THe Rommel Papers

[Roy Batty]

I'm about halfway through the book, but couldn't wait to discuss a couple of the things I've read so far.

First of all, the footnotes written by B.H. Liddell Hart: Initially I found them to be most welcome in regards to clarifying actual French and British troop counts and disposition. However, as I've continued reading, he has firmly entrenched himself in my mind as an apologist for the British military and the mistakes they made in North Africa, exploiting footnotes in a personal account of a war posthumously compiled in order to do so. I've found most of his corrections to be trite, unneeded and in some cases I even find them to be suspect.

Example:
Upon conclusion of the second siege of Tobruk, Rommel gave an account of the make-up of the British garrison, after it had fallen and many of its soldiers and officers had been taken prisoner. In my mind Rommel was in a unique position to learn the actual make up of the British forces involved: numbers of troops, tanks and artillery, not only through examination of any seized documentation and interrogation of the captured enemy but also through direct observation prior to, during and after the battle. On the other hand, Hart glibly informs me, the reader, in a short footnote that Rommel was in fact incorrect and then provides the 'actual' disposition of the defending troops.

Hart's assertions are based on... what? A report filed to a military official in London? Bear in mind that this is the man who wrote the introduction to the Rommel Papers, in which he called Rommel a 'great captain' in the likes of Napoleon and Caesar, differing from them only in the general accuracy of his personal accounts, devoid as they are of self-puffery and exaggeration. Are Rommel's accounts only credible when verified by meticulous records-keeping in wartime situations?

I didn't really begin to suspect any bias until I read the passage below, written by Rommel following the fall of Bir Hacheim in the summer of '42 and it's accompanying footnote written by Hart.

Certainly we had suffered heavy casualties, but they were in no way comparable with those of the British, for in the strong-points which we surrounded thousands of British troops had compelled to surrender through lack of water and ammunition. For psychological reasons alone, the sacrifice of whole formations to the enemy is generally a mistake.

Rommel's line of thought here may have been accentuated by his reflections on what happened in the previous winter when he fell back westwards, leaving large garrisons on the frontier position to be cut off and captured.

My first feelings were of disgust; I thought it highly dishonorable. I can well imagine Hart's resentment at reading Rommel's passage and its apparent hypocrisy, but I find his speculation highly inappropriate, all the more so when you take into account that Rommel's failure to extricate parts of his force in the Winter was already shared in detail earlier in the Papers. At best this footnote is an unneeded reminder of Rommel's failure, at worst it's a personal dig against him after he has already been dead and gone. I would like the thoughts of others on this.

The other topic I wanted to discuss pertains to the invasion of France in 1940. Rommel's deep penetration into enemy territory resulted in the overtaking of refugee columns inter-tangled with French troops, who, completely surprised by his appearance, generally surrendered without a fight. In the following quotation, Rommel has overtaken a traffic jam of refugees and troops who did not realize that Rommel's tanks were even German until they were pulling alongside them and calling for surrender with Deutsch accents.

Particularly irate over this sudden disturbance was a French lieutenant colonel whom we overtook with his car jammed in the press of vehicles. I asked him for his rank and appointment. His eyes glowed hate and impotent fury and he gave the impression of being a thoroughly fanatical type. There being every likelihood, with so much traffic on the road, that our column would get split up from time to time, I decided on second thoughts to take him along with us. He was already fifty yards away to the east when he was fetched back to Col. Rothenburg, who signed to him to get in his tank. But he curtly refused to come with us, so, after summoning him three times to get in, there was nothing for it but to shoot him.

I have to admit: my first reaction was one of amusement. Of course, I'm comfortably detached from the affair; I doubt a widow or child of the killed officer would appreciate my good humor or the casual way in which Rommel describes (what amounts to) murder.

I haven't yet looked into the legality of the killing, but the morality of it leaves much to be discussed. Curiously, Hart offered no comment.

[hellheaven1987]

First, I have to point out that Liddell Hart bear a deep hatre towards British military, so he was not a British apologist.

Second, the deployed positions of Tobruk, well, there are always possibilities that both Rommel and British government were wrong, as the actual positions would probably only know by the British commander in Tobruk.

Third, it is war, so I am not surprised about PoWs been executed for disobey orders, several times.

[gsoxx]

I have to admit: my first reaction was one of amusement. Of course, I'm comfortably detached from the affair; I doubt a widow or child of the killed officer would appreciate my good humor or the casual way in which Rommel describes (what amounts to) murder.

I haven't yet looked into the legality of the killing, but the morality of it leaves much to be discussed. Curiously, Hart offered no comment.

Correct me if I'm wrong but the officer wasn't a POW at the time and by not getting into the tank he resisted his capture. That's not murder.

[Roy Batty]

First, I have to point out that Liddell Hart bear a deep hatre towards British military, so he was not a British apologist.

Forgive me for making a generalization. I was referring to the context of the book itself, The Rommel Papers, not his entire career as a military commentator. Certainly he could not always have hated the British military (he was a captain -I forget in which service- before poor health forced him to resign his commission)

Second, the deployed positions of Tobruk, well, there are always possibilities that both Rommel and British government were wrong, as the actual positions would probably only know by the British commander in Tobruk.

That's exactly my point. I'm not saying Rommel enjoyed 100% accuracy in his intelligence gathering: yet he was in a decidedly more proximate to the truth of the forces' dispositions by virtue of his physical presence in that time and place. Unless Sir Basil managed to interview the Commandant after the close of the war (Rommel got to interview him at the close of the siege- as a prisoner) I fail to see how his 'corrections' could even warrant the term.

Personal account of historic events are guaranteed to be inaccurate to some degree -that's one of the fundamental flaws of human perspective: limitation. Either we can generally rely on Rommel's account to be the approximate truth (as Sir Basil assures us in his introduction) or we cannot. Regardless, Hart should have been providing his sources so that we could decide for ourselves where the truth lays (usually somewhere in between).

Third, it is war, so I am not surprised about PoWs been executed for disobey orders, several times.

Correct me if I'm wrong but the officer wasn't a POW at the time and by not getting into the tank he resisted his capture.

So, he was a POW or he wasn't. At what point does one become a prisoner of war? The lt. col in this instance had clearly not offered any resistance beyond a 'curt' refusal to join a German officer in his command tank and indeed had already marched 50 yards to the East (i.e. towards the German rear, the general direction Rommel was instructing POWs to go, usually trusting the enemy's own officers to lead the enlisted men in this task) presumably with the rest of the 'surrendered' French troops.

That's not murder.

We're not talking about a human silhouette viewed in the sights of a rifle, 300 yards away, or a machine gun crew refusing to throw down their arms and walk out of their pillbox after their position has been surrounded. This man was completely powerless (impotent was the word Rommel used) and of no immediate threat to the Germans. (though I suspect Rommel was concerned that he may cause disruption among the prisoners- possibly leading them to over power any guards they had and cause trouble in his division's rear)

Murder is murder, be it in a war or in a prison as part of a lawful execution. Refusing to call it what it is - I almost want to call it childish. Let's not sugar coat the truth here. It does not lessen Rommel's honor any more than it does any soldier's who killed an enemy as part of their duty.

[gsoxx]

Murder is murder, be it in a war or in a prison as part of a lawful execution. Refusing to call it what it is - I almost want to call it childish. Let's not sugar coat the truth here. It does not lessen Rommel's honor any more than it does any soldier's who killed an enemy as part of their duty.

He refused to enter the tank. That's all that matters to me. That he may or may not have walked to the rear to surrender to the following infantry is of secondary concern. That he walked away instead of running is also irrelevant in both cases he didn't obey and fled the scene. You follow the orders of your captor or you may die (Isn't it absurd to assume that he surrendered but still could decide on its own to whom and when and if he has to enter a tank?). Especially in such a heated situation like Rommel's drive through France where there is simply no time for nuances. Don't get fooled by Rommel's buisnesslike tone. Maybe there is more to the situation and my judgement is overhasty. But the way it is described now I can't describe it as murder.

[hellheaven1987]

Forgive me for making a generalization. I was referring to the context of the book itself, The Rommel Papers, not his entire career as a military commentator. Certainly he could not always have hated the British military (he was a captain -I forget in which service- before poor health forced him to resign his commission)

No, his hatre towards British military was developed around 1930s, so when he organized Rommel Papers he was already a renown person for his dislike of British military. Either way, he probably just wanted to add more details about Rommel's judgments and how did Rommel reach each conclusion (in fact, in Hart's another book, History of WWII, he gives me an impression that he was a Rommel apologist; he only achieved more balance tone in his book, German Generals Talk).

That's exactly my point. I'm not saying Rommel enjoyed 100% accuracy in his intelligence gathering: yet he was in a decidedly more proximate to the truth of the forces' dispositions by virtue of his physical presence in that time and place. Unless Sir Basil managed to interview the Commandant after the close of the war (Rommel got to interview him at the close of the siege- as a prisoner) I fail to see how his 'corrections' could even warrant the term.

I don't see why Rommel would be more decisively having more intelligence than British, especially it had been known that British War Cabinet was directly controlling Tobruk's deployment (or, more correctly, Mr Churchill was controlling it, directly).

Personal account of historic events are guaranteed to be inaccurate to some degree -that's one of the fundamental flaws of human perspective: limitation. Either we can generally rely on Rommel's account to be the approximate truth (as Sir Basil assures us in his introduction) or we cannot. Regardless, Hart should have been providing his sources so that we could decide for ourselves where the truth lays (usually somewhere in between).

I have not read this book yet so I cannot give more comments about Hart's source; but bear in mind, Liddell Hart was few historians that could access British military files at will, might even able to access some secret files that classify as national secret.