Replace Ney at Waterloo?

Was reading the Napoleon vs. Wellington thread before it got somewhat sidetracked, but I thought this might be an interesting topic.

1. Who would you replace him with?

2. How you think the campaign (not just Waterloo) would have been different with the replacement.

Davout. Theres a commander who knows how to take advantage of a situation, he would more than likely have attacked at Quatre Bras, and probably would have had the sense and balls to tell Napoleon not to split his force to begin with. Of course the question is would he have served better as a field commander or in his historical role of 1815 as Minister of War.

I will replace Ney with Davout, who was certainly the best marshal of Napoleon in 1815 after Lannes' death. Meanwhile Ney should be tasked to replace Grouchy, since Blucher was not smarter than Ney, Ney's ferocious strategy probably will catch him and allow Napoleon to handle the British with ease.

I would consider replacing Ney with Soult, and Soult with Davout, the reason for this being Soult's poor performance as Chief of Staff.

Napoleon's Waterloo campaign utilized his strategy of the central position. It was absolutely essential that the wings be properly coordinated, and that commanders know what was expected of them.

Napoleon was not accustomed to giving precise and unambiguous orders, relying on Berthier to translate his stream-of-consciousness into something an army could actually do. Soult transcribed Napoleon's orders almost verbatim, and failed to continue Berthier's policy of sending duplicates of important dispatches.

Ney's misunderstanding about his objectives at Quatre Bras, d'Erlon's meanderings between there and Ligny, and Grouchy's ignorance of Blucher's intervention at Waterloo were all in some measure down to Soult.

Soult would have been much more useful commanding the left wing himself. Reille and d'Erlon had both been his subordinates in Spain, and he had had extensive experience fighting against Wellington.

Davout as Chief of Staff could be relied upon to hold his own with Napoleon. His organisational abilities would have ensured that clear orders were drafted. that they flowed smoothly and reliably to their destinations, that detached commanders were kept informed of the changing situation.

Meanwhile, Ney could have been left in Paris as Minister for War. He may not have made a great bureaucrat, but at least his energy and drive would have kept the mobilisation going, and his honesty, loyalty and integrity might have warded off the likes of Fouché.

No - Ney was hopeless and would have been best given command of the Guard alone as the only thing he probably could do well by this stage was lead a last desperate charge sword in hand.

Davout, Soult and Suchet had all commanded independent armies successfully.

Soult was also a terrible Chief of Staff so putting him in Ney's place would have killed two birds with one stone - plus he was the one marshal left on active service who did not underestimate the British.

Replacing Grouchy is another question - he was actually highly competent but for his one decisive lapse on the day of Waterloo and I can't necessarily see that someone like Suchet would have done any better.

Davout was by far the ablest of the marshals but N really did need his formidable organisational skills as Minister of War - so if he'd served as Chief of Staff or as the commander of Grouchy's wing France as a whole would have been less well prepared to prosecute a long war if they had won at Waterloo.

Ultimately the problem was that N was not a good delegator of authority - even when he was in Moscow he tried to micromanage his armies in Spain and refused to designate a single commander in chief there until it was too late.

This meant that even his marshals were given inadequate information and freedom of action to develop into truly effective commanders in their own right - thus the poor record of pretty much everyone except Eugene, Massena and Davout when circumstances did demand that they operate independently (Soult is a special case as although he lost most of his battles against Wellington by the time he took overall command in Spain the odds against him were insurmountable).

Ironically if he'd been less brilliant and omni-competent he would have had to develop a proper general staff system and groom a whole stable of independent-minded generals who could operate without his constant supervision.

Napoleon for Waterloo should have had Davout commanding a portion of his infantry, maybe leading the assaults on the farms, and the famous Murat for leading the cavalry. Unfortunately, Murat was occupied with his kingdom of Naples.

No Murat was technically available as he'd been kicked out of Naples by the Austrians when he tried to launch a War of Italian Liberation.

He actually fled to France and offered his services to Napoleon but was refused as N had not forgiven him or his sister Caroline Bonaparte (who was Murat's wife) for them stabbing him in the back in 1814 and joining the allies so they could keep their crowns.

Plus he was also angry that Murat had mistimed his own war - if he'd waited a few months it might have tied down Austrian forces that were planning to invade France but by jumping the gun Murat just delivered the allies a cheap and easy victory.

Nevertheless N. did regret on St Helena not having Murat at Waterloo - although its difficult to see how he might have won the battle as there was no real potential for a grand cavalry charge of the sort he specialised in - and its difficult to see how he could have handled the one they did deliver any better than Ney did.

Having said that if he was doing Ney's job at Quatre Bras and on the following day he might well have attacked the British much more vigorously and made it harder for them to stand and fight at Waterloo in the first place.

On balance though Grouchy was probably a better choice as cavalry reserve commander than Murat who by this stage was far too erratic and insubordinate.

Can anyone tell me about the generals availiable to Napoleon in the Hundred Days, and where did Napoleon position them. I only know Davout in Paris, Ney, Grouchy, and Soult with Nap in Armee du Nord, and Brune in Italy.

Originally Posted by Prince Francesca

Can anyone tell me about the generals availiable to Napoleon in the Hundred Days, and where did Napoleon position them. I only know Davout in Paris, Ney, Grouchy, and Soult with Nap in Armée du Nord, and Brune in Italy.

Gerard's IV Corps was originally the Armée de la Moselle until Napoleon formed the Armee du Nord for the Waterloo campaign.

Along the French eastern border from north to south were Gerard (on the Moselle), Rapp (Strasbourg), Lecourbe (River Jura), Suchet (Swiss border) and Brune (Italian border).

Lamarque was putting down the royalist rebellion in La Vendée. Clausel commanded the West Pyranees region, and Decan the East Pyranees.

Mortier had declined Napoleon's invitation, citing ill health. Massene also declined Napoleon's call. Eugène stayed in Bavaria at the behest of his father. Berthier had been assassinated (by defenestration no less).

Victor, Oudinot, MacDonald and of course Marmont sided with the Bourbons.

Murat was in France (after his defeat by the Austrians) but wasn't called by Napoleon due to his betrayal in 1814 (see the earlier post by Clodius).

There is much doubt about whether Berthier jumped or was pushed - he was old (63), sick and doubtless in a state of considerable agitation about whether he should give up everything to spend his last days battling hopeless odds at Napoleon's side or betray the man who had made him a Prince.

I believe Mortier was available for service but was taken ill just before the Waterloo campaign.

Augereau was willing to serve but had made the mistake of issuing a proclamation denouncing Napoleon after his abdication - and thus got himself blackballed by both Napoleon and the Bourbons when they returned.

Brune did serve and was lynched by a royalist mob for doing so.

Jourdan commanded the garrison at Besancon and was unlikely to be given command of any army again after losing Spain in 1813.

Kellermann (the marshal not his son the cavalry corps commander) was technically available but was elderly and had not held field command for some years.

Lefebrve also offered his services but wasn't used.

Massena stayed in France during the 100 days but was too old, sick and disaffected to be much use as a general.

Moncey was loyal to the Bourbons as was Perignon and St Cyr.

Serurier appears to have been actually senile.

So really the only marshals available were Davout, Ney, Soult, Suchet, Grouchy, Brune, Jourdan, Kellermann and Lefebrve - and potentially Mortier and Massena if they had been physically fit enough to return to the colours.

As Brune, Jourdan, Kellermann and Lefebrve were old Jacobin generals who were more politically than militarily useful this really reduced down just 5: Davout, Soult, Ney, Suchet and Grouchy.

Amongst the senior corps commanders Gerard and Vandamme both argued with Grouchy that they should march to the sound of the guns at Waterloo and thus showed better judgement than the marshal - however Rielle and d'Erlon both contributed heavily to losing the campaign.

I would think it the benefit of the field to replace him with Murat

Devout was out of the picture, he was the only one of the competent marshals with morale fibre.


I would have picked Ney, as I think he preformed pretty well with his only mistake being the d'erlon fiasco during the battle of lingy.

But Napoleons principle problem among his staff was Soult, over whom I would pick anyone else even some what as competent over.