The existence of quale?

[Amorphos]

The existence of quale?

The American philosopher Daniel Dennett apparently shows that qualia do not exist, in his thought experiments he shows how the physical systems may be followed through without interruption.

His thought experiments…
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm

Qualia…
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia


Essentially if you turn the lights off in the brain ~ if you halt neuronal activity, then you stop quale from appearing and perhaps consciousness itself [as this is deemed to be within the context of qualia].

Do you exist and can you make effect in the world…

This is dependent on weather or not consciousness exists which can probably only be resolved within the context of the question; do qualia exist. We must also ask if information exists.

Your interpretations of sensory input changes informations [and quale] which then go out into reality, hence your subjectivity does change real world things.

If quale are a phantasm [unreal] then what is info as experienced in our minds [information proper [not mechanistic info like in a computer]] and what is the quality of redness? They may well be a phantasm in the context that there aren’t specific objects that can be called qualia, but I feel the term is something of a label because we don’t know how to deal with them in terms of physics.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

Qualia are only a fiction within the perspective of pure Scientism.

Of course, questions of "realism vs. idealism" aside, I don't believe qualia are a mere fiction designed to illude us by ourselves. This seems like a total aphilosophical evasion of the question.

[Amorphos]

Qualia are only a fiction within the perspective of pure Scientism.
Of course, questions of "realism vs. idealism" aside, I don't believe qualia are a mere fiction designed to illude us by ourselves. This seems like a total aphilosophical evasion of the question.

I think they are a fiction in terms of thinking of them as like an object, but we cannot deny that there is definitely something which they elude to. Colours do exist for example, and everything we the consciousness experiences are in terms of quale, or at least where that represents something far more fluid in and of consciousness.

In short quale don’t exist as an individual entity, but what is there that they represent does exist.

I am just not satisfied with either the scientific nor philosophical explanations of reality.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

Neither am I .

[hellas1]

@Quetz,

Good to see that you're still alive!

Quote:
"I am just not satisfied with either the scientific nor philosophical explanations of reality. "

Science is based on quantifiable data, measurement, experimentation, making data information, etc.
As science is constantly changing its' views based on new data, so do the opinions of reality.

Philosophy is merely mental speculation. How can one base one's assurance on mental speculations of varying degrees of logic &/or semantics?

It is no wonder that neither satisfy you.

I prefer to state this: We acknowledge the obvious and leave out speculations UNLESS mathematically they (speculations regarding science) can be narrowed down to very high degrees of probability of having happened/will happen/can happen.

Fair enough?
hellas1

[Amorphos]

Hi hellas, yup I am still around, in fact I havent stopped posting almost daily since 2005.

I take your points, though I think philosophy is more than speculation, it also deals with principles and ontology’s etc.

You see when science talks of data/information it doesn’t ever say what that is.

Info does not exist, there is no particle nor field of info [naturally], so you need something else apart from physical objects to explain how info exists in our minds, and that must be consciousness. It exists where pure mind and the material meet, a sophisticated creature like humans has a complex consciousness, where a jellyfish has a very simple one. Yet even the humble jelly fish perceives qualia of colour [hence fish are very colourful].

[TheCollecTOR]

How would Denett reply to the old What Mary Didnt Know argument?

[That is, if Mary is trapped in a colourless room and learns all 'physical-facts' - and then one day ventures out of the room and sees a red flower, would she learn something new? The argument is that she would. She would learn the experience of 'seeing red', that is qualia.]

Personally i find the case convincing.

[Amorphos]

I think she would see red as soon as she got outside the black and white room and came into contact with it.

Dennetts argument is good, I mean you wouldn’t expect to open up the brain and see colour in there would you? ~ a far simpler argument than Dennetts.

Though that puts us in a quandary; if colour is not in the world nor literally in the brain as qualia, then where exactly is it?!

Personally I think colour qualia are both local and spatial, as like a holographic tv is 2D but seams 3D. We have to assume that what we see is not in the material world et al ~ something of a conundrum eh!

[TheCollecTOR]

I think she would see red as soon as she got outside the black and white room and came into contact with it.

Well thats not really the point. The question isnt when she would see red, the question is if she opon seeing red for the first time, would learn something new. (She has learned all 'physical facts' from a television in her room.) According to the argument: Even though she knows all physical facts, she woild still learn something new upon seeing red. She would learn what its like seeing red. She would learn something about qualia.

[Amorphos]

Quite righ! she would see redness and yes she would experience that in her minds eye for the first time, to wit we denote the notion of qualia ~ as that would be a mental experience/quality.

So once we go there we have the idea of qualia, then Dennett comes along and says qualia don’t exist, so we are left with a few important questions; what is her experience of colour, and what literally is colour in the world [as it is not in the physical] and where is that colour located [in the mind, the brain, the world or both in the world and the mind].