Hannibal's Invasion of Rome

[Lysimachus]

Would he have been better off doing a more conventional seaborne invasion or was crossing the Alps the best thing he could have done? By doing so he achieved what was thought to be impossible, caught the Romans by surprise and basically got him right in to their heartland and allowed him to roam freely around pillaging and burning the landscape, and he then proceeded to crushingly defeat a number of Roman armies (e.g, at Cannae). However, crossing the Alps had reduced his army quite alot and had left him unable of bringing heavy weapons with him which meant that conquering towns was out of the question unless they had submitted to him and this restricted him to roaming the countryside. After a number of Roman armies had been destroyed by Hannibal, Consul Quintus Fabius Maximus employed a strategy of attrition which although frustrated his peers for their desire for an open engagement, meant that he was weakening Hannibal and in hindsight proved to be a very effective strategy. Gradually they chased him out of Italy and got him on the run and forced him back on to his own soil. Once defeated at Zama, and then with Carthage in the next few years being absolutely destroyed he offered his services to a number of leaders in his promise to destroy Rome but of course failed in doing so. To prevent himself being captured, he poisoned himself sometime between 181 and 183BC.

If he had transported his army by a more conventional route, he would have had far more resources. Seeing as he destroyed the armies arrayed against him even with diminished numbers, would it have been better to have done this or would other factors have played against him which would have reduced the positives of doing so?

[Antissa]

Rome enjoyed naval superiority in the Mediterranean as a result of their successes during the First Punic War, so I doubt that Hannibal's armies could've fared well in an amphibious invasion.

[Lysimachus]

Rome enjoyed naval superiority in the Mediterranean as a result of their successes during the First Punic War, so I doubt that Hannibal's armies could've fared well in an amphibious invasion.

In which case I propose two alternate situations. First, what if Hannibal was able to get the majority of his army across despite the Roman naval supremacy? Secondly, what if he was only able to get half of it across? In the latter case, would that just be a re-run of what actually happened or would it have been cut even shorter?

[hellheaven1987]

In which case I propose two alternate situations. First, what if Hannibal was able to get the majority of his army across despite the Roman naval supremacy? Secondly, what if he was only able to get half of it across? In the latter case, would that just be a re-run of what actually happened or would it have been cut even shorter?

1. There is not what if for navy transport; Roman simple knew he was coming, and Hannibal wasted too much time in Iberia sieging some cities.

2. Hannibal could, however, crossed through Marseilles, although Roman had assembled their force there waiting for him. Either way, consider the price of crossing Alphine, it probably more worthed to fight Roman in Marseilles and forced crossed...

[Maverick]

There's no better field commander in history so it's not easy to criticize his decisions, I just think he was unlucky to march against Rome. Before Fabius Maximus Memnon of Rhodes argued for a scorched earth policy against Alexander but was ignored and later the Gauls used it against Julius Caesar sucessfully but they abandonded it.

Rome crucially had the political will to beat Hannibal by not losing to him.

[hellheaven1987]

There's no better field commander in history so it's not easy to criticize his decisions, I just think he was unlucky to march against Rome. Before Fabius Maximus Memnon of Rhodes argued for a scorched earth policy against Alexander but was ignored and later the Gauls used it against Julius Caesar sucessfully but they abandonded it.

Rome crucially had the political will to beat Hannibal by not losing to him.

Lol, Hannibal had no excuse, because he was the one who started the war.

[RomanSoldier9001]

Rome enjoyed naval superiority in the Mediterranean as a result of their successes during the First Punic War, so I doubt that Hannibal's armies could've fared well in an amphibious invasion.

They had little navy during Second Punic War. But they could buil own rigth from star with number of their recourses and roman stuborness.

[ray243]

But then, Rome will be the one who initate the war instead of Hannibal.

[Flavius Nevitta]

Crossing the Alps was not a bad idea in general. It was the best way to get into Italy avoiding the Roman troops sent against him. The problem was the planning.

Hannibal didn't plan the whole thing early enough it seems. Wrong time of year, wrong way, not enough diplomatic success on the way. Others passed the alps too, without such problems as he had. His brother for example, the Celts had done so numerous times and so did the Romans many times in later years.

A maritime operation is not an option. He would have needed a huge fleet for that. Something he would have had to build and which would have alarmed the Romans even more.

[antaeus]

the alpine crossing was successful... he didn't need go via the sea.

[hellheaven1987]

the alpine crossing was successful... he didn't need go via the sea.

Success by losing half of men before the real war even started.

Such a success, I believe.

[antaeus]

Success by losing half of men before the real war even started.

Such a success, I believe.

casualties happen in war... especially in risky ventures...

in the campaign seasons immediately following his arrival in italy, hannibal defeated the romans in the field a number of times, secured the allegiance of the greek cities in the south and put himself in the perfect position to accept rome's anticipated capitulation...

the fact that rome did not capitulate and sue for peace has more to do with their character and hannibal's lack of true understanding of it than it does with anything to do with that march. the march wasn't a failure.. it was a dramatic strategic success which took the romans a decade of hard slog across the mediteranean and many defeats to recover from...

[hellheaven1987]

casualties happen in war... especially in risky ventures...

in the campaign seasons immediately following his arrival in italy, hannibal defeated the romans in the field a number of times, secured the allegiance of the greek cities in the south and put himself in the perfect position to accept rome's anticipated capitulation...

the fact that rome did not capitulate and sue for peace has more to do with their character and hannibal's lack of true understanding of it than it does with anything to do with that march. it took a decade and a semi regular lack of support at home in carthage for the romans to get rid of him... that doesnt suggest the march was a failure...

Lol, if he was that awesome, why not crushed Roman force in Marseilles instead chose to cross Alphine, suffered half of casualty and still had to deal same Roman force??

Sorry, I have studied Second Punic War years and still unable to accept Hannibal's "brilliance" of crossing Alphine.

[antaeus]

Lol, if he was that awesome, why not crushed Roman force in Marseilles instead chose to cross Alphine, suffered half of casualty and still had to deal same Roman force??

Sorry, I have studied Second Punic War years and still unable to accept Hannibal's "brilliance" of crossing Alphine.

"look at me.. i have studied it so lol if you dont agree with me" dude, lay off the drama queen act.

it was an act that took rome more than a decade to recover from.. i'm no fan boy - hannibal ended up a broken man because of his obsession with rome.. but in this case, his strategic vision did catch the romans off guard and allowed him the initiative in the war, which he wouldn't loose for years. he could have faced them in marseilles, but he could have found himself held down in another costly siege which may have cost him half his army.. or he could have left them defeated but on the run and still between him and rome or any number of things...

crossing the alps was a risk, and it cost him.. but by bypassing marseilles, he made the romans chase him so that he dictated the terms of the engagement... once he was on their territory, they had no fall back. its about initiative, making your enemy react to your movements, surely you have 'studied' such things?.

[Hanny]

Would he have been better off doing a more conventional seaborne invasion
or was crossing the Alps the best thing he could have done?..

before we get onto your questions, recall that Hanny`s father lost in sicly because he was dependent on supply by sea, one lesson hanny may well have learnt was that it was better to trust in your own ability to supply yourself than to chance it across the sae lanes, also Hanny showed no aptitude for naval operations at all, and had next to no navy to work with in any event.
Lets review his and romes naval assests in Spain, Carthage and Rome.
35 Quinq and 5 Triremes all fuly manned, 18 without adequate crews in Spain, 55 quinq`s at Carthage. Rome having a fleet of 220 quinq`s, so any seaborne inavsion could not be protected not could suffienct sea lift be marshalled to lift his army of 90k inf and 12k mounted plus 58 elephants, which he split to take with hima nd leave with his brother.
Any seaborne lift had to cover a considerable distance to reach its destination, therby exposing the sea lift to a consular army that would drasticly outnumber it depending on how much was dispacthced by sea, given that x number of men require y amounts of grain and water, we can aduce the requirements that would ned to be carried on the transports to suatin the lift, and of course compare it to what is required on land anc compare the expected 16 miles a day on land to 3/4 knots at sea. One caveat here is that the wind in that part of the Med are not in Hannys favour at the time he found he wanted to leave for italy, meaning oars for the best speed against the wind.
Best thing could mean many things, is it best to keep your army united?, even so to make the march he split into 3 wings. What was Hannys principle war aim?, if we acept that he wanted to remove Rome as the pre eminent Italain power, with acess to a large pool of resources of allied and satalite states, and return Italy to a fractured inter feuding region where Rome was just one of many, and none had the material resources of a united Latin confederation, then this can only be achieved by destrying Roman ability to keep its allies with it,then we can probably agree what best may have ment to Hannys mind and strategic thinking,that being an offensive based on superior mobility against an enemy who was forced to defend fixed assets.
Is that your understanding of his principle war aim?. If so it helps answer other questions as to why Hanny never really wanted to, or tried to siege out Rome, as it was not required for his war aim.

By doing so he
achieved what was thought to be impossible, caught the Romans by surprise
and basically got him right in to their heartland and allowed him to roam
freely around pillaging and burning the landscape, and he then proceeded
to crushingly defeat a number of Roman armies (e.g, at Cannae)..

The Suprise he achieved is in every acount, so he certainly achieved the element of suprise, not least because of the timeing of his arrival outside what Rome understood the usual campaign seasons, Hanny learnt of Rome DOW in the spring, (april of so), he crosses the Ebro a month later (May), spends 2 moths reducing pro Roman or at least not pro Hanny regions of Spain between teh Ebro and the Pyrennees, leaving for Italy in Aug/Sept, covering around a 1000 miles, Sept was when Romans went home as the war season was over.
Surpise was double, as both where and when he came caught Rome unprepared. Rome had 72k raised for the war, Hanny in Spain 102k, a healthy numerical advantage.

However,
crossing the Alps had reduced his army quite alot and had left him unable
of bringing heavy weapons with him which meant that conquering towns was
out of the question unless they had submitted to him and this restricted
him to roaming the countryside..

Well what is quite a lot?, 102k is Spain, 26k in Italy some 8 months later is probablly what your thing is quite a lot, ( compare to Napolean in 3 months of summer going from 450k to 180k in 1812, and even worse comming back in winter) a loss of 75% of starting Carthaginain forces. But we know some 50k of that was left as garrisons or disbaned, so the number actually irrevocably lost to combat disease etc was actually around 25% of start strength, a completly different picture, depends what your thinking of as lost.
What heavy weapons do you mean?, the elephants could carry anothing required thbat was of bulk, do you mean siege equipment?, if so its only wood, so to produce siege equipmemt only requires men with skill and time to produce it, but that is not what hanny operational aim is, he wanted mobility, which was why he went with treachery to gain fortiefied posistions whenver possible rather thana siege, a siege fixes you to a spot and would take away hanny greatest advantage, hios mobility, but Hannibals logistics was based on the mule and it provided him with a pace of mobility the Romans could not match and was central to his operational scheme of winning through superior mobility that created opourtunitys for him to expolit, coupled with a cav arm that would allow him to forage by controlling the landscape and turn any defeat into a ruthless extermination.
So lets break it down from Livy and Polybios numbers where they give them for his losses.
In Spain in June 90k foot 12k mounted
At the Pyrennes Aug 59k, ( a total of 22k are listed as lost or deserted or left as garriosn) so 22k lost in reducing the tribes of Spain., distance marched 290 miles.
at the Rhone Sept 46k, 13k more used as garriosns)180 miles more miles, dithers here as no roman resposns as excepted arrived, Scipio being late in getting to goto Spain, losing one of his legions to got the Po valley to replacea lost legionand had to raise another to replace it, so was late by a m,onth or 6 weeks in getting to nwhere Scip[io wanted top be and hanny expected him to be,so hanny moves onwards.
In Italy, Oct/Nov 26k 20k more lost since leaving the Rhone.160 more miles miles to the alps, 140 miles to cross and enter the Po valley.
Now the 102k is what Livy says he sets out with, and his source is a Roman preater who Hanny had captured and was holding for ransom, so its possible the praetor was privy to what Hannys total force was in Spain, ie not quite what he left with because we also know that Hanny sent 15500 of his spanish assets to Africa, and recieved Africans in return, and left further Spainish assets with his brother but of a small number, if we take that to be 16k in all, it reduces the unlikly 22k lost in the openeing 2 moths to 6k lost ( which compares more in line with carthaginian losses in battle in Italy, Cannea 8k 2/3 for Trebbia for instance. The last one is the 26k being as what Hanny leaves us as the number he arrived with, but this does not include any of his light troops who are later liosted as being present in both counts, this omits 8000, so Hanny record could be 8k lower if the balerics and light troops are included, this means he lost 12k between rhone and Italy.
So, we have a a start strength of 102, less deductions for garrions or disbanded and a total lost to all other causes of 6k in the opening 2 months, 8k for the last 2, the inital stage was therfore in keeping witah loss rate he would find when fighting in Italy, but only if we acept that the 16k is deducted from his on hand strength and is actually in Africa nd not with him in Spain, but to my mind, it fits as argument to better understand the numbers provided, crossing the alps again puts the loss rate back into the same order of magnitude when you consider that units refered to in battles and the numbers given for them, do not appear on the tablet used to detail the forces Hanny arrived with in italy.
So its plausable that Hannys actualy number of casulaties is consirable lower than you may be thinking, even if you use the staright numbers Livy/Polybios give us, you find a high loss rate, but it rather depends what you campare it against, if its execisive does it not?.

After a number of Roman armies had been
destroyed by Hannibal, Consul Quintus Fabius Maximus employed a strategy
of attrition which although frustrated his peers for their desire for an
open engagement, meant that he was weakening Hannibal and in hindsight
proved to be a very effective strategy. .

Atrition is not a stratrgy, its the absence of a stratergy!, attrtion is simply a fact of mil life, in ww2 an allied Inf Div would lose 1% a week of its manpower when not in combat, when in combat this could rise to unsustainbable rates of atrition, but the rate of atrition/friction, is what counts. What Fabias emloyed was startergy of delay and avoidence of combat, knowing that hanny could not replace his manpower at the rate Rome could, if Rome had the time to do so.

How long did it take him to cross the Alps? If he'd went during the spring
or summer wouldn't that have gave him less campaigning time before winter
set in? Also, why was Hannibal in such a hurry? Was he eager to work on
the promise he made to his father or was pressure being applied on to
Carthage and immediate action was a necessity, or...?
.

Chronology is given in all good acounts, the start point in time is the determing factor, when Suguntum is reduced and the spring rains abate making the many southern Spanish rivers crossable, so hanny can only start from a later in the usual campaign season.
What does need to be borne in mind is the logistics, each horse requires 10lbs of grain a day plus an equal amount of foder, so the grass needs to be there to provide the fodder, or more grain is required.
90k foot requires 90 tons a day of grain, (2lbs of grain per man) plus 225 tons water (5lbs water per man), 12k horses require 60 tons of grain a day, plus the same of fodder, plus 4800 tons of water, so the simply act of carrying sucha load would be a considrable task if undertaken by sea, even if sucha quantity of shipping could be found. a mules load was 200lbs each.
Hanny appears to have made a rather slow march overall, 1000 miles in 240 days is an average of 4/5 miles day, but we need to consider the slowest manouver elemet of the Elephants, which would exceed that in any event, and that time was required to acumalte suffiecnt loggistics to propel the army forward through hostile regions or where no grass/grain could be purchased or siezed etc, and Hanny was certainly aware of Roman actiosn and kept hsi options open before makeinga choice of turning back onto Scipio or bypasing himand entering N Italy. The availibilty of grain in the quatitys required is dependednt on the growing season, and the state of a high desnisty regions grain storage facilitys, which helps us to undersatnd why he took so long.

Couldn't he have set off from Carthage with his army, land in Sicily and
then cross near Messana with his army? It's not that long a distance so it
would reduce the naval threat posed by the Romans by giving them a narrow
window of opportunity to react to his movements.
.

He could have, but he had no authority to be in Africa with his army, his command, and personal, responsobility was Spain and its vast economic reources that helped his political faction to be the dominate faction, replacements and income from Spain was how Hanny expected to maintain himslef, remeber it had to fight its way to him, while he fixed romans in Italy and waged war on its resources while thus protecting his own from roman ravages, not from africa except for speclaist troop types, ie numidian and elephants. So crossing back to Africa and marching overland to Carthage would achive nothing but to place him on home ground when a roman consul turned up to invade Africa,( if you look at the time line and distance to be traversed) and in war, home field advatage is not all its cracked up to be as its your crops that everyone eats.

i suspect you will find this of intrest.http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/reso...ker_J_P_01.pdf

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
Comparing Strategies of the 2d Punic War:
Rome’s Strategic Victory Over the Tactical/Operational Genius, Hannibal Barca
by
LTC James Parker
US Army

http://www.pchs1.com/ecourses/punicwar/romans06.htm

This is also fun in a way.

[Hattushilish]

Lol, if he was that awesome, why not crushed Roman force in Marseilles instead chose to cross Alphine, suffered half of casualty and still had to deal same Roman force??

His strategy was to sever the ties between Rome and its Italian allies.
In order to do this, he needed to campaign in Italy and demonstrate to the Italians who had been subjugated by Rome that he was there to "liberate" them and not conquer them.

Luring Roman armies into battles outside of Italy would have been futile... Rome had a virtually limitless supply of Italian manpower from which it could raise new armies; defeating a Roman army in Gaul or Iberia or Africa or Sicily would have accomplished little.

His failure was that he underestimated the bond between Rome and its Italian subject peoples. Even after years of campaigning in Italy only a handful of them defected to his cause.
Subservience to Rome had its benefits... security, republican government, infrastructure etc. Subservience to Carthage didn't really have a lot of appeal, especially after the damage caused to its reputation from the Mercenary War.

[Cornelius Plautus]

Success by losing half of men before the real war even started.

Such a success, I believe.

Look at the times; a lesser general would have lost more troops than Hannibal. Moreover, that Hannibal was able to defeat well-trained, well-equipped, and well-rested Roman troops -who followed the same tactics that crushed Alexander the Great's Successors' armies- on their home ground with a starving half of an army is an amazing achievement in itself.

Additionally, Roman Corvus Quinquiremes were a dominant force in naval combat: they shifted the rules of naval combat from 'ram into your opponent' to 'get close to your opponent and board their ship'. Every Roman Corvus Quinquireme had a group of elite reserve 'marines' (Triarii) who would storm the enemy ship and rip apart its crew. Additionally, the Romans had all sorts of ranged weapons on their Quinquiremes that the Carthaginians did not.

In short, Roman naval technology kept the Carthaginians away. Hannibal was a smart general, and knew it would be safer -or statistically more favorable- to cross the alps than run against a superior naval force. Ultimately, his decision was a sound one, as it lead to many a crushing victory.

[Lysimachus]

Hannibal didn't plan the whole thing early enough it seems. Wrong time of year, wrong way, not enough diplomatic success on the way. Others passed the alps too, without such problems as he had. His brother for example, the Celts had done so numerous times and so did the Romans many times in later years.

How long did it take him to cross the Alps? If he'd went during the spring or summer wouldn't that have gave him less campaigning time before winter set in? Also, why was Hannibal in such a hurry? Was he eager to work on the promise he made to his father or was pressure being applied on to Carthage and immediate action was a necessity, or...?

A maritime operation is not an option. He would have needed a huge fleet for that. Something he would have had to build and which would have alarmed the Romans even more.

Couldn't he have set off from Carthage with his army, land in Sicily and then cross near Messana with his army? It's not that long a distance so it would reduce the naval threat posed by the Romans by giving them a narrow window of opportunity to react to his movements.

in the campaign seasons immediately following his arrival in italy, hannibal defeated the romans in the field a number of times, secured the allegiance of the greek cities in the south and put himself in the perfect position to accept rome's anticipated capitulation...

He secured the allegiance of a number of cities, both Roman and Greek but he was definitely not in a perfect position to accept a surrender even at his strongest point. He had a huge lack of siege weapons which would have meant any city which didn't just defect to him would had to have been sieged by starving them which would use valuable time from which the Romans could muster another army. Also, at the same time his army would be attriting away which would probably cause him to have to abort his campaign prematurely.

the fact that rome did not capitulate and sue for peace has more to do with their character and hannibal's lack of true understanding of it than it does with anything to do with that march. the march wasn't a failure.. it was a dramatic strategic success which took the romans a decade of hard slog across the mediteranean and many defeats to recover from...

No, it was a military success but a political defeat. You can win as many battles as you want (which Hannibal did) but if there is no way to utilise them then it means nothing. He defeated the Romans many times, but there was no way to capitalise on it because he had a lack of numbers and siege weapons which would have meant that while he could subjugate the countryside there was no way to occupy the major urban centres.

crossing the alps was a risk, and it cost him.. but by bypassing marseilles, he made the romans chase him so that he dictated the terms of the engagement... once he was on their territory, they had no fall back. its about initiative, making your enemy react to your movements, surely you have 'studied' such things?.

So basically, Hannibal didn't have the initiative. The Romans pursued him which required him to react rather than be dictating the situation himself. If he is in Roman territory cut off from supplies and reinforcements, isn't he going to be the one that can't fall back?

[Flavius Nevitta]

Couldn't he have set off from Carthage with his army, land in Sicily and then cross near Messana with his army? It's not that long a distance so it would reduce the naval threat posed by the Romans by giving them a narrow window of opportunity to react to his movements.

You forget that the Romans were watching Carthage. Carthage had no fleet able to transport that many troops AND fight the Roman navy.

So they'd have to start building a fleet, which would provoke an immediate response from Rome.

Next point: How does Hannibal get his troops to Africa first? Either he waits for a fleet to be built (and risks the Romans attacking it) or he marches his army there, which would cost a lot of time.

last point: What would the Carthaginians do? The Barcides faced strong opposition in the Carthaginian senate. I doubt they'd support his (dangerous) fleet building program. Going to Carthage he might even risk falling prey to political intrigues while he could operate freely from Spain which was more or less (inofficial) Barcide private property.

[Antigenes]

The Roman navy wasn't the problem preventing Hannibal from being reinforced. It was virtually impossible for any ancient fleet to closely blockade even small areas (witness the repeated failures of the large Roman fleet in the First Punic War to cover the harbor of even the single port Lilibeo); keeping Punic ships out of all of Italy was a pipe-dream. The Carthaginians demonstrated their ability to penetrate the vaunted Roman fleet's shroud by landing the sizable Ligurian expeditionary force under Mago near the end of the war.