What kind of muskets were used in the Civil War?

[The_McThief]

Did they use percussion caps or flintlock? I've been wondering this lately and it's been driving me crazy!

[wowbanger]

The most common rifles used durring the American Civil War were the Springfield Rifle and the Enfield Rifle. They were both detonated using a percussion cap.

[The_McThief]

The most common rifles used durring the American Civil War were the Springfield Rifle and the Enfield Rifle. They were both detonated using a percussion cap.

Thanks man!

[Sphere]

The Springfield and Enfield weren't muskets either, but muzzle loading rifles. Muskets were used sporatically, mostly in the frontier theatres, but most of the fighting was done with much more accurate and deadly rifles with conical bullets.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

Rifles were not "much more accurate" than muskets. Most engagements were still made at close range, and hit and miss was just slightly superior than for smoothbores; max distance ever for engagements was about 500m, where of all men in the battalion, only about 14% would be able to hit a man sized target in a line. Very inaccurate.

Life only changed with the adoption of "trapdoor" breech loaders post-Civil War.

[wowbanger]

Rifles were not "much more accurate" than muskets. Most engagements were still made at close range, and hit and miss was just slightly superior than for smoothbores; max distance ever for engagements was about 500m, where of all men in the battalion, only about 14% would be able to hit a man sized target in a line. Very inaccurate.

The effective range of smoothbore muskets was about 50 to 70 yards. At a range of 500 yards it would be be highly unlikely that smoothbore musket would be able to achieve even 1% accuracy. A 10 fold increase in the range is highly significant and it can definately be said that rifled muskets were much more accurate than smoothbore muskets.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

The effective range of smoothbore muskets was about 50 to 70 yards. At a range of 500 yards it would be be highly unlikely that smoothbore musket would be able to achieve even 1% accuracy. A 10 fold increase in the range is highly significant and it can definately be said that rifled muskets were much more accurate than smoothbore muskets.

Not really "nice" if you consider the realities of battalion fire, which did not change until muzzle-loaders and to a lesser extent black powder were out of the game, namely that the first volley is always the best and that volleys would lose their effectiveness after the second or third attempt unless the soldiers behind the rifles were of the capable and the experienced sort, more like "light infantry".

So while the Minie Rifle did increase the capabilities of long range shooters, the bulk of the line infantry could not sanely expect to fire a volley at even 250 yards and prevail. Often times they engaged in the old 100 yard threshold; taking into account battlefield stress, and many shots were missed, many did not fire because of panic and such, and etc...

There is even that famous a prest tactic employed by the French against the Austrians, which consisted in closing in quickly while rifles were sighted to longer ranges, so the shots would pass above the heads of enemy soldiers thanks to the rainbow-like trajectory of the rifle bullets. Results: very little casualties.

Whereas, for instance, not only was a smoothbore capable of firing shotgun-like buck and ball ammo which earned far better kill rates at 100 yards than rifled muskets, but they did not have such a problem since they were always fired at less than 100m without sights; quite rightly speaking, the ideal limitations of rifled handguns were overshadowed by practical battle concerns.

Another thing you must consider, is that the amount of targets hit even at the "ideal" conditions does indeed have the size of a line of battle, and nothing like even the broken formations employed by modern armies at later extents of history. Against fast moving targets using concealment, it's quite right to say the kill rate would be insignificant; more even so when one could barely aim, due to stress, smoke and all (which I called before, "practical" considerations). This de facto made the impact of the Minie Rifle much less considerable than traditionally inputed.

[Dr. Croccer]

Rifles were not "much more accurate" than muskets. Most engagements were still made at close range, and hit and miss was just slightly superior than for smoothbores; max distance ever for engagements was about 500m, where of all men in the battalion, only about 14% would be able to hit a man sized target in a line. Very inaccurate.

Life only changed with the adoption of "trapdoor" breech loaders post-Civil War.

Not really. Compare the casualty ratios of battles in the ACW to those in the Napoleonic Wars. They were considerably bigger. For example, the respective casualties of Austerlitz and Gettysburg (both battles with comparable amount of soldiers) are 25.000 and over 40.000 respectively. The two sides in the ACW fought with similair tactics as before but the majority of troops were armed with far more accurate rifles. This really caused far more casualties and frankly eliminated the point of traditional line warfare, as that relied on the fact that muskets were inaccurate and only effective when massed and fired in a volley. Rifles really ended that form of warfare as being effective, as only a handful of volleys could decimate entire units. Most American generals were still adjusting to that fact, or refused to do so, hence the catastrophic losses.

Another thing you must consider, is that the amount of targets hit even at the "ideal" conditions does indeed have the size of a line of battle, and nothing like even the broken formations employed by modern armies at later extents of history. Against fast moving targets using concealment, it's quite right to say the kill rate would be insignificant; more even so when one could barely aim, due to stress, smoke and all (which I called before, "practical" considerations). This de facto made the impact of the Minie Rifle much less considerable than traditionally inputed.

This is a moot point, because the enemy tended not to move much in that era. Apart from specialised skirmisher units and irregular troops, most Western soldiers advanced slowly in large blocks. This was the norm untill the First World War, when it became impossible to implement.

[Tiberius Tosi]

Rifles were not "much more accurate" than muskets. Most engagements were still made at close range, and hit and miss was just slightly superior than for smoothbores; max distance ever for engagements was about 500m, where of all men in the battalion, only about 14% would be able to hit a man sized target in a line. Very inaccurate.

Life only changed with the adoption of "trapdoor" breech loaders post-Civil War.

14% is quite accurate actually. One French general put the shot to kill ratio during the Seven Years War at about 1 to 1000, which is high compared to todays standards even (1 in 3,000 or 1 in 10,000 depending how which statistics you go by, 1 in 250,000 if you count all bullets fired in Afghanistan by the US lol, although this is very misleading) although admittedly conditions are much different today than then so they are not very comparable to todays standards.

[Domen123]

where of all men in the battalion, only about 14% would be able to hit a man sized target in a line.

Which still means, that they were much more accurate than muskets.

[The_McThief]

Another question: did they still use European line tactics during the Civil War, or did they mostly use guerilla tactics? It's probably a stupid question, but I don't know much about the Civil War. More of an "American Revolution" kind of guy...

[Farnan]

Rifles were not "much more accurate" than muskets. Most engagements were still made at close range, and hit and miss was just slightly superior than for smoothbores; max distance ever for engagements was about 500m, where of all men in the battalion, only about 14% would be able to hit a man sized target in a line. Very inaccurate.

Life only changed with the adoption of "trapdoor" breech loaders post-Civil War.

14% is pretty accurate. 500m is a long range, even soldiers with modern equipment and sites have a hard time hitting at that distance (being the max effective range of a M4).

Another question: did they still use European line tactics during the Civil War, or did they mostly use guerilla tactics? It's probably a stupid question, but I don't know much about the Civil War. More of an "American Revolution" kind of guy...

It was mostly line in the beginning, then towards the end turned into Trench Warfare, especially Petersburg.

However there was a lot of use of cover such as gullies and hillsides.

[Hanny]

14% is pretty accurate. 500m is a long range, even soldiers with modern equipment and sites have a hard time hitting at that distance (being the max effective range of a M4).

Troops then as now used area fire against formed bodies of troops as a target, WBTS rifles had low velocity compared to a musket., both haveing 900 at 100 yards, which made it p[possible to aim ata specific traget, but at 300 yards it dropped to 740 fps and so you had to use area fire as the low velocity rounds simply wobbeled its way to an area ina dimishing arc.

http://www.armystudyguide.com/conten...dy-guide.shtml
Describe the ranges for the M4 Rifle.

• Maximum Range - 3,600 meters
• Max Effective Range for a Point Target - 500 meters
• Max Effective Range for an Area Target - 600 meters

It was mostly line in the beginning, then towards the end turned into Trench Warfare, especially Petersburg.

However there was a lot of use of cover such as gullies and hillsides.

http://www.usregulars.com/hardeehome.html








Hardee's Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics (1855)

[scanned from an original copy]

Bvt. Lt. Col. Wm. Hardee, (c. 1850s)

RIFLE


AND LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICS;


FOR THE EXERCISE AND MANŒUVRES


OF TROOPS WHEN ACTING AS LIGHT INFANTRY
OR RIFLEMEN.


PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE







WAR DEPARTMENT,

BY

BREVET LIEUT.-COL. W. J. HARDEE,
U.S. ARMY

During the war the average range of an engagement was 68 yards, during G-Burg it was 200 yards, so while the technology allowed range fire to be used, terrian and eyesight and training modified it downwards from its theritical usage.

Lots of books or online detail easily to be found.
The range at which an enemy soldier can be engaged on the battlefield is a factor that has occupied both soldiers and pundits since the invention of firearms. In Civil War circles much of the recent controversy has centered around Paddy Griffith’s revisionist work Battle Tactics of the Civil War, in which he argued that infantry engagement ranges were essentially unchanged since 1815 and therefore Napoleonic warfare was still possible. This view has been adopted and amplified by historians like Earl Hess.
Some time ago I did a review of Joe Bilby’s Small Arms at Gettyburg, which I thought was the best look yet at mid-war engagement ranges. After a careful look at both the literature and the ground, Bilby concluded that the average engagement range at Gettysburg was about 200 yards, or about triple that of the Napoleonic wars.
In another post I argued that the effect of the heavily-wooded American landscape had to be considered, and that battlefields here were quite different than those in Europe.
Fast forward now to the present day for a fascinating look at the infantry engagement ranges in two places, Iraq and Afghanistan. The immediate impetus for this is a paper written by an Army major, Thomas Ehrhart, “Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer.”

Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements [in Afghanistan] occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain.


http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=24366

A Reevaluation of the Rifle Musket's Influence in Civil War Combat

Since the guns of the Civil War fell silent in the spring of 1865, veterans and historians have debated the war’s modernity. This debate frequently centers on the influence of the rifle musket. The often cited traditionalist interpretation holds that the rifle musket revolutionized warfare because its range and accuracy were superior to those of the smoothbore musket. Supposedly, the rifle musket minimized the role of artillery and cavalry, contributed to the war’s high casualty rate, and generally rendered most battles indecisive, thereby prolonging the war. In The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat, Earl J. Hess challenges this entrenched traditionalist interpretation, arguing that the influence of the rifle has been greatly exaggerated. Instead of revolutionizing Civil War combat, Hess argues that the rifle had only an “incremental, limited effect” on the nature of warfare (p. 4). Popular perception of the rifle musket transforming combat is a “myth”; Hess presents the “reality” of its influence.
Hess’s conclusions are based on several arguments. The basic premise of the rifle musket revolutionizing warfare is that the weapon provided an increased range of approximately five hundred yards. Hess argues, however, that the Minie ball’s arched trajectory virtually negated any advantages the rifle musket may have offered on the battlefield. This parabolic trajectory produced two killing zones, one within the first hundred yards of the shot and another as the bullet descended. In between the two killing zones was a relatively safe zone of nearly three hundred yards, where bullets passed over the approaching enemy. The smoothbore musket, in contrast, offered clear advantages as a weapon that was easier to aim and produced a relatively flat trajectory. To compensate for the rifle musket’s trajectory, soldiers needed proper instruction, sight estimation, and plenty of target practice, none of which they received in adequate measure. Consequently, advantages the rifle musket may have offered on the battle line were never attained.
The second argument challenging the effectiveness of the rifle musket is based on the range at which soldiers opened fire. Paddy Griffith’s Battle Tactics of the Civil War (1989) was among the first to challenge traditional notions about the range of Civil War small arms. He concluded that soldiers tended to open fire at ranges consistent with smoothbore muskets. Since then, several other works, including Mark Grimsley’s essay “Surviving Military Revolution: The U.S. Civil War” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1350-2050 (2001) and Brent Nosworthy’s Bloody Crucible of Courage (2005), have supported Griffith’s conclusions. Hess agrees and explains that the short range of Civil War combat resulted from several factors, including the rifle’s arched trajectory and the wooded, dense terrain of many of the war’s battlefields. Moreover, there was the natural tendency for the soldier to wait until he could see his target before opening fire, and commanders generally ordered their men not to shoot until the enemy was within close range.
One of the strengths of Hess’s work is that he places Civil War battles and weaponry within the larger context of military history. Fundamental to the traditionalist interpretation is the belief that the increased casualty rate, proliferation of entrenchments, and seeming indecisiveness of Civil War battles resulted from the widespread acquisition of the rifle musket. By analyzing the nature of American and European combat before and after the Civil War, Hess further supports the conclusion that the weapon’s influence has been overstated. Examining a sampling of battles fought before the Civil War with smoothbore muskets, Hess finds that the loss ratios are nearly consistent with Civil War battles. A casualty rate of 30 percent was not uncommon in smoothbore musket engagements. At Blenheim (August 13, 1704), for example, the French suffered 33 percent losses, while the Duke of Marlborough’s alliance forces sustained 23 percent casualties (p. 200). Napoleonic battles witnessed similarly heavy casualty rates; at Austerlitz (December 2, 1805), Napoleon’s army inflicted 31 percent casualties and a year later at Jena (October 14, 1806) inflicted another 54 percent losses (p. 200). Hess concludes that the Civil War rifle musket did not increase the casualty rate when compared to other American or European conflicts. Hess also disputes the traditional argument that the rifle musket negated the decisive victory by arguing that there were a few decisive victories in the Civil War, including Richmond (Kentucky), Chickamagua, Missionary Ridge, and Nashville. Though these battles may have been militarily decisive they failed to achieve any major political victory. The indecisive nature of the Civil War stemmed from the Union and Confederate governments’ (as well as their people's) determination to see the war to its conclusion--not the rifle musket. Consistent with his earlier studies on trench warfare, Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864 (2005) and Trench Warfare under Grant & Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign (2007), Hess finds no correlation between the use of the rifle musket and the development of fortifications. In Virginia’s Overland Campaign, the utilization of entrenchments developed, not because of the firepower of the rifle musket, but from the continuous contact between the two armies. And again, examples from other conflicts provide strength to this argument. Citing events from the Franco-Prussian War and World War I, Hess concludes that the primary reasons entrenchments were used was the proximity of the two opposing armies to each other regardless of “whether that enemy was armed with a smoothbore musket or an M-16” (p. 215).
Where Hess finds that the rifle musket made a significant impact was in skirmishing and sharpshooting, both of which required individual skill. The new weapon gave skirmishers the opportunity not only to harass the enemy but also to inflict considerable casualties. Equipped with a telescopic site, the rifle musket created an ideal environment for sharpshooting, though Hess argues that sharpshooting was a highly technical craft and resulted in minimal change to Civil War combat.
The rifle musket’s influence continues to dictate our perception of Civil War battles, tactics, and operations. The traditional interpretation of its dominating effect continues to influence Civil War history, and few scholars have dared to challenge this argument. Griffith, Grimsley, Nosworthy, and now Hess have effectively reexamined this prevailing view. Equipped with careful research, a plethora of examples and statistics, and commendable contextual research on warfare, Hess’s work will reshape the debate on the modernity of the Civil War and is an essential read not only for Civil War scholars but also for military historians

http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/cwarmy.html

Casualty Figures

Further proof that Civil War weapons were not as deadly as they are often portrayed can be found in casualty figures. Historians charting the lethality of weapons discovered a counter-intuitive trend. As the lethality of weapons increased, the percentage casualties for a constant unit of time has decreased. So while battles in the linear era produced casualties in the range of 10 to 40% per day, by World War II, casualties on the order of 1% per day were considered heavy. Let's take a look at some battles over a range of time periods to compare the losses - killed and wounded only - not captured or missing. (generally, figures are from David Chandler's Guide to the Battlefields of Europe)
Marlburian - early 1700s
battleFrench Loss %Allied Loss %Blenheim 35%?23%Ramillies20%6%Oudenarde7%5%Malplaquet15%22%

Frederican - mid 1700s
battlePrussian Loss %Enemy Loss %Kolin43%22%Rossbach3%?Leuthen18%15%Zorndorf 35%45%

Napoleonic- early 1800s
battleFrench Loss %Enemy Loss %Austerlitz12%19%Auerstadt27%14%Eylau19%35%Friedland9%41%Borodino23%33%Salamanca28%10%Vitoria10%7%Waterloo?22%

Civil War
battleCSA Loss %USA Loss %Second Manassas18%21%Antietam26%17%Fredericksburg7%11%Chancellorsville22%16%Gettysburg37%28%Wilderness19%18%Spotsylvania23%18%Shiloh27%21%Murfreesborough27%27%Franklin23%8%

19th Century
battleLoss %Loss %Solferino13% (French)12% (Austrian)Koniggratz or Sadowa3% (Pr.)12% (Aus.)Gravelotte and Mars la Tour11% (Ger.)11% (Fr.)Sedan4% (Ger.)14% (Fr.)

As you can see, there isn't a great deal of difference in percentage casualty rates between Civil War battles and battles of 150 years before. Although there aren't a great deal of mid to late 19th century European battles to compare to, it is clear that casualty rates were lower than earlier battles, often much lower. This indicates that later wars like the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War, rather than the Civil War, were significantly more modern than wars of the past. Later, we'll gain insight about the tactics of the 18th century and the Napoleonic Wars - and to study their evolution. After all, that is exactly what Civil War commanders did.

http://www.auburn.edu/~noekenn/smhtalk.pdf

Lately, however, we’ve seen a barrage of new literature on this topic. In different
ways, Brent Nosworthy’s encyclopedic Bloody Crucible of Courage and Earl Hess’s
concise Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat have lain to rest any notions of the Civil War’s
modernity. Both also deflate old assumptions, notably the war’s special bloodiness, the
dramatic effect of the rifle on combat, and the confident assertion that those Europeans
could’ve avoided the horrors of the Western Front if only the dunderheads had paid

attention to what happened at Petersburg.

http://www.iusb.edu/~journal/static/...0/stanage.html

The Rifled Musket (see targets).

At 100 yards, the Springfield hit between 48 and 50 times out of 50 shots per target, getting less than 50 hits only once. Accuracy fell off, though; at 200 yards, the hit rate ranges from 41 down to 32. At 300 yards accuracy is worse, between 23 and 29 hitting the target. At 500 yards the hit rate was between 12 and 21. A moderate wind existed during all firings of the Springfield (Ibid 59-65).
The smoothbore musket was tested in two categories, with and without buckshot. At 100 yards, again with 50 shots of ball being fired, between 37 and 43 hit, a hit rate that was not as good as the Springfield, but respectable. At 200 yards, the accuracy fell dramatically, with only 18 to 24 hitting. At 300 yards, accuracy was even worse, with no more than 9 shots hitting the target.
With buckshot added to the firing, the hits jumped dramatically. All cartridges fired had 1 ball and 3 buckshot in them. Still firing 50 times, the accuracy with buckshot at 100 yards ranged between 79 and 84 hitting, while the balls hit between 31 and 36 times. Note the reduction in the number of balls hitting, but the increase in overall hits because of the number of projectiles. At 200 yards, between 19 and 31 buckshot and 18 to 22 balls hit. There were no buckshot firings beyond 200 yards (Ibid 73-78). Assuming that the range of 100 yards was typical for combat firings, a comparison can be made, the smoothbore musket firing ball alone was not much worse than the rifle-musket. With buckshot the effectiveness of the smoothbore was much greater. Beyond that, accuracy with either load dropped considerably. At 200 yards, some of the buckshot failed to penetrate the targets. This meant that the number of seriously damaging hits from buckshot would be very small. This demonstrates the relative usefulness of the two arms. At some point beyond 100 yards, the rifle-musket would be better because in the hands of skilled troops it was more accurate. At 100 yards and closer, the smoothbore would have been much more deadly when firing ``buck and ball.'' If it was firing just ball ammo, then the rifle-musket was again the superior, because all or almost all of its shots hit at 100 yards.

[Domen123]

Gettysburg = around 35,000 casualties if not including captured (only wounded and dead).

The battle lasted for 3 days and forces involved were around 166,000. So daily losses were around 11,500 (or 6,9% of forces involved).

Austerlitz = around 23,000 wounded and dead (however in fact it might have been fewer because there are no any really reliable figures about Austrian-Russian losses so existing figures may be overestimated - or underestimated as well). Forces involved were around 160,000. But the battle lasted for just one day.

So average daily losses were heavier in the battle of Austerlitz (14% of forces involved) than in the battle of Gettysburg.

It shows that introducing better rifles had no real influence on casualties (however I suppose that in the battle of Austerlitz bigger percentage of losses was suffered from bayonets, sabers and other melee weapons than during the battle of Gettysburg).

Anyway - I somewhere read that during the ACW almost 90% of infantry bayonet assaults were not successful because of more accurate rifles (while in the Napoleonic period bayonet was considered by many generals as "better than bullet"). But I don't know how reliable is this figure - see for example the famous "Picket's charge".

Despite heavy losses and unfavourable terrain (2,000 metres of open field) Picket's forces managed to reach the Yankee lines under heavy fire and were repulsed not before the hand to hand combat (so guns and rifles were not decisive there). And in the end Confederate losses were not as huge as we would expect.

Union lost around 1500 dead or wounded during the Picket's charge.

Picket's charge cost the Confederates 1123 dead (7,5% of the attacking force) & 4019 wounded (27% of the attacking force):

[Kretchfoop]

...
Anyway - I somewhere read that during the ACW almost 90% of infantry bayonet assaults were not successful because of more accurate rifles (while in the Napoleonic period bayonet was considered by many generals as "better than bullet"). But I don't know how reliable is this figure - see for example the famous "Picket's charge".

Despite heavy losses and unfavourable terrain (2,000 metres of open field) Picket's forces managed to reach the Yankee lines under heavy fire and were repulsed not before the hand to hand combat (so guns and rifles were not decisive there). And in the end Confederate losses were not as huge as we would expect.

Union lost around 1500 dead or wounded during the Picket's charge.

Picket's charge cost the Confederates 1123 dead (7,5% of the attacking force) & 4019 wounded (27% of the attacking force):

Pickett's Charge was nothing short of an absolute bloodbath. While those numbers you cite are accurate I'm not sure if you know that the Confederate assault lasted approximately 1 hour. Losing 1/3rd of your forces (over 50% if you include prisoners) in an hour is a tremendous amount of casualties any way you look at it. Now, how many of those were caused by rifle fire as opposed to artillery fire or due to the bayonet, I do not know.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

Not really. Compare the casualty ratios of battles in the ACW to those in the Napoleonic Wars. They were considerably bigger. For example, the respective casualties of Austerlitz and Gettysburg (both battles with comparable amount of soldiers) are 25.000 and over 40.000 respectively. The two sides in the ACW fought with similair tactics as before but the majority of troops were armed with far more accurate rifles. This really caused far more casualties and frankly eliminated the point of traditional line warfare, as that relied on the fact that muskets were inaccurate and only effective when massed and fired in a volley. Rifles really ended that form of warfare as being effective, as only a handful of volleys could decimate entire units. Most American generals were still adjusting to that fact, or refused to do so, hence the catastrophic losses.

Actually Dolmen rebukes your point quite nicely.

The ACW was bigger in scope and impact not because of rifles, but because the war capacity and number of men involved was far larger. The Union alone mobilized about 2 million men, about 1/4 of the civilian male population.

This is a moot point, because the enemy tended not to move much in that era. Apart from specialised skirmisher units and irregular troops, most Western soldiers advanced slowly in large blocks. This was the norm untill the First World War, when it became impossible to implement.

Again, this is not true. Line infantry was still the norm in mid 19th Century battles; it wasn't the introduction of rifles that significantly changed warfare as much as the introduction of breech loaders and repeaters, all used in the Civil War.

Breech loading rifles like the Kammerlader, the Sharps or the Dreyse had twice, nay thrice the firing capacity of muzzle loading rifles. This is especially true for cartridge rifles and carbines, which were mostly employed by cavalry and irregular skirmishers; atop of that was the large use of cartridge repeaters by the Union which had about 20-40 times the rate of fire of a normal muzzle-loader. In these conditions, the original rationale for dense formations expires, and they become a liability more than an asset.

The notion that line infantry lasted until the First World War is myth; the British formally abandoned the two liner in 1859 and the red uniform as early as 1848, followed by others later as breech loaders became current. In the late XIX century, the tactical notions shifted from a mass of short range concentrated fire to long range engagements between mobile light infantry. All major service rifles built later onwards, from the Chassepot and up to the first and second generation bolt action magazine rifles like the Gewehr 98 or the Lee-Enfield, were designed with that focus in mind: some of them were sighted up to a 1000 yards! Whereas the sights in rifled muskets were quite rudimentary, and were non-existing in smooth bore muskets. They were big, too, because that was thought to preserve accuracy.

The paradigm that WWI broke was exactly this. Afterwards guns get smaller, and rate of fire became favoured over accuracy.

Anyway - I somewhere read that during the ACW almost 90% of infantry bayonet assaults were not successful because of more accurate rifles (while in the Napoleonic period bayonet was considered by many generals as "better than bullet"). But I don't know how reliable is this figure - see for example the famous "Picket's charge".

Muskets were just as capable of breaking bayonet charges - the key was synched fire at short range. Many bayonet charges could be broken by good timing, but whether or not this would happen is a question of luck. Remember that in battlefield not everything is nice and clean: some would shoot before time, and entire battalions would rout in face of a bayonet charge before even fighting.

The bayonet was more of a morale tool: while it was easier for men to resist heavy musket and artillery fire, a melee charge was very intimidating.

[Ramashan]

The battle lasted for 3 days and forces involved were around 166,000. So daily losses were around 11,500 (or 6,9% of forces involved).

Austerlitz = around 23,000 wounded and dead (however in fact it might have been fewer because there are no any really reliable figures about Austrian-Russian losses so existing figures may be overestimated - or underestimated as well). Forces involved were around 160,000. But the battle lasted for just one day.

So average daily losses were heavier in the battle of Austerlitz (14% of forces involved) than in the battle of Gettysburg.

I don't think these two battles can be used as a fair comparison, since on the first day of Gettysburg most of the forces on either side were dispersed, and then on the second and third in was attacks against a heavily fortified position, on the second day most of the action in a heavily wooded and rock strewn region. I'm not familiar with Aiusterlitz but it seems to have been more exposed, in a matter of speaking.

There is no denying that a rifled musket with a minieball load was more affective at long range than a standard musket. It had approximately 500 yards of affective range but could go further compared to the 50 or so yards of a Brown Bess. I think some of the things that make comparison misleading are, it took the same amount of time to load a rifled musket as it did a standard musket and you had to do it from a standing or kneeling position which left you exposed. Also, many Civil War soldiers were moderately trained before going into battle and received much of their marksmenship, unless they were a hunter before hand, in battle. Usually aiming gets a little sloppy when someones firing back at you.

Another thing is, that the officers in the ACW quickly went over to a 'throw up defenses' tactic in the war that nearly always gave one side cover. So, statistics on accuracy can only come from battles like 1st Manassas, Antietem, and Chancellorsville where a lot of open fighting was going on.

As for Pickets charge and the statistics, there is some belief that many of the soldiers in the charge simply lay down on the leeward side of the Emmitsburg Rd. and as for the South Carolina troops that made it to the lines, I think this goes back to the issue of reloading and aiming. Although you have a good defensive position with fairly accurate and ranged rifles, you don't have a steady rate of fire that a machine gun would offer. So, if you move fast enough and the defenders are thin enough along the line you can cross that distance. Just look at Thomas' troops assailing the heights at Chattanooga, militarily speaking, they should have never been able to go up the 400 feet to take the defenders at the top of the ridge, but they did.

Long range accurate fire power really wouldn't make a difference on huge infantry until it could be delivered quicker, IMO.

[The_McThief]

I don't think these two battles can be used as a fair comparison, since on the first day of Gettysburg most of the forces on either side were dispersed, and then on the second and third in was attacks against a heavily fortified position, on the second day most of the action in a heavily wooded and rock strewn region. I'm not familiar with Aiusterlitz but it seems to have been more exposed, in a matter of speaking.

There is no denying that a rifled musket with a minieball load was more affective at long range than a standard musket. It had approximately 500 yards of affective range but could go further compared to the 50 or so yards of a Brown Bess. I think some of the things that make comparison misleading are, it took the same amount of time to load a rifled musket as it did a standard musket and you had to do it from a standing or kneeling position which left you exposed. Also, many Civil War soldiers were moderately trained before going into battle and received much of their marksmenship, unless they were a hunter before hand, in battle. Usually aiming gets a little sloppy when someones firing back at you.

Another thing is, that the officers in the ACW quickly went over to a 'throw up defenses' tactic in the war that nearly always gave one side cover. So, statistics on accuracy can only come from battles like 1st Manassas, Antietem, and Chancellorsville where a lot of open fighting was going on.

As for Pickets charge and the statistics, there is some belief that many of the soldiers in the charge simply lay down on the leeward side of the Emmitsburg Rd. and as for the South Carolina troops that made it to the lines, I think this goes back to the issue of reloading and aiming. Although you have a good defensive position with fairly accurate and ranged rifles, you don't have a steady rate of fire that a machine gun would offer. So, if you move fast enough and the defenders are thin enough along the line you can cross that distance. Just look at Thomas' troops assailing the heights at Chattanooga, militarily speaking, they should have never been able to go up the 400 feet to take the defenders at the top of the ridge, but they did.

Long range accurate fire power really wouldn't make a difference on huge infantry until it could be delivered quicker, IMO.

That's a really good point. I agree.

[43rdFoot]

The idea that the rifled musket did not offer much improvement of the flintlock of earlier times is absolutely ludicrous. The rifled musket quadrupled the effective range of the infantry small arm. Unfortunately, generals always get ready for the next war by preparing for the last. The U.S. and the C.S.A. were entirely unprepared for the war as it would unfold, and their tactics were far more suited for Napoleonic era. Only the latter half of the war, where it became absolutely clear that offensive actions were largely impossible, would the general officers of both sides adapt to the realities of the new war. From there you see the development of trench warfare, such as the sieges at Petersburg and Vicksburg. The images from those battles look eerily similar to images of the Western Front.

[Farnan]

I know the max effective range of a M4 rifle. I also know your average soldier would be lucky to hit a target at that range (at 500 meters your targets are tiny, hell at 300 meters the targets are tiny).