Terrific work rez. Thanks
I'll float along with a some material here.
The realm of the Achaemenid Great King by the time of
Darius III, ruling mainly from Susa (
modern Shush, western Iran), was a tremendous accomplishment laid down by
Cyrus the Great two centuries earlier, which within one generation after the latter's death had been expanded and re-solidified by
Darius I (the Great): the states within the vast cultural diversity, permeating the lands from the Aegean-Syr Darya-Egyptian region to the Indus River Valley, were autonomous states liable to a central authority. The sagacious imperial foresight of
Cyrus was forwarded by
Darius I within few decades following the death of the former: a stable process of the Great King's authority was established by the dawn of the 5th century B.C., in which an ethno-cultural absorption was realized, centered on a sound administrative network of tributary regions -
satrapies; they constituted twenty regional divisions among twenty-two regions, following
Herodotus' breakdown in
The Histories (Book 3.90-97). All the
satrapies were subject to
Darius I at the culmination of his reign. There was no uniformity regarding Persian rule entailing direct control from the center; each
satrapie's legal systems were codified, tribute exacted through appointed officials with established regional treasuries, and an advanced form of communications was established through engineered roads and bridges which streamlining travel, which in turn greatly facilitated commerce. An innovative 'postal service' was realized, most notably exploited viably via the famous Susa-Sardis Royal Road. All this reflected an efficient territorialization which linked the Great King's rule from his center.
Moreover, a universal currency was introduced, the
daric, which standardized the increasingly flowing commerce which permeated the diverse languages and customs of
Darius I's growing hegemony. But the
satrapies' own distinctive structures were not altered, and they effectively continued their own traditional ways, with some native kings (now effectively 'client kings' of the Great King) still in place despite the appointed
satraps. Of course things were bound (not necessarily 'inevitable'?) to go awry at times. But for two centuries the Achaemenid Persian Empire endured with overall superb handling, due very much because of
Darius I's (and surely an administrative counsel he had) codifications and standardizations.
Cyrus was an ingenious visionary leader in conciliating various peoples, and
Darius I, an innovator in far-reaching administration and commerce.
The Achaemenid sphere of influence was huge by the time of the Ionian revolt (the springboard to the epoch struggle between Persians and Hellenes) in 499 B.C., and the proclivities of 'political inertia and cupidity' (
John Cook,
The Persian Empire, Pg. 70) cannot be estimated with no room for error, etc. Indeed, the numerous revolts and inability of the Royal Court to limit independent powers within many of the
satraps (the 'protectors of the Kingdom's authority') became a recurring problem: the
satraps were the provincial leaders of the Great King, and often members of the royal line, such as
Artaphernes, were in charge of the internal administration and security of their own
satrapie, as well as its responsibilities to the Great King, including the provision of military levies if called upon), on a relatively minimal scale, from this time until the 340s B.C. indeed illustrated the problem of a fragility of the Achaemenid imperial framework, of which
Cyrus and
Darius I were certainly not unaware; however, all the suppressions and re-conquests of those rebellions reveal a resilience of the Persian overlords, effectuated with an efficient martial and mustering capacity to move and deploy armies over vast swaths of territories. The Empire at the accession of
Darius III may have been economically weaker due to the loss of revenue in some
satrapies, but is so, it wasn't exorbitantly so, and the realm was probably no less well administered, nor smaller, than two generations prior; all the aspects of immense resources and centralized commerce (internally within each
satrap and their tributary allocations to the Great King) was still under strong and able administrative control from a good Great King (the Empire under
Darius III 'was irrefutably not moribund', writes
Pierre Briant,
From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, Pg. 812 of the English edition).
Achaemenid control of Asia Minor had been re-established by 386 B.C., and likewise in Phoenicia and Egypt in the mid-late 340s B.C., and the rising power of Macedon which included incursions east into the regions of Perinthus and Byzantium, was met with Persian aid for defensive measures at the Bosporus Straits, for the time being, which helped stave off that threat. When it was reported to
Artaxerxes III of the increasing power of
Philip II of Macedon, he reacted to the Macedonian threat with alarm (
Diodorus,
Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.75), and
Pausanias (the travel writer of the 2nd century A.D.) tells us it was the
satrap of Phrygia,
Arsites, who sent the mercenary force to aid against
Philip's attacks (
Description of Greece, Book 1.29.10) on the two major strongholds linking the bridgehead to Asia from Europe.
The direct line of the Achaemenid Royal House was effectively wiped out in 336 B.C., the result of murderous acts of the powerful minister turned vizier
Bagoas. The accession of
Codomannus (
Darius III was immediately assumed as his regal name upon becoming the Great King), was an appointment with an aim of procuring control of the Court of the Great King by the powerful vizier and his associates, including
Mentor, who was along with
Bogoas a hero in re-conquering Egypt; but
Darius III was a member of the royal stock, hence a legitimate Great King. It seems he had been a very capable military leader, something we know thanks to the accounts of
Justin, who epitomized the lost works, to our misfortune, of
Gnaeus Pompeius Trogus:
Justin tells us,
Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 10.3,
"…Possession of the throne was given to Ochus [Artaxerxes III], who, dreading a similar conspiracy, filled the palace with the blood and dead bodies of his kinsmen and the nobility, being touched with compassion neither for consanguinity, nor sex, nor age, lest, apparently, he should be thought less wicked than his brothers that had meditated parricide.
Having thus, as it were, purified his kingdom, he made war upon the Cadusii. In the course of this campaign Codomannus [Darius III], followed by applause from all the Persians, challenged a volunteering enemy soldier in single combat, and, having killed his antagonist, regained the victory for his fellow soldiers, as well as the glory which they had almost lost. For this honorable service Codomannus was made governor of Armenia. Some time after, on the death of Ochus, he was chosen king by the people from regard to his former merits, and, that nothing might be wanting to his royal dignity, honored with the name of Darius. He maintained a long war, with various success, but with great efforts, against Alexander the Great. But being at last overcome by Alexander, and slain by his relations, he terminated his life and the kingdom of the Persians together…" This is also in
Diodorus (
Bibliotheca Historica, Book 17.6, with a slight variance). The last few words there from
Justin are not unprejudiced, IMHO, taking them at face value: the organized resistance of Achaemenid authority fell in the face of the formidable Macedonian juggernaut on the huge plain around Gaugamela in October of 331 B.C. (or with a stamp the next year with
Alexander's circumvention of the defense mustered at the Persian Gates, then the horrid sack of Persepolis), but
Darius III is not personally responsible for the 'termination' of his kingdom, nor his life. He didn't flee cowardly, as many attest: his person was needed for a planned further resistance, hence he was heading to the eastern
satrapies once he saw his cause at Gaugamela was hopeless. He was then betrayed, and was overall one of the few not 'incompetent' figures (eg,
Gaius Terentius Varro at Cannae,
Vercingetorix amid the Gallic revolt,
Johann Tserclaes at Breitenfeld) who was unfortunate to lead men in battle against a genius of war. As Great King,
Darius III had the capacity to draw on abundant sources of revenue, despite perhaps a weaker economy of his realm than the 'mature' days some six or so generations prior (maybe it wasn't so at all), and he deployed a vast array of military contingents no less ample than the previous generations; he proved he was determined to adapt to changing conditions he identified. His strategy outdid
Alexander by flanking the Macedonians and placing his larger force (though not substantially, as even 'revised' accounts claim) astride their communications just before the Battle of Issus (he seems to have been mobilizing a contemporaneous land and sea offensive against
Alexander and the Greek League, and
Memnon's death may have been a fortunate occurrence for the Greeks). Using elephants at one point, an influence from the eastern subjects of the Indus (though we read nothing of their action, if any took place), was not without tactical credence, and
Darius drilled his men with newer weapons more conducive to facing the Macedonians after the lesson of Issus; scythed chariots had worked well before against Hellenic troops (most notably when 700 hoplites, not at the ready, where stymied by 400 Persian horsemen spearheaded by just two scythed chariots, in 395 B.C., at the backdrop of
Agesilaus II's incursion in Asia Minor), and when he tried to create initial damage to the enemy with them (clearly not stubbornly banking solely on the chariot charges), he had a huge preponderance in numerical superiority in all arms - and he had even adopted better Greek-style weaponry between the battles fought at Issus and Gaugamela, as
Alexander sojourned in Egypt. Moreover, he prudently awaited
Alexander to come to his chosen position into the hinterland, as
Artaxerxes II did with his younger brother
Cyrus within his probable strategy of the famed blood feud of the royal brothers over six decades earlier. Whatever the details of how much
Darius III could avail himself of Hellenic mercenary hoplites, or the intricacies behind the
kardaces (they were probably lighter than a conventional hoplites, but crack infantrymen of some sort), there is nothing to indicate that Achaemenid levied infantrymen had lost any adeptness since their role in the Battle of Cunaxa in 401 B.C. (even though by the time of Granicus front-line infantry had been replaced by cavalry along a their battle front, perhaps a reflection of the rising supremacy in Macedonian horsemanship, to which they had no heavy foot to stand up to).
Darius III was faced with a 'smart bomb' of antiquity to which he could parry no successful answer;
Artaxerxes II, with his able subordinates (
Tissaphernes was probably the brainchild behind the Cunaxa campaign), was not.
If we can sustain couple substantial snippets from
Xenophon, followed by
Plutarch (the Carian historian and physician in the Achaemenid Court,
Ctesias, was doubtless used and filtered) the army under the Great King's general
Teribazus were well-marshaled and disciplined to a degree which amazed the Hellenic 'observers' when the opposing lines were being drawn up; this reeks of irony, because although we know there certainly was not a figure of 900,000 men under
Teribazus (cited by
Plutarch), Hellenic authors thought so (perhaps disingenuous, if not wholly), thus a superb discipline was exercised here by a 'marshaled' (ie, the type of army typically mustered by the Achaemenid court) army of the astronomical numbers they themselves often believed was the case - one affecting aspect part and parcel of the growing idealization of
Panhellenism, and to the whole perception of martial 'Persian inferiority'. Modern estimates, drawing on logistic realities and the simple logic that
Cyrus the Younger would not have marched into the hinterland if he knew his older brother could muster such a colossal force, conclude the armies were of similar size, perhaps neither exceeding 60,000 men (the Royal Army was probably larger). The campaign was a huge domestic wrangle, of which the Greek participation is blown far out of proportion by the Greek polemical tradition to their actual role in the campaign.
Xenophon,
Anabasis, Book 1.8.12-14, at the onset of the action at Cunaxa,
"...At this moment Cyrus rode along the line, attended only by Pigres, his interpreter, and three or four others, and shouted to Clearchus to lead his army against the enemy's center, for the reason that the King was stationed there; 'and if,' he said, 'we are victorious there, our whole task is accomplished.' Clearchus [the Spartan leader of the 13,600 Greek mercenary force], however, since he saw the compact body at the enemy's center and heard from Cyrus that the King was beyond his left wing (for the King was so superior in numbers that, although occupying the center of his own line, he was beyond Cyrus' left wing), was unwilling to draw the right wing away from the river, for fear that he might be turned on both flanks; and he told Cyrus, in reply, that he was taking care to make everything go well.
At this critical time the King's army was advancing evenly, while the Greek force, still remaining in the same place, was forming its line from those who were still coming up. And Cyrus, riding along at some distance from his army, was taking a survey, looking in either direction, both at his enemies and his friends..."
Plutarch,
Life of Artaxerxes, Ch. 7 (more pronounced),
"...As Cyrus proceeded on his march, rumours and reports kept coming to his ears that the king had decided not to give battle at once, and was not desirous of coming to close quarters with him, but rather of waiting in Persia until his forces should assemble there from all parts. For he had run a trench, ten fathoms in width and as many in depth, four hundred furlongs through the plain; and yet he allowed Cyrus to cross this and to come within a short distance of Babylon itself. And it was Teribazus, as we are told, who first plucked up courage to tell the king that he ought not to shun a battle, nor to retire from Media and Babylon, as well as Susa, and hide himself in Persia, when he had a force many times as numerous as that of the enemy, and countless satraps and generals who surpassed Cyrus in wisdom and military skill. The king therefore determined to fight the issue out as soon as possible.
So, to begin with, by his sudden appearance with an army of 900,000 men in brilliant array, he so terrified and confounded the enemy, who were marching along in loose order and without arms because of their boldness and contempt for the king, that Cyrus could with difficulty bring them into battle array amid much tumult and shouting; and again, by leading his forces up slowly and in silence, he filled the Greeks with amazement at his good discipline, since they had expected in so vast a host random shouting, and leaping, with great confusion and dissipation of their lines. Besides this, he did well to draw up in front of his own line, and over against the Greeks, the mightiest of his scythe-bearing chariots, in order that by the force of their charge they might cut to pieces the ranks of the Greeks before they had come to close quarters..."
We are to believe, unless the tacit revealings above of the disciplined ability of the Royal Army are incorrect, under adept generals (
Tissaphernes, particularly, who was very familiar with Greek arms) no less, that, upon the advance of the men of bronze, the thousands of men on the Great King's left fled like cowards before the Greeks even came within missile range, which would have meant their execution (many were Egyptian soldiers, far from home)? I don't think so. Many of the chariots which arrived at the Greek ranks were riderless, and
Tissaphernes swiftly threw
Cyrus' right, now sans the Greeks, into defeat. The Persians could win battles more subtly, and used what they had to work in their favor (such grand tactical maneuvering in antiquity reached a pinnacle with the likes of
Hannibal). Basically, the Greek force was drawn away from the main battle, thus effectively isolated and strategically neutralized, now far from home. The subsequent great journey 'home to the sea' certainly merits legendary status. But that's another story...
At the risk of over-simplifying, the underlying reason, why the organization of the great Achaemenid Persian realm of its 'land' and 'peoples' (
empire is an anachronistic term), or the
khora basileos (royal territories) of the Great King's
arkhe (power) in Greek linguistics, crumbled by early 330 B.C. was not due to any significant element in connexion with 'decadence', 'weakness' or mishandled administration. The Empire of the Great King fell because one of the greatest, standing (ie, professional), balanced, adaptable, and overall most scientifically developed armies of warfare for its era, built by one of the most underestimated men of political and military action of any era (specifically from a reflection of surviving sources),
Philip II of Macedon, was launched into Asia led by his far more mercurially fiery, but no less ingenious, son;
Alexander was one of the most brilliant yet vainglorious (a necessary attribute for what took place from 334-324 B.C.; plenty more 'humble' leaders would have stopped much further west) battlefield commanders of all time. In the Macedonian-led army of conquest, a cohering military base was established for the invading army under a system of logistical application brilliantly created by a master, and applied by a brilliant practitioner.
Alexander was determined with the total conquest of the Achaemenid realm, and
Darius III and his subalterns, though afflicted with some extremely circumstantial bad luck, simply could find no military answer against this supreme instrument of war designed with all the aspects which make a flexible and disciplined army of conquest so great. The army of conquest (not one mustered to just win battles, as Greeks basically did before
Philip II), to reiterate, had a military genius at its helm, arguably the greatest of all time (if that 'title' must be sought). But a strong spirit did not die in the wake of the transfer of power, and the dynastic outgrowths of Parthia and the Sassanids stood strong against the later aggressions of Rome. At Carrhae in 53 B.C., the superiority of the principles of shock, missile power, and logistics by a horse-army was overtly demonstrated by the Parthians against heavy infantrymen superior to anything that came out of Greece (other than perhaps the
hypaspistai, but they were not as preponderant as the best Roman legionaries).
rez (and others who are involved), I'm enjoying your contributions to the 'Persian infantry' thread; I'd like to contribute soon. Heavy heavy crack infantryman of, the
Dailamites (or
Daylami, who fought at close-quarters, armed with swords, battle-axes, two-pronged javelins, etc., and wore heavy mail) arrived on the warring scene with the Sassanids, most predominantly under the reign of
Khosrau (Khosrow) I in the early 6th century A.D. These heavy infantrymen were a compliment to the vaunted Savaran cavalry (Sassanid knights every bit a match for their Byzantine counterparts). The Dailamites (
aluh = 'eagle',
amu[kh]t = 'taught') hailed from the rugged terrain of northern Persia (
modern Gilan and environs). They are 'the only Persian infantry force positively praised by Greco-Roman sources', writes Dr.
Kaveh Farrokh (in his superb
Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War, pg. 232). But he doesn't provide the specific sources, let alone their specific comments (which were among
Procopius and
Agathias, presumably). If the
Daylami were indeed descended from the Median
Dimilii tribe, the biggest question may be why their capacity to fight as heavy close-quarter infantrymen was never utilized, even marginally, until the c. late 4th century A.D. Mmmm. I wish they received better press. Do you know much about these soldiers? I realize it's far removed from the epoch of the Achaemenids.
Above left: I found this depiction of a Dailamite heavy infantryman (
here, specifically).
Right: the Achaemenid
dathabam (a file of ten men), which followed the Assyrian tradition of archers shooting behind a shield (
spara) wall. The shield-bearer (hence
sparabara) fought behind his
spara with a six-seven ft. spear and, if need be, a long dagger (the
akinaka). He was also the
dathapatis, the leader of the
dathabam (should he fall and enemy soldiers reach them, the archers defended themselves as best as they could with an
akinakes, a short sword not unlike the Greek
xiphos); ten
dathaba constituted the infantry tactical unit known as a
satabam; ten
sataba of a hundred men formed the thousand-man regiment called a
hazarabam; ten
hazaraba, in turn, comprised a
baivarabam (the convenient 10,000 'myriad' to the Greeks; the Mongol
tümen), hence Turkic in origin, was the field army numbering 10,000 men) of which the most renowned was the
Amrtaka (the 'Immortals'), who were always kept up to full strength (traditional). Otherwise, the decimal system was certainly not always maintained at these paper-strengths amid campaigns, a military historical reality for all 'parade-strengths' of every national army's organized units. By the early/mid 4th century B.C., this tactical concept had disappeared.
Different scholarly hypotheses can often be equally convincing, and the various explanations often reflect the current beliefs and attitudes of the society in which certain archaeologists and historians live and work. It gets complicated, and Territorial expansion by ancient states is influenced by macro-sociological aspects free of the paramount (though basic) influencing agent of environment (ie, waterways and deltas). There is a great variation in the qualitative and quantitative evidence that different ancient cultures have left for modern archaeological scholarship; Egyptian civilization, throughout its staple periods left great monuments, a wealth of artifacts, and a rich literary legacy (albeit not in prose form), while other cultural centers, such as Meroė and Carthage (the horrifically thorough destruction of the latter in 146 B.C. notwithstanding) are hitherto more mysterious, even staying within conventional science (ie, no Lemuria or Atlantis!). The controversy surrounding the interesting
Jiroft theory seems to reflect an overview of what can be seen as independent or part of a whole 'culture' with the various city-states. Much of the evidence of life and warfare in antiquity always entails interpretation, perhaps the strongest 'catalyst' of controversy, if I may; fascinating stuff bequeathed by antiquity is often partial and even contradictory, thus scholars always draw thought-provoking but imprecise conclusions.
Literary and archaeological evidence, and the occasional interjection of circular reasoning (which doesn't always lift the interpretation issue), can often offset each other now and then, and focalized changes can upsurge with newly uncovered data. To each his/her own, though, and many great and differing scholars are a joy to study: passionate disinterest and melancholic yearning both exist among the nostalgic, but that we are availed the balance of more 'balanced' professionals such as
Samuel Kramer (Sumer),
Ian Shaw (Egypt),
Pierre Briant (Achaemenid Persia),
Nicholas G. Hammond (Hellas), to name a few, we should consider ourselves quite fortunate. Of course it runs deeper, particularly with ancient Persia (Elamites, Sassanids etc.), and I'm going off on tangents from the issue of Hellas and the Achaemenids for our topic. But I'll never feel bad for thinking so pensively about the indirectly connected aspects of the ancient history of 'Europe' (mainland Greece and Roman eras), the Near East (Asia Minor, Egypt, and Phoenicia, etc.), and 'Asia' (Sumerian and Persian dynasties).
From my view, the multicultural and social issue of 'let's be fair to the Persians' should not be undertaken for the stroking of political correctness per se, at least for students etc. interested in the grand topic who are not political pundits or lobbyists for historical figures and subjects (ie, those who kiss babies and exhort in a manner influenced by their forensic requirements, etc.). Moreover, I feel, such a feeling shouldn’t be coupled with an overlapping denigration of the traditional historiography laid down by Hellenes, of which the advent lay with
Herodotus of Halicarnassus, who, whichever school of thought about him various scholars and aficionados, etc., of this subject decide to advocate, was the first to not only adeptly narrate for us an accurate account (historicity beyond the surface will never be proven, particularly in antiquity, and
Herodotus' works are not free from unevenness) of a monumental past event, but to imbue it with what he saw as intent, cause, and effect; he was indeed the Father of History, or at least the architect, putatively for his classic
The Histories, the first account of prose work we have which can be valued as a tremendous historical source;
The Histories, almost certainly, were to be directed at readers rather than listeners, evidenced by the frequent use of the past tense when referring to
Herodotus' own time, thereby adopting the perspective of future absorbers of his work. From the get-go
Herodotus clearly assumes the role as an historic abutment of
Homer. Reliance is almost solely dependent on
Herodotus for the great events of the early 5th century B.C. which decided the fate of the overall political course of the eastern Mediterranean Basin and 'Europe'. Moreover, he furnishes much data about Achaemenid Persia in the decades prior; he was well placed to hear and learn much, coming from the Carian port of Halicarnassus, traveling extensively when his mind was mature and knew what he was looking for. But the backdrop isn't exclusive with
Herodotus, as professor
John F. Lazenby, one the finest modern scholars dealing with the momentous events of ancient Greece and Republican Rome, lucidly writes on the first page of Ch. 1 of his superb
The Defence of Greece 490-479 B.C.,
"…The Persian Wars without Herodotus would not so much be Hamlet without the prince, as Hamlet without Shakespeare…"
Food for thought.
Thanks, James
EMPRESS OF ALL THINGS
[Medal] Jom for Phalera
Until we win! Or die.
Originally Posted by Jom
You beaut and magical
浪人
Fierce When Cornered
Horrible(ly cute)
.
Do it now.
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