A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God
Friends, I don't think anyone will disagree with me when I say that there is little rational discourse on this sub-forum. Either an irrational fideist will come up with an utterly silly point about Jesus sucking people into the air before the end of the world, or an equally vacuous rationalist will tell us that the Universe simply goes on forever in cycles, this being achieved when human beings go back in time to destroy everything in a vortex of super-technology. Since both sorts of people act in a very ridiculous fashion, I want everyone to read some real logical argument on this subject:
An Anglican priest called Samuel Clarke undertook a few lectures in 1704, spoken from St. Paul's Cathedral. In these, he attempted to succinctly put everything together rationally. Please don't dismiss his talks as "too archaic to apply to modern wisdom", or some such excuse. Look at them plainly, all of you, and see if they really are negated by modern knowledge. Be honest with yourselves.
I must translate some of his 17th-century English to a readable form, so bear with me. If you wish to read it in its impossible font, where some letters "s" look like letters "f", you are free to do so:
http://www.archive.org/details/discourseconcern00clar
Introduction: on atheists in general
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Originally Posted by Samuel Clarke
All those who either are, or pretend to be atheists: who either disbelieve the being of God, or would be thought to do so; or who deny the principle attributes of the divine nature, and suppose God to be an unintelligent being, which acts merely by necessity (that is, which acts not at all, but is only acted upon): all men that are atheists, I say, in this sense, must be so upon one or other of these three reasons:
1. Either, first, because being extremely ignorant and stupid, they have never duly considered anything at all, nor made any just use of their natural reason to discover even the plainest and most obvious truths, but have spent their time in a manner of life very little superior to that of the beasts.
2. Or, secondly, because being totally debauched and corrupted in their practices, they have, by a vicious and degenerate life, corrupted the principles of their nature, and defaced the reason of their own minds; and, instead of fairly and impartially enquiring into the rules and obligations of nature, have accustomed themselves only to mock and scoff at religion; and, being under the power of evil habits, and the slavery of unreasonable lusts, are resolved not to hear any reasoning which would oblige them to forsake their beloved vices.
3. Or, thirdly, because in the way of speculative reasoning, and upon the principles of philosophy, they pretend that the arguments used against God seem, after fullest inquiry, to be more strong and conclusive than those by which we endeavour to prove that God exists.
These seem the only causes that can be imagined of any man's disbelieving the being or attributes of God, and no man can be supposed to be an atheist unless it is on one of these three accounts. Now to the two former of these three sorts of men, it is not my business to speak to. The first of these wants to be instructed in the first principles of reason, but the second disbelieves only for a present false interest, and because he is desirous that the thing should not be true. The first has not yet arrived at the use of his natural faculties, while the other has renounced them, and declares he will not be argued with as a rational creature. It is therefore the third sort of atheists only to whom my present discourse can be supposed to be directed, or indeed who are capable of being reasoned with at all.
Prelude: an appeal to atheists' good conscience
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Now before I enter upon the main argument, I shall list several things which these men, upon their own principles, are obliged to admit:
1. They must of necessity own that, supposing it cannot be proved to be true, it is at least very desirable (and which any wise man would wish to be true, for the great benefit and happiness of men), that there is a God, an intelligent, wise, just, and good being, to govern the world. Whatever hypothesis these men can possibly frame, whatever argument they can invent, by which they exclude God out of the world, that very argument or hypothesis will necessarily lead them to this first concession! If they suppose that the world was made by chance and is subject to be destroyed by chance at any moment, no man can be so absurd as to contend that it is as comfortable and desirable to live in such an uncertain state of things, without any hope, when compared to a world that is under the preservation and conduct of a powerful, wise, and good God.
If they argue against the being of God from the faults and defects which they imagine they can find in this visible and material world, this obliges them to acknowledge that it would have been better the world had been made by an intelligent and wise being, who might have prevented all faults and imperfections. If they argue against Providence from the faults and inequality which they think are in the moral world, this is a plain concession that it is better that the world should be governed by a good and just being, than by mere chance or unintelligent necessity.
Lastly, if they suppose the world to be eternally and necessarily self-existence, and consequently that everything in it is established by a blind and eternal fate, no rational man can deny that liberty and choice is a more eligible state than to be forced in all our actions, as a stone moves downward by an absolute and inevitable fate. In a word: which way soever they turn themselves, and whatever hypothesis they make, concerning the world, nothing is so certain as this: that man, considered without the protection and conduct of a superior being, is in a far worse position than with the existence of God. Man, in of himself, is infinitely insufficient for his own happiness. He is liable to many evils and miseries which he can neither prevent nor redress: he is full of wishes which he cannot supply, and surrounded by infirmities which he cannot remove. He is secure of nothing that he enjoys in this world, and uncertain of everything that he hopes for: he is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to desire what he is never likely to obtain.
Now I desire to make only one use of this atheist's concession: that since the men I am arguing with are unavoidably obliged to confess that it is at least a very desirable thing that there should be a god, they must, upon their own good principles, be very willing; no, must desire above all things to be concinved that their present opinion is an error, and sincerely hope that the contrary may be demonstrated to them to be true. Consequently, they are bound with all seriousness, attention, and impartiality, to consider the weight of the arguments by which the being of God may be proved to them.
Secondly, all such people who profess themselves to be atheists upon the principles of reason and philosophy are bound by these principles to acknowledge that all mocking and scoffing at religion, all jesting and turning arguments of reason into ridicule, is the most unreasonable thing in the world. Consequently, they are obliged to exclude all people who are irrational and scoffers at religion, who deride at all adventures to prove God with reason. Hearing the reason of a case with patience is an equity which men owe to every truth that can concern them.
... And because it is not my present purpose to explain or illustrate things to believers, but only to convince unbelievers, and settle their doubts, by strict and undeniable reason, I shall not allege any thing which, however really true and useful, may be liable to contradiction or dispute. On the contrary, I shall only urge such propositions as cannot be denied without departing from reason, which all atheists pretend to be the foundation of their unbelief. Only one thing is absolutely necessary before everything else: that they consent to lay aside all manner of prejudice.
The MAIN BODY:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
1. First, then, it is absolutely and undeniably certain that something has existed from eternity. This is so evident and undeniable a proposition that no atheist in any age has ever presumed to assert the contrary; and therefore there is little need of being particular in the proof of it. For as something now is, it is evident that something always was. Otherwise, the things that now exist must have been produced out of nothing, absolutely and without cause: which is a plain contradiction in terms. For, to say that a thing is produced, and yet that there is no cause of that production, is to say that something is effected when it is effected by NOTHING. Whatever exists has a cause, a reason, a ground of its existence; a foundation on which its existence relies, a ground or reason why it exists, rather than does not exist. Either in necessity of its own nature (and then it must have been of itself eternal), or in the will of some other being (and that other being must, at least in the order of nature and causality, have existed beforehand).
That something has therefore really existed from eternity is one of the most certain and most evident truths in the world, acknowledged by all men and disputed by none. Yet as to the manner how this can actually be, there is nothing in nature more difficult for the mankind of man to conceive! For how can anything have existed eternally; that is, how can an eternal duration now actually be past? It is an utterly impossible thing for our narrow minds to comprehend, and yet to deny the truth of this proposition (that an eternal duration is now actually past) would be to say something far more unintelligible, even a real contradiction!
2. There has existed, from all eternity, some unchangeable and independent being. For since something must have been from eternity (as is granted by all), either there has always existed some one unchanging and independent being, from which all other beings that are or ever were in the Universe, have received their original existence; or, else, there has been an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings produced one from another in an endless progression without any original cause at all. Now, this latter supposition is so very absurd that, though all atheism must, in its account of things, come to this conclusion, I think very few atheists were ever so weak as to openly and directly defend it. It is plainly impossible, and a contradictory to itself.
If we consider such an infinite progression, one entirely endless series of dependent beings, it is plain that the whole series of beings can have no cause from without: because in this series are all things that ever were in the Universe. It is plain that it can have no reason within itself, of its existence, because no being in this infinite succession is supposed to be self-existent or necessary , but every one dependent on what came before. Where no part is necessary, the whole cannot be necessary.
Absolute necessity of existence is not an intrinsic, relative, and accidental thing, but an inward and essential property of the nature of the thing which exists! An infinite succession therefore of merely dependent beings, without any original independent cause, is a series of beings that has neither necessity, cause, nor any reason or ground at all of its existence, either within itself or from without! That is an express contradiction and impossibility; it is supposing something to be caused (because it is granted in every one of its stages of sucession not to be necessary) and yet that, in the whole, it is caused absolutely by nothing. Every man knows this is a contradiction to imagine done in time, and because duration in this case makes no differnece, it is equally a contradiction to suppose it is done from eternity. Consequently, there must, of necessity, have existed from eternity some One immutable and independent being. To suppose an infinite sucession of changeable and dependent beings produced one from another in an endless progression, without and original cause at all, is only driving back from one step to another, and removing out of sight the question concering the ground or reason of the existence of things.
3. This unchangeable and independent Being, which has existed from Eternity without any external cause of its existence, must be self-existent; that is, necessarily-existing. For whatever exists must have either come into being out of nothing, absolutely without cause, or it must have been produced by some eternal cause; or it must be self-existent. Now to arise out of nothing absolutely without cause has already been shown to be a plain contradiction. To have been produced by some external cause cannot possibly be true of every thing, but something must have existed eternally and independently, as has likewise been shown already.
It remains therefore that that being which has exited independently from eternity, must of necessity be self-existent. Now to be self-existent is not "to be produced by itself', for that is also an express contradiction. But it is to exist by an absolute necessity originally in the nature of the thing itself. This necessity must be antecedent; not indeed in Time, to the existence of the being itself, because that is eternal - but it must be antecedent to the natural order of our ideas, to our supposition of its being. That is, this necessity must not barely be consequent upon our supposition of the existence of such a being, but it must force itself upon us, whether we wish it or no, even when we suppose no such being to exist. For example: when we are endeavouring to suppose that there is no being in the universe that exists necessarily, we always find in our minds some ideas of infinity and eternity, which, if we remove them (that is to say: that there is no being or substance in he universe which is eternal or infinite), is a contradiction in the very terms, because modes and attributes exist only by the existence of something to which they really belong! He that can suppose eternity and infinity are removed out of the Universe may just as easily remove the equality between two sets of two, and four.
He goes on for quite some time on this subject. It's certainly a little deeper than your modern televangelist's preaching crusade, isn't it?Any thoughts or challenges?
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I have no answers.
of atheists descending on this thread to have their say. Is my contribution desired? I can probably bring something new to the table but if it's gonna be just Monarchist versus Atheists here then it's probably a repetition of past debates and I don't think he can handle this all by himself either.
