All of us in the military knew, and made clear, that this would be a long, hard summer for our people in
Afghanistan; that they faced a resilient and determined enemy who would make every effort to disrupt our work to support the development of effective governance in Helmand province. It was clear to us that the Taliban had identified Helmand and Kandahar as their vital ground, and that they would throw everything into the struggle there. That's why the International Security Assistance Force,
Isaf, responded by increasing its own force levels in the region, deploying elements of the US Marine Corps.
Nor do we gain any satisfaction from the accuracy of our prediction, because the consequence is a price that our people have paid in blood.
There has been much debate about the rationale for our engagement in Afghanistan. I see it in fairly straightforward terms. We face extremist Islamist groups who pursue a campaign of global terrorist violence in order to further their ideological ends. These groups pose a direct threat to the UK, its citizens and their interests, so must be countered. But we cannot counter them effectively by taking them on one by one. We have to help foster an environment in which it is much harder for them to thrive and operate. And as part of that effort, we need to reduce the ungoverned spaces that harbour such groups, and from which they mount their campaigns.
Governance, of course, is a political activity. So our military purpose has been to create the time and space within which political solutions, local as much as national, can be forged. Where we are providing the requisite degree of security, real governance is starting to emerge; evidence that the strategy, when properly resourced, is working.
What about resources? We certainly require more boots on the ground, but they really need to be Afghan boots. The extent to which Nato nations might have to do more in the interim is something that the new Isaf commander, General McChrystal, is reviewing. But in terms of numbers, it is the Afghans who are of strategic importance in the longer term, not Nato.
Equipment is a subject that has generated much debate, some of it well informed, some of it not. Our equipment is good and improving; commanders speak of it very highly. But the enemy adapt their tactics and techniques to counter our capabilities, so what is "the right equipment" in a campaign changes, and often very quickly.
I believe that what we're doing in Afghanistan is of strategic importance to the UK; I believe that, although very difficult, it is possible. I believe that the strategy is the right one, although I think that General McChrystal will have some important things to say about what is required to implement the strategy effectively. But I do not think the outcome is a foregone conclusion.
I see two major threats to our strategic success. The first is national and international will: do we have the staying power and strategic patience to see through such a long-term endeavour in the face of the short-term vagaries of tactical fortune? The second is Afghan delivery. We can only hold the ring for so long; following the elections, early Afghan progress on things like security sector reform, rule of law, economic development and reintegration of reformed insurgents – all critical to governance – is essential.
Our military are withstanding hardship, danger and loss with
steadfast determination. They look to us to seize the opportunities they've created; to deliver on the issues of will, commitment and Afghan political progress that are now crucial to success. We owe them and their families no less.
General Sir Jock Stirrup: UK armed forces chief of staff
Originally Posted by General Sir Jock Stirrup
All of us in the military knew, and made clear, that this would be a long, hard summer for our people in Afghanistan; that they faced a resilient and determined enemy who would make every effort to disrupt our work to support the development of effective governance in Helmand province. It was clear to us that the Taliban had identified Helmand and Kandahar as their vital ground, and that they would throw everything into the struggle there. That's why the International Security Assistance Force, Isaf, responded by increasing its own force levels in the region, deploying elements of the US Marine Corps.
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ing straws..early progress? its been 8 bloody years for christs sake, how many even bother to vote? 5,10% at most? and honestly who can blame them for not being bothered to vote for druglords and corrupt 'leaders' that control barely half the fecking country anyway.
