Did battle of Kilkis during Balkan Wars in a sense cheated Militairty tactitians

[jo the greek]

The battle of Kilkis - Lahanas was a bloody victory for the Greek Army in BW2 against entreched enemy
And i have read in the past that was a victory heard in all Europe so
did this helped in short militairy schollars to not unterstand the militairy advance during WW1 with the results of the trench warfare?

from Wiki

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The Bulgarian 2nd Army commanded by General Nikola Ivanov held a line from Lake Doiran south east to Kilkis, Lachanas, Serres and then across the mountain Pangeo to the Aegean. The army had been in place since May, and was considered a veteran having fought at the siege of Adrianople in the First Balkan War. General Ivanov possibly to avoid any responsibility for his defeat, claimed after the war that his Army consisting of only 36,000 men and that many of his units were understrength but a detailed analysis of his units contradict him. Ivanov's 2nd Army consisted of the III Division minus one brigade with 4 regiments of four battalions (total 16 battalions plus the divisional artillery), the I/X brigade with the 16th and 25th regiments (total 8 battalions plus artillery), the Drama Brigade with the 69th, 75th and 7th regiments (total 12 battalions), the Serres Brigade with 67th and 68th regiments (total 8 battalions), the XI Division with the 55th, 56th and 57th regiments (total 12 battalions plus the divisional artillery), the 5th border battalion, the 10th independent battalion and the 10th Cavalry Regiment of 7 mounted and 7 infantry companies. A total of 232 companies in 58 infantry battalions, a cavalry regiment (14 companies) with 175 artillery guns. That gives a number between 80,000 (official Bulgarian source) to 108,000 (official Greek source according to the official Bulgarian history of the war before 1932)[2]. All modern historians agreed[citation needed] that Ivanov underestimated the number of his soldiers but the Greek army still had a numerical superiority.[3] The Greek Headquarter also estimated the numbers of their opponents between 80,000 to 105,000 men.[4]
The Greek army, commanded by King Constantine I, had 8 divisions and a cavalry brigade (117,861 men) with 176 artillery guns [5] in a line extended from the Gulf of Orphano to the Djevjeli area, since it was not possible for the Greek headquarter to know where the Bulgarian attack will take place, giving by necessity the Bulgarian Army the possibility to enjoy temporary local superiority to the chosen for the attack area.
On 26 June the Bulgarian Army took orders to destroy the opposing Greek forces and to advance towards Thessaloniki. The Greeks stopped them and by 29 June an order for general counterattack was issued. At Kilkis the Bulgarians had constructed strong defenses, including captured Ottoman guns which dominated the plain below. The Greek 4th, 2nd and 5th divisions attacked across the plain in rushes supported by artillery. The Greeks suffered heavy casualties but by the following day had carried the trenches. On the Bulgarian left, the Greek 7th Division had captured Serres and the 1st and 6th divisions Lachanas.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kilkis-Lahanas

[Erebus Pasha]

Jo I had not heard of the battle until I read Richard C. Hall's The Balkan Wars and I'm not sure how much the battle was studied by foreign observers as opposed to any other battle of the Balkan Wars, or indeed battles of previous conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War. Also I'm not sure how much bearing it had on military thinking prior to WW1.

What is clear is that a Bulgarian miscalculation of Greek strength prior to the battle helped to cause their eventual defeat. Although the Bulgarians occupied strong defensive positions, once the rank and file realised they were completely outnumbered, and were cut off from support from 4th Army (thanks to the Serbs), morale plummeted. The battle was a disaster and, according to Hall, was the biggest defeat suffered by the Bulgarians during that war and the Greek's greatest success. The costs to the Greeks were heavy though with nearly 9,000 casualties. The subsequent Bulgarian retreat and inability of 4th army to lend any meaningful support meant that Bulgaria had no chance of keeping Aegean Macedonia.

The lesson of the battle was not lost on the Bulgarians when they returned to the scene of the action during the next war. Occupying the same positions that they had done with little success against the Greeks, the Bulgarians held off the Allied armies operating out of Salonika for nigh on three years.

[jo the greek]

Jo I had not heard of the battle until I read Richard C. Hall's The Balkan Wars and I'm not sure how much the battle was studied by foreign observers as opposed to any other battle of the Balkan Wars, or indeed battles of previous conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War. Also I'm not sure how much bearing it had on military thinking prior to WW1.

What is clear is that a Bulgarian miscalculation of Greek strength prior to the battle helped to cause their eventual defeat. Although the Bulgarians occupied strong defensive positions, once the rank and file realised they were completely outnumbered, and were cut off from support from 4th Army (thanks to the Serbs), morale plummeted. The battle was a disaster and, according to Hall, was the biggest defeat suffered by the Bulgarians during that war and the Greek's greatest success. The costs to the Greeks were heavy though with nearly 9,000 casualties. The subsequent Bulgarian retreat and inability of 4th army to lend any meaningful support meant that Bulgaria had no chance of keeping the Aegean Macedonia.

The lesson of the battle was not lost on the Bulgarians when they returned to the scene of the action during the next war. Occupying the same positions that they had done with little success against the Greeks, the Bulgarians held off the Allied armies operating out of Salonika for nigh on three years.

Interesting not common in vv post