Enlightment Warfare

[MemnonOfRhodes]

What I don't understand about this era of warfare (1700-1900),is why during battles they fought in those formations..
Why did it take so long to switch from marching and fighting in closely packed formations to fighting from cover to cover and spread out?

[Farnan]

Command and control mostly. It was much easier to command soldiers formed in blocks than spread out armies and units.

[MemnonOfRhodes]

how come they switched to it in WW2? better doctrines?

[Trax]

Why did it take so long to switch from marching and fighting in closely packed formations to fighting from cover to cover and spread out?

You need a concentration of man- and firepower to take and hold ground.
Spread your troops out and the enemy will punch through. They may take more casualties than you do in the process but you still loose the battle.

[MemnonOfRhodes]

but why did they change these tactics, equipment?

[removeduser_4536284751384]

muskets are extremely innacurate. You could practise all day and probably not be able to hit a man sized reliable from any range.

So the best way to get a good volume of fire is to make a big line of men and have htem all fire at the same time.

Of course with the invention of accurate rifles in the late 1800s and also the machine gun, these formations lost their purpose (accurate rifles meant no need for formations), and also became death traps (KEKEKEKEKEKE AAAARGH)

[Trax]

Because of the increase in defencive firepower?

muskets are extremely innacurate. You could practise all day and probably not be able to hit a man sized reliable from any range.

Simply not true.

[MemnonOfRhodes]

Because of the increase in defencive firepower?

How can firepower be defensive or offensive?

[wupwup]

How can firepower be defensive or offensive?

Offensive dose damage. I guess like snipers. Defensive stops you getting hit. I.e forming a formation so everyone fires at once. This meens you are not an individural target and the person fiering at you is likely to be dead quicker

[Del Valle]

How can firepower be defensive or offensive?

Different sides of a battle can have differing amounts of firepower, an example being WWI, where Tommies armed with only rifles and grenades had to rush the defensive German trenches full of heavy machine guns. Firepower in itself isn't offensive or defensive, though.

[removeduser_4536284751384]

Simply not true.

well I guess some good marksmen could do it out to 60-80 metres, but no further than that. It was far easier to simply form a big formation.

[Trax]

well I guess some good marksmen could do it out to 60-80 metres, but no further than that. It was far easier to simply form a big formation.

Musket is not much more inaccurate than rifle in the average engagement distance.
It's just that under battle conditions all fire were extremely inaccurate.

[hellheaven1987]

Musket is not much more inaccurate than rifle in the average engagement distance.
It's just that under battle conditions all fire were extremely inaccurate.

That is a no, and a big no when rifles became more easier to build.

[Last Roman]

Musket is not much more inaccurate than rifle in the average engagement distance.
It's just that under battle conditions all fire were extremely inaccurate.

there was this test on TV (some show on the history channel) and overall, the rifle seemed to be much more accurate past 75 m. or so.

[MemnonOfRhodes]

you mean like covering fire?

[MemnonOfRhodes]

for example,why didn't they use trenches like they did in ww1?
with muskets that could work...
Again massacre's ,but still


Or was it about ''being Gentlemen's''?

[CiviC]

for example,why didn't they use trenches like they did in ww1?
with muskets that could work...
Again massacre's ,but still


Or was it about ''being Gentlemen's''?

Actually trench warfare was very developped, but only in sieges, and probably in a siege you could find a scenery and warfare very simmilar with WWI (except machineguns).



But in a field battle it had no purpuse to build trenches. Trenches are usefull when you have a frontline the extends continously for tens, hundreds or even thousands of kilometers. But in the Age of Enlightment armies were very small and they couldn't cover long frontlines, it was mostly a war of maneuver, where armies tried to outflank eachother, so they had to keep all their force concetrated in one compact body of units. Entrenching meant to loose mobility and the enemy could simply outflank your trenches and fall on your back.

Still there were many cases when armies were entrenched behind some sort of earthworks like for example at Malplaquet

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

"The position taken up by the French army extended from the North West, at the village of La Folie, which marked the extreme left of their line, across the undulating meadows running South East to the Chausee Brunehaut road and the Wood of Lainieres, which secured their right flank. Across the entire front of this line Villars had constructed field works and entrenchments, which included, in the centre, five redoubts. The Wood of Laineres had been fortified with lines of breastworks, and abbatis placed forward to slow down the attacking columns. In front of the French left wing stretched the Wood of Sars (also sometimes called the Wood of Taisnieres). Villars had incorporated the southern tip of this wood within his main battle position, and, as with the Wood of Laineres, had prepared it for defence by building breastworks and earthworks also protected by lines of abbatis."
http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/...isposition.htm

or Fontenoy

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

"The delay entailed in collecting the Allied forces, together with the uncertainty of the threat towards Mons had given Marshal de Saxe time to prepare a favourable position on which to receive the Pragmatic Army, and given the fact that he already had all his engineers from the siege of Tournai on site to oversee the construction of his battlefield fortifications, it is small wonder that he himself thought his position almost impregnable.
The French right wing was anchored firmly on the river Scheldt at the fortified village of Antoing.Here the houses had been turned into miniature fortresses, the streets were barricaded and slit trenches were dug around the outskirts of the village to enable an even greater volume of fire to be delivered by the defenders. On the east bank of the Scheldt a strong battery of artillery was installed so as to enfilade any advance on Antoing from the south. From Antoing the French line extended to the west for just over a mile until it reached another fortified village, Fontenoy. Along this line de Saxe had constructed three redoubts each about 400 meters apart. These were not just constructed as a kind of breakwater upon which the enemy columns would have to loose formation in order to attack and then reform after passing between them, but also to facilitate counterattacks, allowing the French cavalry to flow through in pursuit of a beaten foe.
The village of Fontenoy, like Antoing was turned into a strongpoint with cannon placed to cover every approach. From here the French line turned at right angles to the north for approximately 1000 meters following the course of a sunken road across a plateau leading to the Bois de Bary (Wood of Barry). Behind the sunken road de Saxe placed two lines of infantry, supported by two lines of cavalry of around 60 squadrons.
On the French left, in and around the Bois de Bary, de Saxe lavished still more of his considerable talents in field fortification. The wood was lined with infantry and many of the trees had been felled to form abattis. Two strong redoubts were constructed at the eastern side of the wood to dispute any turning movement, the most famous of these being known as the Redoubt D’Eu which had been built at the south-eastern tip of the Bois de Bary so as to enfilade any advance made by the Allies against the French centre. In support of this position was a reserve of picked infantry and cavalry regiments, including the Irish Brigade, the “Wild Geese”. In all the French army numbered 93 battalions,146 squadrons and 80 cannon, some 70,000 troops, of which 27 battalions and 17 squadrons were left to cover Tournai."
http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/...background.htm

So it's a modern Hollywood myth that troops fought only in standing lines.

[hellheaven1987]

What I don't understand about this era of warfare (1700-1900),is why during battles they fought in those formations..
Why did it take so long to switch from marching and fighting in closely packed formations to fighting from cover to cover and spread out?

The main problem was musket, in order to increase its hitting rate, had to mass into line formation. Once rifles were becoming main smallarms, formation was slowly abolished and used more spread-out tactic. It was pretty safe to say that at the end of 19th Century formation was pretty much abolished (I have not heard British used formation during Second Boer War, so it should be stopped using after that).

for example,why didn't they use trenches like they did in ww1?
with muskets that could work...
Again massacre's ,but still


Or was it about ''being Gentlemen's''?

I also find it quite interesting, although mobile fortifications did use considerable numbers during 18th Century, why did not just dig mobile trench at all?? Anyway, mobile trench was already appeared during Crimean War, and used in ACW.

[Trax]

Well, we are speaking of enlightenment warfare here.

Rifles start showing superiority beyond 100 meters but even in ACW the average engagement distance was mere 150 IIRC.

[43rdFoot]

Several reasons:

1. Command and control. It was necessary to keep men within contact of each other to relay commands correctly, keep the formation moving together, and to prevent desertion.
2. Volume of firepower. A volley from a line could be devastatingly effective for its shock value.
3. Defense against cavalry. In open formations cavalry would find it easy to break through, and once cavalry break through the line will almost immediately begin to crumble. Look up the Battle of Minden for what hapens when cavalry charges a line.
4. Dominating presence. It is not that hard to get men to charge a skirmish line, or a line at open order, and such a charge would often produce results. It is much harder to get men to charge a dense formation, and not often effective.


These tactics were borne out of the technology of the time, and became obsolete as weapons became increasingly more effective. By the time of the 1860s, with the widespread adoption of percussion rifle-muskets charged with Minie balls and improved, more effective artillery, it became too costly to fight wars like that. With further improvements in arms it became necessary to disperse the line. The increase in firepower replaced the morale shock of a line.