Actual effectiveness of guerrilla tactics in the American revolution?

[Old_Scratch]

It seems to be a popular idea that the British lost the American revolutionary war due in large part to guerrilla tactics used by irregular American forces. I'm sure it took a toll on chain of command and morale, but in the grand scheme of things how effective were they versus traditional field battles and sieges?

Also, to what extent, if at all, did the British employ snipers or other irregular forces?

[Nik]

Well, there was Ferguson's Rifle Corps armed with the Ferguson Rifle, but this unit was disbanded after heavy losses and the wounding of its Commander. By then, the british infantry did not have a specialized skirmishing force like the vaunted Light Division of the peninsular campaign (with its famous 95th Rifles), but AFAIK each regiment had a light company used for skirmishing and picket duty, though their equipment did not differntiate from the line companies (experts may correct me if I'm wrong).

As for skirmishers vs line infantry, the former could cause losses to the later if enough maneuvering space was available, or even force a defeat if their numerical superiority was large enough, but the british often could claim victory be dislodging american defensive positions by bayonet charges, though often suffering high casualties. So in short, the irregular forces where important in slowing down the british forces or supporting the regular (state militia), but the turnaround arrived only in the form of french and german professional officers that drilled the continental army to the same standard as teh red coats.
Though the wild and free militia sniper made a great romantic image, pitting the british mercenary against freedom loving colonist.

[Farnan]

It was a Mao style war. The guerrillas supported the regular army by tying down British and Hessian units and killing foragers (which was very important during the Saratoga Campaign). They didn't win the war but they were a strategic asset.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forage_War
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saratog...g_difficulties
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis...the_Revolution

[Erebus Pasha]

What is strange is that whilst American revolutionary irregular forces caused a great nuisance for British operations in the South, it was the opposite in the Northern and Western frontiers. Here loyalist forces such as Butler's Rangers, Brant's Volunteers and the Kings Royal Regiment of New York conducted regular raids on rebel settlements and isolated garrisons. They were aided here by those Native Americans that sided with the British. Sullivan's expedition in 1779 did knock the stuffing out of the Iroquois but it didn't stop the raiding which continued until the end of the war. Unfortunately for the British whilst their raiding was generally successful in these theatres they lacked enough regular forces to exploit these many temporary victories and cause Washington even bigger headaches. This was due in part to fresh memories of Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga and the perceived French threat to Canada.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cobleskill
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wyoming...e_and_massacre
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carleton's_Raid_(1778)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Minisink
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lochry's_Defeat
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Blue_Licks

As for the regular light infantry, they were generally well handled during the Philadelphia campaign under the stewardship of commanders such as Charles Grey, performing well in ambushes such as Paoli and at River Vale (also known as Baylor's Massacre). They were less successful in the Southern Campaign, mainly due to the fact that Banastre Tarleton threw them away at Cowpens.

[Londinium]

They were certainly very effective in the South, British strategy in the South was designed to prompt a general uprising of Loyalists to help them hold down the South. This worked to a degree and the British army itself had become highly disciplined and effective to the degree it lost no important battles in Georgia and the Carolinas at all, with the possible exception of Tarleton's loss at Cowpens. However Patriot guerillas were a constant thorn in their back, threatening to cut supply lines back to Charleston and threatening outlying Tory settlements like Ninety-Six. This led to constant revisions of British plans and an inability to hold down various areas of the South for a long time, leeching British troops away from the main army under Cornwallis; it also led to fewer Loyalists enlisting for the King than had been expected.

Furthermore the brutality of the Patriots in the south was much more marked than the North with outright terror tactics perpetrated against Loyalists, the likes of Francis Marion 'the Swamp Fox' being prominent in this. They were also pretty effective at beating the poorly led Loyalist militias in the area, first at King's Mountain which probably ended the possibility of a quick victory in the South for the British. Then at the Battle of Haw River where a Patriot militia pretended to be Tarleston's men, and attacked and in some reports, massacared, a sizable Loyalist militia going to meet up with Cornwallis' force. From this point onwards Loyalist support (in terms of military actions) were severely curtailed.

So yes guerilla helped immensely to defeat the British in the South, considering the Continental army was getting smacked around the face and chased up country. This and the fact that the Americans could defend in depth and keep sending troops south from Virginia meant the British could never hold onto the Southern colonies unless they neutralised Virginia. Thus Cornwallis' and Arnold's rather shambolic Virginian campaign, which contrasts hugely with Cornwallis' vigorous and brilliant campaign across the Carolinas.

[Farnan]

Well we won Cowpens and tied Guiliford Courthouse

[Londinium]

Well we won Cowpens and tied Guiliford Courthouse

I said you won Cowpens, we lost about 700 captured and 100 killed out of a force of 1,150 including some of the best troops in the South. Had Tarleton won that battle the Southern campaign might have gone very differently as it was we lost it.

As for Guildford, we most definitely won that battle however it was a phyrric victory in that we suffered such high casualties in doing so, requiring the army to push into Virginia to get reinforced and deal with where Greene was being reinforced from, effectively abandoning all the gains we'd made in the South aside from Charleston. It just sums up the entire Revolution from a British view, poor constantly changing and conflicting strategic decisions undermining the brave efforts of our army which more than matched the Americans throughout the war and gave them numerous bloody noses.

[Erebus Pasha]

What how can you say we won Cowpens? we lost about 700 captured and 100 killed out of a force of 1,150 including some of the best troops in the South. Had Tarleton won that battle the Southern campaign might have gone very differently as it was we lost it.

He says it because he is an American.

[Londinium]

He says it because he is an American.

I noticed that, thus why I editted it, I assumed he was British because he stated that Cowpens was a defeat as I had. My bad.

[Farnan]

Guilford was a tactical British victory but a strategic defeat. Thus I call it a tie...

There is also the fact Greene pulled out under his own free will. He could still have won the battle but did not want to fight a decisive battle.

[Mr. Scott]

It seems to be a popular idea that the British lost the American revolutionary war due in large part to guerrilla tactics used by irregular American forces. I'm sure it took a toll on chain of command and morale, but in the grand scheme of things how effective were they versus traditional field battles and sieges?

Also, to what extent, if at all, did the British employ snipers or other irregular forces?

Well, the guerilla warfare allowed the south to withstand the british, but the determining moments of the war were in the conventional style battles.

It was more so to just slow down the enemy. Kinda like the "sabotage army" feature in napoleon

[Londinium]

Well, the guerilla warfare allowed the south to withstand the british, but the determining moments of the war were in the conventional style battles.

It was more so to just slow down the enemy. Kinda like the "sabotage army" feature in napoleon

Not so much, the defining nature of the war was how the Americans could keep picking themselves up from defeat after defeat, dust themselves off and return to the fray. Thats the whole point of the Revolution, past a certain point there was no matter how many battles the British won (Imo the entry of the French ended the chances of a British win) and indeed with the exception of prominently Saratoga and Yorktown they won most of the major battles. The simple fact was that the Americans would disperse, resort to guerilla warfare in the intervening time and then reconvene for another pop at the British later on. It has startling parallels with the American experience in Vietnam.

[Farnan]

Not so much, the defining nature of the war was how the Americans could keep picking themselves up from defeat after defeat, dust themselves off and return to the fray. Thats the whole point of the Revolution, past a certain point there was no matter how many battles the British won (Imo the entry of the French ended the chances of a British win) and indeed with the exception of prominently Saratoga and Yorktown they won most of the major battles. The simple fact was that the Americans would disperse, resort to guerilla warfare in the intervening time and then reconvene for another pop at the British later on. It has startling parallels with the American experience in Vietnam.

Not a coincidence. General Giap, commander of North Vietnamese forces during the war, is a major fan of George Washington.

[Londinium]

Not a coincidence. General Giap, commander of North Vietnamese forces during the war, is a major fan of George Washington.

Thats actually pretty interesting I didn't know that before. Might be pretty useful as I'm considering writing my final year university dissertation on the similarities between the British experience in the American Revolution and the American experience in Vietnam.

[Erebus Pasha]

Not so much, the defining nature of the war was how the Americans could keep picking themselves up from defeat after defeat, dust themselves off and return to the fray. Thats the whole point of the Revolution, past a certain point there was no matter how many battles the British won (Imo the entry of the French ended the chances of a British win) and indeed with the exception of prominently Saratoga and Yorktown they won most of the major battles. The simple fact was that the Americans would disperse, resort to guerilla warfare in the intervening time and then reconvene for another pop at the British later on. It has startling parallels with the American experience in Vietnam.

To keep the Revolution going all Washington had to do is keep his army intact and in the field. He was also careful when to fight a decisive battle and would mainly offer battle on the ground of his own choosing. Of course he wasn't always successful (although this wasn't always down to his own failings) but he never allowed his army to put in a position where it might be crushed, such as what happened to Gates at Camden.

I do think the use of guerilla warfare is overstated during this conflict. Although Washington had fought in the wilderness during the Seven Years War he wasn't a practitioner of irregular warfare. In fact he was trained in the regular school of warfare and saw the ultimate success of the Revolutionary War being based around victory on the battlefield in the conventional fashion, rather than the hit and run tactics of the irregulars. Irregular tactics were used by both British and American, Whig and Tory. The British used it to some success, alongside their Indian allies, in the Northern and Western theatres although it really didn't affect the outcome of the war (although the bitterness would continue long after the conflict between the American settlers and the neighbouring Indian tribes in the Old North West), whilst in the South the rebels used it to suppress their loyalist adversaries, thereby cutting the British off from any local support. But here it was Nathaniel Greene, rather than irregular commanders such as Marion, that determined the ultimate outcome of the campaign in the South.