The Arab conquests of the Byzantine Middle East

[Erebus Pasha]

The 7th Century in the Middle East is something I don't have too much knowledge of, so I was wondering if anybody could help me to explain why the Arab conquest of Byzantine Palestine and Syria in the 630's was so rapid and decisive. Was it due to the exhaustion caused by the long conflict that occurred between Byzantium and the Sassanid Empire? The superior strategy and tactics of the Arab leadership over their Byzantine rivals? The indecision and panic of Heraclius due to old age and illness? Or was it a combination of all these factors or indeed something else?

[SeniorBatavianHorse]

My main area of interest is Late Roman so this period really only falls on the cusp of my knowledge, but from what I remember it was partly an exhaustion from the bitter fighting between Rome and Persia (forgive me but I ardently oppose the name 'Byzantine' for the later Roman Empire!) which left both states exhausted, coupled with a religious doctrinal dispute within the Roman Empire which left a great schism so that the Arab armies were able to appeal to the disaffected Christians to come over to their side - now I know that is probably a simplification - however a more interesting question arises in that why was the Roman Empire able to HALT the Arab conquests eventually?

Syria, Palestine, Aegypt were falling like dominoes and yet the Empire was able to re-consolidate its armies while falling back and then hold the Arab armies in check. The great untold story here - I have always thought - is that Rome held out while Persia didn't. Historians tend to over-emphasize the loss of the Roman provinces while underplaying the fact that the Empire repulsed the Arab armies eventually from taking over the whole Empire. Perhaps I am being too romantic, though.

Again, I must stress I am a little vague in this period and welcome any enlightenment here.

[Timoleon of Korinthos]

I was reading a book on Heraclius the other day, Geoffrey Reagan's "First Crusader", whose concluding chapters referred precisely to the topic at hand, the rapidness of the Arab conquests.

The main point the author raises is that the newly found religion of the Arabs allowed to enshroud their conquests from the very beginning with the mantle of religious war and to inspire the notion of martyrdom and fulfilment of the divine will among the Arab soldiery, which tactically translated into a huge boost of morale, which as Napoleon said accounts for three quarters in war. One has only take a look at the record of battles to realise this: Ajnadayn, Yamruk, Heliopolis, all major battles ended in spectacular Byzantine defeats. In essence and in striking irony of fate, he remarks, the Arabs played the same card of religious zeal, which Heraclius had so masterfully exploited among his own faction in order to pay back the Sassanids (and save his capital from the Avars) early in his reign. The Byzantines, on the other hand, failed to recognize the threat and more importantly the perspective of their opponents: to them they were just another conglomeration of desert tribes bent on looting, which a mere display of superior Roman discipline would scatter.

That having been said, the provinces of Syria, Palestine and Egypt had always been showing serious autonomist tendencies, marking their ethnic and political opposition to the central government of Constantinople under guise of the heresies of Nestorianism and at that point Monophesytism. The population showed no signs of opposition to the Muslims, just as they hadn't shown to the Sassanids during Khosroes' invasion, and this unwillingness to resist eased the effort of the conquerors by allowing swift advance and negating worries about the pacification and military safeguarding of the occupied territories.

Finally, a third factor was Muslim luck in the sense of great commanders like Khalid ibn Walid having arisen in their ranks, forged by the struggles in Arabia in the 620s, as opposed to unfortunate circumstances for the Byzantines which manifested themselves not only in Heraclius' old age and illness, which de facto eliminated the Empire's most charismatic general, but also in the form of political and social discord fueled by Heraclius' second marriage with his niece Martina, perceived widely as incest, and her machinations in favour of her son. This situation created a rift with the Emperor's brother Theodoros that was campaigning in Syria and pessimism among the populace and the army by giving birth to the belief that God was punishing them for the sins of the royal house once the first defeats occurred. And I would personally add that the stance of Heraclius towards the end of his reign was highly counterproductive, though he posthumously enjoys some sort of immunity from criticism among scholars out of respect to his earlier achievements, because despite his miserable condition he declined to give up his power in favour of a younger, more energetic, emotionally more confident and more committed and pragmatic Emperor.

[jo the greek]

I was reading a book on Heraclius the other day, Geoffrey Reagan's "First Crusader", whose concluding chapters referred precisely to the topic at hand, the rapidness of the Arab conquests.

The main point the author raises is that the newly found religion of the Arabs allowed to enshroud their conquests from the very beginning with the mantle of religious war and to inspire the notion of martyrdom and fulfilment of the divine will among the Arab soldiery, which tactically translated into a huge boost of morale, which as Napoleon said accounts for three quarters in war. One has only take a look at the record of battles to realise this: Ajnadayn, Yamruk, Heliopolis, all major battles ended in spectacular Byzantine defeats. In essence and in striking irony of fate, he remarks, the Arabs played the same card of religious zeal, which Heraclius had so masterfully exploited among his own faction in order to pay back the Sassanids (and save his capital from the Avars) early in his reign. The Byzantines, on the other hand, failed to recognize the threat and more importantly the perspective of their opponents: to them they were just another conglomeration of desert tribes bent on looting, which a mere display of superior Roman discipline would scatter.

That having been said, the provinces of Syria, Palestine and Egypt had always been showing serious autonomist tendencies, marking their ethnic and political opposition to the central government of Constantinople under guise of the heresies of Nestorianism and at that point Monophesytism. The population showed no signs of opposition to the Muslims, just as they hadn't shown to the Sassanids during Khosroes' invasion, and this unwillingness to resist eased the effort of the conquerors by allowing swift advance and negating worries about the pacification and military safeguarding of the occupied territories.

Finally, a third factor was Muslim luck in the sense of great commanders like Khalid ibn Walid having arisen in their ranks, forged by the struggles in Arabia in the 620s, as opposed to unfortunate circumstances for the Byzantines which manifested themselves not only in Heraclius' old age and illness, which de facto eliminated the Empire's most charismatic general, but also in the form of political and social discord fueled by Heraclius' second marriage with his niece Martina, perceived widely as incest, and her machinations in favour of her son. This situation created a rift with the Emperor's brother Theodoros that was campaigning in Syria and pessimism among the populace and the army by giving birth to the belief that God was punishing them for the sins of the royal house once the first defeats occurred. And I would personally add that the stance of Heraclius towards the end of his reign was highly counterproductive, though he posthumously enjoys some sort of immunity from criticism among scholars out of respect to his earlier achievements, because despite his miserable condition he declined to give up his power in favour of a younger, more energetic, emotionally more confident and more committed and pragmatic Emperor.

Indeed the so many heretics of that area show there was a tendacy to break away from Byzantine controll

What interest me also is the Conquest of Egypt and Carthage.

[Herakleios]

You raise important points Timoleon and Regan's book is indeed a great read, but there are a few things that must be added.

Muslim luck in the sense of great commanders like Khalid ibn Walid having arisen in their ranks,

Not so much luck, the early Islamic military leadership system was highly favourable to merit and skill, much like that of the later Mongols; this decidedly gave it an edge in producing quality commanders vis-a-vis the Sassanian and Byantine systems, which were more aristocratic. Also, there was much more delegation of authority, commanders were allowed more autonomy on the battlefield and could question the orders of their superiors if necessary. That is not to say of course, that the Arabs were not highly disciplined and obedient of course, they were, and definetely more than the Byzantines expected. Perhaps in part because of the sublimation that religious zeal can trigger on individuals.

Also, it must be pointed out that both Byzantium and Persia had lost a large number of their soldiers and veterans in their last bloody war, the latter were useful not only in battle, but also in training new recruits and passing on military traditions. Gabriel and Boose estimate that Byzantium alone could have lost as many as 200,000 men in the war! Compound to that the general exhaustion that the war caused on the state, economy, and people of the empire, which obviously would have had consequences such as low morale amongst the ranks of the army, and it is not surprising that a commander who distinguished himself in the Persian war, such as Theodore, proved so inept and clumsy againt the Arabs.

Also, added to the religious unrest of the Eastern provinces of Byzantium, the egalitarian nature of Islam proved attractive to many of those who were oppressed by the empires, especially in Iran, which had already been shaken by social movements such as those of Mani and Mazdak. This is why it is not surprising to find many Persians and Byzantines deserting to the Arabs and converting to Islam before and during the course of the conquests, some of these even providing vital technical, strategical and tactical expertise and intelligence to their Arab leaders.

[Acco]

The 7th Century in the Middle East is something I don't have too much knowledge of, so I was wondering if anybody could help me to explain why the Arab conquest of Byzantine Palestine and Syria in the 630's was so rapid and decisive.

The Byzantine and Sasanian Empires had been seriously weakened after their warring in the beginning of the 7th century, which, despite being prolonged for more than twenty years and having depleted the human and material resources of both states, ended in status quo ante bellum. As a result, even though the Byzantines regained control of Syria in 629, their grip over the region was tenuous at best, as both empires struggled to recover. Then you have the Arabs, who were quite an experienced and organized fighting force, successfully utilizing camel transport to actuate around wide areas of campaigns, replete with generals who had accumulated renown and battle-hardiness in their campaigns after the death of their Prophet. In addition, the religious fervour of the Arabs and the enormous prospect of wealth and riches in the weakly-held region of Byzantine Mesopotamia had created a combination of shared interests among them. In brief, the Byzantine Empire was spiraling in decline, while the Arabs were marked by fervent partisanship and years of military experience in Arabia in the 620s and could just about replace both empires.

Another aspect to look at is the fact that the populace didn't really mind Arab rule. Generally, government at the time really only encroached the city and its immediate hinterlands. To the people of the countryside, it mattered very little who ruled the cities, as they had developed their own customs and titles. And to the urban dwellers, they were content with most rulers so long as they were safe, secure and their taxes were not too overbearing. Moreover, those who had lived in the Byzantine Empire as religious dissidents probably preferred living under an Islamic administration which had no major opinion on Christianity and all its sects and hadn't totally developed a stringent doctrine unique to Islam.

However, this area of history is not my forte, yet it does interest me, so if I have made any mistakes, I would welcome any illumination on the subject.

[Ludicus]

The Byzantine and Sasanian Empires had been seriously weakened after their warring in the beginning of the 7th century, which, despite being prolonged for more than twenty years and having depleted the human and material resources of both states, ended in status quo ante bellum. As a result, even though the Byzantines regained control of Syria in 629, their grip over the region was tenuous at best, as both empires struggled to recover. Then you have the Arabs....

Exactly
post 186

The superior strategy and tactics of the Arab leadership over their Byzantine rivals?

The crystallization of Arab political power,630-750, Chris Whickam, A History of Europe from 400 1000, page 284:

" The Arabs were able fighters, and both the Romans and Persians had log used them as mercenaries, the Ghassanid confederation byt the Romans, the Lackmids for the Persians. Given the exhaustion of the empires in the 630s and the new -found religion unity of the Arabs, Arab victories are not themselves extraordinary, and of course after the first great battles were won in 636-7 every arab with a camel was likely to want to take part in the conquests and in the wealth they brought. What was less expected was that the conquests would hold together....But the core reason for the survival of Arab rule was not only a political but also a cultural hegemony was not luck. Rather, it was the result of the decision to settle the Arab armies, not as landowning aristocracy as in the Germanic West but as paid garrisons in newly founded cities(amsãr) Kufa and Basra in Iraq, Mosul on the edge of Iraq-Syria borderlands known as Jazira, Fustat (the future Cairo) in Egypt, and others...this set the template for a structural separation between a paid army and the rest of civil-civilian-society which was greater even than in the Roman empire, and which marked most Muslim political systems ever after"

[Herakleios]

because despite his miserable condition he declined to give up his power in favour of a younger, more energetic, emotionally more confident and more committed and pragmatic Emperor.

Yes, this was probably his worst mistake. Same thing happened to Justinian though, I suppose it's just human nature, and not everyone can be as devoted to the state as Diocletian was.

the enormous prospect of wealth and riches in the weakly-held region of Byzantine Mesopotamia had created a combination of shared interests among them.

This is a factor in Arab morale that needed to be mentioned as well.

From one of Khalid's speeches:

Do you not see the wealth of the land of the Persians ? Do you not remember the poverty of the land of the Arabs ? Do you not see how the crops in this land cover the earth ? If the holy war were not enjoined by Allah, we should still come and conquer this rich land and exchange the hunger of our deserts for the abundant eating which is now ours.

Though the Arabs had long conducted raids on their wealthy imperial neighbors, such as those the Saracens had in the times of Diocletian or those of the Taghlib or Bakr bin Wael that were fought by Shapur II, these were largely for pluder and with no long-term consequences. However, the new political cohesion that the caliphate gave the Arabs allowed for more ambitious campaigning and imperialism.

Or was it a combination of all these factors or indeed something else?

To answer your question more directly I would say: a combination of all those factors and some other things.

[motiv-8]

Hey Erebus, if you are genuinely interested in this topic then I wholeheartedly recommend picking up Hugh Kennedy's The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. On of the best recent treatments that I know of.

You can sample the book here if you'd like.

[SeniorBatavianHorse]

An excellent down-loadable PDF on this very topic can be found here

[Stavroforos]

Hey Erebus, if you are genuinely interested in this topic then I wholeheartedly recommend picking up Hugh Kennedy's The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. On of the best recent treatments that I know of.

You can sample the book here if you'd like.

I've only very briefly dealt with Islamic or Near-Eastern studies, but Hugh Kennedy always pops up. For good reason, but it's like the guy is everywhere. Kind-of like Goldsworthy nowadays with Roman literature, only Kennedy is like...good.

I'm trying to find the essay I wrote for the Scriptorium competition last year about the Arab conquests but I can't find any thread with it. If any mods found it, could you add the link to my message, or PM me so I can do it?

[clandestino]

By my opinion it was combination of all those factors that OP mentioned. I would point out the religious differences and contradictions between official Byzantine church and Monophysite church in Syria and Egypt as one of the important factors for the weakness of Byzantine defense in the Middle east, most people who followed monophysitism preferred Muslim rule over the Byzantine cause Arabs guaranteed them ( short term ) religious tolerance while under Byzantine rule they were treated as heretics and were subjects of persecution. For example in Egypt the Coptic patriarch of Alexandria was one of the strongest advocates of Arab rule in the country and helped them to occupy the country. I presume that most of the common people who followed monophysitism had similar views and refused to fight for the state who persecuted their religion.

[Lysimachos11]

The main reason is simply the Byzantine-Persian War of 602-629. Both the Sassanid and Roman Empires were completely devastated by this war.

The only reason the Roman Empire was victorious was because of a sudden reversal of which the details I can't remember. Basically the Roman Empire was defeated but was able to overcome the Sassanids only by help of a Nomad army that was around at the right moment.

You also have to keep in mind that many Arabs lived in Syria and other Roman and Sassanid provinces, like the Ghassanids. Muslim Arabs were simply coming to rule over other Arabs in a lot of places.

Another very important advantage for the Muslims was that many provinces had been switching sides throughout the Byzantine-Persian War. IIRC the province of Syria had been outside of effective Byzantine rule for 20 to 30 years, and an entire generation there had never lived under Roman rule. When the Arabs took over a few years after the reconquest by the Romans of provinces like Syria, the Arab rulers were just as alien as the Romans before them.

A final note: the Wikipedia articles concerning this episode of history are junk.

[Herakleios]

Basically the Roman Empire was defeated but was able to overcome the Sassanids only by help of a Nomad army that was around at the right moment.

Where do you get this from? The Byzantines lost most of their trans-Aegean lands during Phocas' chaotic reign, true, but as soon as Heraclius came to power he prepared his counter-offensive: he raised new troops, reorganized the army, and put it through an intense regime of drilling. He also framed the campaign as a religious war, inflaming the citizens of Byzantium into volunteering for the war and fighting harder, because the Persians had stolen the True Cross from Jerusalem when they overran the Levant, which outraged Orthodox Christians. Heraclius' campaign against the Persians was a success, he defeated all of the Persian commanders such as Shahrbaraz and Shahin, and their armies in Anatolia, the Caucasus, and finally at Nineveh, the Sassanians lost most of their men and veterans in these battles, in the end, the Persians killed their king and the new one sued for peace, returning all the lands. He did make an alliance with the Turks of the Caucasus in the course of the campaign, but they hardly saved him or Byzantium: their participation came late in the war, was minimal and they even refused to follow Heraclius into Mesopotamia after the death of their leader, and thus were not even present at the crucial battle at Nineveh.

Also, it is true that the Turks invaded Iran from Central Asia during the war, but this was repelled and punished by commander Bagratuni, pacifying the Turks until the Arab conquests, and this episode did not stop the advance that other generals and troops were making in the west.

[Lysimachos11]

Where do you get this from? The Byzantines lost most of their trans-Aegean lands during Phocas' chaotic reign, true, but as soon as Heraclius came to power, he raised new troops, reorganized the army, and put it through an intense regime of drilling. He also framed the campaign as a religious war, inflaming the citizens of Byzantium into volunteering for the war and fighting harder, because the Persians had stolen the True Cross from Jerusalem when they overran the Levant, which outraged Orthodox Christians. Heraclius' campaign against the Persians was a success, he defeated all of the Persian commanders such as Shahrbaraz and Shahin, and their armies in Anatolia, the Caucasus, and finally at Nineveh, the Sassanians lost most of their men and veterans in these battles, in the end, the Persians killed their king and the new one sued for peace, returning all the lands. He did make an alliance with the Turks of the Caucasus in the course of the campaign, but they hardly saved him or Byzantium: their participation came late in the war, was minimal and they even refused to follow Heraclius into Mesopotamia after the death of their leader, and thus were not even present at the crucial battle at Nineveh.

Also, it is true that the Turks invaded Iran from Central Asia during the war, but this was repelled and punished by commander Bagratuni, pacifying the Turks until the Arab conquests, and this episode did not stop the advance that other generals and troops were making in the west.

Like I said I can't remember the details, but I do know that Rome eventually won the war only because of luck. In my memory it involved aid from Caucasian Nomads and indeed the political breakdown in Persia you mention that saved the day. My point is that without a very fortunate reversal of power late in the conflict in favour of the Romans it is easily imaginable the Roman Empire had lost most of Syria etc. even before the Arab invasions. The Roman Empire was very weak despite it's being victorious in the war with the Sassanids.

As for why the Sassanids were destroyed and the Romans prevailed, this has much to do with Constantinople as the heart of the Empire being so hard to take for the Arabs because of it's walls, location and the fact that it was further away from Arab lands. Ctesiphon as capital of the Sassanid Empire was easily within striking distance of Arab armies and did not have the defensive potential of Constantinople despite being a heavily fortified city.

[Claudius Gothicus]

As for why the Sassanids were destroyed and the Romans prevailed, this has much to do with Constantinople as the heart of the Empire being so hard to take for the Arabs because of it's walls, location and the fact that it was further away from Arab lands. Ctesiphon as capital of the Sassanid Empire was easily within striking distance of Arab armies and did not have the defensive potential of Constantinople despite being a heavily fortified city.

That doesn't explain why the Persian Empire didn't crash after Ctesiphon being taken/plundered so many times by the romans century after century.

[SeniorBatavianHorse]

Read Theophanes' account of Heraclius' campaign online here

[Herakleios]

In my memory it involved aid from Caucasian Nomads

I did address the participation of nomads in the course of the conflict, which you greatly exaggerate, in my last post:

He did make an alliance with the Turks of the Caucasus in the course of the campaign, but they hardly saved him or Byzantium: their participation came late in the war, was minimal and they even refused to follow Heraclius into Mesopotamia after the death of their leader, and thus were not even present at the crucial battle at Nineveh.

Also, it is true that the Turks invaded Iran from Central Asia during the war, but this was repelled and punished by commander Bagratuni, pacifying the Turks until the Arab conquests, and this episode did not stop the advance that other generals and troops were making in the west.

and indeed the political breakdown in Persia you mention that saved the day.

The breakdown came because of the miltiary defeats, it did not cause them, Khosrou was killed after the battle of Nineveh, and many other battles, effectively finished the process of breaking the backbone of the Sassanid army in the west.

My point is that without a very fortunate reversal of power late in the conflict in favour of the Romans it is easily imaginable the Roman Empire had lost most of Syria etc. even before the Arab invasions. The Roman Empire was very weak despite it's being victorious in the war with the Sassanids.

The Roman empire was not the same it used to be, true. But you're stretching it by calling it weak. It was still, along with the Sassanians, the most powerful, sophisticated, and wealthy state on its' side of the world. A fact that would be obscured during the reigns of weak emperors, but evident during those of competent ones. Even after the Arab conquests it would remain a major power in the region until pretty much the Fourth Crusade, and it says something that it was one of the few states that survived the sweep of the Caliphate. There would be some low points to be sure, but there would also be golden ages. However, that the war left Byzantium depleted in every sense, economic, military, etc. is undeniable, that's what happens when two great powers of equal stature become engaged in total war with each other.

As for why the Sassanids were destroyed and the Romans prevailed, this has much to do with Constantinople as the heart of the Empire being so hard to take for the Arabs because of it's walls, location and the fact that it was further away from Arab lands. Ctesiphon as capital of the Sassanid Empire was easily within striking distance of Arab armies and did not have the defensive potential of Constantinople despite being a heavily fortified city.

Ctesiphon was a formidable fortress-city by the time of the Sassanians and Khosrou II, so much in fact, that Heraclius never even tried to besiege it. It was probably a match for Constantinople in all but strategico-geographic advantages. The problem is that Sassanian leadership pretty much left the city to fend by itself in order to organize the counter-offensive in the East, which was not exactly sound strategically. Also, the main reason why the Sassanians fell faster than Byzantium was the virtual state of anarchy, ephemeral rulers, coups and counter-coups, that plagued the days of the dynasty after Khosrou's disastrous war, the loss of military manpower, the best generals of the army, and veterans also made the army less efficient, though even despite this fact the Sassanians managed to win a couple of battles and repel the Arabs in the first invasions. However, the Arabs were simply too motivated and kept trying. In contrast to this zeal and tenacity, it is worth mentioning that Persia was in a socially susceptible situation, since the Magi and wealthy classes had grown largely elitist and exploitative, which caused much disaffection amongst the populace and prompted egalitarian movements such as those of Mani and the 'socialist' Mazdak. Khosrou I had managed to deal with this well enough through administrative and legal reforms (he was known as Anushirvan the Just), but the extravagance and megalomania of Khosrou II did much to inflame the situation. This really left the gates wide open for the message of Islam. Case in point being Salman the Persian, a former Sassanian magus who converted to Islam and provided the Arabs with intelligence on Sassanian methods of warfare. Byzantium also benefitted from a safer geographical situation in respect with the Arabs' base of operations vis-a-vis the flat plains of Mesopotamia. There are probably other reasons which I cannot remember right now, but that shall suffice for the moment.

http://www.deremilitari.org/resource...theophanes.htm

Check that, which SeniorBatavianHorse posted.

[Herakleios]

From Theophanes:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

AD 624/5
In this year Chosroes, emperor of Persia, made a new levy by conscripting strangers, citizens, and slaves whom he selected from every nation. He placed this picked body under the command of Sain and gave him, in addition, another 50 000 men chosen from the phalanx of Sarbaros. He called them the Golden Spearmen and sent them against the emperor. As for Sarbaros, he dispatched him with his remaining army against Constantinople with a view to establishing an alliance between the western Huns (who are called Avars) and the Bulgars, Slavs, and Gepids, and so advancing on the City and laying siege to it. When the emperor learnt of this, he divided his army into three contingents: the first he sent to protect the City; the second he entrusted to his own brother Theodore, whom he ordered to fight Sain; the third part he took himself and advanced to Lazica. During his stay there he invited the eastern Turks, who are called Chazars, to become his allies. Now Sain with his newly recruited army overtook the emperor's brother and prepared for battle. With God's help (by the mediation of the all-praised Theotokos), when battle was joined a storm of hail fell unexpectedly on the barbarians and struck down many of them, whereas the Roman array enjoyed fair weather. So the Romans routed the Persians and slew a great multitude of them. When Chosroes learnt of this, he was angered at Sain. And Sain, because of his great despondency fell ill and died. By order of Chosroes his body was preserved in salt and conveyed to him; and, though it was dead, he subjected it to ill*treatment.
Now the Chazars broke through the Caspian Gates and invaded Persia, that is the land of Adraigan, under their commander Ziebe who was second in rank after the Chagan. And in all the lands they traversed .they made the Persians captive and burnt the towns and villages. The emperor, too, set out from Lazica and joined them. When Ziebel saw him, he rushed to meet him, kissed his neck, and did obeisance to him, while the Persians were looking on from the town of Tiphilios. And the entire army of the Turks fell flat on the ground and, stretched out on their faces, reverenced the emperor with an honour that is unknown among alien nations. Likewise, their commanders climbed on rocks and fell flat in the same manner. Ziebel also brought before the emperor his adolescent son, and he took as much pleasure in the emperor's conversation as he was astonished by his appearance and wisdom. After picking 40,000 brave men, Ziebel gave them to the emperor as allies, while he himself returned to his own land. Taking these men along, the emperor advanced on Chosroes.
As for Sarbaros, he attacked Chalcedon, while the Avars approached the City by way of Thrace with a view to capturing it. They set in motion many engines against it and filled the gulf of the Horn with an immense multitude, beyond all number, whom they had brought from the Danube in carved boats. After investing the City by land and sea for ten days, they were vanquished by God's might and help and by the intercession of the immaculate Virgin, the Mother of God. Having lost great numbers, both on land and on sea, they shamefully returned to their country. Sarbaros, however, who was besieging Chalcedon, did not depart, but wintered there, laying waste and pillaging the regions and towns across the strait.
AD 625/6
In this year the emperor Herakleios, by invading Persia together with the Turks starting in the month of September - an unexpected move, since it was winter - threw Chosroes into a state of distraction when the news had reached him. But the Turks, in view of the winter and the constant attacks of the Persians, could not bear to toil together with the emperor and started, little by little, to slip away until all of them had left and returned home.

Notice how late in the war the Turks/Khazars joined, and notice how brief their participation was.

[motiv-8]

This is the same Theophanes that claimed the basis of Islam was from Muhammad's epilepsy? I'd be careful working with that kind of work.