinary experience; and reason is always present to us, whereas laws of nature have to be laboriously sought out. So metaphysics floated to the top like foam, which dissolved the moment it was scooped off. But as soon as one lot of foam dissolved, more came frothing up to the surface. Some philosophers eagerly collected foam; some tried to show their wisdom by ridiculing the vain efforts of others; none looked for the cause of the foam down in the depths.

We are tired of dogmatism that teaches us nothing, and just as tired of scepticism that promises us nothing (not even permission to rest comfortably in ignorance). The knowledge we need is important, and that’s a challenge to us; but we have had centuries of bad experience with things we thought we knew through ‘pure reason’ that turned out not to be knowledge at all, and that fact makes us suspicious. So we are under pressure to push on forwards, and also nervous about doing so. Where do we go from here? That depends on the answer to the question ‘Is metaphysics possible at all?’ We should try to answer this not by picking away sceptically at particular doctrines of this or that actual system of metaphysics (for we don’t yet admit that there are any systems of metaphysics) but by considering the concept of such a science.

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/kantprol.pdf

[TheCollecTOR]

Difficult quest then, considering this is one of the most fatal misunderstandings of Descartes.

Sum Res Cogitans: I am a thing that thinks. This is the only conclusion that he drew out of his meditations, and this was that "one specific, unshakable thing" that he thought he could know for sure

.

Well that just simply isnt true... The meditations is full of other conclusions and thoughts, from the analysis of substance, the distinction of primary and secondary qualities to the existence of god and establishing dualism. Infact, Descartes drew a whole number of conclusions in the meditations.

Furthermore, he does say: "he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. "

Ego Sum Ego Existo" is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind" seems to me in this context to be equivalent too saying "cogito ergo sum". That is, if it is such that i exist whenever "i am and i exist" is put forward by my mind, isnt the critierian simly a thought act of some sort? By scholars: cogitationes.

Cogito Ergo Sum was never specifically formulated as such, except in one response to contemporary criticism and even then it has to be read in the context of his words. But if we systematically browse through his Meditations we will find the phrase Cogito Ergo Sum occuring not once.

True. However i will argue it can be read plausibly as a paraphrase.

Well, this could be doubted long before and since I am not familiar (yet) with this Al-Ghazali, I trust that you could've settled this question yourself. "I think, therefore I am." What does that even mean? What is that supposed to mean? What are the implications here, if it is true? And how would Descartes back it up? Well, he wouldn't and he didn't. It's a strange line of reasoning at any rate, that Being would be a causal effect of Thinking.

Sure that would be strange indeed. But no one is proposing being as a causal effect of thinking (atleast not in this case). What this Cogito Ergo Sum interpretation of Descart really say is this: my thinking can only be a causal effect of my being (in some sense, as have been shown it could be my being in some Spinozian all-encompassing substance...) hence its simply a matter of logics:

If thinking is a causal effect of being, then if one thinks one must be (in some sense). Given P then Q, P -> Q.

[The Dude]

.Well that just simply isnt true... The meditations is full of other conclusions and thoughts, from the analysis of substance, the distinction of primary and secondary qualities to the existence of god and establishing dualism. Infact, Descartes drew a whole number of conclusions in the meditations.

Well obviously yes I read them. But I was making a point specifically about the Cogito argument.

]Furthermore, he does say: "he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind."

Ego Sum Ego Existo" is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind" seems to me in this context to be equivalent too saying "cogito ergo sum". That is, if it is such that i exist whenever "i am and i exist" is put forward by my mind, isnt the critierian simly a thought act of some sort? By scholars: cogitationes.

Absolutely, and I agree. But the problem that I see is not the argument in itself, but mostly the following:

True. However i will argue it can be read plausibly as a paraphrase.

Well I would be careful with that. If a text is in the end nothing but a collection of what -we- argue can be plausibly read as a paraphrase, then in what sense are we still reading the same text as the one the original author wrote? We need to be careful that Descartes remains Descartes and does not become someone else that we want him to be.

If Cogito Ergo Sum is to be specifically argued then what we can do is write a text ourselves in which we make that case. If it is indeed what Descartes has said, then it shouldn't be too hard to cite him and draw inspiration from it, but attribute the specific conclusion nevertheless to ourselves.

Sure that would be strange indeed. But no one is proposing being as a causal effect of thinking (atleast not in this case). What this Cogito Ergo Sum interpretation of Descart really say is this: my thinking can only be a causal effect of my being (in some sense, as have been shown it could be my being in some Spinozian all-encompassing substance...) hence its simply a matter of logics:

If thinking is a causal effect of being, then if one thinks one must be (in some sense). Given P then Q, P -> Q.

But you already bring the concept of substance into it, so you know that Descartes argues for two kinds of substance whereas Spinoza feels there is only one. And now this needs to be explained: if the mental substance is expressed in thought, and the material substance is expressed in space, how does the mental substance imply the material one?

It would be a strange leap in logic for that to occur. Unless you were to argue that for Descartes, the mental substance alone fulfills the prerequisite of being. But that would not make him a dualist at all. That would make him a monist in the sense of Berkeley. And now you see that all sorts of questions start to be raised that can't be directly answered from the meditations themselves.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

... I'm not a great fan of Kant's skepticism, his rigid dualism, and finally his empty moral system. But I'll leave 'till have I read him a bit more before making a complete rebuttal.

[TheCollecTOR]

... I'm not a great fan of Kant's skepticism, his rigid dualism, and finally his empty moral system. But I'll leave 'till have I read him a bit more before making a complete rebuttal.

When did Kant become a skeptisist? And when the hell did his moral system become empty? ...

I always find it strange that when people take certain arguments seriously, they become skepticists. Many people seem to read Hume the same way.. Anyways:

1. Kant was no skeptisist. The transendental-epistemolgy of Kant leaves both knowledge and justified belief untouched. (Or saved, rather.) He even proposed a solution to the ever-lasting problem of induction.

2. Kantian morals is basically the lone challenger of moral relativism in the meta-ethical sphere. (And most ethistis are relativists now, really its the only viable option. But Kant is a worthy challenge. That is, the most worthy...)

The facinating thing about Kant is that from a simple notion of rationality he builds (or atleast tries to build) an entire (quite elegant) moral theory. Basically it can be summed thus: If you act unjustly, you act irrational. Human beings are rational, hence you dont act in accord with... etc. and then there you have it.

---

- And about skepticism: I have been taking courses on epistemology at the university, and my professor is some kind of a skepticist. It has indeed made me realize that strictly speaking, we cant seem to justify our belief in knowledge, or even justified belief at all... There are a bunch of theoretical attempts at refuting scepticism, but it just doesnt cut it... Even though several of the attempts has been quite elegant.

[Tostig]

By 'know' do you mean 'have a true, justified belief about'? Or do you mean 'have an internally coherent account of?'

[Marechal Ney]

Sorry for the delay.

By 'know' do you mean 'have a true, justified belief about'? Or do you mean 'have an internally coherent account of?'

The first one; a belief held with absolute certainty.

I think the best way to conduct this would just be to try to think of something you can prove, than someone else tries to find some way in which it could be wrong...

[TheCollecTOR]

Well I would be careful with that. If a text is in the end nothing but a collection of what -we- argue can be plausibly read as a paraphrase

Of course i agree.

But you already bring the concept of substance into it, so you know that Descartes argues for two kinds of substance whereas Spinoza feels there is only one. And now this needs to be explained: if the mental substance is expressed in thought, and the material substance is expressed in space, how does the mental substance imply the material one?

It would be a strange leap in logic for that to occur. Unless you were to argue that for Descartes, the mental substance alone fulfills the prerequisite of being. But that would not make him a dualist at all. That would make him a monist in the sense of Berkeley. And now you see that all sorts of questions start to be raised that can't be directly answered from the meditations themselves.

Well Descartes does provide arguments for his dualism and his conception of substance - but thats not really the question in this argument. But in short, Descartes explicitly say that the physical substance does not entail a mental substance. So its a mistake he cant be blamed for, as he never made it. The cartesian road towards establishing the existence of bodies is a different one. What Descartes is saying is that ego sum, ego existo every time i put it forward in my mind. But he is not at this point saying something substantial about his own existence. And he has not yet defined the dualism properly. Its just that what he knows now, is that he exists. It could still be a merely mental existence. And he will go on to elaborate the details of this existence, answering the questions you put forward.

Its evident by quoting the passage in question, that Descartes have not established the links between the physical and mental sustance:

"Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something"

As you know, the meditatons is an anti-aristotelian meditational work meant to be read by contemporaries one chapter at a time. Carefully pondering the different aspects of the text, slowly persuading them away from aristotelianism, step by step.