Your Favorite Military Theorist

[ELITEOFKINGWARMAN8]

Who is your favorite Military Theorist?

Sun-Tzu And Baron Antoine Henri De Jomini and Clausewitz, but mostly the first two for me.

[Brain_in_a_vat]

Hmm... probably Sun Tzu.

[Katsumoto]

Sun Tzu all the way brother.

[Adar]

I voted other due to my fascination with Erik XIV of Sweden. He had some very interesting ideas regarding infantry warfare during the 16th century but suffered from severe schizophrenia and got dethroned before the reforms could be implemented. I think they could have worked very well and the "what if" factor makes the matter highly fascinating to me.

When it comes to "the best" I think that either Clausewitz for his conceptual understanding of the military-political relationship or Marius Gaius/Gustav II Adolf/Tzar Peter I/Guderian/Napoleon/Petain (pre WW1) for understanding how new weapons and organizations could be used to change the way wars are fought.

[Farnan]

Other. David Galula.

[Spartacus the Irish]

Other. David Galula.

Definitely man. Read his 'Pacification en Algerie' (translated, I suck at French) and Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice' in my Counterinsurgency module last year, and both my essays revolved around Algeria as a case study and specifically his views, methods and criticisms of the COIN strategy there. Got two low A's, and most of that was simply because Galula gives you so very much good stuff to work from. Wish I'd thought of him before plumping for Machiavelli.

Am I right in thinking that the Americans are turning to Galula for help in their COIN doctrine? As far as I know, they're sick to their back teeth of the Brits spouting off about Northern Ireland and Malaya, and thus are searching elsewhere for doctrine.

EDIT:

No option of Che Guevara? No-one ever read Guerilla Warfare?

As far as I know, he was a failed revolutionary. Bolivia didn't exactly work, did it? I suppose that doesn't make his writings useless, not at all, but it isn't exactly ringing endorsement.

EDITx2:

I am not sure if Machiavelli deserves to be on this list. Certainly both Discorsi and Principe have some passages dealing with warfare and military, in particular the desired reformation of the militia, but his works are mostly of political nature.

"When whole communities go to war...the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy."
- Clausewitz, On War, Pg. 28.

I don't even need to resort to the most famous Clausewitz quote; "Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln", which I take to translate to "War is merely the continuation of politics were the admixture of other means" (There is still debate due to Clausewitz's lovable habit of arguing dialectically, the little scamp .

War is inextricable from politics and policy; thus to try and remove someone from such a poll because they argue more 'politically' seems a little short-sighted to me.

EDITx3:
The lengths I go to, to not double post...

[Barry Ferguson]

As far as I know, he was a failed revolutionary. Bolivia didn't exactly work, did it? I suppose that doesn't make his writings useless, not at all, but it isn't exactly ringing endorsement.

But Cuba was a roaring success. It's also much more a practical manual than anything else

[Spartacus the Irish]

But Cuba was a roaring success. It's also much more a practical manual than anything else

How much of Cuba can be put down to Che, however? This isn't a rhetorical question, I actually don't know. I suppose that is the problem when dealing with Revolutionary/Insurgency warfare. It's so individual and hangs upon the myriad variances of each situation - no two revolutionary wars/insurgencies are the same, so there can be no central theory other than a frankly quite useless broad outline. The devil is in the detail, and what may work in one situation will not in another.

EDIT: Oh, and cheers for the reply Farnan. I supposed as much, it's nice to have my wild, meandering thoughts confirmed.

[konny]

War is inextricable from politics and policy; thus to try and remove someone from such a poll because they argue more 'politically' seems a little short-sighted to me.

Have you actually read Machiavelli? If so, why don't you give us some examples of his revolutionary military theories instead of quoting phrases from Clausewitz?

[Spartacus the Irish]

Have you actually read Machiavelli? If so, why don't you give us some examples of his revolutionary military theories instead of quoting phrases from Clausewitz?

Apparently you have not read anything at all, including my previous post. Machiavelli wasn't a strictly conventional military theorist, as you seem to be fixated upon. He didn't give the best trajectory for bombarding a wall, nor the most efficient method of concentrating against your enemy.

Yet you have somehow managed to be correct (unintentionally, I may add), in that he did have some revolutionary theories.

The first being the importance of citizen armies or militias over the armies of mercenaries (the vast majority of armies during the time of Machiavelli's life were mercenary, and for a good deal after; the Thirty Years War being a case in point. And these mercenary armies were villified for their poor performances). His reasoning was twofold. Firstly, that armies raised from the area or town being attacked have a stake in the outcome of the battle, they would be fighting to protect their homes, families and livliehood, and thus would be far more inclined to stay and fight, and far less susceptible to bribes. Following on from this was the fact that such 'permenant armies' (permenant in terms of staying in one area for a long time, i.e. living there, rather than going wherever the money is a la mercenaries) could therefore be trained and equipped, and eventually instilled with a certain amount of discipline and professionalism - Machiavelli looked to the performance of the Roman Empire and Roman Army for his ideas. Perhaps thus they were not particularly new, but they definitely needed to be retold.

Machiavelli stated that the characteristics of the state define and shape the characteristics of the army - this is why he sought to improve the state. The Roman Army was strong because at its height, it extolled the very best aspects of Roman culture - discipline, citizenship, and reward for effort and loyalty. And its nadir, the Army reflected the corruption, greed, and moral bankruptcy of said Empire.

Centuries before Napoleon stated he would rather have a lucky general than a good general, Machiavelli noted that Leadership and Luck are key aspects, and at times each are as important as the other, because he also noted that both can run out, especially the latter (which Napoleon did not take heed of).

He said that war should be fought as ruthlessly as possible, whilst still ensuring victory. The latter point is important, and still has echoes in the modern world - military leaders, especially in the realm of MAD and the threat of retaliation, have to prosecute wars up to a point. It would have been no good, for example, MacArthur or Ridgeway using chemical or nuclear weapons against the Chinese in the Korean War, then waking up to find Russian bombers over Japan and America. A little anachronistic example perhaps, but it suffices to extrude Machiavelli's words into a relatively contemporary situation.

Basically, most of Machiavelli's works seem at first glance by the uninitiated to be solely political; but politics is comprehensively intertwined with warfare, and often their conduct is the same. For example, Machiavelli states that as a leader you should try to be both feared and loved, if possible; but if that is not possible, it is better to be feared. He states this because fear is easier to control than love; it is far easier to make someone fear you than love you, and far harder to overcome fear than to lose love. Now translate this to war. Montgomery was adored by British troops following his North Africa campaign, for he had brought them victory, visited them, talked to them (this was not something British commanders did); but the casualties of the Normandy and Holland Campaigns dulled this love somewhat. Patton was both feared and loved by his men; they loved his eccentricities and his attitude, and were afraid of the same, afraid they could not live up to his high expectations (although he actually have quite low expectations of the individual US soldier later in the war, with good reason).

Machiavelli noted that in politics it was essential to unseat an opponent from an unexpected direction, be it fraud, murder, subterfuge, blackmail, bribery, any number of things. He expanded this into, of all things, town fortification defence; 'Our first care is to make our walls crooked and retort, with several vaults and places of receipt, that if the Enemy tries to approach, he may be opposed and repulsed as well as in the flank as in the front.' Basically meaning that town defences should not consist of straight walls, but rather more angular and deep defences, with places to barrack units and positions to fire from, so that fire, and counterattacks, may be made upon the flank of the enemy attempting to force their way through the breached walls. This point actually led the 'bastioned trace' being formed in towns throughout Europe, of mutally supporting bastions projecting from the wall to give fire upon any attempted enemy assault.

I trust this small selection will suffice to quiet your rather accusative tone.

[hellheaven1987]

The first being the importance of citizen armies or militias over the armies of mercenaries (the vast majority of armies during the time of Machiavelli's life were mercenary, and for a good deal after; the Thirty Years War being a case in point. And these mercenary armies were villified for their poor performances).

Machiavelli did not know Thirty Years War, he just used what he saw from Italy to explain warfare.

Besides, the poor performance of mercenary during Thirty Years War was largely because the failure of logistic (and fail very badly) rather than the issue of mercenary morality; the fact that mercenaries could perform as well as others when they were properly feed and equiped had proved soudly in that war.

[konny]

The first being the importance of citizen armies or militias over the armies of mercenaries

And the second one is?

It is commonly known that Machiavelli wanted to have the military ("his" militia) reformed according to the model of the classical Roman army. But with this he was one out of hundreds in a line from Vegetius well into the 17th Century.

This was neither unique, nor was it desirable: Machiavelli was not writing for a rather large but poor state, like for example Sweden or Brandenburg, that would have been able to benefit form changing the army from mercenary to conscript, but for an Italian city state. Those city states in fact got their political meaning in the late Middle Ages and early Modern Times from the point that military strength (in their periode) meant nothing but money. When, with the advent of the standing armies, this also included manpower and access to ressources, look what happened to the independence of the Italian city states!



Everything else Machiavelli wrote was meant to be political. Even when refering to (seemingly) military historical topics, like his long excurse on how the Macedons shifted around conquered populations, and stuff like that. A military commander might draft inspirations out of that for his own leadership, but that does not make Machiavelli a military theorist. The same commander might also get his inspiration out of the Bible, without us adding Jesus to the above list? A theory cannot be called "military" if it has to be adopted to warfare before.

I trust this small selection will suffice to quiet your rather accusative tone.

Accusative tone? You considered me narrow-sigthed, uninitiated and not having read anything at all. Usually I am polite, but sometimes the echo is like the sound.

[Katsumoto]

So much of Sun Tzu's theories still apply to convential warfare today, 2500 years after it was written. I'd say that's pretty impressive.

[il padrino]

machiavelli ftw

[Old_Scratch]

I find Sun Tzu's The Art of War to be a little too simplistic. It's a good primer but it doesn't paint a broader picture of strategy like Musashi does in A Book of Five Rings. Also, I really like Machiavelli's The Prince. It covers a lot of interesting topics concerning the ruling of a nation.

[bushbush]

I find Sun Tzu's The Art of War to be a little too simplistic. It's a good primer but it doesn't paint a broader picture of strategy like Musashi does in A Book of Five Rings. Also, I really like Machiavelli's The Prince. It covers a lot of interesting topics concerning the ruling of a nation.

no it's not really simplistic, but it does hold many universal truth that still dominate the politics and wars of today. More importantly, art of war itself is an attempt to look at military strategy at philosophical level, there are a lot of meaningful lessons not easily understood unless you are very familiar with other eastern philosophical works. I recommend reading the annotations by generations of chinese generals and scholars written for the art of war.

[Katsumoto]

That's the whole point, it's vague but relevant to so much of warfare.

[Old_Scratch]

That's the whole point, it's vague but relevant to so much of warfare.

It's actually not really vague at all. It's pretty specific about the topic. That's why I find it simplistic. Compare it to A Book of Five Rings, which is a book that is purposefully vague and unspecific in order to cover the entire spectrum of strategy and it's fundamentals. It's set in the context of swordplay but Musashi also makes it clear that the principles can be applied to anything and compares it's principles to architects building a house.

[konny]

I am not sure if Machiavelli deserves to be on this list. Certainly both Discorsi and Principe have some passages dealing with warfare and military, in particular the desired reformation of the militia, but his works are mostly of political nature. I would replace him with Lazare Carnot or Frederic the Great (who also was very productive on the theoretical level).

[hellheaven1987]

Liddell Hart for deep strategical operation + elastic defence + small unit infantry tactic + APC operation.

J.F.C. Fuller for bliztkrieg.