Successful as he was in central Spain, Wellington knew that he could not lead an assault on Diaz in Pamplona without resupply and reinforcements from England. He sent word to London of his intent, and his plans for the summer campaign of the following year, along with his requests for men and goods. Over the next months, a steady stream of fresh troops and equipment was flowing from Gibraltar.
By January, my wound had almost completely healed, and I was able to resume the duties of my assignment. I spoke extensively with Wellington's senior officers, and they displayed incredible patience at my amateurish knowledge of warfare and what had to seem like naive questions on my part. First, I was unprepared for the slow speed at which armies move, learning over the campaign that without steady supply, an army is just a large gathering of bored and hungry men. The logistics these officers had to manage was staggering to me, with many of them providing the most up-to-date figures of men and supply in incredible detail. The exact location of every well in the region. The number of pigs and chickens on hand. The number of sick and precise knowledge of each soldiers state of recovery. It was during this time that I learned that warfare was about so much more than the battlefield, and eventually I understood a flippant remark I overheard from Wellington the previous year, that the battle is won or lost "long before we ever see the enemy".
In May, 1806, Wellington's massive force left Madrid and marched north to Zaragoza to cross the Ebro. I was heartened to be out of the city, but the heat was suffocating, and I did not yet have the stamina for long marches. Wellington met little resistance on the road to Zaragoza, and while his troops seemed encouraged by their relative ease of travel, the General knew better. His scouts, commanded by a dashing figure named Colonel Bertrand "Buck" Wilford, had been carefully monitoring Diaz's movements for months, and had kept Wellington appraised of a massive Spanish force rallying in Pampalona. Wellington knew that his ease of movement was attributed to Diaz's wish to hit our armies with a single massive blow. On June 2nd, the British army, over 3000 strong with 10 infantry regiments, 5 artillery battalions, and nearly 500 cavalry and dragoons, crossed the Ebro and turned west.
Diaz, well aware of our presence, was busy picking a spot along our route most suitable for his defense and most necessary for our travel. On the morning of July 3rd, Wellington's army was camped 4 miles from a village called Monreal, only 10 miles itself from Pamplona, when Wilford's scouts returned with word that they had spotted Diaz's army only 3 miles ahead. The officers were gathered, maps were examined, a plan was drafted, and by late morning, the army began the march out of camp to meet the enemy. The fate of Spain would be determined near that sleepy village, in what is now known as the Battle of Pamplona.
- Sir John MacDougal, 1859
(from the Journals of John MacDougal)
The Battle of Pamplona (continued), 1806
-------- Pamplona Battle Video, Part II **HERE ** ----------
(Part I HERE ) When word came of Diaz's arriving army from Colonel "Buck" Wilford, I quickly broke fast and joined Wellington's aide-de-campe (a great source of information for me, and a very patient man to boot) for the short march to meet the enemy. July 3rd would be hot and hazy.
Diaz was marching to meet Wellington's army at a site where the road to Pamplona narrows, between a small outcropping of trees called the Gallego Forest and Medina Hill. Traveling north, the land takes a downward slope from that point, so Diaz, wishing to defend from elevation, was eager to beat Wellington to the site. And knowing that Colonel Wilford's scouting report would be accurate, Wellington was sure that Diaz would win that race. He was correct.
Map of the battlefield: Medina Hill itself was protected by a deep forest gully that ran perpendicular to the road. A direct assault , therefore, on the Spanish line was out of the question. That left Wellington with few options. To circumvent the gully, he would need to traverse the woods to the west. A thick forest, sure to break up his lines, would be an impossible pass against the full might of the Spanish defense from Medina Hill. Therefore, Wellington had no choice but to simultaneously seize the heights east of the road, at a point called the Gallego Overlook. He sought to place artillery on this point, and put enough pressure on the Spanish army, entrenched on Medina and north of the gully, to allow a successful assault through the Western Woods. Colonel Wilford was to lead the Western Wood and subsequent Medina Hill assault. Colonel MacLeod was assigned with seizing the Gallego Overlook. Major Dundee's howitzers would deploy south of the gully.
I asked the aide-de-campe why Wellington wasn't avoiding the western woods altogether and attacking up the road and Gallego Overlook exclusively. He explained that Diaz would then simply pull his entire army back out of our howitzer range, and blow our bunched columns to pieces with his 12 lbers. I suppose that is why I was a journalist, and not a soldier.
We arrived within sight of Medina Hill at about 14:30. At 15:00, Major Dundee's howitzer's opened fire to signal the beginning of the battle. Waiting for any confusion in the Spanish ranks that a barrage may cause, at 15:10 Wilford and MacLeod's long sweeps began.
The Gallego Overlook
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Colonel MacLeod with three regiments of foot, the 18th Highlanders, two horse artillery batteries, and a dragoon squad drove east to the Overlook. Wellington's plan was inescapably transparent. Once he saw that Wellington would split his force, Diaz knew the Overlook would be crucial. He sent six regiments towards the Overlook, and two to intercept the Highlanders and 22nd Foot, who were tasked with defending the center road itself. Our troops were quicker, reaching the middle road and the Gallego Overlook first, but with Diaz concentrating all his artillery on MacLeod, the toll was grim. After a brief exchange of fire with the Highlanders, the intercepting regiments fled to the gully and were chased down before they could regroup.
The Western Woods and Medina Hill Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
While MacLeod was defending the Gallego Overlook, Colonel Wilford was leading two ranger regiments and the 15th and 16th foot through the West Woods. It took nearly an hour to reach the base of the gully, so thick was the underbrush. There, he met the Spanish skirmishers. The firefight was brief, but the density of the woods caused closer contact than either side truly wished for, and a bloody street fight ensued. After pushing back the skirmishers, Wilford arrived at the the base of Medina Hill where he met the main Spanish line of nearly 1000 men. With no howitzer support, outnumbered, and facing an enemy on the upslope, he quickly realized that exchanging fire would be a losing battle of attrition. Hoping to shock the front of the Spanish line, and cause a confused stampede against themselves, he ordered his rangers and foot regiments to fix bayonets and draw swords. He charged their line.
His plan did not work as hoped, but he did not entirely fail either. The chaotic panic and stampede he had hoped for did not materialize. However, the Spanish were pushed partly back up Medina Hill, where the large rock outcroppings prevented Diaz from using his superior numbers to fully face Wilford. And while Diaz had numbers, most of his troops were militia and guerrillas. They were poorly equipped, and were no match for the experienced soldiers assigned to Wilford. Slowly, the Spanish line was pushed back up the hill.Wilford 's men were taking staggering losses, and were exhausted fighting on the upslope. At this point, they had been in locked in close combat for over an hour.
At the same time as Wilford was making slow progress up Medina, the Spanish were taking a heavy toll under the howitzer barrage as the battle of Gallego Overlook raged. Eventually, exhausted and decimated, and having performed far beyond what honour dictated, their lines fled. This allowed Major Dundee's howitzers to resight to Medina Hill, and provide Wilford with much needed relief. As Wilford was winning his battle, and personally leading a charge towards the Spanish 12 lb batteries, his dragoons were hit by our own explosive barrage. He was thrown from his horse, and killed instantly. Wellington and his staff (and myself, as I was safely watching from the south flats) watched this unfold in horror and dismay.
Despite the shock of the loss of Wilford, it was clear that the day was ours. Colonel MacLeod was pursuing the fleeing Spanish to the north east. Our losses were devastating in the Western Wood, but only 200 or so irregular troops survived of the defenders, who quickly capitulated once Medina Hill was taken. Fully 800 Spaniards died defending that hill without fleeing.
Epilogue
(from the Journals of John MacDougal)
The Death of Bonaparte, 1806
----Final battle video **HERE **--- The Conquest of France
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
During my absence from the theater, our armies had walked into France virtually unopposed. Moore took Marseilles, then Turin and was largely responsible for keeping the Grande Armée further east in their continuing war with Austria. Abercromy pushed up the west coast, seizing Bordeaux and Nantes, then Rennes and Caen. Wellington and Stowell took the center route in the attempt to control the bridges over the Rhone and Loire. They took Toulouse and Bourges, but found a determined resistance at the Loire, south of Orléans . Control of a key bridge was at stake, and Wellington paid heavily for it, loosing nearly 600 men in the battle. To try to split the French forces, who were centered around Amiens and Paris, Stowell pushed to within sight of Reims, but was driven back by a combined French-Batavian force.
Two significant prizes remained out of reach. Paris, and Bonaparte himself. Napoléon was still engaged with the Austrians around Osterreich, and the French capital was heavily defended. Wellington, prudently realizing that he could not besiege Paris until fresh troops and supply arrived, bunked down in Orléans to wait for help.
By this time, it was late fall in 1806, and he felt secure in the knowledge that Bonaparte was too far to the east to raise any seige on Paris before it fell. And in the event that Bonaparte attempted to rescue Paris, he had both the Alps and General Moore, based in Turin to block any passage west, to contend with along the way. History would prove Wellington to be tragically wrong.
I had rejoined Wellington's army by way of Brest, hitching up with a column of infantry escorting new 5 lb howitzers to Orléans. The trip was peaceful, and I was able to enjoy the beautiful architecture in Rennes along the way. And for the first time in my assignment, I was riding horseback on account of my injuries from the previous year. A city born Londoner, I was not altogether comfortable aboard a horse, but I could not complain to the poor infantry in my company. We kept a steady pace for the long journey, and without any word of reason to worry, the column did not hasten. We arrived in Orléans on December 8th, just two days after couriers had arrived with the worst possible news.
- Sir John MacDougal, 1859
The Arrival of Napol é on
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
It cannot be understated the surprise at the suddenly arrival of Bonaparte in western France. The Alps and Jura mountain range are nearly as impassable in fall as they are in winter. Moreover, his intelligence as to the whereabouts of Moore's army had to have been exact. Any error in such a situation can easily turn the ambusher into the ambushed, or so I was told. In truth, in my naivite at the time, I did not appreciate the significance of Bonaparte's arrival, both to Wellington's position and to the appreciation of the herculean task of moving an army quickly through mountains.
For me, I could only react to the reactions of those around me. But for Wellington's sang froid, the army would have been in a panic. Ammunition was very low, and an outbreak of dysentery had seen more of Wellington's army in sick beds than on the drilling grounds. Morale was low, as the long hoped-for return home at Christmas was a fairy tale to all but the most optimistic or delusional. Paris was now most definitely safe from us, and we had gone from predator to prey within weeks.
When Bonaparte's army arrived within 10 miles of Orleans, on December 13th, Wellington was under no illusions. His forces stretched thin and being short of supply, the Dublin-born aristocrat had nowhere to retreat. He would make his stand in Orl é ans.
- Sir John MacDougal, 1859
December 14th, 1806: The Battle of Orl é ans
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
It was a beautiful day, as if nature was perpetuating a great fraud to temper the bloodbath that would be visited upon the countryside. Bonaparte had fielded nearly 3000 men to Wellington's 2000. He had 3 12 lb batteries to support his attack. And while our horse artillery was mobile in theory, the mud was preventing anything from dashing across any field. A small hill to Wellington's right flank provided me with a relatively safe perch from which to observe the battle. When one of the majors gave me a letter to give to his wife, he was quickly reproached by Wellesly. He would have no thoughts of morbidity on that day. I wish greatly that I could remember his last words to me, but the possibility that Wellington himself would not live through the day had never even entered my mind. He was larger than life, and as steady as the tide. Besides, I was too awestruck by the size and splendor of the French army, attempting to see the Emperor himself through the remnants of the morning fog.
The battle began as I was becoming accustomed to seeing all battles begin...with a barrage. As the well-organized French columns snaked their way across the field, crossing in strange directions that I had supposed were meant to hide their specific intent to the defenders. They marched on, even after coming within range of our howitzers and their devastating explosive rounds.
It was my failing as a journalist that I was so mesmerized by the developing battle that I missed out on its specifics. I am sure that a career tactician would have better noted who flanked who with what exactly when, and then debate it post facto in taverns or courts for years to come. I can recount that the French artillery were deployed on our flanks to rake our lines; that cavalry were sent around and behind our left flank (the responsibility of Colonel McLeod); that militia units helped "fix" our right flank; and that when two of foot regiments in the center pivoted to assist a collapsing left flank (formed up in desperate squares), the French curiassiers hit the gap. I can tell you that Wellington, coming to McLeod's assistance, was struck down mortally by a sabre across his chest, and his head was crushed by a horse's hoof; and I can state with certainty that Napoléon, leading the center charge himself, was felled by a bullet, likely shot by a Cpl. Smythe of the 22nd according to an eye witness. Bonaparte was killed instantly.
I cannot tell you that we retreated in good order, that all men died with honour, or with dignity. Panic struck when word of Wellington's death spread through the ranks. I myself was heading for my horse when a French fusilier squad appeared from the wood and demanded my surrender. A stray cannon ball, shot from a 12 lber no doubt, proceeded to sheer off the head of the man who had just accosted me in broken English. From that moment onwards, I remember little of the battle and subsequent rout. I was in a haze, removed from my own body at the impossibility of it all. The Battle of Orléans had lasted only 30 minutes.
I searched the cool December sky for a message from The Maker, some sign that there was reason, a purpose for what I had witnessed. Some message of hope, of design, that I could carry back home and share with a nation soon to be in grief. I found nothing.
- Sir John MacDougal, 1859
Epilogue
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
The Battle of Orléans effectively ended the war between Britain and France. Two things were clear...France would be unable to attack the British mainland, and Britain would never be able to maintain a foothold in France. Battered and war weary, a tentative peace was made, at least for a few years. Europe would eventually fall back into its habit of power and counter-powers, old and new alliances, secret pacts, and thievery done in the name of national pride.
I was beyond caring, having seen enough of war. I had made a few friends in that time, and many lay dead, face down and deformed in the mud of France. No, I could not bring myself to care what kings and lords and emperors were scheming. I was starting anew.
Upon return to England, I was knighted I believe less for any journalistic accomplishment than for simply surviving. I submitted my reports and promptly resigned my position at the Times , then boarded ship for America to seek peace and a new beginning. In time, I married, raised four sons, and even now in my progressing years, I find solace in the fields of my farm, outside of a quiet village called Sharpsburg, in Maryland, near Antietam Creek. May God grant me the gift to never see such times again.
- Sir John MacDougal, 1859
--END OF THE JOURNAL --