Eric Voegelin\Paul Feyerabend on the Superstitious\Immanentist\Gnostic Nature of Scientism\Liberalism & Other Modern Ideologies (A Nice Summary)
For those who haven't read these two works (a must read which effectively cleared my mind of that old devoution to the Altar of so-called "Knowledge"), I've found a couple of nice summaries on the web:
Voegelin: http://evans-experientialism.freeweb...m/federici.htm
Feyerabend: http://evans-experientialism.freeweb...yerabend01.htm
Spoiler for Feyerabend:Galileo prevails because of his style and his clever techniques of persuasion, because he writes in Italian rather than in Latin, and because he appeals to people who are temperamentally opposed to the old ideas and the standards of learning connected with them. Such 'irrational' methods of support are needed because of the 'uneven development' (Marx, Lenin) of different parts of science. Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived only because reason was frequently overruled in their past. Galileo's method works in other fields as well. For example, it can be used to eliminate the existing arguments against materialism, and to put an end to the philosophical mind/body problem (the corresponding scientific problems remain untouched, however). The results obtained so far suggest abolishing the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification and disregarding the related distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms. Neither distinction plays a role in scientific practice. Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous consequences. Finally, the discussion in Chapters 6-13 shows that Popper's version of Mill's pluralism is not in agreement with scientific practice and would destroy science as we know it. Given science, reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded. This feature of science calls for an anarchistic epistemology.
The realisation that science is not sacrosanct, and that the debate between science and myth has ceased without having been won by either side, further strengthens the case for anarchism. Even the ingenious attempt of Lakatos to construct a methodology that (a) does not issue orders and yet (b) puts restrictions upon our knowledge-increasing activities, does not escape this conclusion. For Lakatos' philosophy appears liberal only because it is an anarchism in disguise. And his standards which are abstracted from modern science cannot be regarded as neutral arbiters in the issue between modern science and Aristotelian science, myth, magic, religion, etc. Moreover, these standards, which involve a comparison of content classes, are not always applicable. The content classes of certain theories are incomparable in the sense that none of the usual logical relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be said to hold between them. This occurs when we compare myths with science. It also occurs in the most advanced, most general and therefore most mythological parts of science itself. Thus science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared to admit. It is one of the many forms of thought that have been developed by man, and not necessarily the best. It is conspicuous, noisy, and impudent, but it is inherently superior only for those who have already decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who have accepted it without having ever examined its advantages and its limits.
And as the accepting and rejecting of ideologies should be left to the individual it follows that the separation of state and church must be supplemented by the separation of state and science, that most recent, most aggressive, and most dogmatic religious institution. Such a separation may be our only chance to achieve a humanity we are capable of, but have never fully realised. The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it takes too simple a view of the talents of man and of the circumstances which encourage, or cause, their development. And it is pernicious, for the attempt to enforce the rules is bound to increase our professional qualifications at the expense of our humanity. In addition, the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic: every methodological rule is associated with cosmological assumptions, so that using the rule we take it for granted that the assumptions are correct. Naive falsificationism takes it for granted that the laws of nature are manifest and not hidden beneath disturbances of considerable magnitude. Empiricism takes it for granted that sense experience is a better mirror of the world than pure thought. Praise of argument takes it for granted that the artifices of Reason give better results than the unchecked play of our emotions. Such assumptions may be perfectly plausible and even true. Still, one should occasionally put them to a test. Putting them to a test means that we stop using the methodology associated with them, start doing science in a different way and see what happens. Case studies such as those reported in the preceding chapters show that such tests occur all the time, and that they speak against the universal validity of any rule. All methodologies have their limitations and the only 'rule' that survives is 'anything goes'.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:The change of perspective brought about by these discoveries leads once more to the long-forgotten problem of the excellence of science. It leads to it for the first time in modern history, for modern science overpowered its opponents, it did not convince them. Science took over by force, not by argument (this is especially true of the former colonies where science and the religion of brotherly love were introduced as a matter of course, and without consulting, or arguing with, the inhabitants). Today we realise that rationalism, being bound to science, cannot give us any assistance in the issue between science and myth and we also know, from inquiries of an entirely different kind, that myths are vastly better than rationalists have dared to admit.' Thus we are now forced to raise the question of the excellence of science. An examination then reveals that science and myth overlap in many ways, that the differences we think we perceive are often local phenomena which may turn into similarities elsewhere and that fundamental discrepancies are results of different aims rather than of different methods trying to reach one and the same 'rational' end (such as, for example, 'progress', or increase of content, or 'growth').
To show the surprising similarities of myth and science, I shall briefly discuss an interesting paper by Robin Horton, entitled 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science'.' Horton examines African mythology and discovers the following features: the quest for theory is a quest for unity underlying apparent complexity. The theory places things in a causal context that is wider than the causal context provided by common sense: both science and myth cap common sense with a theoretical superstructure. There are theories of different degrees of abstraction and they are used in accordance with the different requirements of explanation that arise. Theory construction consists in breaking up objects of common sense and in reuniting the elements in a different way. Theoretical models start from analogy but they gradually move away from the pattern on which the analogy was based. And so on.
These features, which emerge from case studies no less careful and detailed than those of Lakatos, refute the assumption that science and myth obey different principles of formation (Cassirer), that myth proceeds without reflection (Dardel), or speculation (Frankfort, occasionally). Nor can we accept the idea, found in Malinowski but also in classical scholars such as Harrison and Cornford, that myth has an essentially pragmatic function or is based on ritual. Myth is much closer to science than one would expect from a philosophical discussion. It is closer to science than even Horton himself is prepared to admit.
To see this, consider some of the differences Horton emphasises. According to Horton, the central ideas of a myth are regarded as sacred. There is anxiety about threats to them. One 'almost never finds a confession of ignorance and events 'which seriously defy the established lines of classification in the culture where they occur' evoke a 'taboo reaction' .4 Basic beliefs are protected by this reaction as well as by the device of 'secondary elaborations" which, in our terms, are series of ad hoc hypotheses. Science, on the other hand, is characterised by an essential scepticism; 'when failures start to come thick and fast, defence of the theory switches inexorably to attack on it'.' This is possible because of the 'openness' of the scientific enterprise, because of the pluralism of ideas it contains and also because whatever defies or fails to fit into the established category system is not something horrifying, to be isolated or expelled. On the contrary, it is an intriguing 'phenomenon' - a starting-point and a challenge for the invention of new classifications and new theories. We can see that Horton has read his Popper well. A field study of science itself shows a very different picture.
Such a study reveals that, while some scientists may proceed as described, the great majority follow a different path. Scepticism is at a minimum; it is directed against the view of the opposition and against minor ramifications of one's own basic ideas, never against the basic ideas themselves. Attacking the basic ideas evokes taboo reactions which are no weaker than are the taboo reactions in so-called "primitive societies." Basic beliefs are protected by this reaction as well as by secondary elaborations, as we have seen, and whatever fails to fit into the established category system or is said to be incompatible with this system is either viewed as something quite horrifying or, more frequently, it is simply declared to be non-existent. Nor is science prepared to make 'a theoretical pluralism the foundation of research. Newton reigned for more than 150 years, Einstein briefly introduced a more liberal point of view only to be succeeded by the Copenhagen Interpretation. The similarities between science and myth are indeed astonishing.
Etc... Etc...
Summary on Voegelin
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:The core assumptions of scientism are that reality exists only in the immanent realm, and that truth and knowledge of reality can be derived only as outcomes of the scientific method.
Observers of the contemporary intellectual climate are all too familiar with the influence of scientism—also referred to as positivism, radical empiricism, scientific reductionism, or scientific naturalism—on conventional attitudes and scholarly opinion. Much debate about scientism stems from arguments over the validity of applying the methods of mathematizing natural sciences, such as physics, to the social sciences. the application of the scientific method to the traditional humanities has been inspired by the desire to purge such "subjective" influences as myth, revelation, and faith from the study of human nature and human society. the core assumptions of scientism are that reality exists only in the immanent (intramundane) realm in the form of reified external objects and that truth and knowledge of reality can be derived only as outcomes of the scientific (or Newtonian) method. Given these methodological constraints and assumptions, reality is reduced to phenomena—matter in motion—observable through the physical senses. A corollary to the assumption regarding truth and methodology is that the scientific method is the only acceptable system for constructing theory. In its extreme form scientism posits that truth can be represented only through quantitative symbols. While objective knowledge can be expressed this way, qualitative distinctions about moral and aesthetic experience are considered subjective and thus outside the boundaries of science. In short, scientific knowledge of metaphysical experience is not possible. Claims about transcendent nonmaterial reality, especially the moral dimension of reality, are said to be mere speculation and are classified disparagingly as values. Eric Voegelin argued that positivism "rests on the assumption that the theological and metaphysical phases of the mind are transitory and not necessary." Accepting these doctrines leads to the conclusion that most of the intellectual and artistic work that shaped Western civilization is the product of mere opinion, prejudice, or tradition. Scientism, in short, undermines the pre-Enlightenment intellectual, moral, and cultural foundations of Western civilization. Defenders of traditional Western civilization, especially those who argue for the existence of a universal moral order, have, as a result, seen scientism as a threat to the cultural heritage of the West. An impressive group of scholars attempted to refute scientism: Eric Voegelin, C. S. Lewis, G. K. Chesterton, Irving Babbitt, Leo Strauss and Robert Nisbet [I would add and recommend F. A. Hayek’s must read The Counter Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason.]
To most intellectual conservatives, the approach of scientism to truth and knowledge seems incomplete, fallacious and misconstrued. Yet its acceptance of truth, however narrowly it may be, is sufficient in today’s intellectual and cultural climate to attract some support from the intellectual Right. Scientism is given the illusion of validity in the postmodern context because of the pervasive acceptance of ethical relativism (subjectivism) in both academe and the culture at large. Compared to postmodern relativism, scientism seems to some conservatives preferable or at least a useful intellectual ally. This attraction is enhanced by the typical encounters with ethical relativism one experiences in higher education. Teachers frequently encounter the subjectivist claim that "what is true for you isn’t necessarily true for me." Truth, then, is a purely relative matter of individual or cultural choice, and the concept of a universal reality known to all humans through participation in it has become increasingly alien to students, intellectuals, and the larger culture.
Subjectivist assertions lead to disturbing consequences. Politics—particularly justice—is reduced to a utilitarian calculation of base self-interest that removes the common good (summum bonum) from politics. The prevalence of subjectivism marks the ascendancy of the view of justice that was expressed by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic: "might makes right." Justice, in the classical or Christian sense, cannot flourish in a society that perceives it as a selection of competing utilitarian claims. Utility, choice, and pleasure—the common denominators of contemporary politics—are not the measure of justice. To believe otherwise is to repeat the mistake of Protagoras and claim that "Man is the measure of all things." Moreover, without cultural and ethical impediments to control the will to power, the strong are apt to choose their interest over others. Mere utility, choice, and pleasure are not impediments to the will to power but rather its animating instruments. Justice requires a controlling force as an ethical restraint on will and appetite. This control, as Irving Babbitt has noted, is the very essence of humanity and is "ultimately divine." This divine element provides a universal ethical standard against which human behavior can be measured.
A desire to preserve the foundations of Western order can lead to frustration that invites the invocation of at least part of the Newtonian tradition. After all, that some truth is better than none undoubtedly provides an epistemological starting point. Yet, one should be cautious before entering an intellectual alliance with the advocates of scientism.
The end of the twentieth century affords an opportunity to revisit the debate over scientism in light of recent intellectual trends. Postmodernism, for example is characterized by its rejection of modern science, classical reason, and Judeo-Christian faith. Any claim of universality, according to the postmodern mind, whether classical, Christian, or modern, has dangerous implications. In fact, such horrific events of the twentieth century as mass murder stem from joining moral universalism and modern science. Hence, some are tempted to embrace the postmodern rejection of rationally and scientifically derived universal moral standards.
Voegelin’s thought avoids the extremes of both postmodern relativism and modern scientism and provides a penetrating source for understanding the historical and theoretical development of scientism (which he usually calls positivism). He links it to a range of thinkers: Hobbes, Hegel, Marx, Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, and Bakunin. Such historical examples make the dangers of positivism clearer. Voegelin’s work is itself a response to the modern desire to be "scientific" and an attempt to restore political science to its classical roots. His arguments are grounded in human experiences rather than the authority of reified traditions, dogmas, or doctrines. And because he offers a more complete understanding of knowledge and truth than does positivism, he establishes a philosophical foundation for a universal reality that humans experience through participation. Consequently, he presents a rich and penetrating historical analysis of human experience with transcendent reality that is a powerful antidote to postmodern relativism.
Scientism is an ideology grounded on the assumption that facts can be distinguished from values. Facts, it is claimed, are derived from the scientific method, whereas values are the products of uncritical human constructions (opinions) such as religion, tradition , or prejudice. The fact/value distinction assumes that reality can be known by fragmenting its parts from the universal whole. Once separated from the whole and viewed as objects, facts are classified as empirical knowledge. According to the tenets of scientism, if human reason is liberated from the constraints of values and properly grounded in scientific method, it is capable of discovering empirical truths instrumental not only to material progress, but to political and social advancement. Such progress is therefore predicated on the belief that the scientific method provides a universal standard for the discovery of truth. Scientifically derived truth, then, provides a body of knowledge that forms the foundation of political and social consensus. All humans are assumed to be rational and equally capable of both employing the scientific method and understanding the knowledge that results from its use.
In this scheme, conflict in human society is caused by mere differences of opinion; a confrontation of values rather than facts. The scientific method eliminates such conflicts because it provides a "scientific" understanding of reality on which rational individuals agree. Once the scientific method is widely utilized, differences of opinion , and the corresponding political and social conflict that is caused by them, wither away. Disagreement and conflict disappear in the same way as they do among mathematicians who present mathematical proofs. Given an accepted body of mathematical principles and methods, the proof either works or fails. In the process of discovering mathematical truth, there is no place for opinion or subjective judgment. The structure of mathematical reality, represented by its principles and laws. is fixed. Erroneous application of principle is possible, but that is not the same as an opinion that causes disagreement. Once the truth or failure of the proof is established, there is no legitimate basis for disagreement. Although the methodological approach may be appropriate for mathematics and the mathematical sciences, its application to the human sciences has been the subject of intense debate.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and Rene Descartes influenced the early development of positivism in important ways. Bacon advocated the scientific method as the foundation for a new civilization. Proper use of the scientific method would purge the mind of personal unscientific influences and lead to the acquisition of knowledge. Bacon provided much of the theoretical foundation for the scientific revolution. Its social and political implications, while recognized by Bacon, were more explicitly developed by Hobbes and such later positivists as Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte. The common ideological thread of the positivist movement is belief that the scientific method will lead to human domination of nature and that subsequent social, political, and economic transformation is inevitable.
Yet the historical development of positivism was more complex. As developing positivism fueled industrialization, material progress occurred, but the anticipated social and moral improvement was illusive. A key cause of the lack of moral progress was illusive. A key cause of the lack of moral progress was positivism’s undermining of Judeo-Christian moral consciousness. That the rational-scientific approach of the early positivists displaced Christianity in public life is hardly surprising, for the incompatibility of positivism and Christianity is apparent. The metaphysical elements of Christianity that pint toward the existence of a transcendent reality cannot be reconciled with the immanentist methods or the principles of positivism. And the destructiveness of positivism to the existing social order was heightened through its emergence at a time when the engendering experiences of Christian faith were losing their cultural strength. As a result, Western society became vulnerable to the emerging modern ideologies and in particular could not withstand Newtonian materialism. Voegelin explains, for example, the effect of the publication in 1687 of Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica.
To a spiritually feeble and confused generation, this event transformed the universe into a huge machinery of dead matter, running its course by the inexorable laws of Newton’s mechanics. The earth was in insignificant corner in this vast machinery, and the human self was a still more insignificant atom in this corner. Christian faith in metaphysical reality—the unseen realm of life—lost its vitality under the pressure of Newtonian materialism. Consequently, the development of positivism undermined the philosophical foundations of Christian truth.
According to Voegelin, Christianity was displaced in two phases: "despiritualization" and "respiritualization." Once positivism destroyed Judeo-Christian consciousness, individuals where open "to respiritualization from non-Christian sources" that included such radical political ideologies as nationalism, humanitarianism, biologism, and psychologism. If the early positivists removed spiritual matters from science, their intellectual heirs filled the spiritual void with immanentizing political religions. Saint-Simon and Comte filled the spiritual void with a new intramundane religion of humanity in which they assume the role of priest, prophet, pope, and god-incarnate. These religious positivists pushed the Western crisis to a new level of spiritual deformation. Voegelin concisely explains the displacement of Christianity by modern political ideologies as language symbols separated form their experiential roots. Rationalism, he wrote:
destroys the transcendental meanings of symbols taken from the world of the senses. In the course of this de-divinization (Entg: otterung) of the world, sensual symbols have lost their transparency for transcendental reality; they have become opaque and are no longer revelatory of the immersion of the finite world in the transcendent.
Christian symbols became opaque because "the active center of intellectual life" shifted "to the plane of our knowledge of the external world." Consequently, the symbols of transcendent reality lost their relevance or judged by utilitarian criteria, were not considered to express truth about reality. Once Christianity lost its authoritative and unifying place in Western civilization, the spiritual void could be filled by pseudo-religions of modern ideology. Viewed in this historical and philosophical context, scientism is a deformation of reality and part of a larger historical movement that contributed to the loss of transcendental consciousness. It is a major part of the disorder of the modern age and not a means to restore the West. Voegelin identifies the eighteenth century, the Age of Enlightenment, as the context in which scientism must be understood. Three attributes of the Enlightenment are particularly important: "a denial of cognitive value to spiritual experiences, the atrophy of Christian transcendental experiences," and the attempt "to enthrone the Newtonian method of science as the only valid method of arriving at truth." What makes scientism so dangerous, Voegelin claims is the fusion of two modern assumptions: that the methodology of the mathematizing sciences is inherently superior to all others and that the success of the natural sciences can be duplicated by other areas of science if such methodology is employed; and, more dangerously, that the methods of the natural sciences are the standards for theoretical relevance in all areas of science. The combination of these assumptions lead to the belief that:
a study of reality could qualify as scientific only if it used the methods of the natural sciences, that problems couched in other terms were illusionary problems, that in particular metaphysical questions which do not admit of answers by the methods of the sciences of phenomena should not be asked, that realms of being which are not accessible to exploration by the model methods were irrelevant, and, in the extreme, that such realms of being did not exist.
While scientism is open to truth and the existence of an objective material reality, it is closed to the spiritual reality of the inner life as experienced through participation in transcendence and expressed symbolically through myth, revelation, history, or philosophy. While such positivists as Comte included spiritual matters in their work, this spirituality is not transcendent but secular-immanent—a pseudo-spirituality. As Voegelin explains: "The horizon of man is strictly walled in by the facts and laws of the phenomena. . . . If god exist, they certainly are not permitted to participate in history or society." Comte attempts to eliminate transcendent reality from human consciousness when he "declares as illegitimate all questions that cannot be answered by the sciences of the phenomena." In this aspect of positivism there is an existential unwillingness to engage in the search for transcendent reality. Voegelin call this aversion to philosophy "logophobia" (fear and hatred of philosophy). The political and social consequences of positivist logophobia include the destruction of human consciousness of the Agathon (the Good), which in turn severs any connection between the order of the soul and the order of the political community. In short, politics loses it transcendent foundation. Voegelin recognizes scientism as a primary obstacle to the restoration of Western civilization. In The New Science of Politics he analyzes modern positivism to demonstrate its fallacious assumptions and contrasts it to Aristotle’s episteme politike. Aristotle’s political science examines symbols as they occur in reality—a benchmark of the Aristotelian procedure. All societies create symbols to express their place in the larger order of reality. "Elaborate symbolism" is used to express the meaning of society that includes its place in history and the larger reality
(cosmos). Such self-interpretation provides humans with a sense of the abiding and permanent features of life that form the basis for a just social and political order. It is precisely these experiences with self-interpretative symbols that articulate experience with transcendent reality that modern positivism attempts to exclude from scientific discovery. Because the symbolism takes the form of rite, myth, and theory and its content is metaphysical experience, it fails to meet the positivist definition of scientific fact. Consequently, what Voegelin considers "an integral part of reality" isn’t real at all in the eyes of the positivist. Yet as he explains, "when political science begins, it does not begin with a tabula rasa on which it can inscribe its concepts; it will inevitably start form the rich body of self-interpretation of a society and proceed by critical clarification of socially pre-existent symbols. Voegelin’s creation of a new science of politics is meant to recover human experience as metaphysical reality, to establish the process of this recovery as scientific, and to restore human consciousness of metaphysical reality.
The awareness of a divine presence in human consciousness, differentiated by Plato and Aristotle as nous is akin to right reason or the ability to understand truth. Nous, therefore, aids in this effort to express truths about nonmaterial reality. Human understanding of truth requires the participation of the divine in the process of knowing. Nous is not a tangible object in the external world and, therefore, the ideology of scientism declares that it is not part of reality. For Voegelin, however, it is real because it is experienced. Symbols such as "nous’ are articulations of experience with transcendence that can be discovered. Acceptance of Voegelin’s argument about science and the scientific validity of such symbols as nous depends on a certain openness to the transcendent reality he discusses. Scientism is incompatible with Voegelin’s philosophical approach because the former begins with closure to transcendent reality; scientism refuses to engage in the philosophical search for higher truth. Consequently, open discussion is impossible with positivist ideologues because they cannot transcend their ideological dogmas; they are unwilling to put aside the obstacle to open discussion, i. e., the propositions of scientism. Rational debate is impossible among true ideologues because the ideological dogmas prevent open discussion.
Voegelin’s new science of politics enables him to rediscover human experience with a transcendence that has become opaque in the modern world because of such gnostic political ideologies as scientism, Marxism, and National Socialism. Restoration requires that gnostic ideologies be seen for what they are and that souls closed as a result of their influences be opened by the renewal of experiences with and insights about transcendence. This cannot occur unless a consciousness of transcendent principles exists. Yet restoration is necessary, Voegelin points out, because of the destruction of science by positivism in the second half of the nineteenth century. Positivism has contributed to the Western crisis because it determines theoretical relevance based on method rather than choosing methods based on the search for truth. Voegelin considers this a perversion of the meaning of science. Properly understood, "science is a search for truth concerning the nature of the various realms of being .. . . Facts are relevant in so far as their knowledge contributes to the study of essence, while methods are adequate in so far as they can be effectively used as a means for this end. Different objects require different methods." When method is elevated to become the ultimate standard for truth, the search for truth is subordinated to the particular methods used in the discovery of reality. Voegelin argues that if "the use of a method is made the criterion of science, then the meaning of science as a truthful account of the structure of reality, as the theoretical orientation of man in his world, and as the great instrument for man’s understanding of his own position in the universe is lost." Because scientism is responsible for the loss of transcendental consciousness and the destruction of science as the search for truth, it cannot be a source for the restoration of science or the recovery of the Western social and political order.
Returning to the problem of scientism and postmodernism: it makes no sense to use scientism as an intellectual counterweight to postmodernism. In their common manifestations they are two variations of the modern secular mind; they both define themselves by rejecting transcendent reality. In fact, acceptance of the principles of scientism does not preclude subjectivism in matter regarding the transcendent reality. In rejecting the existence of transcendent truth, scientism and postmodernism occupy the same ideological ground. Even if scientism is accepted as true by postmodern subjectivists, what has been accomplished? The ideological presuppositions and dogmas of scientism are based on a misunderstanding of reality and truth. Acceptance of these dogmas perverts science and destroys transcendental consciousness. That reality can be only material or quantifiable or that only the scientific method can discover truth is simply contrary to historical experience and philosophical insight. In sum, positivism is an impediment to the philosophical search for the truth of metaphysical reality.
The restoration of truth and acceptance of transcendent reality cannot be accomplished by engaging in ideological warfare. Dogmatic battles between ideologues who assert propositions as evidence of the truth of their ideology will not reestablish consciousness of transcendence. More philosophically-minded individuals will recognize that the preconditions for rational debate include the acceptance of human experience and transcendence. "Questions of social order can be discussed rationally only if the whole concept of the order of human existence, of which the social order forms a part, is viewed in its entirety and right back to its transcendental origin." The failure to accept this condition is precisely the logophobia that Voegelin understood to have corrupted the modern world.
The work of thinkers such as Voegelin has helped to restore interest in the transcendent ground of politics and science. Such renewed interest is an indication that scientism may be losing its vitality. At the very least, its core assumptions are being seriously questioned. While scientism continues to manifest itself in ways that endanger the dignity of human life, there is hope Voegelin’s work will give pause to those who are inclined to let modern science progress in an ethically unfettered manner. Moreover, his work serves as a cautionary note to those who are tempted to invoke the tradition of scientism as a remedy for postmodern subjectivism.
Dr. Michael P. Federici Email: mfederici@mercyhurst.edu
I guess the last propositions pretty much sum up the nature of debate here. Of course, I'll leave people to their own conclusions, but I just wanted to point out the absurd dualism that frequently passes for accepted opinion here and how some age old opinions held as "sacrossanct, scientific truths" are in fact mythological absurdities whose survival merely happens due to custom.
Oh and by the way... This is not a complete rebuttal of either Religion or Science. It is just an attempt to take away some old superstitions from their podex and view all things again with a fresh mind.
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Originally Posted by Odovacar
