PTSD in Napoleonic Warfare

Before I start, note that I only have mid-level knowledge of the Napoleonic period, so correct me if I'm getting something wrong...

Apparently, some historians think Marshal Ney got PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder) from the disastrous campaign in Russia. They also say this might have led him to be rash at Waterloo, leading to his ill-conceived charge at what he thought were retreating troops (although it has been suggested that he might have known they weren't, but charged anyway)

What are your thoughts on this, and have any other generals from this time period been suspected of having PTSD? I think it's interesting because most people never really thought of war trauma existing before WWI, but in fact it has had an impact historically.

From what I've read, Ney's mistake at Waterloo was just a simple error in judgement characteristic of the time. This sounds a little like bs to be honest. Though I imagine walking straight into musket volleys would produce some narly PTSD, but I could be wrong.

I think way too much is made of the supposed mistake of the French cavalry attacks at Waterloo. Bear in mind that much of this is based upon nothing other than British national propaganda and the Waterloo dispatch written by Wellington after the battle who hadn't actually got a clue what was happpening for the entire period anyway as he was stuck in a square on the reverse slope of the ridge and couldn't see anything.

If you actually read more informed accounts of this entire period you begin to realise that these cavalry attacks and the infantry and artillery (yes they were supported) damned nearly broke through the allied centre. In fact, French horse artillery were pouring canister fire into the squares defending the crossroads at ranges of less that 100 paces, La Haye Sainte was not only taken but the skirmishers of D'Erlons Corps were in possession of the ridge crest and picking off the men in the squares on the reverse slope, and the remants of the allied cavalry whilst too weak to drive them off were ordered to form up behind their own infantry to try and stop them running away. Two German field battalions deployed just beyond the crest above La Haye Sainte lost over 50% of their men to this close range fire and one had two whole companies on one face of its square literally blown away by canister and had to form a tri-angle instead. In fact, the situation was so dire that most regiments sent their colours to the rear convinced that they were about to be overrun and destroyed in detail.

Only two things saved the centre and the battle for the allies. The timely advance of the Nassau Regiment led by the Prince of Orange which temporarily drove the French infantry and artillery back over the ridge line and gave the allied squares a chance to reform and sort themselves out, although it cost the Nassau Regiment one battalion in a futile bayonet charge, and the bad humour of Napoleon, who not aware of the opportunity he was throwing away refused to release any of his reserve guard infantry to support D'Erlons attacks and complete the destruction of the Allied centre.

By the time he finally got his head round the situation and released the guard to attack, the moment had passed and Wellington was back in command and moving troops from his right and left to fill the void. If anyway cocked up it was him, Ney actually offered him victory and he turned it down.

Originally Posted by Didz

Bear in mind that much of this is based upon nothing other than British national propaganda and the Waterloo dispatch written by Wellington after the battle who hadn't actually got a clue what was happpening for the entire period anyway as he was stuck in a square on the reverse slope of the ridge and couldn't see anything.

Interesting, I never knew Wellington lacked so much control at Waterloo. I agree with you, though, that much of Napoleon's history is muddled by biased British versions of the account (not just Waterloo, but his whole career). Ultimately, I think it's the propaganda used at that time that still paints the picture today of Napoleon as a short lunatic running around Europe. At the time, he was around average height, and for his ego, I think that's just been inflated to illustrate him as having no genuine cause for fighting half of Europe. Thanks for your detailed post though, it was very interesting to read.

Originally Posted by Zigama

Interesting, I never knew Wellington lacked so much control at Waterloo. I agree with you, though, that much of Napoleon's history is muddled by biased British versions of the account (not just Waterloo, but his whole career). Ultimately, I think it's the propaganda used at that time that still paints the picture today of Napoleon as a short lunatic running around Europe. At the time, he was around average height, and for his ego, I think that's just been inflated to illustrate him as having no genuine cause for fighting half of Europe. Thanks for your detailed post though, it was very interesting to read.

Well its not something that got recorded in the official histories of the battle, but from eyewitness accounts its clear that Wellington and his staff spent the entire period of the French cavalry attacks darting from square to square and completely unable to see what was going on beyond the ridge line, or indeed to pass any orders to anyone other than the battalion they happened to be be taking shelter with.

The main battle in the centre of the line was therefore fought mostly by the Prince of Orange as the senior commander on hand at the time, Picton having been killed earlier. But the British history largely ignores this part of the battlefield, in favour of the activity further to the right on the slopes above Hougoumont where most of the British regiments were stationed and Wellington was trapped.

The situation there was certainly far less favourable for the French cavalry and there was little opportunity to get infantry and artillery into that area in support as the gorund is very enclosed between the Hougoumont estate boundaries and the narrowing of the gap between the ridge and the plateau to the west. The slopes here are also much steeper than to the east near La Haye Saint and so artillery would probably have had trouble getting up the slope, although Mercer does mention that French skirmishers were present and shooting at his gunners between cavalry attacks.

What is even more interesting and only became clear to me upon purchasing Sibornes history of the battle is that several British battalions were actually stationed on the forward slope of the ridge behind Hougoumont, which explains why French cavalry are described as passing through the squares to reach the Nivelles Road, (that had always puzzled me before) and also why French cavalry officers in this area described their attacks as attacking up a valley, rather than up a ridge, as they were in fact attacking along the lower slopes of the ridge behind Hougoumont which was also on the slope of the plateau along which the Nivelles road runs, and if you walk the ground you realise that from their perspective this does indeed look like a valley leading up to the Nivelles road beyond Hougoumont, across which several British Squares had been deployed, but these square were actually not part of the main allied line at all, and were only there because Wellington had ordered them to chase off a strong force of French infantry skirmishers from the Hougoumont assault force that had secured the ridge line earlier and were shooting his infantry on the reverse slope. These battalions then got trapped by the French cavalry on the exposed forward slope of the ridge and were badly mauled for some time, but distracted most of the French cavalry west of the spur from their true objective.

In fact, it was probably the movement of these battalions down the front face of the ridge and their overthrow of the French infantry above Hougoumont that prompted the perpetuation of the advance of the French cavalry who would have been under orders to support the infantry to their front.

[Extract from Sibornes history of Waterloo]

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The French Cavalry that attacked the squares of Du Platt's Brigade, immediately in the rear of Hougoumont, have no sooner been driven off by the gallant resistance of the Germans (1st, 2nd 3rd and 4th Line Bns Kings German Legion), than the skirmishers, who, as before observed had advanced in such numbersalong the eastern enclosures of that post (Hougoumont), crept close up under the brow of that part of the ridge on the interior slope (e.g. reverse slope) of which was posted the main body of Brunswick Infantry (These were the young boys mentioned by Mercer as being petrified and unable to move).

At this time, however, Lord Hill was bringing forward Adam's 3rd (British) Brigade (1st Bn 52nd Light Infantry, 71st Highland Light Infantry, 2nd Bn 95th Rifles (6 Coys) and 3rd Bn 95th Rifles (2 coys)(, having directed it to cross the Nivelles Road, and to advance in columns up the slope, in the rear of the Brunswickers. The Brigade had been moved from the plateau on the far right some time earlier where it had been positioned close to the Nivelles Road in reserve. Suddenly the summit of the ridge above it was crowded with French skirmishers, who were almost as quickly concealed by the smoke the rattling fire which they opened upon the allied artillery and squares. The gunners whose numbers were fearfully diminished were speedily driven back from their crippled batteries upon the nearest infantry; upon which the concentration of this galling fire threatened the most serious consequences. (Note: Mercer tells us that he refused to obey Wellingtons order to abandon his guns and take shelter in the nearby Brunswick Square as he was convinced that the sight of his men running would be the final straw for the young boys in the Brunswick battalion and that they would simply panic and flee the field. He therefore made his gunners stand to their guns and allow the French to take pot shots at them.)

But succour was on hand. Wellington, in the midst of the shower of bullets, had galloped to the front of Adams Brigade and ordered it to form line, four deep, and then pointing to the daring French skirmishers on the height above, called out with perfect coolness and unaffected assurance "Drive those fellows away!". With loud cheers, Adams Brigade advanced rapidly up the slope. The 71st and 2/95th Battalions were leading and the 52nd in close support behind, driving the French skirmishers ahead of them back over the crest of the ridge and down the opposite slope before halting in a small hollow between the ridge crest and Hougoumont. Here percieving the French cavalry preparing to attack they formed squares, 52nd being divided into two squares of wings and moved to cover the intervals between the 71st and 95th, just in time to fire a most effective volley into the first squadrons of French cavalry as they attacked the square of the 71st. (Note: The Brigade was then assailed for sometime by the French Carabiners and Horse Grenadiers interspersed with infantry attacks from the eastern boundry of Hougoumont, whilst French cuirassiers launched a number if attacks more direclty up the ridge towards Mercer and the Brunswick Squares. However, Wellington would not have witnessed the action of Adams brigade after it dissapeared from sight over the crest of the ridge.)

Barbero also mentions this event and adds that the 52nd impressed everyone who witnessed it over this period as it succeeded with amazing discpline and order to form from square to line several times under fire to deal with the alternating threats from the enemy cavalry and infantry.

Only a few squadrons seem to have tried to force the main ridge line around Mercers battery.

Originally Posted by Didz

Only two things saved the centre and the battle for the allies. The timely advance of the Nassau Regiment led by the Prince of Orange which temporarily drove the French infantry and artillery back over the ridge line and gave the allied squares a chance to reform and sort themselves out, although it cost the Nassau Regiment one battalion in a futile bayonet charge, and the bad humour of Napoleon, who not aware of the opportunity he was throwing away refused to release any of his reserve guard infantry to support D'Erlons attacks and complete the destruction of the Allied centre.

By the time he finally got his head round the situation and released the guard to attack, the moment had passed and Wellington was back in command and moving troops from his right and left to fill the void. If anyway cocked up it was him, Ney actually offered him victory and he turned it down.

Napoleon wasn't there when Ney ordered the charge. He was a mile or so behind the lines, accompanied by de la Bedoyere.

Originally Posted by The Rt Hon. Daniel Ryan

Napoleon wasn't there when Ney ordered the charge. He was a mile or so behind the lines, accompanied by de la Bedoyere.

Yes! Obvoiusly I didn't explain my point very clearly.

By about 6pm the combined attacks by the French Cavalry, infantry and artillery on the Allied centre had almost broken through. La Haye Sainte was in French hands, French infantry had occupied the crest of the ridge at the Crossroads above and the driven Kempts brigade back down the reverse slope. French artillery had reached the ridge line and were firing cannister at point blank range into the squares of german infantry on the reverse slope above La Haye Sainte.

The Allied centre was on the brink of collapse and rout and Wellington was nowhere to be seen. Most allied regiments sent their colours to the rear to try and avoid losing them in the impending rout. The Allied artillery had been overrun and silenced.

Ney sent a messenger to Napoleon informing him of the situation and asking for fresh infantry support. The infantry of D'Erlons Coprs had been in action since the atart of the battle and were not only exhausted but were low on ammuntion. He needed a few fresh battalions to occupy the ground gained and finish the destruction of the Allied infantry which was helplessly trapped in squares under close artillery fire.

But Napoleon was in a bad mood when the messenger arrived, and as you say, he was no where near the action to see what was happening, certainly not beyond the Allied ridge. His famous reply was 'Infantry! And where do you expect me to find infantry? Do you want me to manufacture some?

It was that flippant reply that cost the French the battle, an hour later Napoleon magically found seven battalions of infantry, but instead of attacking the weakened Allied centre he attacked their reinforced right flank where Wellington was stationed and wasted his best troops on a pointless assault on the strongest part of the Allied position. This despite telling everyone at the start of the battle that his intention was to break through the Allied centre, which was where Ney had been focussing his main attention all day.

When Ney got Napoleons reply he tried to complete the rout of the Allied centre with the exhausted troops he had available but the Prince of Orange ordered forward the three relatively fresh battalions of the Nassau Regiment and managed to drive them back over the ridge effectively saving the Allied centre.

Ney certainly suffered from bad judgement in the 1813 campaign (whether that was due to PTSD or not is a good question). He clearly failed while leading his wing of the Grande Armee at Bautzen to complete the victory over the Russo-Prussian army which might well have resulted in an early end to the 1813 campaign. His attention was focused on the Kreckwitz heights instead of marching deep into the Allies rear & cutting off their escape.

He also failed at Dennewitz as he accompanied Bertrand's IV Corps; he again focused on too narrow an area resulting in a horrendous defeat.

Well M.Ney was known as the "bravest of the brave" but that may have been his biggest problem, leading him to misjudge the British at Waterloo, and decide to charge then to logically make a decision on what the British were maneuvering for. This bravery could also be seen as foolishness.

Originally Posted by ♠ Marshal Beale ♠

Well M.Ney was known as the "bravest of the brave" but that may have been his biggest problem, leading him to misjudge the British at Waterloo, and decide to charge then to logically make a decision on what the British were maneuvering for. This bravery could also be seen as foolishness.

Yes, poor Ney became the mutual scape goat for both Napoleon and Wellington in respect of their failings during this period of the battle.

Wellington slandered him and the French Army in order to cover up his own failure to adequately reinforce his centre, and also dismissed the role of the Prince of Orange and the Nassau Regiment in saving him from defeat by creating a myth of incompetence which rendered any stories of what really happened implausible.

At the same time Napoleon was perfectly willing to allow Ney to take the blame for the failure this attack, even though it had been he who refused to reinforce its success and thus denied Ney the infantry he needed to expliot its success.

The reality was that the French had pretty much broken the Allied centre and had artillery, cavalry and skirmishers beyond the crossroads in the Allied centre. The battalions in this area had given way or were trapped in square and at the mercy of the French guns, all Ney needed were a few fresh battalions of infantry to expliot the breakthrough and roll up the allied line. The ones he had on hand were already spent and most had fired off all their ammunition. Napoleon refused to send him any reinforcements because he was in a fit of peak when the request arrived and the Prince of Orange was able to drive the French back over the ridge before the situation got any worse.

If you served in any armed force and have seen action, you likely have PTSD in 1 form or another. Some men learn to live with it and can carry on as soldiers in the field...including, imo, Ney.

As Didz says very well, Ney was a scapegoat as far as I can see and have read. Tho, Wellington's post June 18th 1815 sychophants aside, he got the real s***ty end of the stick at Quatre Bras & Waterloo.

1. His orders to D'Erlon's initial (and quite successful it seems) attack, were comprimised by the ground, possibly forcing the ridiculous massed formations focused on the allied centre-left, into the killing zone of very well set arty on the forward of tactical crest. The planned pin, mass centre and right (to cut comms with Blucher) attack was now a no-go...not Ney's fault

2. As Didz said, if a sustained mass of infantry had succeeded the cavalry main thrust in battalion columns, the Allied front would have been certainly broken and have forced the allies and prussians apart- in simple terms...campaign won for Nap. Nap, having to deal with his comprimised flank/rear, either spent too many reserves protecting his LOC or waffled at using them in order to support and effect a decisive victory vs Welly. Not Ney's fault.


Back to the thread title...i think PTSD was as common then as now- however, society then had no means of allowing the condition to be expressed. I imagine most sufferers went to their graves feeling that this was the lot of a soldier

i dont think Ney got PTSD in Russia... he fought in bigger battles of 1813, especially Leipzig... plus Waterloo was a lost cause. War was lost at Ligny (due to Prussian withdrawing towards British forces), it was not possible to save anything at Waterloo...