Question about Checkerboard Formation

Read the descriptions in NTW for the Prussian Foot Guard. It mentions the change from the line advance to the checkerboard formation. How exactly does it work? Do they still march in lines or squares and how does this offer an advantage over the single line?

Don't know how the Prussians used it, but in general the checkerboard formation gives a you more flexibility, because you can change directions more easily. Dependent on how deep your formation is you can develop a line to the front, but also cover both flanks.

The Romans used checkerboard formations for shifting units in and out of the battle line. See here: http://home.zonnet.nl/richardevers2000/Formations3.htm

I saw this question about a week ago and I’ve been scratching my head ever since trying to decide what CA are talking about.

I think it depends upon the context in which we are thinking about a checkerboard formation. On a grand scale checkerboard formations on an 18th century battlefield were quite common, if not the norm. I believe the allied advance at Minden was performed by three lines of infantry ‘en-exchequer’ with each battalion covering the intervals between the two battalions ahead of it, and certainly at Culloden the government infantry were formed in two lines ‘en-exchequer’ with each battalion in the second line covering the interval between those in the first.

The reason for this was pretty obvious as the interval between two battalions is always going to be the weak point in the line, particularly if unit frontages cannot be maintained due to casualties, so posting another unit behind the interval made perfect sense.

Likewise as Yarkis has said having a formation deployed ‘en-exchequer’ makes it much easier to conduct a passage of lines if you need to relieve the pressure on a unit in front of you, or pass another force (say of cavalry) forward to exploit a success.

However, I can’t see why CA would mention this as a specific tactic for the Prussian Foot Guard.

It’s probably more likely that someone at CA read something about the rather unusual fire control system of firing by ‘halb-compagnien’ which is mentioned by Nafiziger (Imperial Bayonets page 40).

Nafziger doesn’t go into much detail as to how it worked in practice except to say that it was one of several firing drills mentioned in the Prussian 1792 regulations and involved the battalion firing three rank volleys by alternate half platoons. The first rank kneeling to fire.

This system doesn’t make a lot of sense as in practice it would mean that only half the battalion would fire in each 20 second period. The other half holding their fire until the first reloaded. As such it would reduce the overall firepower of the battalion and seems pointless compared to the other systems employed by Prussia and the other European armies of the period.

However, it did have one unique advantage as it allowed the Prussian army to adopt a formal system of ‘fire and advance’. Nafziger is annoyingly vague has to how this worked in practice. But apparently the right hand half platoon fired first and then shouldered arms and advanced without reloading. They would then halt, and presumably begin reloading, whilst the left half platoon marched forward and through the intervals in their line before halting at a signal from their officer.

The right hand platoon then having reloaded would begin its advance and as it got level with the left hand platoon the left hand platoon would fire its volley and begin reloading. The right hand platoon advancing onwards and halting at a signal from its officer somewhere further ahead.

Some aspects of this process as described by Nafziger don’t make much practical sense, and I suspect that in reality each half platoon would fire and then reload as the other was actually moving into position, a bit like the system used when skirmishing.

However, what it does describe is a situation where at any point in time the battalion or regiment would be divided into two lines of half-platoons arranged (at least when at the extremes of each step) in exchequer.

Perhaps there is some famous action when the Prussian Foot Guard actually performed this drill in battle and CA came across it during their research. It’s the only explanation I can think of at the moment.

I too having been giving this some thought - and have concluded it refers to the adoption of the checkerboard brigade formation post Jena-Auerstadt - see article by Jeff Lewis at http://www.napoleon-series.org/milit...regs1812e.html Although the diagrams are not showing, if you click on each box they will open up and display correctly.

http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Pr...y.htm#_tactics



Read down past the basic tactics and you will see how a Prussian Brigade deployed in a checkerboard formation.

Originally Posted by Lowes

Read down past the basic tactics and you will see how a Prussian Brigade deployed in a checkerboard formation.

Its not really though is it.

I mean I know it looks like a chequer board because of the way the its been presented on the web-page, but the actual formation that the author is trying to represent is based upon the manoeuvre regulations of 1812 which are covered in Appendix 5 of Nash's book on the Prussian Army.

If you actually look at the diagrams he provides you realise that the formation only appears to be a chequer board pattern because of the composition and role of the troops in the formation and the initial formations they are in. In effect its a result diagramatic convention rather than actual intention.

These are the diagrams as drawn by Nash:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

As you can see the formation is screened by a line of skirmishers drawn from the fusilier battalions of both regiments, and the reserves for skirmish line have been shown positioned centrally behind the screen they are providing. Behind the skirmish line and its reserves the main battle line is composed of three musketeers battalions with the fourth battalions and the grenadier companies (assuming they are present) acting as the reserve.

The Artillery has been shown positioned to each flank with the brigades cavalry acting in support.

Here is another view of the same formation. However, in this depiction the skirmish line has been withdrawn (or has not yet been deployed) and the two fusilier battalions are shown formed up behind the flanks of the three musketeer battlaions of the main battle line.



In both cases the battalions have been drawn as though formed in column, however at some point the three musketeer battalions would have formed line or square and thus destroyed the symmetry of the formation somewhat. Likewise terrain would always have an overriding influence.

By comparison take a look at this diagram showing the battle deployment of the Englsh and Scots at the battle of Culloden in 1745.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

One can easily look at that diagram and conclude with perfect justification that both the English army and its Scottish opposition are deployed in a chequerboard formation. I think the bottom line being that it just made sense, and wasn't particularly special.

The simple fact is that as most Prussian regiments consisted of one fusilier battalion and two musketeer battalions, any formation that placed the fusilier battalion in its correct position screening the rest of the regiment would inevitably appear as a chequer board pattern when viewed diagramatically.

Likewise, the third line containing the composite grenadier companies and the spare musketeer battalion is simply a tactical reserve, which since the early 18th century would usually be positioned to cover the weak points in the main battle line and therefore is drawn covering the intervals between the musketeer battalions.

There is nothing particularly novel or noteworthy about this deployment and as far as I can tell it was pretty standard across all nations. The Prussians merely formalised it because they were able to as a result of the standardisation of their brigade structure. The British for instance tried to establish a similar principle with their cavalry brigades which were supposed to contain three regiments, (two forwards and one in reserve) but were constantly frustrated by variations in brigade composition. The French did a similar thing but kept it at regimental level.

What remains unresolved is why CA have attributed this checkerboard formation exclusively to the Prussian Foot Guard as queried by Voodo Chile in his OP.

Well "chequerboard" is misleading, the formation was as outdated as the Prussian military itself, it was really more reminiscent of ancient Manipular lines, with the three-line formations organized into Marching battalions, each "line" progressively possessing more "combat weight" then the next. These battalions would be in a formation vaugely resembling a column, as, if I recall, the Prussians preferred this formation to a square in the event of enemy cavalry. It was called a "chequerboard formation" because. while effectively a brigade formation, individual units moved as battalions and there were considerable if not dangerous spaces between the individual marching segments. This goes back to the Prussians inability to deploy in a line and maintain marching order.

There's a battle in which a Prussian general actually attempted to form a line from these battalion columns, and the operation went so awry that he had to reform the chequerboard to prevent his units from routing. Just goes to show the inability to form a line -- if I recall the incident's name, time and place, I shall post it here.

There is nothing particularly novel or noteworthy about this deployment and as far as I can tell it was pretty standard across all nations.

Yes, standard for 1792 perhaps, the Prussians were using it straight until the Leipzig campaign, unfortunately. Its a wonder they won any battles at all.

he British for instance tried to establish a similar principle with their cavalry brigades which were supposed to contain three regiments,

Which is why other European nations of this time period have a marked superiority over British cavalry, who had superior training and mastery of their mounts, but piss poor marching discipline, their deployment and ability to reform/form for a charge was severely affected as a result, another problem that carried through right to the end of the Napoleonic Wars, vis-a-vis Uxbridge's decisive charge at Waterloo; that all but scattered the British cavalry for the duration of the battle.

Also it should be noted that, despite the obvious differences between the nature of deploying Cavalry and deploying Infantry, a Prussian Brigade was of 2 regiments plus change, logistically speaking an easier affair to handle, though you have already displayed your knowledge of this, regardless I think the reference to the British cavalry is nonplus.

What remains unresolved is why CA have attributed this checkerboard formation exclusively to the Prussian Foot Guard as queried by Voodo Chile in his OP.

Another little quib of CA, it is safe to presume. The formation was standard across all Prussian Brigade formations.

It is safe to say your knowledge of military tactics of this period are markedly superior to mine (truly my area of expertise is from the year 1942 onwards), and I invite and anticipate any further knowledge you can share and disclose to me.

Originally Posted by Lowes

Well "chequerboard" is misleading, the formation was as outdated as the Prussian military itself, it was really more reminiscent of ancient Manipular lines, with the three-line formations organized into Marching battalions, each "line" progressively possessing more "combat weight" then the next. These battalions would be in a formation vaugely resembling a column, as, if I recall, the Prussians preferred this formation to a square in the event of enemy cavalry. It was called a "chequerboard formation" because. while effectively a brigade formation, individual units moved as battalions and there were considerable if not dangerous spaces between the individual marching segments. This goes back to the Prussians inability to deploy in a line and maintain marching order.

There's a battle in which a Prussian general actually attempted to form a line from these battalion columns, and the operation went so awry that he had to reform the chequerboard to prevent his units from routing. Just goes to show the inability to form a line -- if I recall the incident's name, time and place, I shall post it here.

I'd be interested to know more as much of what you say above is new to me. The brigade formations themselves are dated by Nash as originating from the 1812 manoeuvre regulations, so I assumed they were a new innovation linked to the Prussian Army reforms.

Originally Posted by Lowes

Which is why other European nations of this time period have a marked superiority over British cavalry, who had superior training and mastery of their mounts, but piss poor marching discipline, their deployment and ability to reform/form for a charge was severely affected as a result, another problem that carried through right to the end of the Napoleonic Wars, vis-a-vis Uxbridge's decisive charge at Waterloo; that all but scattered the British cavalry for the duration of the battle.

Thats a bit of a simplification of the issues that affected the performance of the British cavalry over this period, and the operational availability of the Union and Household brigades after Uxbridges initial charge at Waterloo.

But its fair to say that there were problems with the performance of the British cavalry. These partly arose from the way British cavalry regiments were employed when not on active service, and partly from the background and attitudes of the men who were attracted to pursue a career as British cavalry officers.

It was also not helped by the fact that early in the war these very same headstrong tactics actually delivered a number of amazing successes, not least that action conducted by the 15th Hussars at Sahagun on the 21st December 1808 which was celebrated in a song of self-promotion written by a Sergeant of the Regiment and inspired every other regiment in the British Cavalry to emulate often with disasterous results.

It was also not helped by the fact that early in the war these very same headstrong tactics actually delivered a number of amazing successes, not least that action conducted by the 15th Hussars at Sahagun on the 21st December 1808 which was celebrated in a song of self-promotion written by a Sergeant of the Regiment and inspired every other regiment in the British Cavalry to emulate often with disasterous results.

Point.

I'm sure we could pound out why the British cavalry performed, or failed to perform during the Napoleonic wars but it is a topic I feel that deserves a thread of its own, so for now back to the issue at hand.

Firstly, I have found the incident in question that I mentioned previously, a quotation:

“As we (Prussians) neared the French batteries, Bulow attempted to protect our first wave, which was advancing in battalion masses, against the impact of the cannonballs by forming an ordinary line.
This failed and the fast reorganization into battalion masses was the only means of preventing disorder. In addition, it proved that in the present employment of artillery and by the utilization of any terrain, an advance in combat with long, thin lines is impossible and should be stricken from the regulations.”
(- General Boyen, after the battle of Gross-Beeren 1813)

You may corroborate this with your own research if you will, and I will not spend too much time dissecting this, but even if this quote is not speaking about chequerboard formations (no indeed, upon re-reading it, it occurs to me that the Prussian battalions may have been moving in column-compact) it goes to show that there was a marked inability to form lines in good order and time in the face of the enemy at a move-to-contact.

Further, it seems that there was still much debate going on over this formation during the Leipzig campaign, further evidence to support that it was indeed a recent reform and that I am in the wrong on this.

Upon reading up on Nazfiger, I can't personally find any mention as to when this formation was adopted by the Prussian infantry, but I'm willing to cede that it was formalized as part of the reforms, as you said.
I also came across something you may find of interest when doing the research:

I"...the number of lines was not always three. For example in 1813 at Dennewitz, General Krafft deployed his brigade in 2 lines, the battalions of the first line attempted to deploy in line, while those in the second stood in columns, 400 paces (!) apart and behind the first"

Anyways, I'm just as confused now as to what standing doctrine was for the Prussians, though this all this digging about has taught me some interesting facts about the warfare of this era. I feel rather embarrassed on the whole old thing, I fear I stretched my neck out too far without conducting the proper research, though the facilities weren't available to me at the time.

Originally Posted by Lowes

You may corroborate this with your own research if you will, and I will not spend too much time dissecting this, but even if this quote is not speaking about chequerboard formations (no indeed, upon re-reading it, it occurs to me that the Prussian battalions may have been moving in column-compact) it goes to show that there was a marked inability to form lines in good order and time in the face of the enemy at a move-to-contact.

There is no need to corrobate it as its a reasonably common comment in tactical records of every nation of the period. There have been previous threads on this forum which have debated both the logic and benefits of forming troops in dense columns when they were under artillery fire, or due to advance into it. It was pretty much a universal practice but seems counter-intuitive to modern minds used to the concepts of camoflage and cover.

My own theory on the benefits of the column and similar dense formations such as the square, is quite simply that it improved the ability to maintain unit cohesion.

When extended into line the length of the unit formation and its lack of depth required that its officers and NCO's be disbursed over a distance of some 150 yards (depending on the units strength). This in turn meant that in the event of any faultering in the ranks there would probably only be one or two officers or NCO's readily on hand to restore order and prevent the men from absconding.

By comparison when deployed in a column the frontage of the unit would usually be around 50-80 files, about 40-50 yards and the Officers and NCO's from the lead companies and the support companies would be able to combine their efforts much more easily to maintain order in the ranks. Plus, the very nature of the multiple supporting companies to the rear made it that much harder for men to abscond from the formation without being noticed and stopped.

Thus it is that in many cases one reads of battalions deliberately forming columns or squares when under severe pressure, or of being unable to quit such a formation to deploy into line. At Waterloo for example Mercer mentions that the nearby square of Brunswick children, which had weathered the French cavalry attacks then remained in square for the rest of the battle despite being pounded by French artillery simply because its officers were no longer confident of being able to keep it together if they tried to extend it into line, and also describes how the boys were so petrified with fright that even when a shot ploughed through their ranks they were unable to move and had to be thumped by their officers and NCO's to get them to close the resulting gaps.

The square like the column had the advantage that as the losses increased the square contracted and the business of keeping it together became easier for the officers and NCO's.

Originally Posted by Lowes

Upon reading up on Nazfiger, I can't personally find any mention as to when this formation was adopted by the Prussian infantry, but I'm willing to cede that it was formalized as part of the reforms, as you said.

I also checked Nazfiger just to see if he corroborates Nash's diagrams, but like you I could find no mention of these formations.

The only reason I feel confident that they orignate from the 1812 reforms, is that they are heavily dependant upon the regimental structure of two musketeer, one fusilier battalion which I don't think existed earlier, and because they are based upon a brigade of combined arms with integral cavalry and artillery support, which again was a more recent innovation copied from the French Corps system.

Prussian Brigade formation is shown on page 277 of Nafziger. It is in the section about Operation of Combined Arms. Page 278 has the formation for a bayonet charge & forming against cavalry during an attack.

Originally Posted by Prince of Essling

Prussian Brigade formation is shown on page 277 of Nafziger. It is in the section about Operation of Combined Arms. Page 278 has the formation for a bayonet charge & forming against cavalry during an attack.

Why does he do that. I went through the entire Prussian tactical section looking for it.

Anyway! Fig 132b seems to match Nash's Fig 8 . Fig 132a is somewhat different to Nash's Fig 9 as it implies that when formed the two fusilier battalions are posted 150 yards in advance of the main battle line in close order, whereas Nash shows them formed to the flanks of the support line. However, its possible that these are two different formations, or snapshots of the transition from one formation to the other.

e.g. Nash's Fig 9 transforms into Nafziger Fig 132a by throwing the fusilier battalions forward, and then into Nash's Fig 8/Nafziger's Fig 132b by the Fusilier battalions throwing out a line of skirmishers.

At least Nafziger agree's with Nash on the 1812 date.

Originally Posted by Didz

Why does he do that. I went through the entire Prussian tactical section looking for it.

To keep us on our toes???

I must try and remember to always look through the back of the book, rather than the nation specific sections. Thats twice now you've had to point me to a section hidden at the back that I'd overlooked.

Hmm, well thank you for your insight Didz! Oh interesting note related to NTW itself from what you said; there is a small morale bonus for being a part of a column formation -- looks like CA did their homework.

Yes, unfortunately I don't think there is a morale penalty for trying to change formation under fire. The old Talonsoft games always imposed a risk of disorganisation based upon troop training when conducting any transition which was at least an attempt at modelling the risks.