Austrian Army Regimental Names

[Didz]

I wonder whom "Keiser von Russland" designates ?! The Tsar at the time or an austrian pretender ? Also what are the two "deutschmeister" regiments translated as ? Otherwise very fresh, especially with a Bourbon Legion pour la France.

There is more information on these regiments here: http://www.napoleon-series.org/milit...trianinf1.html

For IR Nr 2 it states:

Infantry Regiment Nr. 2 (Hungarian)

Regimental Designations and Colonels-in-Chief:

1761-1806: Infantry Regiment ‘Erzherzog Ferdinand’ Nr. 2 (Ferdinand-Karl, Erzherzog von Osterreich)
1806-1814: Infantry Regiment ‘Freiherr von Hiller’ Nr. 2 (Hiller, Feldzugmeister Johann, Freiherr von) [1]
1814-1825: Infantry Regiment ‘Kaiser von Russland’ Nr. 2 (Alexander I, Kaiser von Russland)

Deputy Colonels-in-Chief:

1801: Hiller, Feldmarschalleutnant Johann, Freiherr von
1814: Koller, Feldmarschalleutnant Franz, Freiherr von

Colonels:

1799: Candiani, Oberst Hieronymus
1805-1809: Hessen-Homburg, Oberst Philipp, Prinz zu
1809-1814: Torri, Oberst von
1814-1815: Csorich, Oberst Franz von

Subordinate Officers (1799):

Lippe, Oberstleutnant Freiherr
Schmidl, Major
Fuglein, Major

Notes:

[1] Feldzugmeister Johann, Freiherr von Hiller (1754-1819) was commissioned into the Austrian artillery in 1770. He commanded VI Corps at the Battle of Aspern-Essling (1809) then later served in Italy.

[Prince of Essling]

I wonder whom "Keiser von Russland" designates ?! The Tsar at the time or an austrian pretender ? Also what are the two "deutschmeister" regiments translated as ? Otherwise very fresh, especially with a Bourbon Legion pour la France.

Didz has already responded on "Kaiser von Russland".

The history of the origin of Hoch-und-Deutchmeister name can be found at http://www.ir134-hud.com/history.html - extract below for ease of reference:

"The cross of the Teutonic Knights dated back to the time of the first crusades. In 1190 AD, the Deutsche Ritterorden (German Knightly Order) was founded. The knights were trained as medical as well as religious warriors. Their valorous deeds and excellent training were very important in the campaigns of colonization and christianization of the lands east of Prussia. However, after Hochmeister Albrecht von Brandenberg left the Catholic faith during the Protestant reformation, the knightly orders decayed and virtually disappeared. A new order designated the Hoch-und Teutschmeister was founded in circa 1530. Shortly thereafter the first wars with the arch enemy of Christian Europe, Turkey, began. Despite the religion-based wars raging, the German knightly orders were unable to rebuild and take a significant role in the defense of what is now Austria, Czech Republic, Germany and Poland. The time of the knightly orders had ended.

In 1696 Franz-Ludwig, Count Palatine of the Rhein, Duke of Neuberg, authorized the Hoch- und Teutschmeister regiment which was to be composed of three battalions of foot each of which would have four companies. This is considered to be the formal birth of the present Hoch- und Deutschmeister - possibly the proudest name in Imperial Austria's military history.

The regiment was commanded by Austro-Hungarian Prince Eugen against the Turks in the great battle of Zenta which broke Turkish power in Europe for a time. The HuD took a prominent role in the victory which may well be considered its true baptism of fire. The regiment is next mentioned for its role in the storming of Belgrade in 1717 and the attack on Kolin in the Seven Years War in 1757.

In 1769 the Austrian military establishment began to number regiments. The HuD was granted the Number 4. Under Emperor Josef II the regiment was named the home regiment for Vienna and recruitment was concentrated there. The people of Vienna referred to the Regiment as the "Wiener Edelknaben" which literally translates to "Vienna Pages." The sons of the best families of Vienna sought positions in the Regiment as a means of further establishing themselves in Viennese society. Members of the regiment included Archdukes from all over Austria as well as Imperial princes.

In the last Turkish war, the Hoch-und Deutschmeister helped conquer Belgrade in 1788 and Cetin in 1790. In the wars with Napoleonic France that followed, the Hoch- und Deutschmeister was in more than 90 battles in 25 years. In the Wars of Liberation in the early 19th century the HuD fought Napoleon at San Michele (1813), Mincio (1814), Valeggio (1814) and finally marched its banner triumphantly through the streets of Napoleon’s capital, Paris, in 1815................"

[ordoprinceps]

Hi P of E,
You have provided excellent info as usual.
I have a question about the Austro-Hungarian Army; I understand that because of the many changes of its long history (centuries) a simple answer may not be possible. So here goes… Some authors, such as Albert Seaton, argue that the Austro-Hungarian Army was Europe’s most formidable force after the fall of the Roman Empire and up to Napoleon. Seaton as an example says the Austro-Hungarian Army was the most formidable army that Napoleon faced.
The NTW game doesn’t make the Austro-Hungarian army very formidable in my opinion. In fact I recall during one of “Napoleons battles” in the game the narrator who is doing Napoleons voice says with distain, “Austrians annoy me”. It gives the player of the CA vanilla NTW game the impression that they were a push over as we say in the states.
As our resident site historian, do you think in reality (not the game) that the author Seaton was correct on this point?

[Didz]

From a wargaming standpoint the Austro-Hungarian Army of this period is considered below par as a fighting force and is usually heavily penalised in tabletop wargaming rules. So, for me it isn't surprising to see a similar attitude in NTW.

The general explanation mirrors that quoted by Albert Seaton in his book 'The Austro-Hungarian Army of the Napoleonic Wars' 1973 in which he states 'One of the main weaknesses of the Austro-Hungarian Army lay in it's multi-racial character. The steadiest and staunchest arm was it's German infantry and this took the brunt of most fighting. The Bohemian and Moravian elements tended to be politically unreliable and prone to desertion, particularly since the Austrian was often viewed as a foreign ruler and oppressor. The Hungarian was in yet a different category for he regarded himself as superior to the Austrian in war; in fact he was usually a better horseman then his Germanic neighbour but he lacked self-discipline, stamina and stolidity which make a good infantryman; and although he had bravery and dash, he displike routine and application to monotonous tasks.'

This sort of racial stereotyping is common in discussions of the Austro-Hungarian Army of the period and is a common theme even amongst historians.

Petre: for example states: 'The Austrian soldier was animated only by the hope of avoiding defeat, rather than the determination and assurance of victory which inspired his enemies. That was a spirit which gave but slight hope of success. The Austrian was by nature slow, and wanting in animation, unlike the vivacity and endurance of the Frenchman. His slowness was as much a part of his nature as rigidity was of the Prussian's, or doggedness of the Russian. Consequently, the whole army. as a whole. was terribly slow. It's rapid movements were only in defeat.' In other words it was good at running away.

Even Tolstoi makes a negative observations about the character of the Austrian soldier in his appendicies to 'War and Peace'.

Traditionally therefore, wargame rules penalize the Austro-Hungarian Army with poor musketry, slow campaign and battlefield movement and slow formation changes and reactions to tactical and strategic events.

I was puzzled about this partly because I don't believe in racial stereo-typing, and partly because the same troops that were considered poor quality in Austrian service seem to have been highly valued by Napoleon. So, when I came to design the rules for my wargame campaign I dug a little deeper into the explanations for some of the issues that certainly did plague the Austro-Hungarian Army.

Ignoring the easy and obvious racial differences explanation I tried to look at issues which were inherent in the way the Austro-Hungarian Army functioned rather than the nature of the men that it employed. Given that these same men performed well in both the French and British service it seemed foolish to assume that they were the cause of the problems.

What I discovered was:

1. Austrian Racial Dogma: It appears from looking at the records and reports of the Austrian Army of this period that the Austrian officer Corps expected certain ethnic groups to behave in certain ways. They actually tried to play to these so called strengths and weaknesses in the way men from certain area's were employed. But more importantly they allowed themselves to predict and expect the behaviour that they eventually got. In other words many of the problems of the Austrian Army were the simple result of 'say you will or say you won't'. The officers expected the behaviour they got, and as such encouraged exactly that behaviour. When the British and French took command of these same regiments they had a different attitude and so got different result. The British for example believed that any man could be trained to be a good soldier, it merely required the application of enough discipline and encouragement, whilst the French believed that any man could be inspired to glory. The Austrians seemed to believe that a man's worth and character was predetermined by his parentage, and that you have to simply accept those limitations.

2. Austrian Obsession with rules: The other thing that became clear was that the Austrian Army was over burdened with rules. In theory this could have been a good thing, as most of these rules were carefully researched and tested, and based upon observation of the success and failure of other armies. So, in general and taken in isolation these rules were 'good practice' and ought to have given the Austro-Hungarian Army a massive advantage. They were also one of the few armies of this period who put enormous effort into training their officer corps and selecting officers for their technical command skills rather than their social status. So, again in theory their officer corps should have been the best in Europe. Unfortunately, again this training seemed to be focussed on the rigid application of the rules, rather than enhancing the cadets judgement and leadership skills. So, by the time they joined their regiments most young Austrian officers had become brainwashed by the idea that successful command and warfare was dictated by the effective application of the rules they had learned at the academy, and that breaking the rules essentially guaranteed defeat, for which you could personally be blamed if you had ignored the rules. So, the mentality amongst the Austrian Officer corps from the top down seems to have been that as long as you follow the rules you will win, and if you lose then you cannot be blamed.

The problem then hinged on the nature of some of the rules:

For example a lot has been said about the slow campaign movement of the Austrian Army, but the reason for this was a very simple rule which stated that an Austrian soldier must be provided with a minimum of three days ration of bread before he is asked to begin a march, and that once that bread is consumed the army must halt until it can be replenished. This effectively meant that every three days the army would halt, construct field bakeries and requisition flour to bake enough bread for the next three days march. Compared to the French system which expected troops to requisition food locally as and when needed, but not to delay the march whilst it is gathered this obviously led to the Austrian Army being out-marched consistently.

Other rules strictly regulated the number of men who should be detached as skirmishers by a battalion. This rule had no provision for tactical circumstances or the number of skirmishers being deployed by the enemy. Rather it was a fixed ratio which was intended to ensure that every Austro-Hungarian regiment deployed an adequate skirmish screen without allowing any flexibility on how and when they were deployed.

There is also the famous example of the Austrian colonel who halted his regiments advance in the thick of a battle because he had noticed that the regimental band had fallen behind and was now more than the regulation distance behind the colours.

There is even a story of a negotiation between an Austrian Colonel whose regiment was trapped in square by French cavalry. He refused to surrender, because as he pointed out the French could not penetrate his square without artillery. Murat then asked if he would surrender if he brought up a gun. To which the Austrian Colonel replied that under the rules of war he would have no choice but to surrender under such circumstances. So, Murat double hitched teams to a 6pdr horse artillery piece and dragged it through the mud to within canister range of the Austrian square, and rules satisfied the Austrian square laid down it's arms and marched into captivity.

That is my view on the reason for the Austrian Armies poor performance.

[ordoprinceps]

Hello Didz,

Excellent! Wonderful! Thank you citizen Didz +Rep!

There are two reasons in my view for using this site; the first is obvious in terms of mods and modding. The second is the possibility of scholarly discourse among military history enthusiasts. Your response is exactly the kind of thoughtful and well researched discussion that I look forward to from members of this site.

I was not aware of Albert Seaton’s 1973 book on the Napoleonic wars. I was actually referencing his 1973 book titled “The Austro-Hungarian Army of the Seven Years War”. In that book he does (in my opinion) a wonderful job of having a brief and concise encapsulation of the historical development of the Austro-Hungarian forces with a significant focus on the history and progression of the Hungarian army and of Hungarian contingents of the Austro-Hungarian Army. He discusses briefly what was believed at that time to be the origin of Hungarian military forces coming from the steps and into what is now Hungary. Not all scholars today agree with all of Seaton’s comments. Still, I found it interesting and stimulating. He discusses the role of Hungarian forces strangely coming to the aid of the Austrian monarch against Frederick the great despite the long history of animosity between Austrians and Hungarians up to that point. For anyone who has an interest in that area of history I find this to be a brief concise yet excellent read.

In that book he makes mention of the Austro-Hungarian Army as being one of the most formidable forces that Napoleon would face. Clearly his opinion was different from many other contemporary scholars. In reading his book regarding Austrians and Hungarians as well as the various other races involved in that region from the 1400s through the Seven Years War you get the impression that the Austro-Hungarian Army was far more formidable then as opposed to the Napoleonic era. That book has been out of print for some time. I purchased my copy from a bookstore in the UK that had a number of used out-of-print books on military history. Unfortunately the book is faded and yellowed with time to the point where the color plates in it are of little value.

Thank you for your research and comments regarding Austrian dogma and discipline. Your assessments make good sense. It is interesting that I have read a number of documents that have made similar comments regarding dogma. Also I do recall reading on a number of occasions that the Germans were by far the best disciplined troops in the Austro-Hungarian Army and that the Hungarians not surprisingly were superior horseman as that was their heritage.

As a former US Marine I can attest that a man regardless of his heritage can be trained to be a superior soldier. In the US Marine Corps when I served there was every race and nearly ethnic group represented. Any man who could make it through the rigors of Marine Corps 13 week boot camp (basic training) and earn the title United States Marine could go on to be trained in virtually any aspect of military function and to do his job superbly. In fact at the time I served which was well over 40 years ago we used to say “all Marines are green”. This denoted the fact that regardless of an individual’s race, ethnic group or religion we were all brothers, we were all Marines. It’s too bad the civilian world can’t get a handle on that.

Didz, you made the comment about poor musketry; I wonder if this would be true across the board for all of the Austrian contingents including the German troops. As a former US Marine I can attest that much of marksmanship is about discipline in the training. You’re thought on that?
Wonderful example about the bread ration, skirmishers and the bizarre example of the band and the colors; thank you for that I was unaware. The example of the surrender of the square almost evokes laughter, how ridiculous. Truth is stranger than fiction as they say.

Thanks for this info. I look forward to further scholarly discussion with you in the future.

[Steph]

The organization of the Austrian army reflect this concept of "class predestination".
All the Hussars regiments were "hungarian", all the Dragoon, Cuirassiers or Chevau Leger were "German", Ulhan were Poles from Galicia "Grenzer" were only from southern border region, etc.
To add about what Didz said, I think there was a system of promotion through seniority, more than merits. Many high rank officers were older guys (generals = 63 years old on average), used to the regulation, and a regulation initially designed to fight the "old" ennemy: Prussia.
And so when they had to fight the French, and especially Napoleon in the early campaign, they had to face a "modern" army, with relatively young officers promoted more through merit, and the French were not gentlemen enough to wage war as the regulations planned for it. And if you look at the performance of Austria in late war, like 1809, it was much better: the Austrians had started to learn how to fight the French (i.e. realize they are no longer fighting Prussian mid 18th).

Quote from an old hungarian officer interrogated by Napoleon "We have to do with a young general who is in this moment before us, then again behind us, then again on our flanks - one does not know where to place oneself. This manner of making war is insufferable and violates all usage and custom'.
Comment from napoleonistyka website :This was rather like the cry of a gentleman who had gone to fight a duel in the proper ritualised fashion, and found an opponent who insisted on firing before he was told to, and his behind trees to make a more difficult target. Unfortunately, in this case there was no umpire.

Difference in nationality was also an hindrance, since in non German regiment, the troops, and even a lot of NCO, did not speak German at all, while the officers were often German. And so it could create translation issues with orders.

I have also a more personal idea, I'd like to get others view points on this.

Every nation had some guards or elite corps (Britain, Prussia, Russia, but also Sweden, Denmark, Bavaria, Spain, etc). Except Austria: there is "elite" unit in the whole Austrian roster. They have specialized regiments for Cavalry, but no Guard. and for Infantry, they do have Grenadiers, but again they don't have a guard status.
So I'm wondering what the effect of this is. When you have a guard unit, do they regular soldiers want to try to do their best in hope they can one day go to the guard? Does the presence of a guard unit on the battlefield boost the other units? The Guards is here, we are safe?


About musket accuracy, some figures about training

There were lead allowance for yearly exercises in live fire training.
- British riflemen - 60 rounds and 60 blanks per man
- British light infantry - 50 rounds and 60 blanks
- Prussian jägers and riflemen - 60 "practice rounds" per man (in 1811-1812)
- French infantry - 40 rounds
- Prussian light infantry (fusiliers) - 30 "practice rounds" per man (in 1811-1812)
- British line infantry - 30 rounds
- Austrian line infantry - 10 rounds (in 1809, Wagram Campaign)
- Austrian line infantry - 6 rounds (in 1805 Austerlitz Campaign)
- Russian jagers - 6 rounds (before 1805)
- Russian musketiers and grenadiers - 3 rounds (before 1805)

As you can see, the training of the Austrian was quite low for Practice rounds compared to Prussia or Britain.

[Didz]

In that book he makes mention of the Austro-Hungarian Army as being one of the most formidable forces that Napoleon would face. Clearly his opinion was different from many other contemporary scholars. In reading his book regarding Austrians and Hungarians as well as the various other races involved in that region from the 1400s through the Seven Years War you get the impression that the Austro-Hungarian Army was far more formidable then as opposed to the Napoleonic era.

One possible explanation for the degradation of the Austro-Hungarian Army was the general trend towards a nationalistic army and officer corps.

During the Seven Years War and earlier officers and soldiers were largely professional 'mercenary' types, who fought for whichever monarch was paying the most money and offering the most reward. It's therefore reasonable to assume that large sections of the early 18th Century Austro-Hungarian Army was populated by foreigners. As such the issue of the Austro-Hungarian racial dogma was diluted, as many of the officers would not have been Austrian, and many of the men would not have been German or Hungarian. This was similarly true of every army in that period, Prussia even paid a bounty to agents who found them willing recruits from whatever country they came from.

However, by the close of the century the introduction of mass-conscription by the French had rendered such casual recruitment arrangements inadequate, and most countries were introducing similar arrangements to boost recruitment in order to try and match the manpower of the French. Thus the concept of the professional soldier became buried under the rush to raise more men, and the officer corps also needed to draw heavily on local talent rather than the international market.

That would have led to a much greater influence from racial dogma and cultural stereotyping in the Austro-Hungarian army and increase the reliance of the use of rules rather than experience.

p.s. I'm not aware of any reason why Austrian musketry would be less effective than any other European army. The Austrian Army had kept pace with the evolution of fire control and manoeuvre and had introduced the new systems into their training and drills. Nafziger suggests that because of the Austrian obsession with control some of the formation changes were carried out at a slower march cadence than other nations meaning that that in general they were slower to deploy form column to line and vice versa, but that because of their innovative mass-formations for cavalry defence they were actually one of the faster nations when it came to responding to cavalry threats.

I note Steph's useful analysis on the number of practice cartridges allocated to recruits, but unless this is also a reflection of the amount of musketry drill it would not have affected the volume of fire produced by an Austrian regiment compared to one of another nationality. Bear in mind that for most troops musketry was not about hitting a target, but rather a case of reloading and firing in a rapid and controlled manner. Therefore, the drill and fire control system was more important than the target practice.

It also has to be noted that target practice was useless training for the 18th century battlefield, as targets did not move whereas people do. And as observed by members of the 95th Rifles in Spain most enemy light troops seemed to aim directly at their target and pull the trigger, as though they were firing at a mark which meant that as long as you kept moving you were unlikely to be hit.

On the issue of troop quality it is interesting to noted that the Austrian experiment into the use of dedicated light infantry regiments in the late 18th Century failed largely because the Austrian officers claimed that the Croatian and Slavic soldiers they were given were incapable of functioning in a disciplined manner. It is true to say that both desertion and insubordination in these units was extremely bad, and one British officer who visited Austria and saw these units commented that they were nothing but a bunch of rogues and that he was glad to hear that the Austrians had disbanded them.

However, it is interesting that these same men eventually found themselves serving in either the French Army or with the British, and both their new masters rated them very highly. The suggestion being that this was essentially a leadership and command failure amongst the Austrian officer corps rather than some inbred ethnic shortcoming amongst the men.

[exNowy]

As you can see, the training of the Austrian was quite low for Practice rounds compared to Prussia or Britain.

I'm sorry but your statement is wrong, because you compared different infantry types. Austrian line infantry with Prussian or British light infantry and that was incorrect. Didz also explained why these target trainings could be misleading.

However in this thread I noticed more pure statements especially these according to Austrian Army weakanses.

For instance I saw that Didz ignore and minimalize racial aspects in Austrian army. He exaggerate Austrian obsesion with rules and introduce strange Austrian Racial Dogma. These cases looks like wrong suppositions.

In general I could say that Austrian Army weakansses lay in their multinational. multi linguistic and multi religious army composition, specific organization and poor general command. Their old aristocratic commanders and many German or Hungarian officers stuck too long with outdated battle tactics, supply and communication systems.

Didz mentioned Austrian Army weakness in poor musketry, slow campaign and battlefield movement and slow formation changes and reactions to tactical and strategic events, however these aspects in many cases are stereotypic myths.

Musketry in general was poor at that period. Even the best trained British infantry shot horrendous rounds to chieve some hits. Austrian army was not so bad in that matter too. Austrian well trained infantry fired better (more accurate) than Russian, Prussian, many German and other armies. In organized infantry fire they were at the same or even better level as French. However Austrian infantry was weaker in skirmish combats, because both sides initially used different tactics.

Do not forget that Austrian officers dislike open order, because their regiments included different nations and German or Hungarian or another nobles officers were afraid their multinational subordinates soldiers, which were prone to desertion. Therefore they kept them in close or packed formations.

Then Austrian infnatry during fire combats still used slow linear tactics in similiar form to 18 century.

However Austrian reformed, reorganized and strengthened their infantry before 1809. Even earlier they light infantry was not bad. Napoleon said that Austrian Grenzers were really warlike warriors. Austrian Jegers also were not bad, however there were not many Jegers battalions until 1809.

There also was another aspects in infantry combats. Do not forget infantry weapons cases.
Austrian muskets in bayonet combats were slightly weaker than French, British or Russian while old Prussian muskets were worse. Austrian muskets were too delicate and were prone to impariments during bayonet combats. Then French or Russian line infantry could be more aggresive in bayonet combats.

According to Austrian army slowness I could said that comparing Austrian and French army it is true, but comparing to other armies in some cases it is untrue.

Prussian and Russian armies before reforms introduced in 1807 and 1810 also were slow in their movements. Until their reforms these armies were organized in outdated style, used poor logistics, slow supply trains and magazine system. Take a look how slowly marched Russian armies to Austrian campaign 1805 and to Prussian 1806-1807. Prussian Army was even slower than Austrian at that period. However Russian army was more aggresive in their movements. They used numerous Cossacks cavalry which helped Russian army observe enemy movements, then Russian army can react (mainly retreat) earlier while French can not capture or interupt them.

British, Spanish, small German armies alos were not the masters in fast operations.
Then do not blame Austrian too much about their slowness when other armies were not masters too.

However there are some points in Austrian slowness in battleground or in campaigns.
Austrian basic tactical infantry and cavalry formations included more soldiers. Their battalions or regiments nominally has more men, that's why in some cases they manoevered slower too.

Do not forget that Austrian slowness also could lay in their multinational organization, aristocratic commanders, prefered cautious or defensive tactics, supply and communication system, terrain and weather conditions. Austrian army operated mainly in harder terain, montainous Tyrol, North Italy, Bavaria or Saxony. They must crossed there many streams and rivers and their supply system evidently slower their movements there.

After several defeats Austrian reformed, reorganized and strngthened their army. However they recruited many young, inexperienced soldiers, many insurrection and Landwehr units too. Thei army still had multinational soldiers and these as well as complex political aspects led to very cautious and slow Austrian strategy. That's why many people noticed their army as slow in movements too.

[Dracula]

About musket accuracy, some figures about training

There were lead allowance for yearly exercises in live fire training.
- British riflemen - 60 rounds and 60 blanks per man
- British light infantry - 50 rounds and 60 blanks
- Prussian jägers and riflemen - 60 "practice rounds" per man (in 1811-1812)
- French infantry - 40 rounds
- Prussian light infantry (fusiliers) - 30 "practice rounds" per man (in 1811-1812)
- British line infantry - 30 rounds
- Austrian line infantry - 10 rounds (in 1809, Wagram Campaign)
- Austrian line infantry - 6 rounds (in 1805 Austerlitz Campaign)
- Russian jagers - 6 rounds (before 1805)
- Russian musketiers and grenadiers - 3 rounds (before 1805)

As you can see, the training of the Austrian was quite low for Practice rounds compared to Prussia or Britain.

I don't quite understand that. Do you mean they could train in 3 rounds in the last case ? And what exactly a round is ?

[Steph]

If I understand correctly, it's the number of shots with real amo they were allowed to fire in real situation for training each year.
I'm not sure it's actually target practice, but more getting used to reload, to the recoil, the noise, the smoke.

[ordoprinceps]

Hi Steph,

This will be a long post and I wish to address your question on guard units but first I think it appropriate to respond to your other comments with a few additional new thoughts.

Thanks for this very interesting and useful information. This does further substantiate what Didz presented. Class predestination is a dangerous concept both in general society and definitely in the military. Forgive me for once again referring to my time as a US Marine but I think it is pertinent to this conversation.

As I mentioned previously in my post response to Didz when I served in the Marines we always said that “all Marines were green” referring to our field uniforms of course. We were all brothers regardless of race, religion or ethnic background. We were always faithful (semper fidelis is the US Marine Corps motto), to each other to our missions and to our country. I know for certain that if we had officers or NCOs who viewed any particular group as being incapable of performing all the tasks required of a combat Marine it would’ve reduced the effectiveness of the units very significantly.

Thank you for the examples that you provided they are very interesting and very informative. Again, this is precisely the kind of discussion that I enjoy so much on this site. I thank you for your willingness to contribute this important information.


I think you’re right, Napoleon was a phenomenon! He represented a new kind of general and the French army of the day was an amazing force to be reckoned with. Clearly, I believe the Napoleonic French army was the most superior of that time of history anywhere in the world. As history reflects it took most every nation in Europe to finally cause enough casualties and destruction to the French army and the French economy to defeat Napoleon. I think it can be argued that even if all the powers in Europe united simultaneously against him he still may have won had he not squandered approximately hundreds of thousands of excellent troops in the frozen wastes of Russia.

I didn’t know that all Austrian Hussar regiments were Hungarian. I kind of assumed that all of the other Austrian cavalry except Ulans were German. Thanks for that info.


What you said about age is also interesting. In the 21st century at least here in the US it is now often said that 60 is the new 40 (referring to age). So in the 21st century 63 is and all that old and there are many in their 60s who are embarking on a new 20 year career towards their 80s. However in the late 18th and early 19th centuries the average age of death in many countries was in the 30s. In the US even in 1950 the average age of death was only 54. So 63 years of age in the early 1800s was indeed very old. And in any time of history it is clear that young men tend to be more exuberant and more aggressive as well as more energetic. Napoleon’s army clearly reflected these traits.

The point you made on language and communication is also extremely significant. In the modern military of course effective communication at the smallest unit level is crucial to success if your officers cannot effectively communicate commands to “all” of the troops in the heat of battle the probability of losing the battle will be significantly high.


The Effect of Guard Units

This is a point I think that can be debated both pro and con. I will use an example from the US military because of my familiarity with it rather than simply a historical reference. The United States Army follows an old tradition of elite units upon, elite units and yet more separate and different elite units. I overemphasize this to make my point. Elite units in the Army actually get a bit confusing to an old Marine like myself. Who more than Napoleon pushed this concept with so many elite Guard units they were (if combined as one force) bigger than some nations armies.


The U.S. Army airborne is elite, then a step above them is the Army Rangers who are also airborne but with additional training. A step above them would be the U.S. Army Green Berets formally called U.S. Army Special Forces who have all the training of the previous two but in addition have a special mission to work in small teams deep in enemy lines and win the hearts and minds of the indigenous people to hopefully convince them to fight for the US cause, they have additional language skills etc.


Then there is Delta Force which was originally army only but now has contingents from all the US services even the U.S. Marines. I make that latter statement because for many years the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps refused to contribute the Marine Corps’s elite unit called Marine Force Recon because he said the purpose of recon was to do their jobs without being known by the enemy and being part of an outfit like Delta Force would draw too much attention and publicity and allow our enemies to better understand organization, function and therefore perhaps be able to find weaknesses. Marine Force Recon’s motto is “Swift Deadly and Silent”. There is now a joint special ops command that includes elite special ops troops from Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. It gets confusing. Very Napoleonic.


In the U.S. Army I think there is no question that the presence of an elite US Army unit on the field does boost morale of regular Army units. Here however is the other side of the argument; US Marines consider all Marines to be elite, the entire Corps. Just the basic training for a US Marine is more than twice as long as it is for a member of any other US military services. Additionally, and this is also not commonly known, if a Marine wanted to join the Army, Navy or Air Force they retain their Marine rank and are not required to complete training in those services because the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes that U.S. Marine basic training is significantly tougher than the other services. This is not a biased opinion but a official rule that even many Marines are unaware of.


If on the other hand a member of the other services wants to be a Marine he must complete Marine Corps basic training just as though he had no military experience. In my boot camp platoon there were two veteran sergeants one from the army and one from the Air Force who had to train as privates (but rank would be restored if they graduated boot camp) and one of them did not graduate. This is why they say Marine is and “earned title” and “Once a Marine always a Marine .” Qualification for marksmanship is higher than for the other services as are the physical standards. Additionally US Marines endure 13 weeks of isolation in which psychological conditioning changes the mindset and the resolve of the average Marine. The average Marine recognizes that the men of Force Recon are superior Marines yet the presence of Force Recon on the battlefield does not change the morale of the other Marines at least not in my personal experience. That is an opinion of course based on my experience and there may be other Marines who would disagree. I should note that my experience was more than 40 years ago so things may have changed.


I do not wish to make it sound in any way that any member of the US military is potentially less qualified or less courageous than any other member of any other service, there are countless stories of inspirational valor from all U.S. services and they all deserve respect and gratitude for their service, I’m simply stating facts about training and qualification nothing more. From training to battlefield is a whole different subject.


To help you on understanding my point I'll be making about Guard units a little better I’ll give you a piece of information that almost no one knows, because Marine Force Recon does not wish to have movies made about them or be made public in any way they are the special ops unit that no one ever heard of. There have now been several movies made about Navy SEALs and this makes almost every civilian think that the Navy SEALs are the world’s most elite military unit. Make no mistake they are some of the finest fighting men in the world; however they are not the most highly trained despite what the movies depict.

There are certain functions that only Navy SEALs and Marine Force Recon are trained to perform these are relayed to underwater work. These are functions that are not trained for Delta force, or any other US Army or Air Force special units. Marine Force Recon is trained to do virtually everything that Navy SEALs are trained to do.

In one Navy Seal movie they made quite a deal about the horrendous and make no mistake it is truly horrendous “hell week” the purpose of hell week is to weed out those who are not absolutely the best of the best. Navy SEALs hell week is 10 days of incredible and almost incomprehensible physical and psychological stress that almost no human being could possibly survive this is why when they make the final cut the Navy SEALs have such exceptional men in their teams. They deserve all the glory they can get. However what is not known by almost anyone including members of the Navy is that Marine Force Recon’s “hell week” is 30 days long.


Out of every group of Marines who makes it past the first qualification period, you’re lucky if two or three men survive that next 30 day hell week. The primary purpose of Marine Force Recon is to go deep behind enemy lines, “Swift and silent” and do reconnaissance to report enemy troop movements and call in artillery or airstrikes. There have been a long list of missions that they have accomplished that have affected significant portions of wars that the US has been in and the public never even knew they were there. Force Recon is the only special ops unit specifically designed for this purpose yet they are also designed to perform virtually all the other functions of Navy SEALs and Delta force.

Please forgive me for going on so long on this but I say that not because I was a Marine but because I want to make the point that even with these exceptional men of Force Recon present on the battle line other US Marines do not seem to be significantly affected by their presence other than they see other brother Marines.

I do believe to your point however Steph, that the average line unit would not only be inspired by the presence of elite units and feel their chance for victory is enhanced but I think that you are also correct in assuming that many members of the regular Army would likely aspire to becoming members of the Guard. I have seen evidence of that in the U.S. Army when serving with U.S. Army units and I think history reflects that as well in a number of countries. Even among U.S. Marines I know there are some Marines who aspire to be members of Force Recon. So I think you’re quite right Steph, that the lack of guard units in the Austrian Army had a generally negative effect on that Army overall. There is of course no way to precisely calculate how strong that effect is but I think we can logically assume it was a negative effect.


The historical accounts of the presence of the old guard on Napoleon’s battlefield and the effect they had on other units is a good example but certainly not the only example.

Thank you for the information about rounds per man, that is very interesting.



Thank you for engaging in this excellent discussion and please forgive my long statements about Marines, I just thought adding military info (though not Napoleonic) is appreciated by military enthusiasts and it was important to my point.

[ordoprinceps]

[QUOTE=Didz;14004279]One possible explanation for the degradation of the Austro-Hungarian Army was the general trend towards a nationalistic army and officer corps.

Hello Didz and Steph,

Thank you again for an excellent and thoughtful discussion. The authors I have read regarding the time period of the Seven Years War are in concert with your assessment. In fact as I was reading about some of the units beginning with the first Silesian war and going forward and it seems that mercenary units were more the rule than the exception. I also did not expect to find in my readings generals with names like Count Von Wallis of a man of Scottish descent and Count von Browne a man of Irish and German descent. Outside of adding the von those names don’t sound very German.

Your point about mass conscription in France makes perfect sense. As you read the numbers of the various forces engaged in the first and second Silesian war as well as the Seven Years War, these forces were small enough where you could field significant forces comparatively with mercenary units but it would be difficult to impossible to create armies on the scale of the French Napoleonic Army with mercenaries alone.

Regarding musketry, muskets by their very nature are highly in accurate weapons. So I think that the points made by you and Steph regarding training in terms of familiarity of the weapon, reloading, getting use to the recoil etc., as well as firing drills would have logically taken precedence over marksmanship training as we understand it today. I don’t recall which Russian general said it, but I believe there was a Russian general that referred to bullets as “mad things”; the implication being something which could not be controlled.

Even up through the time of the American Civil War muskets were still so in accurate that American Civil War troops on both sides were still drilled to march tightly shoulder to shoulder in the hopes that the musket ball would hit something on the other side. Those units with rifles of course as opposed to muskets were an entirely different story, but rifles at the time of the Napoleonic wars were in my understanding relatively rare.

BTW, I very much appreciate you supporting your arguments with specific references such as your example from the 95th rifles, that makes for a much better discussion in my opinion.

It has been my personal experience that any man from any ethnic origin can be trained to be a superior soldier but it depends largely on the trainer and the leaders at various levels. Leadership starting with NCOs on up is crucial to fielding a superior military force. No matter how courageous the men are without proper training and leadership it will be extremely difficult to assemble quality force.

Thanks for your additional input.

[Steph]

Well, if you look at the French Foreign Legion, which has quite a good reputation, currently counts 7700 men from 146 different nationalities. I think it shows training if far more relevant than origin.

[Dracula]

So 6 rounds for the Austrian line infantry in 1805 means 6 bullets per year ? Can't be.

[Didz]

Austrian line infantry with Prussian or British light infantry and that was incorrect. Didz also explained why these target trainings could be misleading.

Actually the only direct comparison I made was between the Austrian experiment with dedicated light infantry and the equivalent use of the same troops by the British and French.

In general I could say that Austrian Army weakansses lay in their multinational. multi linguistic and multi religious army composition, specific organization and poor general command. Their old aristocratic commanders and many German or Hungarian officers stuck too long with outdated battle tactics, supply and communication systems.

Personally, I have to disagree although I acknowledge that most historians prefer this simplistic explanation.

The fact is that the Austrian situation was not unique in Europe, and yet every other nation seemed able to cope with it and produce an effective army. More importantly, other armies most notably the French and British took exactly the same men and produced effective and efficient units from them.

Austrian infantry was weaker in skirmish combats, because both sides initially used different tactics.

You would have to explain that statement, as skirmishing is pretty generic as a tactic and the Austrians had studied the methods used by other armies and based theirs on those used by others. Likewise many of the tactic's used by other armies were based on the Austrian system, so it's wrong to suggest that they were in any way unaware of the importance of skirmishers, the issue was purely a matter of over regulation in the way they were employed. The Prussians for example used exactly the same system, but did so in a more flexible way and their officers felt able to break the rules when necessary. There are instances for example when almost an entire Prussian battalion would be deployed in skirmish order to meet a particular threat even in Landwehr regiments.

Do not forget that Austrian officers dislike open order, because their regiments included different nations and German or Hungarian or another nobles officers were afraid their multinational subordinates soldiers, which were prone to desertion. Therefore they kept them in close or packed formations.

Austrian regulations were very explicit about the number of men who had to be detached from a unit as skirmishers. It was actually Frederick the Great who said that one must not allow ones soldiers to think, otherwise they would never stay and fight. The Austrians on the other hand had a long tradition of using irregular units to support their line infantry, the issues only arose when they tried to regulate those units into formal light infantry formations. If Austrian officers tended to hold more many men in close order than appropriate it was usually because they had already deployed the regulation number of skirmishers and to deploy more would be a non-conformance with regulations.

Then Austrian infnatry during fire combats still used slow linear tactics in similiar form to 18 century.

The primary battlefield formation used by the Austrian Army was the masse. This was essentially a column formation similar in many respects to the French attack column. However, the Austrians developed it into a complete tactical system which began with the Battalionmasse and Divisionmasse and extended to corps level. These formations were very innovative and were intended to allow that Austrian Army the considerable tactical flexibility needed when fighting the Ottoman armies in the south who had large number of rapidly moving light cavalry. Again the obsession with linear tactic's was largely a fault fo the early Prussian Army which in the early part of the war was still using the tactical systems designed by Frederick the Great. The Austrian Army had already moved on largely out of necessity due to the threat from the Turks.

Well, if you look at the French Foreign Legion, which has quite a good reputation, currently counts 7700 men from 146 different nationalities. I think it shows training if far more relevant than origin.

Exactly, which is why I think this whole multi-racial/multi-ethnic explanation latched onto by historians is a complete red-herring. However, it plays nicely into the modern day obsession with ethnic persecution and claims for ethnic homelands.

In practice as Sun Tzu proved to the King of Wu, a good leader can even train a bunch of court concubines to become efficient soldiers.

[Steph]

So 6 rounds for the Austrian line infantry in 1805 means 6 bullets per year ? Can't be.

Why? Real bullets are relatively expensive. So if the training is mostly on marching, close fighting and repeating drill, there could be very few real shots.

[Didz]

Why? Real bullets are relatively expensive. So if the training is mostly on marching, close fighting and repeating drill, there could be very few real shots.

Exactly, for line infantry being trained to fight in close order the fire control and loading drill was far more important, and you didn't need to fire the musket to practice it. The only real reason to use a cartidge was to get the men used to the sound and feel of a musket going off.

Only skirmishers were expected to aim at a target, and they were usually hand picked men with previous hunting experience, and were trained at target shooting. The Austrian for example used a lot of men from the Tyrol with hunting experience in this sort of role.

[exNowy]

Personally, I have to disagree although I acknowledge that most historians prefer this simplistic explanation.

The fact is that the Austrian situation was not unique in Europe, and yet every other nation seemed able to cope with it and produce an effective army. More importantly, other armies most notably the French and British took exactly the same men and produced effective and efficient units from them.

Hmm, it looks that you disagree with the most historians and you disagre with me. I'm sorry, but it also looks that you do not understand Central European racial problems too.

The fact was that Austrian situation was unique in Europe.
Show me another European Empire where ruling nation was in such minority as Germans were in Austrian Empire at that period.

Austrian Empire incorporated many nations e.g.
Germans 4,7 million
Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks 3,5 million
Hungarian 3 million
Polish from 1,2 to 2,7 million in Old and New Galicia, the latter lost in 1809
Ruthenians (Ukrainians) 1,7 million
Romanians 1,4 million
Italians 1,3 million on areas lost in 1805 and over 3 million on areas regained in 1814
Croats 1 million
Slovenes 0,7 million
Serbs 0,6 million
many others 0,8 million
Total 21 million inhabitants before 1805 or 19 million after 1809

Can you see that ruling nation Austrian Germans, which lived mainly in Austria proper and some other dispersed places, were in such minority in this empire?
They formed c.a 22% population, even together with Hungarians that still was less than 40%.
Then do not minimalise racial problems, these were serious problems.
Take a look even at this map
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Et...ernig_1855.jpg

You know that these big variety of nations spoke in quite different languages, they believed different religions. They had different aspirations. Polish and other Slavic nations dreamed about their freedom. Romaninas and Italians also were not happy under German or Hungarian rule. Even Hungarians thought about their own Kingdom. Jews were not interested in soldiers duties. Then various recruiting areas and different national aspirations weakened soldiers motivations to fight for Austrian/German Kaiser and his German aristocratic gnerals. Many of them simply deserted from Austrian Army.

Then French and British cases are quite different. Even they recruited the same nations as Austrian there were quite different national attitude to ruling circles.
French and British included only small part of these foreigners. French additionally switched liberty mirage which was important, for some nations e.g. for Polish and few other nations which lived in Austrian Empire at tat period. You could read about Polish Legions in French service, then you could undestand these national-ethnic problems I suppouse.

You would have to explain that statement, as skirmishing is pretty generic as a tactic and the Austrians had studied the methods used by other armies and based theirs on those used by others. Likewise many of the tactic's used by other armies were based on the Austrian system, so it's wrong to suggest that they were in any way unaware of the importance of skirmishers, the issue was purely a matter of over regulation in the way they were employed. The Prussians for example used exactly the same system, but did so in a more flexible way and their officers felt able to break the rules when necessary. There are instances for example when almost an entire Prussian battalion would be deployed in skirmish order to meet a particular threat even in Landwehr regiments.

Esencialy you are right, but I coud quote Napoleonistyka site "The Austrian light infantry was superb until 1790s.
After the 1790s the quality of Austrian light infantry decreased"

That was during French Revolutionary Wars when French used masses of skirmishers and columns tactics against allies slow lines.
Then in general both enemy sides initially used different tactics. These was until allies made some reforms after their next defeats in early 1800s.

Austrian regulations were very explicit about the number of men who had to be detached from a unit as skirmishers. It was actually Frederick the Great who said that one must not allow ones soldiers to think, otherwise they would never stay and fight. The Austrians on the other hand had a long tradition of using irregular units to support their line infantry, the issues only arose when they tried to regulate those units into formal light infantry formations. If Austrian officers tended to hold more many men in close order than appropriate it was usually because they had already deployed the regulation number of skirmishers and to deploy more would be a non-conformance with regulations.

Partly I agree, but we should remember that numbers of soldiers used in skirmish combats were important.
Then general infantry tactic initially were different in French and allies armies, because French still used more skirmishers and had more light infantry units.

We also should remember that Austrian and Prussian or Russian armies did not want to use many thinking or independently fighting soldiers. Their can recruited numerous poor serfs many times and these were not well predestined to such warfare, especially when they came from other nations as like Polish recruited by force into Austrian, Prussia or Russian armies.

The primary battlefield formation used by the Austrian Army was the masse. This was essentially a column formation similar in many respects to the French attack column. However, the Austrians developed it into a complete tactical system which began with the Battalionmasse and Divisionmasse and extended to corps level. These formations were very innovative and were intended to allow that Austrian Army the considerable tactical flexibility needed when fighting the Ottoman armies in the south who had large number of rapidly moving light cavalry. Again the obsession with linear tactic's was largely a fault fo the early Prussian Army which in the early part of the war was still using the tactical systems designed by Frederick the Great. The Austrian Army had already moved on largely out of necessity due to the threat from the Turks.

I was referring to fire combats and there even Austrian used line formation. Then you speach above was out of my statement.

Exactly, which is why I think this whole multi-racial/multi-ethnic explanation latched onto by historians is a complete red-herring. However, it plays nicely into the modern day obsession with ethnic persecution and claims for ethnic homelands.

Pure nonsens. During French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars racial-ethnic problems rose important problems. That's why Napoleon formed many Italian, Irish, Polish and other nations Legions. Austrian split their army on so called "German" and "Hungarian" units. Even British formed their King's German Legion. Then what for they did these? They could include all mixed nations directly into French, British or Austrian regiments, but in many cases they did not do that. Did they already have modern day obsession with ethnic persecution etc?

In practice as Sun Tzu proved to the King of Wu, a good leader can even train a bunch of court concubines to become efficient soldiers.

Oh, You should reread Sun Tzu. Then you will know, how he trained these women and what happend with court concubines.
And exactly we do not know were these concubines real soldiers or were not in the end.

[ordoprinceps]

Well, if you look at the French Foreign Legion, which has quite a good reputation, currently counts 7700 men from 146 different nationalities. I think it shows training if far more relevant than origin.

That is a perfect example Steph! Yes the FFL has an outstanding reputation as an elite unite. I appreciate knowing the numbers.

[Dracula]

It is impossible. I had been at a course for safe dealing with arms recently and had to fire some not less than 400 bullets alltogether (for a few days only), of which 12 were with shotgun. And I am no near the army . Perhaps 6 rounds means 6 packs of bullets, each one with unknown content, let's say 6x 100 ? Cause I'll appear otherwise better trained than a few regiments together ?! And a "round" in english is more like a "salvo" ...