Alcibiades, Lysander and Pericles the younger

[bspiken]

Been reading some historical fiction lately, Steven Pressfield's Tides of War. And that got me searching for information on the war and its participants.

1./ Would Sicily had gone different if Sparta hadnt supported Syracuse?
1.1./ Did Alcibiades had any influence in Sparta's decision of sending help?

2./ How the hell did Lysander rised to Navarch? I cant find anything noteworthy of him in the war.

3./ Any thoughts on why was Athens killing and expelling generals wholesale? Whats the bloody reason for all its infighting? They were in a losing war and yet all of its generals seemed to spend more time intriguing against each other than doing anything to the war effort.

4./ Did Alcibiades really advice Conon to leave the beach prior to the Battle of Aegospotami?
4.1./ Would leaving the beach made a difference?

Discuss.

[cpdwane]

3./ Any thoughts on why was Athens killing and expelling generals wholesale? Whats the bloody reason for all its infighting? They were in a losing war and yet all of its generals seemed to spend more time intriguing against each other than doing anything to the war effort.

That's Athenian democracy for you. The Athenians throughout their history often ostracised (kicked out for ten years) their leaders for the most minor of offenses, I would imagine because the general populace rarely looked at the bigger picture when they cast their votes on who to ostracise.

[bspiken]

Not everyone voted though, and the vote was then ratified by the council of boule I think. So I doubt it was the people that ostracized them, specially Alcibiades, the plot of cutting of Hermes favorite wand seems a rather obvious ruse to exploit the peoples religious sensibilities and to be able to try him in ausentia. I think it was more a case of envy and lust for power by the powerful Athenians, rather than the fault of the common people.

[conon394]

1./ Would Sicily had gone different if Sparta hadnt supported Syracuse?

Yes even Nicias would have finally finished the siege.


edit: I think it goes without saying that Sparta would matter not at all if Nicias died and Lamachus had survived - then Athens would simply have finished the siege works with alacrity and also presumably have removed the bulk of the fleet to better quarters, watched its back better etc and Syracuse would have capitulated.

1.1./ Did Alcibiades had any influence in Sparta's decision of sending help?

My guess is not as much as he managed to make some people think. He was if any thing very personally magnetic/charismatic and in exile along with a certain noted Historian thus he got the chance to tell his story in a way others did not (say Cleon, or Demosthenes or Thrasybulus)

4./ Did Alcibiades really advice Conon to leave the beach prior to the Battle of Aegospotami?

No Conon was his own man and his competence is well demonstrated elsewhere and later – Presfield is making stuff up if he says otherwise.

4.1./ Would leaving the beach made a difference?

No the basic problem for Athens was one of Pericles’ creation years before. Athens was dependent on imported grain and controlled only one source; a very vulnerable one at that - the grain from the Ukraine via the Black Sea.

Second triremes were not the RN of Napoleon's day they could neither stay on station and had very limited ability to project power. Once Lysander managed to set himself up in a good port blocking the Athenian grain route Athens was screwed. The only option they had was a close blockade and trying to offer battle… which meant Lysander could more or less sit tight until they made a mistake.

That was the great problem for Athens – Its sea power was nowhere near so effective as that of the Britain an age later and to be effective it had to lure its enemy into a fight by deception (since by and large none of its enemies would accept a fair fight) – which could always easily go astray.

Thus that’s why the Syracuse was not a mistake a second grain source would mean Athens could ignore Lysander and force him to pick a fight…

3./ Any thoughts on why was Athens killing and expelling generals wholesale? Whats the bloody reason for all its infighting? They were in a losing war and yet all of its generals seemed to spend more time intriguing against each other than doing anything to the war effort.

What?

Killing generals wholesale where? Most states where hard on leaders Sparta, Athens Carthage, Rome, Thebes, Alexander (he killed a lot his own Generals and friends…).

So aside from the Generals convicted after the Arginusae where is a wholesale killing of leaders?

Sure the trial was irregular – but let’s recall the UK dismissed the man who won the Battle of Britain perfunctorily, the US interred without reason Japanese citizens in WW2 – democracies make mistakes (as do other governments often even more so). We are talking about a decade’s long war where Athens had suffered catastrophic losses and a devastating plague its rather to judge its government harshly on a single count of failure - or more generally to not admit that its not exactly something of an extreme situation.

But let consider the generals in question both failed to rescue a large numbers of stranded ship crewmen – a resource Athens was fast running out of, and did not for all that catch the residual Spartan fleet thus making the victory they did achieve ephemeral at best.

------

That's Athenian democracy for you. The Athenians throughout their history often ostracised (kicked out for ten years) their leaders for the most minor of offenses, I would imagine because the general populace rarely looked at the bigger picture when they cast their votes on who to ostracise.

Bah!

I mean really let’s look at the list of exiled Spartan Kings or disgraced generals (Pausanias, Lysander, Gylippus…)

edit more:

‘That's Athenian democracy for you’

Really this just pisses me off – how bout that Oligarchy huh? Hell Aristotle had lots nice stuff to say bout Carthage they handled those wars with Rome real swell huh?

How bout Dictators yep Hitler, Mussolini, Nappy - no end of good decisions cause they all you know died ruling victorious empires – oh wait. If you prefer a Classical context it’s not like Dionysius’ Syracuse was not fundamentally less stable, less secure and lasted far less than either democratic Athens or democratic Hellenistic Rhodes.

Monarchy that's the ticket because Macedonian did so damn well vs. Rome the way they hammered the legions and all – oops. Also as I pointed out even when things were all ducky under Alex its not like the Macedonian system didn’t see Alex wonder boy kill generals and historians left right and center and with far less trial than at Athens.

[hellheaven1987]

Killing generals wholesale where? Most states where hard on leaders Sparta, Athens Carthage, Rome, Thebes, Alexander (he killed a lot his own Generals and friends…).

Well, Alexander killed his generals because they were plotting to coup him.

Anyway, I am under an impression that Athenians actually prefer exile rather execution against public enemies.

[Timoleon of Korinthos]

1.) Let's begin with how Syracuse would have gone. In my opinion it is clear that the arrival of Gylippus and a bit later Erasinides, each with 2400 men, marks a turning point. Before that the Syracusans have been defeated twice on the battlefield, the second time having lost half of their 600 picked hoplites including commander Diomelus, they have lost Epipolae, they have lost Labdalon, they have lost control of their major harbor, they have failed to disrupt ongoing construction of the Athenian epiteichisma, they have been shut behind their walls. Hermocrates has fallen from power and his democrat rivals Tellias, Heracleides and Eucles are on the verge of capitulating. Soon after the arrival of Peloponnessians the Syracusan resolve to resist stiffens, Hermocrates is on the rise again, the army feels confident to offer battle out in the open, they regain Labdanon and Epipolae, they capture Olympeion and in general wrestle the initiative from the Athenians, whom they apply increased pressure upon, while more and more Sicilian cities flock to their side. So yes, without Spartan/Corinthian intervention even a sloth Nicias would have captured the city.
I believe that a capture of the city would not have produced long term benefits for Athens. After all, the sleeping Carthaginian giant was soon to awaken from an 80 years long slumber and it would take the emergence of the grim strongman Dionysius, his titanic efforts and relentless commitment to save the Greek element on the island. An Athens already engaged in a multitude of fronts in the Aegean could not have channeled the necessary manpower and resources on the island, probably with grim consequences for the presence of the Greeks there, for there would be simply none to put an end to Himilcar's steamrolling campaign in 406BC.
1.1) Apparently he must have, for he was the only one who could have offered an insider's view into the strategical goals of Athens, perhaps exaggerating the extent they revolved around the war with Peloponnese in order to spur them to action. But I do not think he would have exerted greater influence than the Syracusan and Corinthian embassies that delivered speeches on the same subject before the same Apella.

2) Well, it was an office, which unlike in Athens could only be held by an individual for one season. So, the fact that the state was in a perpetual need to replace the admirals and the progressively dwindling Spartan manpower should have ensured than any citizen having shown cleverness and ability to command in his career was a strong contester for the office at some point, even more so if he had ties to one of the royals houses, as Lysander had being mentor of an Eurypontide prince.


3) I assume you are referring to the events that followed up the victory at Arginousae, no? Well, in my opinion it is a typical example of a politician with ulterior motives manipulating the citizen body by stirring up mob mentality [Xenophon, Hellenica, books I and II]:
Then came the meeting of the public assembly, in which others, and more particularly Theramenes, formally accused the generals. He insisted that they ought to show cause why they had not picked up the shipwrecked crews. To prove that there had been no attempt on their part to attach blame to others, he might point, as conclusive testimony, to the despatch sent by the generals themselves to the senate and the people, in which they attributed the whole disaster to the storm, and nothing else...Then came the festival of the Aparturia, with its family gatherings of fathers and kinsfolk. Accordingly the party of Theramenes procured numbers of people clad in black apparel, and close-shaven, who were to go in and present themselves before the public assembly in the middle of the festival, as relatives, presumably, of the men who had perished; and they persuaded Callixenus to accuse the generals in the senate.

Take a closer look at the later political actions of this guy:

Things having reached this pass, Theramenes made a proposal in the public assembly as follows: If they chose to send him as an ambassador to Lysander, he would go and find out why the Lacedaemonians were so unyielding about the walls; whether it was they really intended to enslave the city, or merely that they wanted a guarantee of good faith. Despatched accordingly, he lingered on with Lysander for three whole months and more, watching for the time when the Athenians, at the last pinch of starvation, would be willing to accede to any terms that might be offered.
At last, in the fourth month, he returned and reported to the public assembly that Lysander had detained him all this while, and had ended by bidding him betake himself to Lacedaemon, since he had no authority himself to answer his questions, which must be addressed directly to the ephors. After this Theramenes was chosen with nine others to go to Lacedaemon as ambassadors with full powers... Such were the terms which Theramenes and the rest who acted with him were able to report on their return to Athens. As they entered the city, a vast crowd met them, trembling lest their mission have proved fruitless. For indeed delay was no longer possible, so long already was the list of victims daily perishing from starvation.
On the day following, the ambassadors delivered their report, stating the terms upon which the Lacedaemonians were willing to make peace. Theramenes acted as spokesman, insisting that they ought to obey the Lacedaemonians and pull down the walls. A small minority raised their voice in opposition, but the majority were strongly in favour of the proposition, and the resolution was passed to accept the peace...
In the following year the people passed a resolution to choose thirty men who were to draft a constitution based on the ancestral laws of the State. The following were chosen to act on this committee:--Polychares, Critias, Melobius, Hippolochus, Eucleides, Hiero, Mnesilochus, Chremo, Theramenes, Aresias, Diocles, Phaedrias, Chaereleos, Anaetius, Piso, Sophocles, Erastosthenes, Charicles, Onomacles, Theognis, Aeschines, Theogones, Cleomedes, Erasistratus, Pheido, Dracontides, Eumathes, Aristoteles, Hippomachus, Mnesitheides. After these transactions, Lysander set sail for Samos; and Agis withdrew the land force from Deceleia and disbanded the troops, dismissing the contingents to their several cities...The Thirty had been chosen almost immediately after the long walls and the fortifications round Piraeus had been razed. They were chosen for the express purpose of compiling a code of laws for the future constitution of the State. The laws were always on the point of being published, yet they were never forthcoming; and the thirty compilers contented themselves meanwhile with appointing a senate and the other magistracies as suited their fancy best.

I believe that byexamining his career in retrospect it becomes bovious that he had always put effort intocreating the political conditions that would allow for the modification of the Athenian constitutioninto a more conservative, oligarchic form, in which he was to play a leading role; but in order to do so, he would have to eliminate pro-democrat leaders and oligarchs that could pose a challenge to him, because, as the course of history showed, he would have realised his dream, had he not been out-powered by co-tyrrant Critias.His energetic involvement in the incidents afterArginousae appears to me as a manifestation of his general, long-term personal strategy.

4)Xenophon's account is not that enlightening. He records that Alcibiades advised "them" [as in the Athenians] to move to the anchorage of Sestos, but that "the generals, especially Menander and Tydeus" sent him packing. It's reasonable to assume that the scene might have taken place within a council of the generals, not before the assembly of the entire army, but how many and which generals had attained that meeting can not be said. Nonetheless, it is almost impossible that the appearance of Alcibiades and his counsel would have not been discussed extensively and thus reached the ears of Conon sooner or later. He is just as responsible.
4.1)What Conon said. From the moment the Spartans finally figured out the way they could win the war and having secured the limitless funding of Cyrus, which allowed them to screw up as many times as it would take [basically one, Arginusae] before victory, the Athenians were dead. But they would have gone down in a more dignified manner rather by this tragic military blunder.

[conon394]

Well, Alexander killed his generals because they were plotting to coup him.

Really where is the fair trial to prove it? Cleitus the Black just had the arrogance to say Alexander was acting like a prat.

Anyway, I am under an impression that Athenians actually prefer exile rather execution against public enemies.

Actually I would agree - Carthage with it much lauded government was rather more likely to crucify its generals than the ever so often abused Athenian democracy was to execute (in a more humane way) its own.

[conon394]

Timoleaon

Well it’s hard to argue with someone willing to say Theramenesis the slimy bastard he was in fact - Cleon and Critias were at least honest in their extreme views and goals.


However; I disagree a victory at Syracuse could not have been a coup for Athens.

First Athens would in the short run been free to essentially free the Scicels, and empower of all its allies in Sicily. Thus while I don’t doubt Athens would loot and indemnify Syracuse and even occupy the city itself I doubt much more than that – thus immediately balancing the cost of the trip.

Sure Carthage was a risk but let’s remember we are talking about a Carthage that still used war chariots and was far less potent than the one of 150 years later – 60+ prime Athenian ships were still more navy that the Carthies had face in a generation.

All Athens need do is be the benevolent outsider free the Scicels and reinstate their allies to the maximum extent or even make a major PR move by say reestablishing Megara Hyblaea (how would that play in Magara I wonder Sparta does not care if Corinthian colonists destroy are colony but Athens restores it???).

It worth remembering that we have only T’s darkest allegations about what Athens really intended – not any decrees or such.

All in all it took Carthage some 10 years to react anyway and in the interim Athens would still have had two sources for timber and grain, no crushing defeat and presumably an indemnity… That’s a lot more flexibility that it had even before the failed attack.

The real issue here is Athens had to risk something to win the war – the stand pat thing was a failure – Athens had to many enemies, Syracuse was in fact the least risky option, Pericles should have invaded on day 1.

edit:

he Athenians were dead. But they would have gone down in a more dignified manner rather by this tragic military blunder.

It was always going to be that way - simply put too many people had an interest in Athens being defeated - Persia, Macedonia, Thrace, Thebes, Syracuse, Carthage, Sparta, Corinth,Aristocrats everywhere, short sighted Athenian subjects, hardened Athenian aristocrats and their toadies like Plato... Eventually Sparta was bound to find find somebody who realized he need only take the King's coin keep a fleet in being and wait for Athens to make a mistake - sea power was theoretically neat but in practice too expensive and lacked the power of the cannon to make it really effective.

[bspiken]

1./
Conon. I do agree that Lamachus aggresive strategy in Sicily would've worked instead of Alcibiades diplomacy or Nicias "prudence". However would he be able to turn it around even after the arrival of Gylippus?

Timoleon. I think had the athenians succeded in taking Syracuse, they will be hard targets to get rid off, specially if as Conon says they had just secured a secondary source of grain. Also, 4800 spartan hopilites? That was the reinforcement? I thought they were significantly less.

2./ Lysander however had the position twice (one under Aracus, but according to what Ive read, the admiralty was all his in all but name) and ended up with a lot of renown after the war, is there anything more written on him? (I havent found sources, I havent looked that hard, but Ill appreciate tips)

4./
Conon. I admit my lack of knowledge in the Peloponessian conflict, hence the questions. As far as I could muster, Conon proves himself serving under persian fleet later in the conflict right? Because at Arginusae the 8 generals are the ones that are send to reinforce him are the ones that defeat Callicratidas right? I attest that the principle behind forcing Lysander into a battle is sound, and that it was a losing war since the sicilian expedition (or Pericles policies as you say, he was very good in creating a culturally rich Athens, but his exploits as a military strategist were less impressive). But I dont see any particular brilliance in Conon by adhering to this plan (not that there were many options as you say).

Timoleon. I see that the Athenians were pretty screwed by this time. Conon and yourself made really good points.

3./
Timoleon. Yeah, thats the oligarchy of the 30 right? So the evidence does point out to a political kill rather than a desparation one.

Conon. I was exaggerating, of course there has been a lot of injust treatment of generals in other times and goverments. And there are many more that are more prone to it (monarchy is one of them), my point was more on how does this killing reflected Athenian stress during the last years of the war and how were they affecting the demos decision.

5./ (new one). The Athenians reinstated Alcibiades in the revolt of the 400, but from what Ive heard from Conon394 (and the few bits that ive read) he was not a good general, however his only blunder in the war was the battle of Notium, a rather small and unimportant loss. Why was Athens so harsh in removing him again from command, and why so much written on this fellow? Good novel material? Changing sides, going with persians, great orator, secret adulterer with a spartan queen? (not only Pressfield but you know, all authors).

[conon394]

however his only blunder in the war was the battle of Notium, a rather small and unimportant loss. Why was Athens so harsh in removing him again from command, and why so much written on this fellow? Good novel material? Changing sides, going with persians, great orator, secret adulterer with a spartan queen? (not only Pressfield but you know, all authors).

A lot is written because he was by and away just notable – and clearly the kind of person who in the flesh was attractive…

Why Notium was his downfall, well think about it. Lots of Athenian generals and leaders had been tried, convicted or exiled before but Alcibiades was the very rare Athenian who had in the war actively helped the enemy – Sparta and Persia (others in disgrace simply went into exile, faced trial and execution or sought to aid Athens in exile or wrote history books), and his boasts about securing Persian aid for Athens had already been shown to be false. Little wonder given most of his supposed successes since return were in fact mostly the work of Thrasybulus that his welcome was so thin – let’s just remember who marched uphill in the snow with maybe two dozen men to restore democracy.

Alcibiades was a traitor writ large and was given a second chance – how tight would the leash have been on Benedict Arnold if he came back to George Washington?

[bspiken]

Fair enough, that does make sense. Another question, how much were the victories at Abydos and Cyzicus due to Alcibiades? It seems to me that he got an awful lot of chances by an awful lot of people, a little hard to belive it was just because of his looks and charm.

[conon394]

1./
Conon. I do agree that Lamachus aggresive strategy in Sicily would've worked instead of Alcibiades diplomacy or Nicias "prudence". However would he be able to turn it around even after the arrival of Gylippus?

So I assume we are considering just the ‘what if’ of if he (Lamachus ) did not get himself killed and not the alternative that he had carried the day in the original planning pow-wow session…

As far as I can see had Lamachus remained alive there is little reason to think Gylippus would even arrive let alone be able to impact the siege.

First let’s just consider while alive every indication is that Lamachus was an able and very competent military commander and the difference in the effectiveness of Athenian troops before and after his death is like night and day.

For example:

Lamachus was the only general of the 3 who seems to have had a good ideal of what Athens could do with the force it has sent: he realized unlike Alicibades that diplomatic plans were unlikely to succeed to to the scale of Athenian intervention; that leaving was not really an option without some action – Athens would look foolish, and a lack of cavalry (*) meant Athens needed to maximize the advantage of surprise and sea transport.

While Lamachus was alive the Athenians displayed both vigor and a high level of tactical execution. The landing operations were carried well, and in terms of tactics the Athenians showed all the hallmarks of a well led force – a picked force of hoplites, reserves in battle, effectively exploiting the lassitude of their enemy on several occasions…

Finally don’t forget 6.104,Nicias dismissed the news of Gylippus sailing for Italy – it seems doubtful the energetic and efficient Lamachus would make the same mistake. Thus I think there is reasonable chance Gylippus might never make it.



With Lamachus in command the Athenians constantly catch the forces of Syracuse of guard while they themselves work at a pace that amazes their enemy (6.98) [The contrast to Nicias in command alone is telling the Athenians are indecisive and often caught by surprise]. If Gylippus had still made Himera I just cannot see Lamachus failing to fortify the only obvious route at the Epipolae nor would he miss the chance I thing to force battle (either on the good terms against Gylippus alone or even when Gylippus offered battle on his arrival at Syracuse (7.3) – the hesitancy of Nicias is simply perplexing.

All in all I think its likely had Lamachus lived Gylippus would have arrived and found Syracuse walled off and the Epipolae held against him. In that situation He almost certainly would have had to withdrawal since the Athenians would be free to concentrate the bulk of their army against his initial relief force.


(*) the lack of cavalry is understandable really – even thought the Athenian knew they needed it. Transporting horses in triremes without sedation was likely to lead to issues and horses that might have to killed on the spot. Athens did not have all that much cavalry to spare since it was critical to defending Attica, and a long voyage even if the animals survived was likely to leave them in poor health.

[bspiken]

Conon./

So I assume we are considering just the ‘what if’ of if he (Lamachus ) did not get himself killed and not the alternative that he had carried the day in the original planning pow-wow session…

Ja! Yeah, thats exactly what I was considering. I agree with your hypothesis, Nicias errors are indeed perplexing, and Gylipus was smart enough to find the whole venture impossible (if Lamachus had performed has you say, which is quite likely given his previous performance in the campaing).

This bring another question, do you think that the Hermes plot was intended to prevent Alcibiades from commanding and to give Lamachus greater freedom of action or was it just fear of him getting the fame of bringing down Syracuse (since he had an aggressive commander and a prudent advisor)? Or something else completely unrelated?

[Timoleon of Korinthos]

1./

Timoleon. I think had the athenians succeded in taking Syracuse, they will be hard targets to get rid off, specially if as Conon says they had just secured a secondary source of grain. Also, 4800 spartan hopilites? That was the reinforcement? I thought they were significantly less.

No, they were not 4800 Spartan hoplites. Gylippus arrived with 12 triremes of Peloponnesians and he must have been the only Spartan in the entire expedition. Accounting for a full crew (including officers, marines and rowers) of 200 men per trireme, as was the Athenian norm, these 12 triremes held 2400 men. Erasinides arrived a bit later with another 12 triremes raised from Corinth, Ambracia and Leucas, another 2400 men. The crews of the fleet could and did serve as infantry as well. The first thing Gylippus did after setting off board was to create an expeditionary force of 3000 men, probably comprised by his Peloponnesians and Sicilian allies picked en route to Syracuse.

1./ 2./ Lysander however had the position twice (one under Aracus, but according to what Ive read, the admiralty was all his in all but name) and ended up with a lot of renown after the war, is there anything more written on him? (I havent found sources, I havent looked that hard, but Ill appreciate tips)

Plutarch wrote a biography of him, paired him with Sulla in his Lives.
http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/lysander.html

3./
Timoleon. Yeah, thats the oligarchy of the 30 right? So the evidence does point out to a political kill rather than a desparation one.

To be honest, I don't know if anybody else aside from Conon agrees with this view, I haven't seen any academic put the principal blame on Theramenes before, but it is a firm belief of mine.
At any rate, we have to remember that in all ancient Greece a general would be perceived as primus inter pares, he was expected to lead by example and command obedience by his personal excellence, not by the prestige and authority of his office, which were nowhere near the standards we see in modern armies; and he would be constantly subjected to political control as well. To supplement Conon's remark earlier, there hasn't really been a famous general in Greek history that was not brought to court (Epameinondas, Xenophon), fined (Pericles, Miltiades), exiled (Themistocles, Hermocrates, Pausanias), overthrown (Cleomenes II, Pyrrhus) or even condemned to death (Clearchus, the 8 after Arginusae) at some point.

However; I disagree a victory at Syracuse could not have been a coup for Athens.

First Athens would in the short run been free to essentially free the Scicels, and empower of all its allies in Sicily. Thus while I don’t doubt Athens would loot and indemnify Syracuse and even occupy the city itself I doubt much more than that – thus immediately balancing the cost of the trip.

What allies? The general reception they met was cold to hostile. They had zero support in Magna Graecia, only Rhegio was friendly and none the less did not contribute to the campaign for the restoration of democracy in Leontinoi despite the old pact of friendship. In Sicily, Messene, Catane and Naxos rejected their proposals and had to be captured by force, Kamarina rejected them as well. The only cities to willingly side with Athens were Leontinoi and Egesta; one might add some Sicanian tribes in the interior of the island. Any form of mistreatment of Syracuse after its capture would have sent waves of dissatisfaction throughout an already grudgingly acceptable to Athenian presence island and would have rendered the formation of a broad pro-Athenian political consensus impossible; perhaps it would have lead to exactly the opposite, Selinus or Akragas or Gela offering asylum to Syracusan exiles and possibly support in a venture to regain the city.
And then there is the question of how was a city as large as Syracuse to be kept under control. By military means? It would require the permanent installment of a strong garrison in Ortygia, possibly mercenary, but still the control exerted would still be very fragile, as the occupation of Athens and Thebes was by Sparta, or as the occupation of Syracuse was by Callipus. A mere appearance of a Peloponnesian force outside the city walls could turn the tables. By installing cleruchs? They wouldn't make much of an impact in a city that already numbered more than 10,000 male citizens. By political settlement? This would have been even less stable, whether the democratic Athenians would have installed an oligarchy/dictatorship (absurd) or left the democracy intact. And then the city was simply too big to be absorbed into the empire. I severely doubt the Athenian rule in any form would have lasted long.

Sure Carthage was a risk but let’s remember we are talking about a Carthage that still used war chariots and was far less potent than the one of 150 years later – 60+ prime Athenian ships were still more navy that the Carthies had face in a generation.

That's assuming they could engage the Carthaginian fleet in the first place. What if they didn't? What if a Carthaginian invasion took them by surprise and the expeditionary force landed before they could catch it in the open sea? Lacking a strong political base to serve as the foundation of a broad military coalition to face the gigantic Carthaginian army on land, they were practically domed. They would have lost allied cities as they lost western Thrace to Brasidas, before realizing what is going on, and probably the Carthies would capture a broken Syracuse itself. Perhaps they would have even played the liberator card on their way to domination.

All Athens need do is be the benevolent outsider free the Scicels and reinstate their allies to the maximum extent or even make a major PR move by say reestablishing Megara Hyblaea (how would that play in Magara I wonder Sparta does not care if Corinthian colonists destroy are colony but Athens restores it???).

No scenario could have worked out for Athens. Destroying Syracuse would have left Sicily spineless, as the Peloponnese and Boetia became after the reduction of Sparta and Thebes respectively, and this would have signaled direct incitement for Carthage to invade and conquer.
Not destroying Syracuse would have left an overall fragile political balance, which would be bound to see the expulsion of Athenian control and reemergence of Syracusan prominence sooner or later, either through Peloponnesian intervention or inner Sicilian coup.
I can't see any sort of stable settlement without introduction of massive Athenian presence on the island and I can't see Athens being able to project any number of mercenaries, cleruchs or otherwise to outweigh the enormous for Greek standards Syracusan population.