D'Erlon's Attack formation at Waterloo

In his book on the battle of Waterloo Barbero states that following a discussion over breakfast D'Erlon settled on a slightly unconventional formation for his Corps when it attacked the Allied Left flank.

Instead of each brigade being formed in assault columns and advancing side by side, Barbero states that the decision was made that each battalion in the brigade would advance in line, one behind the other with an interval of five or six paces between each battalion line.

Barbaro, doesn't say what his source is for this statement, but I assume that someone must have written about it in their memiores. But one thing that puzzled me about it, is that even assuming he is correct, the advantages he claims the French expected from this novel formation don't make a lot of sense, and the disadvantages seem pretty serious.

According to Barbero, this formation was chosen because D'Erlon was familiar with the tactic's of the British infantry and therefore doubted the ability of his men to form line from column whilst under fire from British musketry. Instead the idea was that as the leading battalion was already in line, it would be able to bring all its muskets to bear without needing to change formation.

This sounds sensible, except of course that although a French battalion in line might be able to bring just over 300 muskets to bear over a frontage of 100 yards. It also means that the remaining 900 muskets are still masked by the leading battalion. If instead the French had advanced in four Columns of Division side by side the result would have been four divisions (8 peletons - 650 men) of troops able to present 430 muskets to the enemy.

More importantly each assault column would have been able tactically to feed replacements forward to the firing line from its 2nd and 3rd divisions, whereas a battalion in line would only have been able to use its third rank to replace casualties.

And more important still four assault columns would have been able to form square or deploy to a flank if threatened by cavalry or flank atack, whereas four lines jammed together with hardly any interval are incapable of doing anything except move forward or backwards.

Has anyone read any other evidence of this formation being used, or knows where the information originated, and if so is there a more plausible explanation for D'Erlon's decision?

David Chandler in his Campaigns of Napoleon (1966) also states that d'Erlon adopted colonnes de division par bataillon for the divisions of Quiot, Donzelot and Marcognet (Durutte use battalion columns). Chandler refers to this as an outdated formation and a tactical blunder.

However I do recall reading elsewhere that it was prompted by d'Erlon's experiences against the British in Spain (Napoleon had selected both Reille and d'Erlon because they had fought Wellington before).

In Spain, French battalion columns had usually failed against the British two-rank line because its length allowed it to partially enfilade the advancing column.

British volleys were often so effective that a French battalion was unable to complete its deployment into a firing line. The flanking British companies sometimes angled inward to achieve raking fire.

Ironically the British didn't use the two-rank line much at Waterloo due to the constricted nature of their position. They used mostly four-rank line or square.

d'Erlon's formation would allow his men to engage in a musket duel without having to deploy first. It might possibly have worked on the flat, but unfortunately there was a thick hedge running along the road along the ridge that Picton was defending. Only battalion columns were ever going to negotiate that without becoming completely disordered.

After Bylandt's brigade broke, Picton managed to halt the French attack with Pack and Kempt's brigades, but it was the British heavy cavalry that broke it - because division-sized columns couldn't form square and there wasn't enough French cavalry support (just Travers' Curassier brigade).

Originally Posted by Didz

More importantly each assault column would have been able tactically to feed replacements forward to the firing line from its 2nd and 3rd divisions, whereas a battalion in line would only have been able to use its third rank to replace casualties.

But that is not what they did. They were always meant to be separate and it would totally screw up any organisation if soldiers from the rear companies were meant to be sent forward to help the front division. IIRC B.P Hughes in Firepower assumes the columns acted as something like a 9 rank line but I wonder where he is getting that idea from.

I can't remember if there are any sources saying the French brigades were supposed to be that compressed from the beginning. But the disorder from the advance and fighting could have meant they ended up in an unwieldy mass.

Having four columns by division formed up side by side would AFAIK be unprecedented and leave the brigades with no reserves at all. If D'Erlon had meant the individual battalions to have some distance between them it makes somewhat sense: being in line, the battalions would not be juicy targets for allied artillery and if needed the rearward battalions could have done a quick lateral shift by wheeling individual companies and march outward in column.

It might possibly have worked on the flat, but unfortunately there was a thick hedge running along the road along the ridge that Picton was defending. Only battalion columns were ever going to negotiate that without becoming completely disordered.

It would not have mattered much being in column as they would still need time to deploy afterwards. The main advantage of a column is that it can bypass/avoid smaller obstacles a lot quicker. But a wide hedge with only two companies at a time struggling to go through...no advantage there.


CBR

Originally Posted by CBR

But that is not what they did. They were always meant to be separate and it would totally screw up any organisation if soldiers from the rear companies were meant to be sent forward to help the front division. IIRC B.P Hughes in Firepower assumes the columns acted as something like a 9 rank line but I wonder where he is getting that idea from.

I was asumming that the French battalion operated in a similar fashion to the British, where once the third rank had been expended to replace the casualties within a platoon its strength would be maintained by transferring men from other platoons within the same battalion.

So, in Column of Divisions the lead division would maintain its frontage by drawing on its own third rank, and this is in turn would be replenished by moving men forward from the following divisions of the same battalion. That would have explain the nine rank of supports Hughes describes, but would not have been possible if the supporting ranks were from different battalions.

Whatever, the perceived advantages were that D'Erlon hoped for its seems pretty certain that forming square in this formation would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, and could explain why the French infantry paniced so quickly when the British cavalry appeared.

Originally Posted by Didz

I was asumming that the French battalion operated in a similar fashion to the British, where once the third rank had been expended to replace the casualties within a platoon its strength would be maintained by transferring men from other platoons within the same battalion.

One could shift troops from one company/platoon to another to make up for losses but hardly in the middle of a chaotic firefight?

There are English accounts speaking of French columns trying to deploy under fire but the French rear companies running back to cover behind the lead division. I think even Napoleon himself described how the lead division should start firing right away while the other companies deployed. It was never meant to act as thick 9 or 12 rank firing line. And it would be a bad use of numbers, as columns AFAIK always operated with enough distance to the other columns so it could deploy.

Yes as they were so compressed it was impossible for them to deploy into square if needed. It seems some of the British cavalry simply walked into a dense mass of confused infantry who did not know what happened until the cavalry was among them. The result was total chaos and a quick collapse.

D'Erlon might not have considered a threat from cavalry. Although I'd consider that a big blunder for such an experienced officer. I cannot make sense of using such a dense formation unless it was actually meant to have deeper intervals between the battalions. Then lack of experience in using such a formation, coupled with terrain and combat slowing down the lead units, turned it into a dense mass.

Could he really have expected that they could have kept the short intervals? He engaged all his brigades so the only reserves would be what the individual brigades had. That just sounds extremely risky unless the brigades could be expected to handle it by themselves. That requires room for the rear battalions IMO.


CBR

Originally Posted by CBR

One could shift troops from one company/platoon to another to make up for losses but hardly in the middle of a chaotic firefight?

In British battalions that was the primary role of the file closers, and I would have thought the French would have a similar arrangement. The importance being, not just to maintain the units firepower, but more importantly to make sure that the individual platoons maintained a reasonably uniform frontage so that the tactical integrity of the battalion was not compromised by an uneven distribution of losses.

I can certainly imagine that as the file closers (or their French equivalents) noticed that third rank of the lead division becoming thin they would simply have told off (assigned) men from the supporting platoons to replace the losses.

Originally Posted by CBR

There are English accounts speaking of French columns trying to deploy under fire but the French rear companies running back to cover behind the lead division. I think even Napoleon himself described how the lead division should start firing right away while the other companies deployed. It was never meant to act as thick 9 or 12 rank firing line. And it would be a bad use of numbers, as columns AFAIK always operated with enough distance to the other columns so it could deploy.

According to Nafiger, the French abandoned controlled infantry fire in 1791, after which the men of the first two ranks simply fired voluntarily as fast as they could. It was found that this freedom to fire without waiting for formal commands more than comprensated for the loss of the firepower from the third rank which were no longer able to contribute.

The problem was as you not that the freedom did result in French infantry opening fire spontaneously without waiting for orders, and it was often difficult for their officers to get them to stop and continue advancing.

Originally Posted by CBR

D'Erlon might not have considered a threat from cavalry. Although I'd consider that a big blunder for such an experienced officer. I cannot make sense of using such a dense formation unless it was actually meant to have deeper intervals between the battalions. Then lack of experience in using such a formation, coupled with terrain and combat slowing down the lead units, turned it into a dense mass.

Could he really have expected that they could have kept the short intervals? He engaged all his brigades so the only reserves would be what the individual brigades had. That just sounds extremely risky unless the brigades could be expected to handle it by themselves. That requires room for the rear battalions IMO.

It does seem remarkably short sighted for such an expereinced officer, but it does explain some of the events that followed.


CBR[/QUOTE]

Well Mark Adkin in the "Waterloo Companion" says that D'Erlon's corps began the advance in line formation.
He attributes the decision to a meeting before noon between Ney, Soult, Reille, d'Erlon, Lobau and Drouot. He believes Soult, Reille and d'Erlon's experience in Spain versus the British led to the use of this unusual formation so that no time would be lost in deploying from column to line and potentially getting thumped by a British volley whilst doing so.

Cavalry remained a threat but should be possible to deal with if these massive columns halted and the rear battalion turned about and the men on the flanks faced outwards; it really was a different version of a closed square. With cannon fire the generals may have reasoned, with some justification, that this formation was no more vulnerable than battalion columns.

Sometimes this forum is so frustrating.I spend half an hour commenting on this French account and then before I can post , it tells me to refresh,log in again ,do not have permission etc
http://www.1789-1815.com/wat_col_1corps.htm

Anyway to cut a long story short , Jomini hints at a possible reason for the ridiculous and almost unbelievable order to form in divisional columns as a confusion in interpreting Napoleon's order to form 'colonnes de divisions',which at least in the French army had a double meaning.A four regiment column formation,which was applied here,but also a smaller battalion level meaning of division into two pelotons. Jomini doesnt mention what this possible 2 pelotons formation could have meant.
Many French writers have commented in letters or later accounts on d'Erlon's formations as being the main cause of the French failure.At first after the battle little comment , possibly for fear of hurting Napoleon's reputation but later a general assumption that Napoleon gave the order (the formation of which may have been misunderstood as Jomini hints). Thiers however gives responsibility to Ney or d'Erlon for the formations adopted by 1st Corps which allowed further discussion by some writers as Napoleon himself might not have been to blame.
Another thread on this forum comments btw that Napoleon made 3 contradictory accounts of Waterloo,apparently attempting to pass the blame to his subordinates and blatantly lying about his troop dispositions,eg Lobau's corps.These lies have been repeated by historians accepting them as truth.
http://www.1789-1815.com/wat_verite.htm

Despite all the criticism of the stacked lines formation, it did have some success. It gave Marcognet a musketry advantage over Pack, whose battalions had to fight in column. Also, Donzelot and Bourgeois were able to exchange fire with Kempt's brigade straight from march (which was the whole idea of the formation).

It seems to me that the problem was lack of reserves. I think the columns would have been equally effective at brigade size rather than whole divisions, so Donzelot and Marcognet could each have kept a brigade in support, able to deploy according to circumstance.

Well Scmitz was in donzelot's division and it seems most historians agree that Quiot attacked La Haie Sainte, so Charlet led the attack.

This is how Adkin has it (left to right)

Brigade: Charlet(Quiot) 4 battalions
Brigade: Bourgeois(Quiot) 4 bns
Division: Donzelot 9 bns
Division: Marcognet 8bns
Brigade: Pegot(Durutte) 4bns
Brigade: Brue(Durutte) 4bns

Sorry, Didz. Tell you what. If we ever play a remote round of Wellington's Victory, you can start Quiot's dudes anywhere you want!

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Sorry, Didz. Tell you what. If we ever play a remote round of Wellington's Victory, you can start Quiot's dudes anywhere you want!

Lol! in that case I'll either start them in line 30 paces behind Wellington, or perhaps in the city centre of Brussell's. Hmm! or maybe in the reception hall at Buckingham Palace.

My apologies for resurrecting this, but I just couldn't resist now that CA have officially confirmed the correctness of Didz's theory that Donzelot's division was on the left of d'Erlon's attack at Waterloo.

Observe...

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

I wonder what their map source is.

Sadly, they failed to notice that Alix was indisposed that day.

Oh, and I also found another source over at archive.org, the full text of Quatre-Bras, Ligny and Waterloo; a narrative of the campaign in Belgium, 1815 by Dorsey Gardner in 1882

here (the text in the quote seems to have been obtained via OCR, hence the typos)

BATTLE OF WATERLOO SECOND ATTACK. 239

in their order from left to right were to share in the Battle of
attack in this manner (a) Koussel's division of Keller-
mann's cuirassiers to support the infantry on its right
and attack the troops about La Haye Sainte and the
Allied centre beyond it ; (b) Bachelu's division of Eeille's
corps to occupy the central elevation in the valley,
protecting the batteries mounted thereon, holding the
Charleroi road, supporting the attack upon La Haye
Sainte, and connecting D'Erlon's corps with Reille's ;
(c) the left brigade of Donzelot's division to cross to the
western side of the Charleroi road (into the front of
Bachelu's division) and take La Haye Sainte ; (d, <?,/)
the right brigade of Donzelot's division and the entire
divisions of Alix 151 and Marcognet to crush the infantry
of the Allied left wing, take Mont St. Jean, and hold
the Brussels road ; (g) the left brigade of Durutte's
division to support Marcognet and preserve the
connection with (h) Durutte's right brigade, which
was to take Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain ; and
finally, of the cavalry of the right wing, Jaquinot's
light horse on the right flank and Milhaud's cuirassiers
in the second line were to support the infantry as
occasion might require. The relative positions of the
troops of both armies, as they actually encountered one
another, may be best understood from a diagram. 152

Well there are maps of the initial deployments at Waterloo which do show Donzelots Division on the left of D'Erlon's Corps, although they are not as common as the ones showing Alix in that position. So, I guess it depends which one CA happened to use.

Even so it still doesn't prove that Donzelot, and not Quiot was attacking La Haye Sainte. What we really need is some primary evidence either a) that the Inniskillings charged Quiots Brigade, which would mean they must have been in the centre, or b) that Baring's defenders at the farm were attacked by at least one of Donzelots regiments.

On page 239 Gardiner clearly states that Donzelots Division were to attack La Haye Sainte, and that the Inniskillings charged Quiots Brigade. He also claims that the mysterious phantom column mentioned by Cole's men near the crossroads was the right hand brigade of Donzelots Division, which would make sense if his left brigade was attacking La Haye Sainte.

But he doesn't say what evidence he has to support this, which is frustrating to say the least.

Nice information though.