In his book,
The Blitzkrieg Legend, German historian
Karl-Heinz Frieser referred to the notion of 'Blitzkrieg' as "a world wide delusion".
[63] Frieser, in agreement with Overy, Cooper and others that reject the existence of a Blitzkrieg doctrine, argues that after the failure of the
Schlieffen Plan in 1914, the German Army came to the conclusion decisive battles could not be executed on a strategic level. This meant the idea of one early large scale offensive could not bring about a knockout blow. Frieser argues that the OKW had intended to avoid the decisive battle concepts of its predecessors and planned for a long all out war of attrition.
It was only after the hastily improvised plan for the invasion of Western Europe in 1940 and its successful conclusion, which led the German General Staff to believe that decisive battles were not obsolete. It was only after the
Battle of France German thinking reverted to the possibility of a Blitzkrieg method for the
Balkan Campaign and
Operation Barbarossa.
[64]
...
The German armament industry did not fully mobilize until 1944, and this has led to some historians in the 1960s, particularly Alan Milward, to develop a theory of "
Blitzkrieg" economics. Milward argued the German Reich
could not fight a long war, so it deliberately refrained from arming in depth, to arming in breadth, to enable it to win
a series of quick victories