Casualty rates and death slogs

[fishfood]

Hey,
I'm just wondering really about some general dynamics to the game. I'm not sure what is accurate, but to what extent should units suffer casualties before they break? What's historically accurate? 75%?

One more thing: wouldn't most melee contact only last a short while at the very most before the attack fails or the target routs? Units caught in an obvious death slog wouldn't just fight to the death, I wouldn't think. Even if it's just one unit on another I would expect one to rout just out of the recognition of the fact that both units will decimate themselves. Thoughts? I find it somewhat unimmersive when my army gets bogged down in brawls and just fights to the utter last.

Thoughts?

[l33tl4m3r]

My opinion is that all of what you ask depends COMPLETELY on variables not really listed;

Weather? Experience? Training? Equipment? Support? Terrain? Morale? Leadership?

Also, I think it is important to distinguish between casualties and deaths -- part of the recovered casualties in post-battle reflects the deaths vs. the combat ineffective.

All things being equal; I'd say at about 50% combat capable the unit would consider breaking, maybe ~30% for a total rout.

This is for melee or ranged.

This is how I modded ETW in any case.

[fishfood]

Sorry, I'm thinking about 1 on 1 line infantry in the field. As in what the base rout casualty ratio should be before other modifiers take effect. Like pretty much choose a bunch of units from a bunch of different battles, average them, and see at what casualty rate they routed. I'm really just curious. I'd like to think 30% casualties to break/retreat. If you think about the man standing in line and his moral, that's 50% of the soldiers standing next to him in line. Pretty terrifying, I would think.

[l33tl4m3r]

Sorry, I'm thinking about 1 on 1 line infantry in the field. As in what the base rout casualty ratio should be before other modifiers take effect. Like pretty much choose a bunch of units from a bunch of different battles, average them, and see at what casualty rate they routed. I'm really just curious. I'd like to think 30% casualties to break/retreat. If you think about the man standing in line and his moral, that's 50% of the soldiers standing next to him in line. Pretty terrifying, I would think.

Seems like our numbers almost agree, though I might be a little harsh.

Anyone else?

[Didz]

The research I did when considering morale for my wargame rules suggested that overall casualties have little to do with unit reaction. For example, a battalion will stand for hours under long range artillery bombardment without breaking despite taking a steady trickle of losses amounting to a high percentage of its original strength. What seems to be far more important is what I would generally classify as 'the shock effect'.

The shock effect can be caused by the sudden infliction of a high number of casualties e.g. A close range volley of musketry, a whiff of grapeshot, a blast of cannister. The result of which might not be anything as high in overall casualties as that sufferred over a longer period by a unit under artillery fire, but because it is suffered in such a short space of time causes the unit lose cohesion and panic, effectively overwhelming the ability of the unit command team to maintain order and discipline.

However, the shock effect can also kick in without any casualties being caused at all. The classic being the cavalry charge, where a unit with no casualties at all caught exposed and unprepared by cavalry can and did simply fall apart, and even spread the panic to neighbouring units. Other examples, are flank attacks, ambushes, column attacks, and command screw-ups.

Units also become more susceptible to the shock effect if prior to the shock event their overall confidence in their leaders has been reduced by other events. Tolstoy gives a lovely example of how this might occur in his account of the Battle of Austerlitz, describing how the Russian infantry soldiers formed in their columns prior to the battle became gradually less and less confident in the abilities of the Austrian officers commanding the army as they witnessed one cock-up after another unravel around them and the general lack of clear understanding of their orders amongst their own officers.

So, I think there is an arguement for an overall level of confidence/discpline based upon training, command ability, and situation. But the trigger that turns that into panic and rout would usually be a specific single event that tips the unit over the edge.

[43rdFoot]

As Didz says, it really depends on the circumstances of the casualties rather than the casualties themselves. Let's take for example the militia of the Revolutionary War. At Breeds Hill, the militia were able to defend against 2 British attacks, eventually withdrawing after a third for a lack of ammunition. In comparison, militia at Camden broke without firing a shot. The shock of seeing friends routing after being the subject of a British bayonet attack was too much, and left them feeling to exposed. The whole line crumbled after that, except for three regiments of Maryland and Delaware regulars, who held their ground for 3 volleys before withdrawing in confusion.


How this would pertain to creating game mechanics is beyond me.

[Didz]

How this would pertain to creating game mechanics is beyond me.

Strangely enough I found quite an elegant system for handling it on the tabletop, based upon an old Wargame Research Group ruleset.

The whole system was based upon the accumulation of 'flinch points' which were awarded to units for sufferring various 'shock effects'.

At the end of each turn those units with 'Flinch Points' were allowed to trade them off against those earned by nearby enemy units on a 1 for 1 basis. But after all viable trades had been completed any remaining 'flinch points' had to be acted upon.

Each 'Flinch Point' equated to a 30 pace involuntary flinch away from any nearby enemies. So, a unit was required either to fall back 30 paces, or slow its advance by 30 paces for every flinch point it still had after the trade off. The final rule was that if for any reason the unit could not cash in its flinch points by flinching then it had no choice but to disband and fall back in disorder (e.g. Rout).

A simple example of the system in operation.

A trained battalion of infantry deployed in line are under attack by a column of enemy infantry advancing upon them (e.g. a classic column attack). The column is advancing 60 paces per turn and is now within 60 paces of the infantry line and is about to commence its final bayonet charge. [Advancing Columns within 60 paces inflict 2 Flinch Points on any enemy infantry or artillery units to their front, therefore the infantry line has 2 x Flinch Points]

However, the infantry in line have not yet fired and the column is now within effective musketry range. Therefore, if the infantry line can inflict enough casulaties on the advancing column it can neutralise its 2 Flinch point advantage and perhaps cause it to slow its advance and prevent the bayonet charge. [All units suffered 1 FLinch point per turn for every casualty per figure they suffer. A full strength battalion of French Infantry consisted of 36 figures, so every 36 casulaties they suffer in a turn earns them 1 Flinch point.] The infantry in line therefore needs to inflict at least 72 casualties on the column to cancel out the two flinch points it has due to the shock effect of their advance.

If the lne inflicts at least 72 casulaties on the column then the column will be awarded 2 flinch points. The two opposing infantry units will both end the turn with 2 flinch points, which can be traded off producing a null effect.

The infantry line will stand its ground and begin reloading, the column will be able to continue advancing. However, under the rules infantry may not start a baytonet charge against an enemy un it which does not have at least 1 flinch point, and so the column will have no choice but to stop and begin firing back at the line. So, next turn the column will not be advancing and so the defending infantry will no longer suffer the 2 Flinch Points for having a column advancing upon it within 60 paces, and instead will be engaged in a straight fire fight with the column at a disadvantage due to its narrower frontage.

If the defending infantry had failed to inflict 72 casualties on the column, it would have eneded up with at least 1 net flinch point, and the Column would have been allowed to continue to advance to the charge. The rules then stated that infantry charged by enemy infantry must flinch out of charge reach or rout. The defending infantry can only move 20 paces in line and so even with 1 flinch point they cannot move far enough to cash it in and so the column would have charged and the the infantry line routed and fled next turn.

Finally if the infantry line had fired a very effective volley and inflicted at least 108 casualties on the column it would have caused 3 flinch points, which after the trade off would have left the column with 1 net flinch point. This would have immediately caused the column to slow its advance by 30 paces to 30 paces. Meaning that its shock effect next turn would no longer apply as it is no longer advancing 60 paces, but more importantly the infantry line now has the option of using the 1 flinch point as justification for turning the tables on the column and launching its own bayonet charge. If it does so, and the column having flinched 30 paces is still within charge reach it will rout.

It sounds really complicated but in practice it worked really well, and I recall using those little army counters from an old game of risk to keep track of the flinch points awarded to each unit.

In ETW, we already have a concept of unit status [e.g. Steady, Concerned, Shaken, Broken], so it would not be too difficult to introduce a flinch status based upon a units current situation. The tricky bit would be handling trade off's as this usually involved a degree of judgement and common sense, particularly where multiple units were involved. e.g. one battalion in line being attacked by two battalions in column.

[Cholera]

ETW is way too optimistic about the resilience of regiments to casualties, especially if it means to model pre-Napoleonic (i.e. 1700's) warfare which was less "fanatic" and more prone to tactical retreats or surrenders rather than decisive victories. I would argue that about 20-25% wounded and dead, or about 30% including "missing" and captured without the surrender of the regiment, would cause most regiments of the time to rout.

First, from what I've read, the (very general) rule of thumb for casualties among deaths/wounded/missing during that period of line battles, is about 1:3:1, when both forces manage to leave the field. The "missing" include those who are captured, and of course if portions of the army are surrender at the end this portion goes up. But what is fairly constant is that 20-30% of those who were wounded were killed. ETW does not allow for either wounding or surrendering. But even if we assume that everyone who is "killed" on the field in ETW is either actually dead or wounded or "missing"/captured, that is, they are no longer effective soldiers, the percentages I see of 60 or 70% casualties before routs are way too high.

For the Napoleonic wars, if we look at some casualty counts of battles which resulted in the total routing of the losing army, we see a maximum of about 30% casualties before an army completely disintegrates. At Austerlitz the allied army of ~80,000 lost about 15,000 wounded and dead (19%) and 12,000 captured before breaking, or about 34% "casualties". At Waterloo the French army of 72,000 veterans, which included a high % of elite units like the Old Guard that were considered among the best in Europe, lost 25,000 wounded and dead (35%) and 15,000 missing and captured, for a total of 56% "casualties". At Waterloo a significant portion of the French army ended up being shot or surrendered after the whole army was no longer fighting and in retreat/rout, so its casualty % should be considered higher than the upper limit before units "break" and are no longer effective. So somewhere around 40% casualties of all types should be the breaking point for the most experienced and highest morale units, or if we assume only dead and wounded, about 30%. A more "average" army like Burgoyne at Saratoga might surrender completely after suffering about 1/7 dead and wounded (14%) like his did; and for militia and other non-regular soldiers, 10 to 15% dead and wounded could cause a rout.

One of the highest casualty counts I can think of for a victorious regiment before 1900 would be the 20th Maine at the Little Round Top (Gettysburg), which suffered 32% dead and wounded in about an hour of fighting, with no captured soldiers. There's likely examples of higher casualty rates without routs in the US Civil War, but probably not in such a short time.

Of course, the situation changed completely in the 20th century, and especially with the fanaticism of WWII. The German Army at Stalingrad suffered about 75% dead and wounded before surrendering, and some Japanese units literally fought to the death, with 100% dead or incapacitated.

[kosmosje1]

I would actually wonder if infantry regiments are not much more likely to break and reform repeatedly?

e.g. Unit is fired upon, after time receives 20% casualties and routs, but regroups to attack again. They re-engage the other unit and manage to inflict 20% casualties, causing the other unit to rout. Which in turn is relieved by another unit throwing the attacker back.

I think that would make the combat of the game much more authentic, not?

[Didz]

@Kosmosje1

First hand accounts suggest that from the moment action commences battalions begin to bleed men from their ranks and that process continues constantly throughout the action as individuals and groups of men decide to abscond.

The most common excuse was the wounded, and inparticular a wounded officer, who would often be escorted to the rear by in excess of four men and some reports mention eight men helping a single wounded officer.

The only thing preventing this happening on a grander scale was the supernummary ranks of NCO's and Officers stationed behind the men whose job was to catch the skulkers and force them back into the ranks. However, in moments of panic or confusion this line of catchers could easily become overwhelmed and the battalion would lose a huge portion of its strength.

At Waterloo for example it is said that the woods to the rear of the Allied battle line were jam packed with men who had deserted their unit on some pretext or the other and were now waiting safely out of gunshot to find out whether their comrades would win or lose the battle.

The best film I've seen to dramatise this process was 'The Red Badge of Courage' which actually describes the process quite well.

So, battalions certainly did reform after a rout, but the importnat thing to note is that they would be much weaker afterwards because a significant number of men would have used the opportunity as both an excuse and a chance to make themselves scarce.

[CBR]

One of the highest casualty counts I can think of for a victorious regiment before 1900 would be the 20th Maine at the Little Round Top (Gettysburg), which suffered 32% dead and wounded in about an hour of fighting, with no captured soldiers. There's likely examples of higher casualty rates without routs in the US Civil War, but probably not in such a short time.

There are numerous examples really. I'll just mention one which would be Albuera. Two regiments in Hoghton's brigade each took 66% with only 17 missing out of the 764 casualties.


CBR

[Lumina]

Militia rout pretty easily no matter casualties. I think they give all Line and Infantry units a bit too much morale anyways. Milita are perfect almost, kill their general, break a few regiments of milita in a line on normal and sometimes their entire force of milita will start routing one after another then it falls a part completely and then all start routing... sucks when it happens on campaign and they're your milita!! lol

There are numerous examples really. I'll just mention one which would be Albuera. Two regiments in Hoghton's brigade each took 66% with only 17 missing out of the 764 casualties.


CBR

Some Regiments during the American Civil War took well over 50% casualties without retreating it wasn't un common during the American Civil War to have a Regiment of 1000+ men be reduced to around 200 in just a battle or two.

[Cholera]

Militia rout pretty easily no matter casualties. I think they give all Line and Infantry units a bit too much morale anyways. Milita are perfect almost, kill their general, break a few regiments of milita in a line on normal and sometimes their entire force of milita will start routing one after another then it falls a part completely and then all start routing... sucks when it happens on campaign and they're your milita!! lol


Some Regiments during the American Civil War took well over 50% casualties without retreating it wasn't un common during the American Civil War to have a Regiment of 1000+ men be reduced to around 200 in just a battle or two.

I agree there were many very understrength regiments during the CW, but that developed over months of combat, disease, and desertions, not during one intense battle like in the game. I doubt you can find more than 2-3 regiments that took 50% wounded and killed in ONE fight and didn't rout or retreat, but instead "stood its ground" like the experienced regiments can do in ETW. Some may have retreated and them formed up again, but that's different since it allows a break, evacuating wounded, and reforming the firing line.

The 32% wounded/deadof the 20th Maine is one of the highest of a CW regiment that "stood its ground" in one fight. Another example would be "Charge of the Light Brigade", certainly considered a heroic if stupid charge by a group of high-morale cavalry, but despite its elan the unit broke and routed after just a few minutes. It took a total of 278 W/D out of 673, which is 41% of its total strength, during the entire battle. Since it had to retreat back the same way it came and was shot at the entire time, it must have started the rout at about 30-35% casualties.

The line battles of that time really required some kind of insane determination to stand in packed formation after just a few minutes of face to face slaughter. BUT there was also relative safety just a few hundred yards away, so running made "sense" to a shaken soldier. Later on, say in WWII, the battles were so fluid that the rear was just as dangerous, and also the dispersion factor may have made soldiers feel safer even if they weren't actually safer, so I think that's why you see much higher casualty % before units surrendered or ran. Better training and more fanaticism may also have something to do with it, like for the Japanese in the Pacific or the Russians in Stalingrad, etc.

[british_general]

Naepolean's guard loves fighting to the death, and have you heard of fanatic fighters?

[l33tl4m3r]

Naepolean's guard loves fighting to the death, and have you heard of fanatic fighters?

Hilarious, I was JUST reading about them!

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