Deployment of Donzelot's Division at Waterloo

I was interested that Siborne's engraved map of the deployments at the start of the battle of Waterloo clearly shows Donzelot's Division deployed on the left of D'Erlon's Division with Quiot's (Alix) Division on its right.
http://www.files.maproom.org/00/24/present.php?m=0006

This seems to support those historian's like Barbero who use this deployment in their histories of the battle, and explains the existence of the mystery columns mentioned in the personal accounts of Barnard and other Allied officers closer to the crossroads above La Haye Saint, which can't be explained by the movements and subsequent fate of Quiot's column.

However, it still leaves a question mark hanging over the question of who exactly the Inniskilling Dragoons charged during the advance of the Union Brigade, as there was clearly a mass of French infantry between Quiots Divisional column and that of Marcognet containing the 45e Ligne.

The Inniskillings are said by other witnesses to have charged this mass which was deployed approximately 200 yards to the right rear of Quiot's column although in their own history they believed they were charging Quiots Column itself. Hence leading to the controversy over who captured the eagle of the 105e Ligne, as the Inniskillings are definate that they captured a French Eagle and the only one available was that of the 105e claimed by The Royals.

Siborne's research seems to support the belief that there was nothing between Quiot and Marcognet, leaving the mystery of who the Inniskillings charged unresolved, and so far I've been unable to find any physical evidence to support any theory of the composition of the mystery column in the centre.

The eyewitness accounts seem to identify more columns than can be explained by the now generally accepted tactical formation of Quiot, Marcognet and Durette's divisions.

Originally Posted by Didz

I was interested that Siborne's engaged map of the deployments at the start of the battle of Waterloo clearly shows Donzelot's Division deployed on the left of D'Erlon's Division with Quiot's (Alix) Division on its right.
http://www.files.maproom.org/00/24/present.php?m=0006

This seems to support those historian's like Barbero who use this deployment in their histories of the battle, and explains the existence of the mystery columns mentioned in the personal accounts of Barnard and other Allied officers closer to the crossroads above La Haye Saint, which can't be explained by the movements and subsequent fate of Quiot's column.

However, it still leaves a question mark hanging over the question of who exactly the Inniskilling Dragoons charged during the advance of the Union Brigade, as there was clearly a mass of French infantry between Quiots Divisional column and that of Marcognet containing the 45e Ligne.

The Inniskillings are said by other witnesses to have charged this mass which was deployed approximately 200 yards to the right rear of Quiot's column although in their own history they believed they were charging Quiots Column itself. Hence leading to the controversy over who captured the eagle of the 105e Ligne, as the Inniskillings are definate that they captured a French Eagle and the only one available was that of the 105e claimed by The Royals.

Siborne's research seems to support the belief that there was nothing between Quiot and Marcognet, leaving the mystery of who the Inniskillings charged unresolved, and so far I've been unable to find any physical evidence to support any theory of the composition of the mystery column in the centre.

The eyewitness accounts seem to identify more columns than can be explained by the now generally accepted tactical formation of Quiot, Marcognet and Durette's divisions.

Houssaye "1815 Waterloo" page 193/194 says deployment was from the left Allix (who was of course absent & in his absence his Division was commanded by the brigade commander Quiot), Donzelot, Marcognet & Durutte. Quiot's brigade (54th & 55th Line) wheeled slightly to the left & bore down on the orchard of La Haye Sainte, while Bourgeois' brigade (28th & 105th Line) marched straight on towards the plateau (that would appear to be your mystery brigade). Page 198 says The Royals swept aside the Bourgeois Brigade; The Inniskillings assaulted the column under Donzelot (17th, 19th & 51st Line, 13th Light) & the Scots Greys attacked Marcognet (21st, 25th, 45th & 46th Line). [Houssaye's footnotes quote as source the letters of Ponsonby, Kempt & Pack].

As you say Siborne's Account has the French Divisions in order from the main highway Donzelot, Allix, Marcognet & Durutte (which of course differs from the usual modern accepted line up - Uffindell's "Fields of Glory", Lachouque's "Waterloo"), Hofschroer's "1815: the Waterloo Campaign - The German Victory", older sources also support eg Charras' "Campagne de 1815: Waterloo" - page 271, Craan's map of Waterloo dated 1817, Wood's "Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign" - pages 131/132, Morris' "The campaign of 1815" - on page 241 he acknowledges that most English accounts transpose Donzelot & Allix's Divisions).

But Barbero opts for Siborne's line up and goes on to state that the assault on La Haye Sainte was made by Donzelots division led by the 13e Legere. I'm not sure what the source is for this as Barbero is lax in explaining such things in his text, but I have to say there is a logic to his claim. The French frequently used their Legere Regiments to lead assaults on defensive positions, indeed the 1ere Legere were the Regiment that breached the north gate of Hougoumont.

As for the column issue its not quite so easily solved, but I'll need to find my notes to explain it properly. Basically, there are just too many columns mentioned at once, when you cross-reference all the sources, and Quiot's Division seems to be in two places at once.

Siborne (pages 260 -263) has the Union Brigade deployed for the charge with the Royals on the British right and the Inniskillings on the British left (which became the centre when the Scots Greys who were originally deployed as the Brigade's reserve were compelled to move to their left to escape French artillery fire and got carried away and joined the charge instead of acting as instructed as the Reserve for the other two regiments to rally on).

A Captain Martin, a Swiss who served in the 45th Ligne, says in his memoirs that the French were aligned: Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet & Durutte & that the advance began by the left. [I think the circumstantial evidence is pointing to Siborne having got the deployment of D'Erlon's Corps wrong]

Right well I'm back home now and have had a chance to double check my sources and the situation as I see it is as follows:-

D’Erlons Attack. – A case of too many columns

The following diagram shows Siborne’s assessment of the situation as the Union Brigade made its attack on D’Erlons columns at Waterloo. This deployment matches the letters describing the situation from the officers of the Union Brigade who survived the action and was the basis for his second model depicting the charge.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The plan above shows the deployment of D'Erlon's columns as determined by Siborne from the eyewitness acounts he had available when he produced his model of the charge. I've annotated the columns with my best guess as to the French brigades they represent. As you can see there is a column spare on the extreme left, which based on Kempt's evidence, is probably Aulard's Brigade of Donzelot's division. If so, this supports Barbero's version of events.

Captain Wallace confirms these deployments stating that ‘The Royals on the right charged and broke one of the columns, Captain A. K. Clarke capturing the Eagle of the 105th French Regiment. The left wing of the 28th Regiment fired into the column at the moment that the Royals charged it, and afterwards assisted them in securing great numbers of prisoners.’

The Inniskillings in the centre advanced further so as to charge two columns which were moving up in support of the others, and similarly over threw them, and captured an immense number of prisoners.

The Greys had been ordered to support the other two regiments, but had previously been moved to the left rear of the brigade, for the purpose of obtaining more cover from the French cannonade, so that, on advancing, they found in their direct front the head of a French column establishing itself on the Wavre Road. The Greys therefore, after passing through the intervals of the infantry, at once charged this column, and dispersed it, Sergeant Ewart capturing the Eagle of the 45th French Regiment.

William De Lacy (Ponsonby’s ADC at the battle) writes to confirm the deployment as depicted only mentioning that he thought the Greys were probably more in line with the Inniskillings than depicted on the plan. He was to the right of the Brigade at the time of the charge with the Royals. Though he later confessed that the Inniskillings may have been slightly in advance of the Greys.

Captain Clarke expressed the opinion that the entire brigade was further to the right claiming that he had spoken to the officer commanding the right hand squadron of The Royals who told him that his squadron had passed through the ranks of the 32nd Foot as it moved forward and that he had had a conversation with an officer from that regiment prior to the charge.

Colonel Muter of the Inniskillings states that he was in advance of the centre squadron of the Inniskillings during the advance and that the Royals and Inniskillings advanced simultaneously with the Greys in support to their left. The Inniskillings came into contact with the French columns of infantry after clearing the hedge and chemin creux. We all agree in thinking there were three French columns.

Barbero (page 153) clearly states that Donzelots Brigade led the advance on the left with Schmitz Brigade heading straight for the orchard of La Haye Sainte and Aulard’s moving up on their right with the idea of by passing the southern defences of the farm and attacking it from the east. However, when they came across the barricade and sandpit defended by skirmishers they were compelled to advance further in order to drive them from their positions skirting the sandpit to the east and driving up the slope of the knoll beyond.

Sir James Kempt commanding the 5th Division on the slope above the farm seems to confirm this story stating that his brigade was brought forward to replace Bylandt’s Brigade which had been momentarily driven in and took station along the road (the Chemin de Ohain). They drove in the French skirmishers who had reached the hedge line and found themselves confronted by a column from Donzelot’s Division which was in the act of trying to deploy below the slope and were caught in mid-transition by their first sustained volleys of the battle. Kempts Brigade then pushed forward down the slope with the bayonet and the fighting became so close that Kempt told Wellington afterwards that the wads from their firelocks were adhering to the uniforms of their enemies. It was supposedly at this moment that Picton was shot dead.

By now Marcogenets Division the third column in the echelon had reached the same height as Donzelot’s Division and was pushing through the hedge in front of Pack’s Brigade and the Allied line began to waver.

This was the moment when both the Household and Union cavalry brigades began their attack, passing through the defending infantry and sweeping down the slope dispersing the French infantry. The column in front of Kempts brigade was caught in the flank by the some of Household Brigade who found themselves the wrong side La Haye Sainte and the survivors attempted to take shelter in the sandpit eventually being forced to surrender.


The cavalry advancing at a slow canter drove all before them, breaking up any groups which tried to stand by short charges in troop or squadron strength.

If Donzelot's Division was in the centre between Quiots and Macognets then it must be the two columns being charged by the Inniskillings, but I think that would mean that The Royals are charing the wrong column, as Bougeois Brigade was leading the attack and therefore would have to be the column shown directly below the 28th.

Most interesting - Uffindell's map in "Fields of Glory" shows the French cuirassiers to the right of La Haye Sainte as you look from the British position - see attached. This coincides with Houssaye's account on page 194 in which he states the Cuirassiers charged the skirmishers of Kielmansegge's brigade.

Have looked at Jomini's Political & Military History of the Campaign of 1815". On page 162 he acknowledges that there is great confusion in all narratives on the battle (I note Siborne effectively accused one British writer the Rev G R Gleig of plagiarism of part of his work having shown the French order of deployment as Allix, Donzelot etc & then writing up the attack as Siborne had i.e. Donzelot attacking La Haye Sainte). Jomini reasons that it was Quiot that attacked La Haye Sainte; he observes that German writers tended to have the French in as many columns of attack as Divisions!

Originally Posted by Prince of Essling

Most interesting - Uffindell's map in "Fields of Glory" shows the French cuirassiers to the right of La Haye Sainte as you look from the British position - see attached. This coincides with Houssaye's account on page 194 in which he states the Cuirassiers charged the skirmishers of Kielmansegge's brigade.

If we are talking about the same event then in terms of timeline that event has already happened, by the time depicted on Siborne's diagram above. Thats why Ompteda and Keilmansegges Brigades are shown in square.

Barbero chapter 32 page 157 relates the story which is verified by the letters of Uxbridge and several other officers from the 2nd Life Guards and Dragoon Guards. The story goes that the French cavalry supporting D'Erlons left flank had driven forward as far as the valley floor below the positions occupied by Ompteda, Keilmansegge and Halkets Brigade.


However, Ney selected four or five squadrons to provide closer support for the French infantry commanded by Colonel Crabbe and these had driven in the skirmishers of Halkets Brigade and were currently hidden from the view of Ompteda and the garrison of La Haye Saint in the dead ground on the west of the spur which protrudes from the centre of the allied right.


Without realizing that French cavalry was that close Ompetda and Keilmannsegge were more concerned with the activities of the 13e Legere who having skirted the entire farmhorse complex were now in the Kitchen garden to the rear and the open field to the right trying to force the barricaded hole in the barn wall where the door had been removed the previous night. It was decided either by Keilmansegge or the Prince of Orange to send the Luneberg battalion forward to clear the skirmishers from the north and west faces of the farmhouse and relieve Barings garrison of the additional pressure on his defences.

Colonel Klencke's Light Field Battalion Luneberg accordingly rose to their feet and advance in line down the forward slope of the Allied ridge. Light Field Battalion Luneberg had been raised in 1813 and had seen action in several battles prior to the peace of 1814 being stationed in the Netherlands since then as part of the Hanoverian Subsidiary Corps. As it advance down the slope and across the sunken lane into the open ground beyond it became disordered by the passage of the obstacles but continued to engage the French skirmishers and drive them off down the slope scouring them out of the tall wheat of the field to the west of La Haye Sainte.

As they began to advance down the west side of the farm complex Baring decided to support their advance by launching a sally out of the barn gate and into the flank of the French skirmishers trying to resist them. He was hoping the attack would go so far as to clear the orchard to the south of La Haye Sainte and enable him to restore the original defence perimeter, so he gathered as many men as he could from the garrison and launched a charge out of the open barn door into the wheat field beyond to support the Luneberg battalion.

He was one of the few officers in the area mounted on a horse and was therefore the first to notice the appearance of Crabbe’s first Cuirassier Squadron as they mounted the top of the spur on the right flank of the Luneberg’s line only a few hundred yards away and moved rapidly through the high grain towards them.

Baring immediately ordered his detachment to form on him and retreated as fast as he could back towards the open barn door, but most of his men were chasing the French tiralliers down the slope and into the orchard and didn’t respond to his command and by the time they did it was too late, and no escape was left for most of them than up the slope towards the sunken road.

Whether Colonel Klenke saw the danger is not known as he was one of the first cut down as the cuirassiers descending down the slope and through the Luneberg Battalion. The battalion itself fell apart and the men ran in all directions some tried to get into the farm and were cut down along its walls, others tried to run back up the slope, whilst many threw down their weapons and tried to surrender. Baring managed to escape up the Allied ridge on his horse, but many of his men were caught by the cuirassiers or shot by the French skirmishers who still occupied the kitchen garden and prevented their attempts to get back into the farmhouse from the rear.

Approximately, half of the Luneberg battalion were lost in the rout and Colonel Klenke was killed.

The cuirassiers now drunk on victory continued to pursue the survivors up the ridge where Keilmansegge and Ompetda had now formed their battalions in square to receive them. However, Colonel Crabbe only had about four squadrons with him and had no intention of charging the main Allied battle line with such a small force. He called his men to heel and moved them to the right. Perhaps, intending to finish off the last of Baring’s men trying to force their way through the Kitchen garden and back into the farm house.

However, as they moved to the right across the face of the Allied ridge and above the farm house being jeered and ‘hurrahed’ by the german infantry in their squares above they ran into Ross’s Battery RHA who with their four remaining guns were deployed on the forward slope of the ridge above the farmhouse to support the defenders. Their sudden appearance amongst the gunners seems to have taken them by surprise probably because of the direction they came from and a large number of Ross' gunners were cut down and scattered, before Crabbe's squadron's moved around the east side of the farm and headed back towards their own lines. Barbero says they passed by the sandpit just after it was occupied by the French infantry of Aulard's Brigade and so before their assault on Kempt's position. In which case the rifles must have had a lucky escape.

Crabbe’s attack heralded a more general advance by the French cavalry supporting D’Erlon’s attack and led to the counter charge by Somerset’s Household Brigade intent on driving them back.

However, French skirmishers were to rapidly regain the ground given up during the advance of the Luneberg Battalion and Ompteda’s squares soon found themselves under galling skirmish fire from the sunken road to their front which remained in French hands for much of the battle even before the loss of the farm.

Originally Posted by Prince of Essling

Have looked at Jomini's Political & Military History of the Campaign of 1815". On page 162 he acknowledges that there is great confusion in all narratives on the battle (I note Siborne effectively accused one British writer the Rev G R Gleig of plagiarism of part of his work having shown the French order of deployment as Allix, Donzelot etc & then writing up the attack as Siborne had i.e. Donzelot attacking La Haye Sainte). Jomini reasons that it was Quiot that attacked La Haye Sainte; he observes that German writers tended to have the French in as many columns of attack as Divisions!

Yes, I does look as though Gleig plagiarized much of Siborne’s research, only detracting from it when it was necessary to support Wellington’s version of events.

In Siborne’s 3rd edition of his history (the one I hope to buy) there is a whole chapter by Siborne denouncing Gleig as a blatant plagiarist and explaining in great detail the evidence to support this accusation. It appears that Gleig was using sources that only Siborne had seen and recounting information that only Siborne had access too. He simply reworded passages from Siborne’s earlier works and letters.

Siborne even points out the places where anomalies occur in Gleig’s account due to his attempts to dovetail his research with the information provided by Wellington.

Indeed we are talking about the same event.

Originally Posted by Didz

... Siborne’s 3rd edition of his history (the one I hope to buy) .....

This is same version as I have in hard back - a repro by Greenhill Books. My one real disappointment is no maps of any of the battlefields. The Fourth edition printed 1894 has all of the maps - I haven't been able to find a facisimile version but I have downloaded the full version with maps from Google books from http://books.google.com/books?id=RxQ...page&q&f=false .

Just out of interest does Siborne mention the attack by Crabbe's squadrons?

I must admit I was still assuming the 'English Myth' version of the event was accurate until I read Barbero's account and cross-referenced his version with the Waterloo Letter accounts.

Originally Posted by Didz

Just out of interest does Siborne mention the attack by Crabbe's squadrons?

I must admit I was still assuming the 'English Myth' version of the event was accurate until I read Barbero's account and cross-referenced his version with the Waterloo Letter accounts.

Not in the fullsome terms of your recounting - it is really just about the Cuirassiers riding down & sabring the skirmishers, mention of the wounding of Colonel Klencke, and that amongst the prisoners was Major Dachenhausen; then the counterattack by Somerset's Brigade.

Originally Posted by Prince of Essling

Not in the fullsome terms of your recounting - it is really just about the Cuirassiers riding down & sabring the skirmishers, mention of the wounding of Colonel Klencke, and that amongst the prisoners was Major Dachenhausen; then the counterattack by Somerset's Brigade.

Hmm! I wionder where Barbero got all the extra detail from then. Perhaps, he has access to some of the French sources that eluded Siborne at the time.

I've been able to validate most of what Barbero says from the Waterloo letters and also from my personal experiences of walking the field, but I have not come across any other sources or accounts that mention a Belgian Colonel of Cuirassiers called Crabbe, or the special task force he commanded being hand picked by Ney.

The only other mention I've found of Colonel Crabbe is "Jean-Louis de Crabbé colonel d’Empire laissé pour mort à Waterloo (Jean-Louis de Crabbé, colonel d’Empire, left for dead in Waterloo);" Its the title of a book by François Hue.

A superbly produced account of Col Crabbé, who served with the French army from the Revolution through the Empire. He began a hussar, later becoming a chasseur, before becoming a staff officer. During this time he served in Belgium, Italy, and during the great campaigns of Napoleon, before being mortally wounded at Waterloo.

I suspect this is the source for the story.

The story told by Barbero certainly makes sense from a tactical perspective, D'Erlons Corps were tasked with breaking through the Allied centre above La Haye Sainte and so advance en-echelon with the left hand division leading (Donzelot according to Barberom and Siborne) and then Quiot Marcognet and finally Durette. So the right flank of the Corps was pretty much safe as each division covered the flank of the the one to its left. However, its left flank was essentially in the air and would need to be protected.

This was the task of the French cavalry sent forward in support, but it seems that rather than try and squeeze the entire force into the area available to the left of La Haie Sainte, Ney decided to send a selected force under command of a staff officer to provide immediate support and keep the enemy from turning the lead divisions flank.

The spur in the centre of the Allied left was a key feature of the battlefield and was under constant contention throughout the day being the only point from which an observer could see the entire western flank of the battlefield field from Hougoumont to La Haye Sainte. So, it makes perfect sense that Crabbe would have headed for this point in order to keep track of the progress of D'Erlons assault and watch for any Allied advance towards its flank, and from my own observations in walking the field the slope on the far side of the spur its distinctly convex in profile such that a person standing at its foot cannot see anything on the crest, and vice versa. In fact, standing at its foot its impossible to see anyone moving about on the road above or even the top of the 6' pole marking the position of Mercers battery. Mercer himself confirms that he was unable to see the French cavalry sheltered in this dead ground other than the occassional glimpse of a helmet plume or lance pennon even though they were less that 50 yards below his position.

Crabbe would almost certainly have used this dead ground to shelter his men from the fire of the Allied ridge (as indeed happened in the later French cavalry assaults) and so when the Luneberg battalion advanced he would have seen them from the crest of the spur and been perfectly placed to order his men forward over the crest into their flank.

So, the story itself certainly makes sense, I just haven't seen anyone else mention it before. The 'English Myth' version is more in line with the Riflemen Sharpe story by Bernard Cornwell, where 'Silly Billy' orders a poor Redcoated battalion to its doom because he is too stupid to see the French Cavalry deployed right in front of him. Light Field Battalion Luneberg were not of course a red-coated battalion at all in fact they wore green jackets and looked like riflemen, but the imagery persists in the film 'Waterloo' too.

Originally Posted by Didz

Hmm! I wionder where Barbero got all the extra detail from then. Perhaps, he has access to some of the French sources that eluded Siborne at the time.

Indeed I am wondering this too. From the various French sources I have read (about 7 or 8 so far, will track down more via Google books & Gallica digital library) they do not have the Barbero detail. They are fairly general and say the Cuirassiers were commanded by Travers (he had 4 squadrons in his Brigade).

The Barbero account is just starting to smell a bit like Arnold's description of a combat in "Crisis of the Danube" where he mentioned Austrian cavalry & a marsh but I am told by a friend who is fluent in German and has access to and read the official Austrian History of the 1809 war that no such incident was recorded.

Barbero’s account goes on with the story of this attack stating that Uxbridge returned from his inspection of the Allied cavalry on the right above Hougoumont just in time to witness the final stages of Crabbe’s attack.


Seeing the French cavalry approach close to the german squares and then move off sabring Ross’s gunners he quickly decided that as the Allied cavalry commander it was his duty to do something about it and immediately galloped over to Somerset to order his men forward.

Uxbridge ordered Somerset to wheel the Household Brigade into line and prepare them to charge.

It is not clear at this point if Uxbridge was aware of the much greater danger which was building further east beyond the road, where both Quiots and Marcognet’s infantry columns had now reached the crest of the ridge, driven in the Allied infantry opposing them and were in the process of crossing the Chemin d’Ohain. It's unlikely he could see this activity from his position west of the road though he should have been aware of the noise of battle from that direction. Its possible that he believed he was witnessing a major French cavalry assault right long the Allied line.

However, he certainly crossed behind Picton’s division to reach the Union Brigade and at that point was probably better aware of the nature of the crisis, although by now Picton himself was dead and I don't recall any mention of a discussion with him about the situation as he passed.

Whether he realised the full tactical situation or not he ordered Ponsonby’s Union Brigade to move forward into line with Somerset’s and prepare to charge.

What happened next is the subject of the model as depicted in Siborne’s diagram and where we came in.

Barbero states that having managed with some difficulty to negotiate the sunken road to their front the Household Brigade reformed as best they could in the wheat field beyond and then charged the remaining squadron’s of Crabbe’s Cuirassiers some of whom were still milling about chasing survivors from the Luneberg battalion, Baring’s sally force and Ross’s gunners.

In their scattered and disordered state the Cuirassiers had no chance of resisting this fresh attack. Those who could spurred their horses forward and tried to follow Crabbe round the farm of La Haye Sainte towards the main round, others were simply driven down the slope towards their supports in the valley.

At this point the French Cavalry support in the valley must have been committed in support and the melee would have become general. Certainly Captain Kelly reports that he attacked the Colonel of the 1st Cuirassiers (Dubios’ Brigade) felled him with a rain of sabre blows and then dismounted to rip off his victim’s epaulettes as a trophy.” He was convinced that he had killed this officer, but in fact, the man in question Michel Ordener a 28 year old veteran of eight campaigns and count of the Empire survived and later returned to the action minus his epaulettes. He actually didn't die until 1862.

Meanwhile, the left flank of the Household Brigade was in contact with the main road and so as they advanced they found their progress blocked by the farm of La Haye Saint to their front and the last remnants of Crabbe’s cuirassiers moving across their line of advance from right to left to join the main road and escape.

Pursuiing the same line these squadrons of the 2nd Lifeguards trampled through the kitchen garden scouring it of Frenchmen and then chased them across the road and into the open ground on the east of the farm.

Here they ran into the flank of Aulard’s Column still struggling with Kemps brigade on the forward slope of the ridge and eventually became mixed in with squadrons from ‘The Royals’ who were advancing on their left in pursuit of Bourgeois’ Brigade from Quiot’s Division. Eyewitnesses confirm that troops of The Royals and Lifeguards became somewhat confused at this point with the officers of both regiments mistaking the uniforms of the other as their own, which were very similar in appearance.

Nevertheless, the result was the same and the French were thrown into disorder and driven back down the slope. About 1,500 survivors of Aulard’s column taking shelter in what little safety the sandpit could offer until infantry from Kempt's Brigade took their surrender.

To the west of the farm the rest of the Household Brigade led by Uxbridge cleared the wheatfield of the remainder of Crabbe’s Cuirassier and now began to set upon any of the infantry from Schmitz’s Brigade who had been too slow to quit the area.

Uxbridge noted that these men did not put up much of a fight and quit the area almost immediately. Although a few stayed long enough to gall the advancing cavalry with a few deadly musket shots, killing the Colonel’s of both the 1st Life Guard and the Kings Dragoon Guards.

At this point the charge of the Household Brigade like that of the Union Brigade got out of hand. Despite the intervention of the main French cavalry force in the valley the Household Brigade ignored the rally. Uxbridge later wrote “After the overthrow of the Cuirassiers, I had in vain attempted to stop my people by sounding the rally, but no-one heeded the call.”

By now the charge of both brigades had broken up into a number of smaller contests involving individual troops and squadron’s. Lieutenant Story whose troop was pursuing some French infantry across the slope suddenly found himself face to face with a French infantry officer he knew from his time as a prisoner of war in Verdun, and sparing his life sent him to the rear as a prisoner of war.

Eventually the surviors of Schmitz Brigade managed to find some sort of cover in the orchard south of La Haye Sainte and the Household Brigade began to run out of targets and ended up in a confused heap with blown horses on the floor of the valley, and now receiving the full attention of the enemies fire from the slopes opposite.

It was time for the cavalry to withdraw, and Baring made his way back to La Haye Sainte to resume its defence..

Originally Posted by Prince of Essling

Indeed I am wondering this too. From the various French sources I have read (about 7 or 8 so far, will track down more via Google books & Gallica digital library) they do not have the Barbero detail. They are fairly general and say the Cuirassiers were commanded by Travers (he had 4 squadrons in his Brigade).

Four squadron's is a very small brigade. Traver's Brigade is listed as consisting of the 7th and 12th Cuirassiers, so they must either have been understrength, or perhaps squadrons were withdrawn to form Crabbe's force.

The story of Captain kelly and Michel Ordener also suggests that the 1st Cuirassiers and consequently Dubois Brigade became involved in the fight at some point, suggesting that the entire of Walthier's 13th Reserve Cavalry Division was present in support. Lachouque states that the entire of Travers Brigade was involved and that Bachelu's Division eventually drove off the Household Cavalry.

Crabbe is not a myth!

Page 13 of Martinien, Aristide (1843-1912) - "Tableaux, par corps et par batailles, des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l'Empire (1805-1815)" shows a Colonel B Crabbe, who was part of L'Etat Major, as being wounded at Waterloo and he died on 23 June 1816.

Originally Posted by Prince of Essling

Crabbe is not a myth!

Page 13 of Martinien, Aristide (1843-1912) - "Tableaux, par corps et par batailles, des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l'Empire (1805-1815)" shows a Colonel B Crabbe, who was part of L'Etat Major, as being wounded at Waterloo and he died on 23 June 1816.

Ah ha! so at least we know Hue didn't make him up. Not sure about the 'B' though, Hue suggests J.L., but I suppose if he was born Belgian he may have chosen to Fanco-phile his name at some point.

I wonder if he was attached to Marshal Ney's staff, that would make some sense if Ney chose him to lead his special task force, and I assume that as Ney arrived in Belgium late his staff would have been pulled together in a bit of a hurry?

Originally Posted by Didz

Ah ha! so at least we know Hue didn't make him up. Not sure about the 'B' though, Hue suggests J.L., but I suppose if he was born Belgian he may have chosen to Fanco-phile his name at some point.

I wonder if he was attached to Marshal Ney's staff, that would make some sense if Ney chose him to lead his special task force, and I assume that as Ney arrived in Belgium late his staff would have been pulled together in a bit of a hurry?

I would tend to agree with your last point about being on Ney's staff - but having now looked at 12 French accounts of Travers action (need to find and read Soult's version) there is no mention of Crabbe. I am starting to wonder whether Crabbe was a bit like Marbot - having a tendency to over emphasise his actual role? There is no mention of a special task group only Travers detached to second (?support) the infantry attack of D'Erlon.

After your post about initials of Crabbe I took another look at Martinien - my goof as there are no initials with the name; the B by his name stands for "Blesse" i.e. "Wounded!"

I've read elsewhere that it was a common French practice to detach staff officers and hand picked troops for special missions, but as you say, so far there seems to be no corroboration of Crabbe's role in the destruction of the Luneberg Battalion.

In fact, at the moment I'm just assuming that Hue's book is source for the story as I haven't actually read it. I did scan through the notes and bibliography at the back of Barbero's book but could see no mention of it, so it may not even be the source he is using. As I mentioned before one of the worse aspects of his book is the lack of any verification for his statements within it. He lists his sources at the back but makes no link between the sources and the events he claims to have occurred.

It's very frustrating, and at times quite annoying especially when he makes bold and completely unjustifiable statements like 'Colonel Elphinstone, commander of the thirty third Foot and one of the least esteemed officers in the entire army,......' with no explanation or justification for what can only be a personal judgement made by an unnamed individual with no mention as to how or why Barbero came across it, and instead quoted as though it was an unquestionable fact of history.

Of course it may well be true, but Barbero does nothing to convince the reader of its veracity other than the blantantly egotistical demand on the reader that 'I'm a historian, so you have to believe me.'

In short 'The Battle' is an enjoyable read, but leaves the informed reader with more questions than answers.

Hofschroer’s Confusion.

I was attempting to verify Barbero’s account of Crabbe’s charge by cross-referencing the events he describes with those mentioned by eyewitnesses in various other histories on my book shelf, when I came across an obvious bit of confusion in Hofschroer’s account of D’Erlon’s attack.

This happens occasionally when historians don’t adequately cross-check their assumptions with actual primary sources. But it's unusual to find the confusion recorded by the historian in his own book, usually it’s the result of not bothering to read all the sources, or deliberately ignoring sources that don’t fit the theory the historian is seeking to promote. In Hofschroer’s case it just seems to be a failure to think through what he's writing.

Hofschroer begins his account of D’Erlon’s attack with the traditional ‘English Myth’ version of four columns in echelon. Quiot is said to be leading, followed by Donzelot, then Marcognet and finally Durette. This is of course the safe option, as all loyal English historians have followed this script for decades and Hofschroer has bigger fish to fry in this book and so sticks with tradition. But it ignores all Barbero’s research.

The first problems in the script begin to manifest themselves in Hofschroer’s account when he starts to quote the eyewitnesses to this event.

Problem 1. The evidence of Bijlandt’s Brigade.
‘Bijlandt’s men, one battalion of the 7th Line, the 27th Jager, three battalions of militia, and one battery of artillery had initially been placed in a relatively exposed position in front of Wellington’s left, but had since been moved back to join the main defence line. (In fact, they are shown by Siborne as occupying the section of the line soon to be plugged by the advance of Kempt’s brigade when they finally give ground under pressure e.g. between the main road on their right and Pack’s Brigade on their left, directly overlooking the sandpit.)

Hofschroer continues:

‘This brigade, consisting in part of young inexperienced troops, had already suffered heavily at Quatre Bras two days earlier and the bombardment they had just endured from D’Erlon’s grand battery did not help their nervous disposition. [Note: In fact, Bjlandt’s men had fought with considerable bravery at Quatre Bras, the 7th Line were little short of heroes, and the 27th Jager were mostly veteran’s of the French Imperial Guard. But this degradation of the Netherland Army is also an essential part of the English Myth. If Bjlandt’s men felt anything during the opening stages of Waterloo, its was probably more along the lines of ‘When are the bloody English going to start doing some fighting, instead of sticking us in the forefront of every action.]

The fire of Donzelot’s skirmishers that immediately followed did not allow them to recover their composure. [Ok! so Hofschroer seems to have decided that Donzelot’s Division was providing the skirmish screen for the entire advance, including Quiots Division. Which could make sense if one believes that light infantry regiments like the 13e Legere were specialist skirmishers and therefore would be selected for the task in preference to the skirmishers of Quiots own leading division. However this conflicts with Barbero’s account.]

When Donzelot’s columns approached, the Netherlanders beat a hasty retreat, leaving a gap in the Allied line. [Note: Now there is the rub. Is this a slip of the pen? Didn’t Hofschroer mean to say Quiots Columns? If Donzelot was indeed following to the right rear of Quiots advance, how would his columns have managed to reach the Dutch first. Equally puzzling, if Donzelots columns were not on the left of the French advance near the road, how did they manage to squeeze past Quiots Division to attack the Dutch which had their right flank resting upon the road, and if so where did Quiots Division get displaced too, did it cross the main road and attack on the far side of La Haye Sainte [We know it definitely didn’t because it had to be on the east of the farm to receive the charge of the Royal Dragoons.]

Problem 2: The attack on Kempt's Brigade
Hofschroer explains this by saying that:
On the left, the lead unit of Quiots Division, Brigade Chalet quickly moved towards the farm of La Haye Sainte, where it engaged in a vigorous fire fight with the defenders. (Hofschroer actually uses the original commanders names, which I’ve replaced for clarity) Bourgeois’ Brigade, four battalions strong, moved on forcing the 95th Rifles to abandon the sandpit they were holding nearby. Part of Kempts Brigade was the next French target. [So, basically Hofschroer is placing Chalets Brigade in the role assigned to Schmitz Brigade by Barbero and Bourgeois Brigade in the role assigned to Aulards. The problem he would have noted had he plotted this on a map is that he has now placed Bourgeois Brigade directly on top of Aulard’s Brigade based upon his earlier statement that Donzelot’s Division had attacked Bijlandt. Bijlandt had fallen back, Kempt had now taken his place, and so the lead column of Donzelots Division was now directly below the freshly arrived regiments of Kempts Brigade. Unless of course we are being asked to accept that the dense columns of Aulard and Bourgeois just completed a neat little ‘Dosey-Dough’ around each other to change their position in the line. Not easy for several thousand densily pack men to achieve under fire.]

Problem 3: Bijlandt's brigade reappears in a different position takng Donzelot with him.
Hofschroer then gets even more confused stating:
‘Supported this way, Kempts men held their ground, firing steady volleys against the French infantry columns. The French had lost all their impetus and now attempted to deploy for a firefight, but instead fell into a state of confusion. After their success against Bijlandt’s brigade Donzelots men also paused to reform. [So, now it seems that Donzelot and Quiot’s columns are fighting side by side, but that somehow Kempt has moved into the line alongside the former position occupied by Bijlandt rather than as previously stated to fill the gap it left in the line. This revised history is further supported by the statement that.]
‘Taking advantage of the situation, Pack’s division moved forwards to fill the gap left in the Allied line.’ [So, hang on, didn’t Kempt’s Brigade already do that?, and given the Pack’s Brigade deployed to the left of Kempts, doesn’t that then mean that Bijlandt’s Brigade just did a retrospective leap some 300 yards to the east? Or is Hofschroer just trying to tie up the lose ends and hoping the reader won’t notice.]
The British veteran’s (Packs Division) fired into Donzelots flank from 40 paces with devastating effect. The French began to waver so Picton ordered his men to charge home and almost immediately was himself shot in the head and mortally wounded.
[This passage is very confusing and I can’t actually tie it in with any of the eyewitness statements. On the one hand it’s the classic ‘English Myth’ version of devastating volleys, bayonet charges and Picton falling form his horse whilst leading the charge. But we are told by Barnard and others that that’s not what happened. From an analytical perspective I can’t reconcile how battalions from Pack’s Division would have managed to fire into the flanks of one of D’Erlon’s Columns unless it had somehow changed direction and was now advancing across the front of the slope which is unlikely if they were deployed on a battalion front and en-echelon. The only flank exposed would have been the one exposed by the lead division as it attacked Kempts brigade near the main road, and we know that was soon to be attacked by the 1st Lifeguards in the opening stages of the British heavy cavalry charge.]

Problem 4: Penfold's Eagle.

Finally Hofschroer completes the mental repositioning of Donzelots and Quiots Columns by making the closing statement on the saga.

'The Inniskillings struck Donzelot’s Column.'
[Now interestingly I’ve been trying for some months to find any tangible evidence as to which columns the Inniskilings actually attacked. Sibornes model and the diagram of it posted above clearly show that the Inniskillings advanced between the Royals and the Greys and struck what looks like two columns sited some way back from the road halfway up the slope of the ridge. This is confirmed by Colonel Muter amongst others who states that they crossed the road and descended the slope about 200 yards before clashing with the French, whereas the Grey’s ran into the head of Grenier’s column as it was in the process of crossing the road, and the Royals ran into Bourgeios just beyond the road opposition the junction between Kempt and Pack’s Brigade.

However, so far, I’ve found no tangible evidence to confirm the identity of the columns that the Inniskillings attacked. They ought to have been Donzelots columns of one accepts that they were positioned between Quiot and Marcognet, but if so, then why were they 200 yards away down the slope, having just driven in Bjlandt’s Brigade close to the road, then engaged Kempt's Brigade in a sustained fire fight and finally been attacked in the flank by Packs Brigade half-way across the slope to the East. It now seems Hofschroer has had them perform a massive leap backwards towards their own lines to be in position to be attacked by the Inniskillings. It’s obviously been a busy day for the soldiers of Donzelots Division.

The Inniskillings themselves don’t help much, according to them they attacked Bourgeios column and captured an eagle, they actually claim it was the eagle of the 45e Ligne which was seized by Trooper Penfold, and then handed to Sergeant for safe keeping. The inference here is pretty obvious, but there are inconsistencies in the story which suggests that if Trooper Penfold is telling the truth then the Eagle was not that of the 45e Ligne.

According to Captain Clarke the Eagle of the 45th was captured intact, whereas Penfold states quite clearly that he had the break the shaft of the Eagle he captured to wrench it from the Eagle Bearer leaving the end of the shaft still in French possession. In short I think Lt Colonel Miller who suggested it was the same Eagle is putting two and two together and coming up with five.

So, if it wasn’t the same Eagle, and its possible Penfold’s Eagle simply got lost or recovered by the French then it could have belonged to any of D'Erlon's other regiments. It’s a shame as it would have resolved the mystery perfectly, a captured eagle would have confirmed the identify of the middle columns beyond any doubt.

If we believe Barbero’s account then one of these columns is that of Chalet which stepped off initially some 400 yards behind the right rear flank of Bourgeios Brigade and would therefore have been in approximately the right position to receive the Inniskillings.

The other column shown in the diagram (although Colonel Muter actually claims there were three) is harder to explain. Greniers brigade has somehow managed to draw ahead of the rest of the Corps and gained more ground than even Bourgeios, even though it stepped off after Quiot’s Division and should have been following the same line of advance. It looks as though it has swung out of formation to the right and attacked directly up the slope to the right of Bourgeois, and its possible that if Nogues Brigade which was supposed to be providing close support to its right rear didn’t change its line of march to conform to this change of direction then it might have simply passed behind it and found itself alongside Chalet on the slope just as the Inniskillings came down upon them.

Of course its also possible that the columns are truly the elusive and fast moving Donzelots Division, but if that were the case one would have to wonder why it was halfway down the slope when the Division scheduled to attack after it was actually in the process of breaching the enemy line above it.]

It appears to me that Donzelot’s Division just gets moved around arbitrarily to fit the snapshot of the moment being described, which is possible on paper but pretty difficult when dealing with several thousand closely packed men in a formation of several divisions.

Problem 5: The magical re-appearance of Bourgeios Brigade
In closing here is an account from Fosten’s book on the Union Brigade.
‘Meantime Kempt’s and Packs Brigades had been taken back 150 yards from the road. The men were told to lie down to evade the shells still flying overhead, but seeing that Bylandt’s men had been momentarily routed Picton shouted the order to stand again and Kempts Brigade was brought forward to the road. They drove in the French voltiguers and Donzelot’s men, in the very act of deploying, were caught by the sharp and sustained volley’s from the British.

Marcognet’s, third echelon, had by now reached the same height as Donzalot and was just passing through the in front of Pack’s Brigade. The Scots were deployed in Line, four deep, and opened fire on the head of the French column. The French could not reply except by the Front ranks and so fired a ragged volley [English Myth stuff again, the French would have fired voluntarily as they were trained to do] and then came on with the bayonet. The first opposing ranks were now involved in a desperate hand-to-hand struggle. [Right….well eyewitness accounts state that the only struggle going on at this point was by Pack’s men to get the heck out of dodge, there was certainly no desperate hand to hand fighting going on. The attack of Greniers column had driven in Pack's line which had been decimated by the French musketry fire, an attempt to stablise the line by ordering a bayonet charge failed miserably when the men refused to advance and then began to fall back without orders. In fact, at least one account states that Picton's last command before he was shot through the head was 'Somebody, rally the Scots.'

When the Greys advanced Pack's men were scattered all over the reverse slope, some obviously making for the rear and the relative safety of the woods, whilst others were trying to reform on their officers and NCO's. The Grey's were jeered and swore at as the pushed their way through the Scottish infantry, particularly by the wounded who thought the cavalry were trying to force them to stand their ground. However, the presence of the cavalry did help Pack's officers restore some order and some of Packs men did rally to the colours and move back up the slope behind the Greys.

But, once again one is left wondering where some of the French columns have gone, in this case with Donzelot attacking Kempt and Macognet attacking Pack, there is no room for Quiots Division, and yet they have to be there to receive the charge of the Royals.]