Why democracies fail when fighting against insurgencies

[Pra]

An interestiing article I read about the impossible trilemma of counter insurgency: By Lorenzo Zambernardi

http://www.twq.com/10july/docs/10jul_Zambernardi.pdf

I quote below

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The impossible trilemma in counterinsurgency is that, in this type of conflict, it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and noncombatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents
(Figure 1).

In pursuing any two of these goals, a state must forgo some portion of the third objective. A state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans, Italians, and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe, respectively. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral
damage, but only by abandoning the objective of destroying the insurgents, as U.S. armed forces have started to do in Iraq after the success of the ‘‘surge.’’5

Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and noncombatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, as the United States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have recently begun to do in Afghanistan. As in international economics, where states actually make a trade-off among its economic goals, the argument
here highlights that, in counterinsurgency, it is almost impossible to reach all three objectives within a feasible time frame. So a country must choose two out of three goals and develop a strategy that can successfully accomplish them, while putting the third objective on the back burner.

Continued on...

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

In the contemporary world, the first option (sacrificing civilians) seems infeasible for Western democracies, since it implies a policy of barbarism unacceptable for humanitarian reasons, as
well as high domestic and international opinion costs. Indeed in irregular warfare, civilians and insurgents are closely intermingled
and difficult to distinguish, and non-insurgent casualties often occur.

In the middle of an insurgency, harming innocent civilians also backfires, generating unfavorable political effects which can far outweigh short-term gains in the physical destruction
of an insurgency. In other words, killing noncombatants is not merely a moral wrong, but it is also counterproductive, creating a political problem since it contributes toward creating fresh insurgents and does nothing to help the counterinsurgent win the support of the
population. While the remarkable accuracy of modern weapons has certainly improved the possibility of discriminating between combatants and noncombatants, the problem of indiscriminate killing in irregular warfare seems far from being solved.

The second option (not physically destroying insurgents) implies cutting political deals with insurgents or agreeing to a very long-term commitment in the occupied country. As George Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau argued in the context of the Cold War, this policy seems particularly difficult for democracies, because these are political regimes that tend to demonize their enemies and, in doing so, find it difficult to reach a diplomatic solution.6

While today’s context differs significantly from that of the Cold War, their point is still relevant. This option might prove ideal in certain contexts where insurgents can be persuaded to put down their arms, as it was in Iraq where political agreements with certain factions of insurgents combined with improved security created by the ‘‘surge’’
strongly contributed toward stabilizing the country.7


The third option (sacrificing force protection) implies significant losses of troops, which might be justified in relation to the political goals of the war, but which remain hard to ‘‘sell’’ to Western publics. Indeed, this option seems particularly difficult in the post-Vietnam era, in which the problem of casualty aversion was progressively heightened. It is no coincidence that in early October 1993, after the killing of ‘‘only’’ 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu, the United States dramatically decided to end its military presence in Somalia. And it is no coincidence that in order to minimize the risk of military casualties during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, ground forces were not employed.

The central thesis seems to be

Contemporary democracies have problems with all three policy options: they can hardly stomach innocent lives in collateral damage and they have difficulties in finding a diplomatic solution with their enemies (especially those who are publicly labeled as terrorists). At this stage of the conflict in Afghanistan, however, the United States and ISAF seem to be stuck in the trade-offs implied in the third alternative with military casualties mounting.

What's your opinion on this (and I am really interested in those who were in the military, especially Farnan, srwitt, and Oldgamer (I think you were in the military yes?)

Are we, as a nation, in the US, not capable of the political will to defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan? Has the media been a major factor in why most insurgencies (especially post Vietnam) fail?

I am a critic of the war, but I ask other critics this, say you were the commander of a force facing an insurgency, what would you do? How do you feel you could most effectively fight an insurgency (especially a war of 'choice' like Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam)? Would you look for a politcal solution? What if it's not possible, would you increase a surge? What if increased losses, reduces your morale and the political will at home?

What would you do as a commander facing an insurgency in a 'war of choice'?

[Poach]

The Malayan Emergency was resolved successfully by a democracy.

Ofcourse, it differs from the likes of Afghanistan and Vietnam because the MNLA had no easy access to friendly supplies (N.Vietnam had a land border with China and Afghanistan has a border with Pakistan, the MNLA had no such comfort) amongst other things.

Anyway, onto your point: Does ISAF/The US have the stomache to do what is really necessary to win this war?

You've got to remember why Vietnam and Afghanistan are so difficult militarily: both have open borders friendly to the enemy that we can't cross. In Vietnam, the US couldn't simply start bombing logistics bases in China and in Afghanistan ISAF can't really do it in Pakistan (iirc we do have limited air access over Pakistan, but we can't start a massive bombing campaign against Taliban targets).

If we look at Afghanistan, we're essentially operating against an enemy whose rear area is largely immune to our attacks. The Taliban's training, command and logistics are all based in Pakistan, and their fighters move into Afghanistan from there to fight our forces. This is why Southern Afghanistan is the hottest.

This puts us in a nearly impossible position: all we can do is kill their fighters, and they don't struggle with recruitment. We can assassinate their leaders if we can track them down, which shakes them up for a bit but doesn't cause any serious buckling, but we can't start hitting their support structure. That's why some regard Afghanistan as unwinnable: we can't shut down their capability to produce fighters.

As such, the strategy we're somewhat forced to work with (I'm sure the US/ISAF higher ups would love nothing better than to be told that the CIA is sending them a list of all the Taliban's important Pakistan bases and that their aircraft are free to wipe them out) is one of a war of words. The only workable way to end the Taliban threat is not by killing the Taliban, because we can't do that, but by undermining their cause in Afghanistan, which is a long, slow process that is difficult. That's why the whole "hearts and minds" thing is so commonly talked of: it's our only option. We've got to make the local Afghans dislike the Taliban so much that the Taliban are forced to give up on Afghanistan because even if they make us leave, the locals won't welcome their guys back.

Unfortunately, I can't think of much else we can do. Unless we can convince Pakistan to let us take the fight to the Taliban's home turf (which isn't going to happen), our only option is to kill them when they're in Afghanistan and make as much progress as we can under the umbrella of protection offered by the soldiers. If we can build the country up enough that they realise becoming part of the international community is superior to living isolated under the Taliban then we'll have won, but that takes time.

[hellheaven1987]

The Malayan Emergency was resolved successfully by a democracy.

And force relocation, some violation of private freedom and so on.

Such strategy would only give leftist excuse to accuse the government's is violating human right today.

[Poach]

And force relocation, some violation of private freedom and so on.

Such strategy would only give leftist excuse to accuse the government's is violating human right today.

Indeed, but the New Villages were far, far better than the Boer War camps. Indeed, the New Villages became rather liked by their occupants, as they were superior to their old villages and they actually owned the land.

This is in stark contrast with the Boer War camps, which were just awful.

[hellheaven1987]

Indeed, but the New Villages were far, far better than the Boer War camps. Indeed, the New Villages became rather liked by their occupants, as they were superior to their old villages and they actually owned the land.

Perhaps, but that does not change the fact that those who did not want to move were forced to relocate no matter what; not to mention the restriction of coming out home during the night and food rationing, which both today would be viewed as a serious violation of human right.

[Pra]

Nice points Poach. I think you raised an important question

Do we have the stomache to fight this war?

I actually don't think the general US population does. Unfortunately, trying to win the hearts and minds puts our soldiers at an increased risk of taking casualities-which undermines the war effort.

Attacking terrorist camps with UAVs, or other methods will protect our soldiers, but our population might be outraged. And we could be attacking 'indescriminately', and as such we would 'lose the hearts and minds'.

Last, maybe we could negotiate with the Taliban? But that's out of the question, as a political position-we invaded Afghanistan to take out the Taliban.

A big part of this is the media perception, and the way Western Democracies are set up-we always need to be the good guys, and we end up losing the stomache for the dirty work. Trying to juggle these demands is difficult, to say the least.

[austin.weathers]

Nice points Poach. I think you raised an important question

Do we have the stomache to fight this war?

I actually don't think the general US population does. Unfortunately, trying to win the hearts and minds puts our soldiers at an increased risk of taking casualities-which undermines the war effort.

Attacking terrorist camps with UAVs, or other methods will protect our soldiers, but our population might be outraged. And we could be attacking 'indescriminately', and as such we would 'lose the hearts and minds'.

Last, maybe we could negotiate with the Taliban? But that's out of the question, as a political position-we invaded Afghanistan to take out the Taliban.

A big part of this is the media perception, and the way Western Democracies are set up-we always need to be the good guys, and we end up losing the stomache for the dirty work. Trying to juggle these demands is difficult, to say the least.

Agreed!

[Imperial]

I say it's time for a change. Half of the world already hates the US, attacking targets in Pakistan is imperative to winning the war in Afghanistan.

[Shep309]

Nice poast poach.

I'm a former navy man myself, so I'm used to dealing with things that you know, float, but I'm inclined to agree. Taliban/Al Qaeda aren't so much standing military forces as they are ideals. We can no more prove they're wrong in their thinking than one could prove or disprove the existence, or lack thereof, of a God. Our only goal, like poach said, is the only one attainable. We need to win the populace over into believing that the lesser of two evils is the way we (the US/ISAF) way of doing things.

I used to think this shouldn't be to hard, when these extremists like to usually blow themselves up in crowds and kill innocents, but I'm sure the killing doesn't look much different when friends and loved ones are killed by suicide bombers or "smart weapons". It's especially hard to root out these insurgencies when their bases of operations are usually nestled nicely in to high population urban areas, it's almost impossible to avoid civillian casualties, thus making it that much harder to win over "hearts and minds". Explains why we've been there for the better part of a decade now.

The population in the US will never accept another vietnam type casualty list. Looking at just the numbers here..not trying to be insensative, but in 10 years of war in the middle east casualties among US troops are in the 4-6k range (not sure on the actual numbers) but ti's pretty low considering. Vietnam was at 60k and we really weren't even there for half as long as the wars today.

[Imperial]

The population in the US will never accept another vietnam type casualty list. Looking at just the numbers here..not trying to be insensative, but in 10 years of war in the middle east casualties among US troops are in the 4-6k range (not sure on the actual numbers) but ti's pretty low considering. Vietnam was at 60k and we really weren't even there for half as long as the wars today.

I don't think the soldiers in Vietnam fully adapted to the gorilla warfare like the soldiers in Iraq/Afghanistan. It also has a lot to do with the advances in military technology.

[Shep309]

I don't think the soldiers in Vietnam fully adapted to the gorilla warfare like the soldiers in Iraq/Afghanistan. It also has a lot to do with the advances in military technology.

That's true as well, in Vietnam we were fighting a guerilla army using World War tactics, much like how the British fought the colonials in the revolution. Sure there may have been a pitched battle here and there, but not adapting to the type of enemy you're fighting spells downfall for sure.

When the Veit Cong did fight in like that (pitched battle) they lost decisively. Even the Tet Offensive was a military disaster, yet the images shown at home were enough to make the american population think we were losing.. and badly.

[Pra]

@ Shep, thanks for your perspective.

Are there a lot of suicide attacks, or civilians being used as shields by the Taliban forces in Afghanistan?

I know it's pretty prevalent in Iraq. From what you see, does that take away support for these insurgencies by the local populace?

[Shep309]

@ Shep, thanks for your perspective.

Are there a lot of suicide attacks, or civilians being used as shields by the Taliban forces in Afghanistan?

I know it's pretty prevalent in Iraq. From what you see, does that take away support for these insurgencies by the local populace?

To be honest I did kind of lump Iraq and Afghanistan together. No, not in the terms that Iraq has with suicide bombers. I can recall one incident where a guy blew himself up killing 7 CIA members, but it's definately not as widespread as it is in Iraq. The Taliban seems to be fighting more of a guerrilla war than random bombings.

Honestly, I don't see it taking away support from the populace. In Iraq, yeah a bit, but not so much in Afghanistan. Like I was saying, I imagine the general populace just want's the killing to stop. From the news reports here in the states, and how the Taliban governed, it's hard to believe that the general populace wouldn't jump at the chance to get rid of the taliban, but then you never really will get rid of them. I've also got to consider, I was lied to when it came to going to Iraq in the first place. How do I know the claims that the claims of how bad the taliban are true? I'm not saying it's not true, but given the track record with the previous war (and how it started) how can I know for sure unless I saw firsthand?

[Dr. Croccer]

In counterinsurgency one must be between ineffectiveness because of fear of collatoral damage and bloodthirsty, random slaughter.

[Poach]

Unfortunately, Hellheaven, human rights aren't the first thing on one's mind when attempting to destroy an insurgency. It wouldn't work in Afghanistan, however, as the Taliban's recruits are extremist Muslims from all over the world: they're not an ethnic or political group by nature. Relocating of Pashtun communities may seal off one source of their recruitment, but it won't be anywhere near as effective as it was on the MNLA.

[mrtonberry]

What does democracy have to do with, not being able to stomach the cost of war? It depends on the nation and its environment rather than the political system, IMHO.

[Col. Tartleton]

The only way to win a war is to be more concerned with defeating the enemy then winning the war. Guerrillas understand this better then Regular soldiers. Guerrillas know who to shoot. Regulars won't have that luxury. Thanks to the enlightenment we cannot in good conscience use the same tactics they do without demoralizing our base. A Guerrilla can shoot a civilian without fear of reprisals because he is the agent of fear and reprisals. A soldier fighting for an enlightened ideal cannot lower himself to the same level of detached brutality without being recalled, punished, and having a negative affect on morale.

Mr Mujahideen can do anything he wants to because he's only responsible to a group of equally hardened killers. Mr Marine is just as capable of atrocities but he is expected to restrain himself for the sake of honor. If American doctrine was "Kill them all and let God sort them out" we'd have defeated every army we've ever encountered. We'd have nuked China to ash and bled Vietnam dry.

[mrtonberry]

If American doctrine was "Kill them all and let God sort them out" we'd have defeated every army we've ever encountered. We'd have nuked China to ash and bled Vietnam dry.

Of course, but at the cost of superpower status.

[Shep309]

Of course, but at the cost of superpower status.

Eh, I'm not so sure superpower status would be lost. I'd be far more fearful of a nation who stops at nothing to obliterate enemies, than I would be of one who is constrained by "rules of engagement". A nation who has the will of the people as well as the military and economic might to achieve this, is still a superpower. Is it not?

That would be a true hegemon.

[mrtonberry]

Eh, I'm not so sure superpower status would be lost. I'd be far more fearful of a nation who stops at nothing to obliterate enemies, than I would be of one who is constrained by "rules of engagement". A nation who has the will of the people as well as the military and economic might to achieve this, is still a superpower. Is it not?

By doing so, America will only antagonize itself from the rest of the world, just like nazi's did. Look at how well that ended.