Napoleon's First Invasion of Italy

[Tiberius Tosi]

Preface

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

One of the six variations of the infamous
painting Napoleon Crossing the Alps by
Jacques-Louis David. This painting was
actually about the 1800 campaign in Italy
by Napoleon.

Napoleon's invasion (or more appropriately, his campaign) in Italy in 1796 is one that is often overshadowed by his more splendid campaigns later in his career or the more scenic campaign in Egypt, or is often confused with his 1800 campaign in Italy, in which Jacques-Louis David famously and innacurately painted the infamous painting of Napoleon crossing the Alps on horseback through the Great St. Bernard Pass. While the Italian campaign was relatively small compared to the increasing size of campaigns in Napoleon's later career, it forshadowed Napoleon's ability as a leader, the effect the Revolutionary Army was having on the changing face of warfare, and it gave rise to Napoleon as a potentially powerful and dangerous political figure.
Although this article on Napoleon's invasion of Italy will mostly focus on the military aspects of the campaign, I will have to go in to a fair amount of the political background to the campaign as well as Napoleon's background (which could easily have an entire article devoted all to itself), so as to give the reader a sense of why Napoleon conducted the campaign in the manner in which he did. Once I begin the on the actual campaign, I will keep the political aspect of the war to as bare minimum as possible.
Since the Italian campaign was Napoleon's first real command position in a major war, I will note many parallels between his actions in Italy and how it affected the way he commanded his armies throughout the rest of his career. As Napoleon himself claimed, "I have fought sixty battles and have learned nothing which I did not know at the beginning". I will not attempt to answer the question of rather this statement is true or not, as I feel my answer would be far to bias towards one side, but I will present the facts so as to let you, the reader, decide if his strategies in Italy truly were carried out in the same manner as they were in his later career. While it most certainly had an impact on his later strategy, the question over rather or not his method of carrying out war changed is an open debate.
For those of you who have read part of, or even looked at my article on Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, you know that I am extremely long winded and like to make things almost needlessly long. I will attempt to not do this on this article, as the material is, in my opinion, neither as fascinating by itself or as detailed in history in general as that of the infamous Russian campaign.

Part I Introduction

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

A map showing the general campaigin in Italy in 1796-1797.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

A map showing the overall strategic situation in 1796 (Note the map is mislabeled as 1812, but it is indeed of 1796)

Napoleon di Buonaparte


A young Napoleon di Buonaparte

Napoleon Bonaparte was born Napoleon di Buonaparte on 15 August 1769 in French controlled Ajaccio, Corsica into an Italian family who had recently been relocated to Corsica and settled amongst the upper class. Napoleon was the second surviving son of eight children (five died in childbirth), five of whom where male. At the age of nine, through a family connection with General de Marboeuf, Napoleon was admitted and enrolled in the Royal School of Brienne in 1779.
Napoleon could be described as somewhat of an outcast at Brienne. Most students enrolled in the school were of French nobility, or at the least had many connections to the French and spoke fluent French. The young di Buonaparte, on the other hand, struggled with his French, and carried a heavy Corsican accent, which was commonly the cause of many fight Napoleon go into at his days in Brienne. This loneliness may have actually been the root of his success later in life, however, as Napoleon spent most of his days reading countless books alone. Di Buonaparte was a staunch Corsican nationalist in his younger days, and idolized Pasquale Paoli, the famous Corsican rebel.
Napoleon did show exceptional leadership ability from a young age, as one may expect. As time went on at Brienne and students lessened their attacks on Napoleon, he gained popularity amongst the students from the mockery the instructors gave him. Napoleon's leadership was famously shown in a supposed snowball fight he lead, in which he conducted the fight like a war and defeating the older students.
In 1783, Napoleon graduated from Brienne, and interestingly his instructor wrote that di Buonaparte would make a great sailor once entering the outside world. It is interesting to think how good or bad of a sailor Napoleon may have been had he pursued his instructors recommendation. Instead, however, Napoleon chose to go into the artillery. His mathematical ability and the fact that it was easier for those of lower social status to rise through the rank was most likely the reasoning for Napoleon's choice.
At the age of just 15, Napoleon left for Paris in 1784 to attend the Ecole Militaire, to earn his officer rank. In the spring of 1785, Napoleon's father died, and Napoleon from then on had to live in a state of poverty, supposedly eating only once a day and constantly being tired. Napoleon graduated 42nd (hardly a spectacular position) in his class in August 1785, and was commissioned and arrived with his unit in November.
While the early years of Napoleon's career are long and detailed, I will just give an overview, as it is not terribly important to the Italian campaign. Napoleon took his position as second lieutenant, but he constantly requested leave with full pay, and spent much of his time back in Corsica rather than with the Army. Napoleon was discharged from the army in 1792, after he lost favor with the French government. In July 1793, Napoleon wrote the Le Souper de Beaucaire, which gained him favor in the French government again, and he was appointed to be the commander of artillery at the Siege of Toulon. French Royalists had turned the city over the Britain, and Napoleon formulated a plan to capture strategic hills that gave the artillery a crossfire over the harbor at Toulon. Once Napoleon's plan was set into action and carried out, the British force left Toulon, and Napoleon was promoted to Brigadier General.
Napoleon was assigned to the Army of Italy, and there he formulated a plan of using the Army of Italy as a distraction from the real theatre of war, being along the Rhine and in Germany, and winning victories in Italy to draw Austrian troops off of the Rhine. This plan was the same one carried out in 1796, when Napoleon was in command of the Army of Italy. His strategic plan for Italy was also nearly the same as it would be later in 1796, that is Napoleon called for immediate action against he Piedmontese to knock them out of the war quickly, and then setting the Army of Italy on the more fertile Po River Valley. This would have the effect of forcing Austria to draw more troops from the Rhine into Italy to replace the lost Piedmontese forces. Napoleon's plan was put into action, but then was stopped by the Minister of War who felt that an attack in Italy should and could not be carried out while an offensive was about to occur along the Rhine. Napoleon personally went on a spying mission to Genoa, but after a shift of power in France, this was used as an excuse for charges of treason, and Napoleon was arrested.
On 5 October 1795, after being arrested for a brief period of time and again resigning from the French army, Napoleon was called upon by Paul Barras to quell a revolt that was occuring in Paris against the Directory. Napoleon, being an artillery commander, ordered one Joachim Murat to use grapeshot to stop to mob, killing about 200 civilians and wounding 500. The death count may have been high, but Napoleon had saved the Directory, and that was all that mattered.
Napoleon was hailed by the Directory, and was quickly promoted to second in command of the Army of Interior, only to be withdrawn from that position to be made a general of division, only to quickly be withdrawn from that position to be placed in the even higher position of Commander in Chief. Commander in Chief was one of the most influential positions in the French Army in relation to overall strategy. This gave Napoleon an opportunity to try to convince the Ministry of War to carry out his strategy for Italy. Napoleon indirectly sent General Scherer, then in command of the Army of Italy, numerous and increasingly annoying letters of criticism through other ministers, but Scherer knew who was truly composing the letters. Scherer consistently refused the Ministries orders and instead wrote back with less risky and aggressive strategies, and asked if he could not get his way that he be relieved of his command. The Directory by February of 1796 was tired of Napoleon as well, and on March 2 Scherer was relieved of his command and it was announced that di Buonaparte would be his replacement. Napoleon set out for Italy, and began preparations to set his plans into action.

Revolutionary France


The revolt of 13 Vendemiaire (5 October 1795)

The history of the French Revolution is a long and complicated one, and I will only attempt to focus on the military aspects of that prior to 1796 and stay away from political aspects as much as possible. To oversimplify, in 1792 the War of the First Coalition began due to the imprisonment of King Louis XVI and the overagressive policy of Holy Roman Emperor Francis II (known as Francis I from 1804-1835 as the Austrian king). Francis II predecessor, Leopald II, was threatening as a substitute for war, such as the Declaration of Pilnitz, which threatened war if anything happened to the French monarchs, but stated the Holy Roman Empire (I will from here on refer to it as Austria) would not declare war unless all of the other signers of the Declaration also declared war on France. But when Leopald died on 1 March 1792 and Francis took power, threatening became a prelude to war.
Also adding to the deteriorating situation between France and Austria was the issue over Alsace. Alsace had been given to France as part of the Treaty of Westphalia which (partially) ended the Thirty Years War. Under the Treaty, France was to control all of the territory, but taxes were to be paid to the Hapsburg princes. This Treaty had been upheld almost constantly from 1648 until the French Revolution. The problem arose with the Revolutionary government, which needed money badly, and so they assumed since Aslace was French land before it should still be French land, but that the French government had right to the taxes, not the Hapsburgs.
France declared war on Austria on 20 April 1792, and essentially after some initial setbacks France eventually carried the war on to the offensive. The more idealistic in the French government saw this as France exporting the Revolution, and freeing the rest of Europe from tyrannical monarchs. Most saw it as it really was, however, an attempt by the French government to gain land, money, and carry out a war so as to keep the French population more loyal to the existing government.
The war was France pitted against Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Sardinia, Naples and Sicily, the Dutch Republic, and other numerous smaller states. While this may seem daunting, it is important to note that even after war had broken out, many of the countries were still focused elsewhere. For example, Austria was mostly focused on Poland for the time being, and had little interest in fighting a costly war with France.

Army of Italy


Typical French infantry during the Napoleonic Era. It is important
to note the Army of Italy probably looked nothing like the typical
French infantry, as many were without boots or proper clothing.

As time progressed and 1796 drew nearer, the situation was this: Spain was out of the war, and two main theatres now existed. The Rhine was the primary theatre of operations between France and Austria, with Italy being the secondary. As previously stated Napoleon's suggestion of using Italy to draw Austrian forces from the Rhine theatre was widely accepted. France's strategy for 1796 was for Napoleon to defeat Piedmont, draw further reinforcements from the Rhine, at which time General Moreau could advance across the Rhine at advance on Tyrol. Napoleon would then pacify Northern Italy, and preferably march on the Papal States, and then join Moreau in Tyrol for the final assualt on Vienna. Meanwhile Napoleon would be backed by two armies in Italy separate of his own, one under Kellermann on the western Alps, and the other along the Var River, both to protect his lines of communication and in particular any flanking manouvres by Piedmontese forces in the early stages of the campaign.
While the campaign seemed like a sound strategy, it had numerous flaws. First of all, success relied on both armies being able to do what they had not been able to in the past, and that was advance far inland into enemy territory. Both armies were not within supporting distance of one another, so if one was in trouble the Army of Italy could not aid the Army of the Rhine. Also, the Army of the Rhine was under the command of two separate and suspicious generals, neither of whom were really willing to cooperate with one another. In a similar problem, if one army was defeated by Austrian forces, then Austria could shift their forces to the other theatre, and win on both fronts. No one single general was in command of the operations, and so the three generals acted independently of one another.
The Army of Italy also posed a risk to the Italian campaign.
When it was originally sent into Italy in 1792, the Army of Italy had a very large force hovering around 100,000 men. But as time went on and little advances were made, the Army of Italy dwindled in numbers, from disease, battle, desertion, and even starvation. The Army of Italy was stuck in the western hills of Northern Italy, usually a little east of Savoy. While the Po River Valley could have sustained a force of this size, the land where the Army of Italy had been stationed for the past four years was agriculturaly insufficient to supply the Army. Revolutionary France's policy of armies fending for themselves when it came to food and living off the land as opposed to having supply trains meant that the Army of Italy had little food, clothes, and sometimes shelter.
By the time Napoleon took command in 1796, the Army of Italy had dwindled to around 60,000 men, with only about 37,000 soldiers who were battle capable. It is important to note that in this time period it was not uncommon for about half or more of an army to not be in a fighting position, far behind the front lines and would not hear about any fighting occuring ahead for a long period of time. Napoleon, who was an artillery commander by nature, only had 60 artillery pieces with his army, and any hope of attaining more was a fantasy.
On the flip side, the Coalition forces far outnumbered that which was under Napoleon's command. The Austrian commander of Austrian Italian forces was General Beauleiu, a 72 year old veteran. In all reality this actually played to Napoleon's advantage, as Beaulieu was not as accustom to the changing face of war that was occuring and was still fighting in the old style of fighting more prevalant in the Seven Years War than the Napoleonic Wars. There were three main armies under Beaulieu, some 20,000 soldiers under his direct control, with half of these soldiers being spread out over a considerable distance, all located around Alessandria. The second army of some 12,000 men under General Argenteau, located are Acqui, all outstretched in a defensive line. The third army of around 20,000 Piedmontese forces under General Provera held a thin line from Cuneo to Ceva, watching the western passes to stop any attempt by the French to attack Piedmont, which was in a northerly direction of the French position along the Italian coast in western Italy. Another Piedmontese force of around 20,000 was far north-west of Napoleon's position near Turin, keeping Kellerman's forces in check (which were guarding the western Alpine passes into France. Excluding the second Piedmontese army, and Kellerman's forces, Napoleon was initially facing an Austo-Italian force of around 52,000 men against Napoleon's 37,000 men.
On 27 March 1796, Napoleon rode into headquarters in Nice. From there, he would launch his invasion of Italy, which would eventually bring all of northern Italy under French control and lead to the end of the War of the First Coalition. Napoleon Bonaparte (by now using the French spelling of his name, feeling little connection to Corsica) set the date for his operations to begin on April 15.

Part II Napoleon's First Battle

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Map of the Battles of Montenotte and Mondovi

Napoleon's Preparations


Jean-Mathieu-Philibert Sérurier

Soldiers! You are hungry and naked; the government owes you much but can give you nothing. The patience and courage which you have displayed among these rocks are admirable; but they bring you no glory...I will lead you into the most fertile plain on Earth...Soldiers of Italy! Will you be lacking in courage or endurance?
This, Napoleon's speech, upon his arrival to the Army of Italy in Nice on 27 March was mostly a propaganda tool used to inspire his troops in his daring and risky venture he was about to take them on. But behind the propaganda, it does give us some insight as to Napoleon's reasoning for going about the invasion in the manner in which he did.
The land which France currently had control over in Italy, which included what used to be Savoy, parts of the northwestern Alps, and some of the coastal areas west of Genoa, were very infertile lands and could not support the Army of Italy for very long. For example, when the Army first arrived in Italy years earlier, it had around some 100,000 troops, but now the Army only had some 60,000 with only 37,000 effectives. Napoleon knew that mutiny amongst his army or starvation could ruin the Army of Italy if it stayed in the same location for another year.
He therefore deduced that he had to move west, into the more fertile Po River Valley and Lombardy. There he would find plentiful supplies for his Army, the most important being food for the soldiers and horses. With good food supply and rivers (including the west to east running Po and the north to south running rivers descending from the Alps) Napoleon would never have to worry about his water supply either.
Napoleon made immediate preparations upon arriving in Italy to supply his troops more adequately. But calls for more artillery or weapons (many soldiers had long thrown away their muskets) were usually ignored by the Directory due to the fact that they had little supplies to spare for what they considered a sideshow, and sending supplies over the Alps was a very difficult task which could usually not be completed in the month that Napoleon was asking it to be. Napoleon used personal money to pay his army, which had received little pay for some time, in order to put down mutinous talks. He also sold a captured ship and bought clothing and other supplies with it.
Despite his setbacks, Napoleon did have many advantages. The first being the Army itself, which was a hardened group of veterans, of which all of the weak had either died off or deserted years prior. The Army was now made up of ragtag underclothed and underfed soldiers, who fought like lions on the battlefield.
In addition, Napoleon had one of the best officer corps anyone could ask for at that time. Napoleon had under his command three talented generals who would each take a control of a division of the army. The first was the fifty five year old General Surier. Surier was a product of the Old Regime, born of nobility he did not hesitate to act aristocratic, even in these Revolutionary times. He had little military distinction, but was talented enough to survive the Revolution this long as a noble in the army, so he was most definitely a talented individual.
The second was the thirty eight year old General Augereau, the polar opposite of Surier. While Surier was a product of the Old Regime, Augereau was a product of the Revolution. He was the son of a poor stonemason, and he had fought in numerous foreign armies before finally returning to France in 1792, where he rose to a generals position in less than a year. Augereau was a man of the people, and was well respected by his men, certainly moreso than Surier.
The third was General (Andre) Massena, the thirty eight year old man already familiar with Napoleon. He served with Napoleon at Toulon, he was born in Nice, so he had an understanding of northern Italy as well. He was experience and battle tested, and every time stood up to the test. Also worth noting, with Napoleon was General Berthier, an engineer, Joachim Murat, the infamous cavalry commander, Jean-Andoche Junot, another future marshal of Napoleon's, and Napoleon's brother Louis Bonaparte.
Napoleon was not alone in Italy, as he did not command the entire Army. Instead, he more or less controlled a little more than half, with Kellerman being in command of some 20,000 effectives just west of Turin, in the Alpine passes. Napoleon was to be the strike force, attacking Austrian and Piedmontese forces in Northwestern Italy while Kellerman protected his vital and vulnerable flank, and also being there as a reserve in case insurrection occured behind Napoleon's lines. The two armies were not very cooperative in all manners, but they did not have to be. Napoleon's army was to attack while Kellerman protected his flank and rear, but there was also a huge importance to Kellerman's position.
Napoleon, who was stationed at Nice, was to the south of the Austrian and Piedmontese forces, and also south of Turin. Therefore, while Napoleon was to attack northward at Piedmont, driving closer to Turin, Kellerman could threaten Turin from the west, as well as force the Piedmontese to commit troops to defend west of Turn, making Napoleon's task easier.
The Austrian forces, under General Beaulieu, were much more numerous but also at a great disadvantage. Beaulieu's forces were effectively split into three forces. The first division of some 19,000 men was under his direct command in Alessandria. However many were still in winter quarters or spread out over a great distance. The second was under the command of General Argenteau, with some 11,500 men based around the town of Acqui, but scattered along the hills north of the coast. The third was under General Colli, who commanded some 20,000 Piedmontese forces was on the western flank of the Austrian forces, located around Ceva and Mondovi, in order to prevent Napoleon from attacking northward directly in Piedmont. Also another 20,000 Piedmontese were stationed west of Turin, but as this equalled Kellerman's forces and engagements were limited there, I shall negate both from the overall numbers. In total, Napoleon had some 37,000 French soldiers, up against Beaulieu's 57,000 Austro-Piedmontese forces.
Napoleon set the day for action for April 15 as the invasion date. He moved his forces eastward, along the coastal towns until he was directly south of the Austro-Piedmontese forces. But the invasion would begin early, as it would be Beaulieu who would make the first move.

The Battle of Montenotte


General Andre Massena

Like Napoleon, General Beaulieu was relatively new to the Italian theatre. Upon arrival, he had been given a general order by the Austrian government to drive the Army of Italy back from its current position south of his forces in French territory at Savoy. His orders gave no indication of how many troops he was allowed to allocate to this operation, if the Piedmontese should be involved in it, or where and how to conduct the operation. Beaulieu responded in a poor fashion.
Beaulieu's plan was this: he would attack from the hills north of Savona and descent upon General Massena's forces there on the French right flank, then turn west and move towards Savona, while General Argenteau would attack through Montenotte and attack southward, and cut off Massena from the rest of the Army at Savona, and the turn west and attack Napoleon's main force.
On 10 April, some of Beaulieu's forces descended upon a French defensive position at Voltri, taking Napoleon completely by surprise. The attack did not gain much momentum, and the French retreated in good order to the south. This attack was actually a great benefit to Napoleon, since he now knew exactly where Beauleiu's main force was at, and could not act accordingly.
Meanwhile, Argenteau received his orders a day late, and so his attack on Savona could not begin until the 11 April. Argenteau's attack near Montenotte ground to a standstill when it commenced on the 11 April, and so he decided to stop and settle in at Montenotte so he could call for reinforcements and extra artillery. When Beaulieu realized his mistake and the lack of cohesion in his attacks, he altogether halted his southern advancement, leaving his troops in a long line along the hills north of Savona. Napoleon used this to his advantage, and called in Massena's troops to move west and concentrate all his force on attacking Argenteau.
On the morning of 12 April, Massena launched a frontal assault on Argenteau at Montenotte, while other forces worked their way to the Austrian right flank. By the time Argenteau realized his mistake, it was too late, and as he tried to retreat his men, Massena ordered a frontal assault and routed the Austrian forces under Argenteau. So terrible was the route that by 13 April, Argenteau had only 700 men under his direct command.
Upon their advancement, many of the men who, as noted earlier, were without muskets too them from the Austrian dead, only strengthening the French army further. The French only took 800 casualties while the Austrians lost 2,500 men, and 12 cannons were captured by the French during the battle.
Napoleon had done what would become his trademark strategy during his first battle at Montenotte, and that is concentrating his forces upon one, usually the most vulnerable, spot of the enemy and attacking it with all force possible. Ignoring Beaulieu, Napoleon risked being flanked, but his lines there held and Napoleon realized that Beauleiu had halted his attack for a reason, and judged that the time was ripe for attacking the lesser and more exposed force at Montenotte.
Napoleon may have won, but he did not defeat the Austrian forces. Beaulieu's forces were not routed, and they maintained their position for the most part. Argenteau had merely retreated northward. The Piedmontese force of 20,000 still loomed to the northeast around Ceva, Cuneo, and Mondovi. Napoleon now found himself exactly where he wanted to be, smack dab in the middle between the Piedmontese forces and the Austrian forces, and a northern attack into Dego would exploit this advantage and completely split the two apart. Napoleon would now turn his focus to defeating the Piedmontese under Michelangelo Colli in the northwest.

Battle of Mondovi


An artists rendition of the Battle of Mondovi

Although Napoleon had now defeated Argenteau at Montenotte, he was unsure if that was Argenteau's main force, or that it was a smaller force and that Napoleon's flank would be at risk when he turned west towards the Piedmontese. However, Napoleon gambled that it had indeed been Argenteau's main force and he decided to continue with his plan of attacking Colli's forces, but that he would need to keep reserves to defend his flank.
Napoleon ordered Massena to take half of his force, and advance upon Dego, occupy it and then hold the line there. Dego was naturally located between two hills, and made for an exceptional bottleneck in which to hold the Austrians. Napoleon then ordered Augereau and the rest of Massena's men to attack General Colli at Ceva on 13 April.
However, all of his plans would go different than expected on the 13. Despite some success early in the morning, Augereau's force came to a halt before Ceva near a small castle at Cosseria that was occupied by some 900 Austrian grenadiers. Attacks on the castle ended in disaster, with some 900 casualties and as a result Augereau ordered his men to retreat to their positions on the previous day. When Napoleon learned of Augereau's misfortune, he ordered Massena to hold his attack on Dego and wait for further orders. All the while a terrible storm was taking place, making all movement of men and supplies a difficult task in and of its own.
By the end of 13 April, Napoleon occupied the same territory he did the day prior, and precious time to gain momentum over the Piedmontese had been lost.
The 14 April would turn out to be a much better day. Early in the morning Massena launched his attack on Dego, and quickly captured it, taking some 5,000 Austrian men prisoner, along with gaining 19 Austrian guns. In another turn of events, the Austrians at Cosseria finally gave in and surrendered due to low supplies.
If 14 of April was a blessing to Napoleon, the 15 was another disaster. Massena's men at Dego, expecting no major attacks that day, went foraging for food and supplies throughout Dego and the countryside sorrounding the town. Meanwhile, on the Austrian side, General Wukassovitch carried out his orders he received on the 14 (which were actually issued on the 13) to "attack the next day". The misinterpretation by Wukassovitch would play to the Austrians advantage, since if they had attacked on the 14 as ordered, Massena's force would have been ready and waiting for them. Instead, Wukassovitch quickly routed Massena's spread out forces at Dego on the 15, and again Napoleon's flank was in jeopardy.
Sensing the danger of being flanked, Napoleon ordered a halt to Augereau's forces which were moving to attack the Piedmontese at Ceva. Although Wukassovitch's force was not really large enough to seriously threaten Napoleon, he was not sure if it was just the advance guard of a much larger force, perhaps under the direct command of Beaulieu. Napoleon recalled General La Harpe and had him lead an attack on Dego that evening, costing the French another 1,000 casualties.
Napoleon spent the 16 April worrying about the Austrian forces. He sent out small patrols and scouting parties to try to once and for all paint a clear picture of what the Austrians were doing. After realizing the full extent of the massive casualties inflicted upon Beaulieu's forces, Napoleon decided that he had been hurt too much and needed time to lick his wounds before attacking again. Napoleon moved all of La Harpe's men to Dego to defend against an Austrian attack, and moved Massena's men north of Dego to swoop down and flank any enemy force threatening Dego. Napoleon then ordered Augereau to take Ceva, but after a hastily assembled assault, the French were repulsed.
During the 17 April, little action took place as the French amassed their forces for an attack upon Ceva. On the night of 17 April, however, the Piedmontese fell back from their position from Ceva to a more fortified position near the Tanaro and Corsaglia Rivers. A furious Napoleon ordered on 18 April a hasty attack, which was soon repulsed.
On 19 April the French right flank was relieved when a French attack from Savona hit the Austrians in the flank, and now lessened the pressure on Dego. This action caused the Austrians to retreat far to the north to Acqui. Dego was now strategically unimportant, and Napoleon ordered all but one battalion from La Harpe to move and link up with Massena's force to attack General Colli at St. Michele.
A grand assault was ordered for the 21, but again Colli left during the night of the 20 and escaped. This time he fell back on the town of Mondovi, and took up a defensive position. General Serurier, the fifty three year old veteran, led a daring frontal attack on Mondovi. The attack worked through a series of foolish but effective frontal charges. By the end of the day the French had routed the Piedmontese, taken possession of their arsenal stockpiles, and finally reached the more fertile area of Piedmont.
Although the battle was over, Napoleon did not linger in Mondovi any longer than his men needed to get food and supplies, and on 23 April he started his march towards Turin. Napoleon divided his force into three, him commanding the central one, and with La Harpe and Serurier on the flank and all within a days march of each other to support the other armies. On the evening of the 23, General Colli asked for an armistice, but it only encouraged Napoleon to double his march and advance on Turin even faster.
On the 25 April, Napoleon entered in negotiations with the Piedmontese and a treaty was soon worked out. French armies would be able to use Piedmont for passage into the rest of Italy, and several fortresses and towns were to contain French garrisons as a precautionary measure. The treaty was formally approved by King Victor Amadeus III on 28 April. Joachim Murat delivered the treaty personally to the Directory for approval.
In just some ten days of offensive campaigning, Napoleon had defeated Piedmont and brought it under the will of the French. He had secured a foothold in the fertile region of Italy, and now was en route to attacking the main Austrian forces. Most importantly to the overall strategy of the war, Austria would now be forced to bring in reinforcements from Germany into Italy. Napoleon concluded this offensive with the following speech:
Soldiers! In fifteen days you have gained six victories, taken 21 colors and 55 pieces of artillery, seized several fortresses and conquered the richest parts of Piedmont. You have captured 15,000 prisoners and killed and wounded more than 10,000...." Although the Austrian army in Italy was hurt, it was certainly far from beaten.

Part III The Battle of Lodi and The First Siege of Mantua

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

A map showing the maneuvers immediately following the Battle of Mondovi to the First Siege of Mantua.

The Battle of Lodi


The Battle of Lodi.

After the Battle of Mondovi, Napoleon gave his troops time to reorganize and rest before the forthcoming operation against Beaulieu, whom had now retreated across the far side of the Po River. There were three viable places to cross the Po that Napoleon was agreeable to, at Valenza, just south of Pavia, and Piacenza. The first, and closest, was at Valenza but served many problems. The first was that Beaulieu's main force was located just across the river, and being attacked while crossing the river would prove disastrous for Napoleon. The second reason for not choosing Valenza was that it was still too close to Piedmont, whom could at any time turn on Napoleon and hit him from the rear.
The second option, south of Pavia, still posed many threats as well. While crossing here would have put Napoleon just behind Beaulieu's main force and threatened him to either retreat or give battle, it had the downside of being just within plausible striking distance if Beaulieu learned of Napoleon's move. This would undoubtedly lead to the destruction of the Army of Italy if he was caught half way across when Beaulieu attacked.
Therefore, the most beneficial and realistic crossing option was at Piacenza. Piacenza was some 50 miles west of Valenza, and would place Napoleon safely behind Beaulieu, and the shortest distance away from Milan of all the potential crossing areas. Beaulieu would either be forced to retreat and give Milan to Napoleon, or to defend Pavia with his supplies and reinforcements cut off. Therefore, Napoleon chose Piacenza as his plan of attack to capture Milan.
In order to keep Beaulieu sitting on his hands, Napoleon decided to have Serurier plan a fake attack on Valenza while a lead force under Dallemagne would cross at Piacenza, followed closely by La Harpe and Augereau. Dallemagne, after two days of marching, crossed the Po on the 7 May, and engaged in a small skirmish with Austrian forces. By this time Beaulieu, who had been focusing on Valenza for the past two days, now realized his folly and ordered all forces to converge on Piacenza. By the end of the 7 May, all Austrian forces, spread out over a distance of some 50 miles, were now heading directly for Napoleon's crossing.
On 8 May, Dallemagne fought a stalemate battle with Austrian forces under General Liptay until Liptay gave the order to fall back on to Fombio. La Harpe and Liptay together stormed Fombio and captured the city, pursuing the Austrians for two hours. As 8 May drew to an end, La Harpe and Dallemagne were safely across and in secure positions, while Augereau was in the process of crossing, and Serurier and Massena were nearing Piacenza. However, as night fell Beaulieu's army converged on Codogno and were met by French forces under La Harpe. During the fighting, La Harpe was shot and killed, and only a brave charge from Berthier saved the French from defeat. Eventually the Austrians pulled back, and Beaulieu feared his secure position was lost.
Fearing having his supply lines cut, Beaulieu retreated westward across the Adda River, which ran north-south perpendicular to the Po River. This allowed Napoleon to join his scattered forces on the north side of the Po on 9 May. Although the crossing of the Po had been a success by all means, in careful planning, careful execution, and impressive speed of execution, Napoleon was hardly satisfied. Beaulieu had escaped, and worse yet he was safely across yet another river. Although Milan would now surely be in French hands, Napoleon wanted Beaulieu defeated before he could retreat as far west as the fortress at Mantua, as this would pose a huge risk to Napoleon's operations.
While Napoleon was unsatisfied with the operation, he pushed on. By 10 May, lead French forces were in sight of Lodi, situated on the Adda River, which was defended by an Austrian force of some 10,000 men and 12 cannon under General Sebottendorf. Although this force was nothing but a covering force while Beaulieu retreated further west, it still posed a considerable threat to Napoleon, who needed to cross the river as fast as possible.
The lead French forces quickly cleared the east side of Lodi of any Austrian forces, but came to a halt upon reaching the bridge. The Austrians had situated all 12 of their cannons along the bank of the river and angled towards the bridge, creating a deadly crossfire for any infantry attempting to use the bridge. General Massena set up 24 guns along the east bank of the river to combat the Austrians, and after organizing his grenadiers led a personal charge across the bridge.
The first charge made it halfway across the bridge before being halted by Austrian small arms and cannon fire, no doubt causing considerable havoc among the French. It was not until Massena, Dallemagne, Cervoni, and Berthier went to the front of the line and personally led a charge that the French columb broke through. French soldiers jumped into the shallow water on the west bank of the river and established enfilading fire on the Austrian cannons, while the main column continued their charge across the bridge. An Austrian counterattack retook the bridge, but another French counterattack, this time led by Augereau and Massena, succeeded in breaking through the Austrian center and a French cavalry force flanked the Austrian lines that they finally broke.
The Battle of Lodi cost the French only some 350 casualties, quite low compared to how high such a risky undertaking could have cost them. No prisoners were reported to have been taken by the Austrians, but certainly there were probably some. The Austrians lost 150 men, but more importantly 1,700 were taken prisoner along with 16 guns being captured (while 12 guns were set up on the bank of the river, there were more cannon in the area still catching up to the main retreating Austrian force). The Battle of Lodi and maneuver preceeding it showed Napoleon's grasp of speed more than anything else, and as a result Milan was now safely assured to be in French hands and Beaulieu was again on the retreat, but had not been defeated or sorrounded nor had it even been drawn into a major battle.

Bad News, Milan, and Rebellion


Napoleon enters Milan.

The evening following the Battle of Lodi, Napoleon received a discouraging correspondence from Paris. In a letter from the Directory, Napoleon was told that command of the Army of Italy would be split between him and Kellerman. Kellerman would then take part of Napoleon's army and head south to attack the Papal States and secure as much loot and wealth as possible to help pay for the enourmous debt the Directory found itself in. Meanwhile, Napoleon was to hold his current position and go on no offensive, only to hold the Po River Valley as a covering force for Kellerman.
Napoleon's response was bold and daring, he replied "Kellermann will command the army as well as I, for no one is more convinced than I am that the victories are due to the courage and audacity of the men; but I believe that to unite Kellermann and myself in Italy is to lose all. I cannot serve willingly with a man who believes himself to be the first general in Europe; and, besides, I believe that one bad general is better than two good ones. War, like government, is a matter of tact."
The Directory found itself in an awkward position, since it was in no environment to demote or to altogether sack the only general that had been bringing them continuous victories. The Directory therefore sent the reply, "Immortal glory to the conqueror of Lodi, your plan is the only one to follow..." Furthermore, Napoleon was given 10,000 reinforcements at Kellermann's expense, and Kellermann even sent his own son to serve on Napoleon's staff.
Meanwhile, as correspondence was being sent, Napoleon arrived in Milan only five days after the Battle of Lodi. The people of Milan welcomed Napoleon and the Army of Italy as liberators from Austrian control, but it would be short-lived. Beaulieu had retreated for Mantua, leaving behind a small force in the Citadel in Milan.
While Napoleon tried to maintain order amongst his troops in Milan, looting and pillaging could not be stopped from the underfed, underclothed soldiers. Soldiers as high as the rank of Divisional commanders took part in the looting, and in all took about 2 million livres worth of money from Milanese citizens. This did allow Napoleon to finally pay his soldiers in real money (they were supplied worthless paper money prior to this) it made the Milanese goodwill wear thin.
The looting came to an end on 21 May when news arrived that a permanent peace had finally been secured with Piedmont, and so Napoleon's rear was now safe from any Piedmontese betrayal. The next day, Napoleon marched out Milan with 30,000 soldiers, leaving some 5,000 behind to siege the Citadel.
Beaulieu was in position defending the area south of Lake Garda to Mantua in the south. He had made the mistake of speading himself thin again, and was vulnerable to attack by Napoleon. But before Napoleon could act, bad news came from Milan and Pavia of rebellion.
Bitter from the French looting, the citizenry of Milan had taken to arms and forced the French garrison in the city to surrender, although the French garrison probably could have held out. Within two days, Napoleon reached Milan and took back the city. Upon reaching Pavia, Napoleon gave the troops several hours to sack and loot the city without restraint for several hours, as a lesson to all Italian cities who rebelled against the Army of Italy. Napoleon ordered the French officer who surrendered Milan to be publicly executed and several small villages had all buildings burnt and all men were shot.
While Napoleon dealt with the rebellions, Berthier continued westward, and on 28 May Napoleon and Berthier met up at Brescia. Two days later the bridge at Borghetto was captured by French forces, compelling Beaulieu to retreat even further. The success at Borghetto forced Beaulieu to retreat up the shores of Lake Garda, essentially driving a wedge between Beaulieu and Mantua in the south. Beaulieu was forced to retreat to Trent, and now the First Siege of Mantua had begun.

The First Siege of Mantua

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The defenses at Mantua. For now ignore the troops positions, as they are irrelevant to the First Siege of Mantua.

The French now found themselves in a good and bad situation. On one hand, they had driven a wedge between Beaulieu and Mantua, and if Mantua was taken then they would have almost complete control over Northern Italy and could proceed on to Venice and then to Vienna. However, on the other hand, Napoleon had inflicted enough damage upon Austrian forces and Austrian successes in Germany meant that a reinforcing army was certain to materialize soon. Napoleon therefore would be forced to break the Siege of Mantua at any time if a serious threat developed to his north, where Beaulieu currently lingered. For the first time since Napoleon arrived, the invasion of Italy had now turned in to a defensive campaign for Napoleon.
While preparations for sieging Mantua were underway, Napoleon personally led more attacks on Italian towns in French territory to serve as a reminder for rebellious areas. Mantua, however, was the primary focus at the point in the operation.
Mantua was a fortress city sorrounded by three lakes to its north and east, and by a marsh to its south and west. It was occupied by some 12,000 Austrian soldiers and 300 some artillery pieces. After a failed attempt at taking the city, Mantua was fully besieged on 3 June by Serurier, Augereau, Dallemagne, Lannes, and Kilmaine. The same day as the siege began, grenadiers capture St. Georges suburbs, and it appeared that the siege would quickly be over. However, a series of diversions from Mantua would cause it to not be taken for another 8 months.
While after Lodi the Directory had been willing to cancel its planned attack on the Papal States, it now ordered Napoleon to attack the Pope and secure a sizeable treasure for the Directory. Napoleon was forced to take away Augereau's divisions, leaving Serurier with the impossible task of taking Mantua alone. After a long series of attacks in Tuscany and the Papal States, Pope Pius VI called for an armistice with France and paid a huge indemnity to the Directory. The Papal States also turned over a massive number of cannons it had at Fort Urban to Napoleon. Satisfied, Napoleon withdrew north to Mantua and began sieging the city with the bulk of his army and the newly acquired cannons.
Things started looking even better, when on 29 June the Austrian garrison in the Citadel in Milan finally surrendered. However, these good fortunes were short-lived when French reports indicated that an Austrian offensive was developing to the north around Tyrol. In addition, a rare change in water levels on 17 July threw off a French attempt at storming Mantua. Just as the French began preparing for a traditional siege of reducing Mantua to rubble, Napoleon called the siege off. On 31 of July, Serurier's divisions were the last to leave, spiking some of their cannons, but the majority of the 179 left behind fell in to Austrian hands.
The threat that Napoleon feared of an Austrian offensive from the north was quite real. Wurmser, recently arriving from Germany with 25,000 men now brought the Austrian force to his north up to a number of some 50,000 men. Wurmser could have caught Napoleon off guard much sooner than he did, but he was forced to spent a considerable amount of time in Trent restoring order to Beaulieu's army, which was disorganized and in almost no condition to fight.
As Wurmser moved south, he split his army into three corps, each moving southward toward Napoleon. Meanwhile, Napoleon was scrambling to organize his scattered force from all over Northern Italy to Lake Garda, where he was determined to meet Wurmser. As Serurier left Mantua on 31 July, The First Siege of Mantua had ended, as did any French hopes to quickly take the city and gain control of Northern Italy in the near future. The battle that would follow would indeed be the most clear example of a precursor to Napoleonic warfare.

Part IV Wurmer's Breakthrough to Arcola

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Wurmser breaks through the Mantua

Battle of Castiglione and the Beginning of the Second Siege of Mantua


The Battle of Castiglione

With Wurmser moving his forces South towards Mantua by way of Lake Garda in three separate divisions, Napoleon realized the necessity to engage each wing separately and in turn defeat them with superior numbers and firepower before each wing could come to support the other. Wurmser's plan for the relief of Mantua relied on his ability to join his three divisions once he had made it south of Lake Garda, and he was well aware that his vulnerability would be when his army was separated and moving without possible support of each other. Although Wurmser realized his weakness, he was too fixated on relieving Mantua to properly coordinate the movement of his and Quasdanovitch's divisions, which were central to his plan of linking up south of Garda and moving further south to relieve Mantua. So, in essence, the Austrian forces were moving entirely independent of one another, without much if any communication between the wings, and Wurmser was only making matters worse by focusing almost solely on Mantua instead of the most immediate threat, which was the Army of Italy which stood between him and Mantua.
Napoleon decided to attack Quasdanovitch's division first, and on 3 August Massena fought of Quasdanovitch's men in the Battle of First Lonato. While this action was taking place, Augereau was occupied defending against Wurmer near Castiglione. In all reality, however, Wurmser could have safely taken Castiglione three days prior and now been attacking Massena's rear, but he had waited for three days to make sure Mantua had indeed not fallen and therefore gave Augereau time to move in to position to defend the southern flank of Massena's line.
Napoleon's Army was now virtually sorrounded, with Quasdanovitch attacking southward from the western bank of Lake Garda, and Wurmser attacking north from Goito and Valeggio against the southern rear of the Army of Italy. With the simultaneous engagements going on in the northern flank at First Lonato and the southern flank at Castiglione, Napoleon's army was stretched thin. Augereau would become the hero of the battle when his men held and completely destroyed and entire division under Quasdanovitch during an Austrian attack.
Once Augereau had successfully forced Quasdanovitch back, Napoleon ordered him to swing south and west to fall upon Wurmser's left flank, while Serurier, who had now marched north from Mantua, would attack Wurmer's rear from the south. On 5 August, Wurmser halted his men just south of Castiglione to wait for Quasdanovitch, unaware than Quasdanovitch's forces were in retreat and heading northward again. Napoleon used the opportunity to attack the forces he had moved the previous day, and Massena committed and frontal assualt while Augereau attacked Wurmer's left flank and Serurier attack his rear from the south.
The attack worked exactly as intended, and Wurmser was force to pull all of his forces back east across the Mincio River near Valeggio. However, the French Army was too tired from the previous two days of fighting and therefore could not pursue Wurmer's retreating army. Serurier himself became so sick during the battle that he had to return to France for medical treatment.
With Wurmser now in full retreat northward back into the Alps, most of the Lombard Plain was now securly in French hands, all except of course Mantua. The French began another formal siege of Mantua upon driving Wurmser out of the Lombard Plain. In all the repulsion of Wurmser's force from the Lake Garda vicinity cost the French 6,000 killed and wounded and an additional 4,000 prisoners. The Austrians, however, suffered an astonishing 16,700 casualties in the same battle. Napoleon may have defeated Wurmser, but Wurmser was most definitely not defeated and had in many ways succeeded in his operation. Wurmer's main goal was to not let Mantua fall, as the fall of Mantua would spell the end of Austrian threat in Northern Italy, and in that aspect Wurmser had succeeded greatly. He forced Napoleon to lift the siege and relieved pressure, and allowed the garrison there to stockpile more food for later operations in the area.

Wurmser's Relief of Mantua


Dagobert Sigmund von Wurmser

By late August things were going extraordinarily well for France. In Italy, Napoleon had forced Wurmser back and was besieging Mantua yet again, and on the Rhine the French offensives under Moreau and Canot finally opened, with considerable success in the opening stages. This, however, would be quite short-lived as Napoleon would be dealt a considerable defeat by Wurmser, which would ironically turn out to be a blessing in disguise.
By late August, Wurmser's force of 20,000 men was again ready to begin a new offensive down to attempt another relief of Mantua. This time, the main force was to use the River Brenta, which ran from Trent, where Wurmser's main force was currently located, to the Adriatic Sea. Fearing that he would be trapped between Bonaparte in Italy and Moreau, who was now driving eastward and could soon threaten Wurmser's northern flank, Wurmser calculated that he must make a daring move to relieve the force at Mantua or risk being completely sorrounded and cut off. Wurmser decided to leave General Davidovitch with 25,000 men to guard Trent and the Tyrol, while Wurmser moved his army effectively east, then south, and then finally southwest into Mantua, all the while using the Brenta River as he marched south.
Simultaneously, French forces were moving north along Lake Garda to attack Trent, now occupied only by Davidovitch's force. Vaubois and Massena defeated Davidovitch at Roveredo on 4 September, and entered Trent on the next day. When the French Army entered Trent, Napoleon learned of Wurmser's army moving south along the Brenta River southward toward Mantua. Napoleon ordered 10,000 troops to stay in Trent while the remaining 21,000 troops moved in pursuit of Wurmser, putting Napoleon and Wurmser's armies at about equal strength. This move was extremely bold on Napoleon's part, as the army would be almost entirely cut off from major supply routes. Napoleon's best hope was to march parallel to Wurmser's army south along the Brenta, and ideally force him to retreat eastward instead of trying to make a dash for Mantua.
The French marched parallel to Wurmser's force until 8 September, when Napoleon attacked the Austrian forces near Bassano. The French forces broke through Austrian lines, and a bold cavalry charge by Murat effectively split Wurmser's army into two, all the while taking 4,000 prisoners and causing Wurmser himself to be only left with 3,500 effectives. Only reinforcements from Meszaros would bring Wurmser's force back up to around 16,000, still not a high number when taking into account that Wurmser was trying to break through Napoleon's lines.
Oddly enough, Wurmser remained steadfast in his advance towards Mantua instead of retreating, and the French Army was forced to try to catch up to the now westward moving Austrian Army to try to block the road and prevent Wurmser from reaching Mantua. Wurmser reached Mantua and entered the fortress nearly unopposed on 12 September. On 15 September, Wurmser attempted to retake several sorrounding areas of Mantua, but as French forces had now converged on Mantua, Wurmser's attack failed and he retreated back into the fortress of Mantua.
Wurmser's second attempt to relieve Mantua was a success, in a way. While he had reached the fortress and bulked its' defenses with an additional 16,000 men, he had also again failed to gain any strategic victory, other than making Mantua more difficult to take by the French. In fact, he actually made a prolonged siege by the French more appealing and victory easier, as the Austrian defenses were now shorter on food due to the extra manpower trapped inside the fortress. As supplies dwindled over the next months, as many as 150 men were dying per day from malnutrition and disease. Austrian soldiers were reduced to eating horse meat, and of the 100 or so officers, nearly 60 were sick.
Although the battle was tactically a defeat for Napoleon, it turned out to actually be a strategic victory. Napoleon had now entraped Wurmser's army within Mantua, although a more appealing option would have been to have defeated it, but nonetheless Napoleon would now be afforded some time to strengthen his defenses and continue the siege of Mantua. Bad news reached Napoleon in mid September, however, when he learned that Moreau had retreated back across the Danube and Napoleon's hopes of linking up with Moreau's force were now dwindling. Also, with recent successes in the Rhine Theatre, Austria was likely to send yet another army in to drive back Napoleon from Northern Italy. With Wurmser now in Mantua, the siege of the fortress resumed for the third time.

Part V Arcola, Rivoli, and Victory

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Battle of Caldiero

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Battle of Arcola

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Battle of Rivoli

The Battle of Caldiero


Napoleon leading his men at the Battle of Arcola

As September progressed into early October, news from the Rhine Front only got worse. On 2 October, Moreau had been effectively pushed back across to the west bank of the Rhine. With the Rhine front now less straining, the Austrian government decided to send another army into Italy.
Napoleon's Army in October was not much better off than Moreau's men, as Napoleon only numbered around 40,000 soldiers, 10,000 of whom where completely committed to the siege of Mantua. Napoleon was still sorrounded, with 20,000 men inside Mantua and another Austrian army surely assembling somewhere in Northern Italy, Napoleon realized he had to, for the time being, remain on the defensive. During the lull in fighting, Napoleon tried to distribute his forces to guard all possible entry points into the Lombard Plain. He placed 10,000 men under Vaubois to guard the Lake Garda approaches, Massena was sent to Bassano, and Kilmaine (the replacement for Serurier) was in command of the forces at Mantua. Napoleon remained in a central position between the triangular shaped forces, so as to relieve whichever came under a direct threat.
While there was a lull in fighting throughout most of October, Napoleon had to deal with numerous political problems. Without going into much detail, several of these problems stemmed from the Pope, who was trying to raise an army of 30,000 men to attack Napoleon's forces. Almost all the of the Northern Italian states were conspiring with the Pope and when Napoleon attempted to unite much of Northern Italy into the North Italian Republic, he came under immense pressure and scrutiny, and so much hostility was stirred up that he was forced to abandon his plan.
All of these problems would become a sidenote, when Napoleon learned of a new Austrian Army under the command of d'Alvintzi (and partial command of Davidovitch) of some 45,000 men being raised and almost ready to take the field.
The Austrian plan was to take Bassano and Trent, so as to secure the northern flank. d'Alvintzi would attack with 28,000 men on a broader front while Davidovitch would drive to Trent with 18,000 men and throw the French forces into confusion. The offensive began on 1 November, and immediately threw French forces into disarray. Napoleon ordered Vaubois and Massena to fall back to his central position, as the line at Trent and Brenta Valley could no longer be held. Napoleon disgraced several regiments under Vaubois for their poor performance, as Napoleon felt a small force could have held the same position they failed to hold.
By 9 of November the situation was this: Davidovitch had driven French forces out of Trent, but had stopped before the Rivoli River, which was now reinforced by Augereau's troops, and d'Alvintzi was driving fast eastward towards Caldiero. d'Alvintzi decided to drive his main force towards Caldiero, meanwhile sending a smaller force of 4,000 men south to Arcola to protect his southern flank against an attempt to cut off his supply and communications lines. Napoleon reinforced Massena to a strength of 13,000 troops and ordered them to attack the main Austrian force at Caldiero.
The attack went poorly, and the French attack was soon repulsed at a total loss of around 2,000 French soldiers and two pieces of artillery. With this action, Napoleon had no choice but to pull back to Verona with his main force, and seek alternatives to fighting d'Alvintzi. Napoleon was now being beaten by two forces, one from the north under Davidovitch and one from the east under d'Alvintzi, and was being sandwiched in the middle of the two near Verona. Napoleon weighed lifting the siege at Mantua, but the though of around 20,000 Austrian forces at his rear being unchecked was too dangerous, and so he chose against that option.
Napoleon knew that he would probably not emerge victorious from his current predicament. While his speech to his soldiers was rousing as usual, his comments to his generals and staff were defeatist in the utmost. He began talking of his death, and wrote to the Directory complaining that he was abandoned in the depths of Italy fighting for his very survival. Napoleon had one last gamble on the table, and it was his only hope for keeping the Army of Italy intact and preventing France from losing what it had gained in the last year.
Napoleon calculated his best bet to be using Augereau and Massena's combined force of 18,000 against the vastly numerically superior Austrian force under d'Alvintzi of 23,000 and driving him from the Caldiero, Villanova, and Arcola area. No forces could be drawn away from Vaubois in the north of Mantua in the South, so Napoleon planned to use the southward flowing Adige River to cover his advance of Augereau and Massena's forces to travel southeast and then cross south of Villanova, moving through Arcola and up the Alpone River to Villanova, hopefully driving d'Alvintzi into retreat.

The Battle of Arcola


Infamous painting of Napoleon leading his men across the bridge at
Arcola

In order to attack Villanova, which was by now far behind d'Alvintzi's main force, Napoleon needed to prevent the Austrians from entering Verona, or realizing the Napoleon had abandoned Verona before he himself could reach Villanova. Napoleon gambled that a force of 3,000 men would be enough to guard Verona, and he set the rest of his force off on 14 November, and by the next morning and pontoon bridge had already been built to cross the Adige River south of Villanova.
The battle of Arcola, a three day long battle, opened on 15 November when Augereau's troops crossed the bridge that morning. Messana crossed next, and successfully secured the French western (left) flank by seizing a series of small towns from Austrian hands. Augereau, on the other hand, met with less luck. Augereau's objective was the town of Arcola, which was just east of the Alpone River and guarded by some 4,000 Austrians sent there days earlier.
Augereau's men refused to cross the river and bridge in Arcola under the sweeping artillery fire that the Austrians had set up there. Any attempt to cross was a dangerous ordeal, and most men took cover behind barriers and dykes instead of attacking when told. Without Arcola, Napoleon knew that a drive on Villanova and d'Alvintzi's was impossible. With every hour that passed, d'Alvintzi had more time to react and send reinforcements to defend against the French attack. Napoleon himself led an attack on Arcola, but after an odd series of events was almost drowned and captured by Austrian forces in the dyke outside the town. By this point, any attack on Arcola was given up for the day, and the next day would be needed to attempt to capture the town. Although the first day had been a failure, d'Alvintzi was now in full retreat from Verona, and was heading away from the city and back towards Villanova.
During the night, Austrian forces had reoccupied Porcile on the left flank, and Arcola on the right; and so much of the previous days' work was for nothing. However, Massena quickly led another successful attack against Porcile and capture it, but Arcola would not be so easy. The battle near Arcola quickly turned into a slugfest between French and Austrian forces, with ground be occupied, lost, and reoccupied time and time again. The Austrians tried to drive Augereau's men away from Arcola, but after a seesaw battle, the French drove the Austrians back into the town. That night, Napoleon withdrew his forces to the east bank of the Adige River to prepare for any emergency action, and again the Austrians reoccupied all the ground they had lost on the second day.
The third day Napoleon realized he had gained a vast advantage the previous day. Napoleon's men had successfully driven a wedge between the Austrian forces, which were now in two unconnected wings. On the right, Arcola was still held by Austrian forces but another attack would likely break their will, especially against a numerically superior French force. On the left, General Provera was holding the line near Porcile again with a small force of 3,000, which General Hohenzollern was holding east of Villanova with another force of 3,000. Hohenzollern believe Napoleon to be just east of Villanova, and so these troops were placed there to defend, but in all reality it was a worthless position to hold. Similarly, only 3,000 Austrians were in Arcola, and 4,000 were south of Arcola to defend against a flanking maneuvre. All the while, d'Alvintzi was holding west of Villanova with 7,000 men. With the Austrians so spread out, Napoleon would easily be able to use Massena as a diversionary attack on the left near Porcile, while Augereau swung into Arcola, and 3,000 new troops arriving from Mantua (as it had been decided Wurmser was not going to make any move outside the fortress) would be brought up to flank Arcola from the east bank of the River, and a two pronged attack on Arcola would surely drive the Austrians back and a swinging manuevre on Villanova would force d'Alvintzi into retreat.
The attack opened with marginal success, but soon turned to near disaster when the pontoon bridge Augereau used to cross into Arcola collapsed. The bridge was soon repaired by engineers, but the time used hurt the French considerably. Meanwhile, Massena carried out a highly successful ambush that allowed part of his force to move into Arcola (Massena's force was split, part in the left flank and part in the right) and capture part of the town. After a clever diversion, the Austrian's low morale finally showed as a French attack caught them by surprise in the rear near Arcola, and the Austrian force finally gave way. Augereau's men linked up with Massena's, and together they began marching north. Sensing the he was being sorrounded, d'Alvintzi ordered a general retreat late in the day, and continued during the night. The next morning the French found nearly all of d'Alvintzi's men gone, far from the ideal strategy of cutting them off and trapping them, but a major victory nonetheless.
The Battle of Arcola, which lasted three entire days, cost the French some 3,500 dead and about 1,000 additional wounded. Meanwhile, the Austrians lost about 7,000 casualties in all. With the battle won, Napoleon quickly turned his eye to Davidovitch, who on 17 November finally launched his long delayed attack. With d'Alvintzi in full retreat, Napoleon swiftly rushed to Vaubois assistance and on 21 November, near Dolce, Davidovitch retreated back towards Trent. Upon hearing of this, d'Alvintzi gave up all hope of reaching Mantua for the time being, and withdrew his men to a safe distance.
The Battle of Arcola marked the third relief attempt by an Austrian army to get to Mantua. It showed the Austrian fascination with relieving Mantua and their belief that the relief would bring total victory in Northern Italy. However, victory was still not in the hands of Napoleon, as he had narrowly escaped total annihilation and d'Alvintzi was beaten but not yet defeated.

The Battle of Rivoli


Highly dramatized painting of Napoleon at Rivoli

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Detailed map of Rivoli

As November came to a close, peace negotiations opened and failed between the French and Austrians, and so it was apparent that the war would continue on into the next year. Meanwhile, Napoleon was busy preparing for the next attack by d'Alvintzi, whose army had been reinforced and was now up to around 45,000 men again. Napoleon dug field fortifications at La Corona, Rivoli, and along the Lower Adige in an attempt to block all possible entry routes (of the three feasible ones there were) that d'Alvintzi would take.
There was another lull in fighting in December, and Napoleon took the time to prepare an ambitious attack on the Pope. However, this all came to an abrupt end when fighting was reported by Augereau reported an attack on Legnano, just south of Villanova. Napoleon rushed back to his headquarters upon hearing of this, and he witnessed first hand that Massena was under attack in Verona. However, this led Napoleon to conclude that these were probably diversionary attacks, and that d'Alvintzi was probably stirring up an attack on another location. He wrote to Joubert telling him to write him immediatedly if a force of over 9,000 is spotted, as this would surely give him confirmation that the attacks on Augereau and Massena were diversionary attacks, and that the main force would come from the north and attack southward.
Confirmation came the later that day when Joubert reported he was pushed out of La Corona by a large force of Austrians, which indicated it had to be their main attacking force. Napoleon was now confident that the attack was coming from the north, from a force of 28,000 under d'Alvintzi's command, while 6,000 attacked Verona, and 9,000 attacked Legnano, mostly as diversions but also as hopeful breakthrough points to reach Mantua and therefore attack Napoleon from both the north and south.
Napoleon ordered Joubert to move all his men to the fortifications at Rivoli, which would give Napoleon huge advantages in terrain. The terrain of Rivoli was this: to the east was the river Adige, making any flanking attempt there risky and unlikely to succeed, a large ridgeline ran north of Rivoli, of which San Marco sat just behind and offered ideal ground for giving battle. Just east of the ridgeline was Monte Magnont, a steep a narros north-south running hill that prevented any force from flanking San Marco, except by a narrow path that existed between Monte Magnont and the Adige River. Just north of Rivoli was the Plateau of Rivoli, offereing good ground for giving battle should the French need to fall back from the ridge. South of Rivoli was Monte Piolo, a large hill that protected the rear of Rivoli. To the west of Rivoli was the Tasso River, a narrow but formidable river that would prevent any easy flanking by the Austrians.
On 14 January, Napoleon arrived at 2 in the morning, and began inspecting the positions with Joubert. Joubert's men were to hold the eastern part of the ridgeline (also known as the Trombalore Heights)including San Marco, and just south of San Marco at the Osteria Gorge. Massena was ordered to hold the western Trombalore Heights and keep the rest of his men in Rivoli as reserve to be drawn up as needed. These were the positions of the French forces on the morning of 14 January.
The battle broke at daylight as Joubert advanced with Massena to drive back three Austrian columns totaling around 12,000 men. Spots in the French line, which had previously been notorious for cowardice, began to break and Napoleon ordered up Massena's force from Rivoli for reinforcements. In a comical and lucky event, Massena himself accidentally rode up to Austrians troops, who attempted to take him prisoner. In as calm a fashion as imaginable, Massena simply turned his horse around and rode away while whistling, all the while being under fire from the Austrians. But Massena's reinforcements did not turn the tide of the battle, and as the morning wore on the situation only became worse.
The Austrians by late morning had set up batteries on the eastern bank of the Adige and were pounding the Heights. To make matters worse, the Austrians were advancing fast down the Osteria Gorge, and San Marco's flank was being put under extreme pressure.
By noon the Austrians had taken the Osteria Gorge, and since the frontal attack on the Heights had slowed, Napoleon repositioned Joubert's troops to meet the flanking threat. A lucky shot by French artillery exploded two Austrian ammunition wagons, which caused panic in the Austrians lines. The French infantry charged, and the Austrians were soon drive out of the Gorge and the troops were repositioned on the Heights.
Meanwhile, Lusignan led a flanking move against the French and attacked Rivoli from the rear. But as Massena's men were no longer tied up at the Gorge, Massena devoted his full effort to defending Rivoli from the south. Reinforcements from General Rey soon came from the south, and the two French forces under Rey and Massena trapped Lusignan's men in between them at Rivoli.
While things north of Rivoli quieted somewhat, to the south a new threat emerged. News reached Napoleon that Austrian general Provera was crossing the Adige to the south and heading for Mantua. Napoleon handed over command and took Massena's men south to meet the new threat, while Joubert was entrusted with finishing the battle in the north.
The next day, 15 November, Joubert pursued d'Alvintzi's men, still numbering around 20,000 up to La Corona. A well timed flanking move by Murat led to the capture of thousands of Austrians forces in the Osteria Gorge. Joubert effectively split up the Austrian force on 15 November, and by the end of the day the total Austrian losses for the two day battle was at 14,000 men killed and 11,000 prisoners. This effectively ended d'Alvintzi's army to a mere 13,000 man mob.
To the south the situation was still risky. Provera marched his men towards Mantua, ignoring repeated attacks from Augereau which cost Provera 2,000 men. Provera came within sight of Mantua on 15 November, but found his only place of entrance blocked by Serurier who held La Favorita and St. George's Fort. On 16 November, Wurmser launched a bold attack out of Mantua, but was held back by Serurier, while Napoleon and Massena came up on Provera's rear later in the day. Provera surrendered his men, realizing a relief of Mantua was by now a lost cause.
The Battle of Rivoli was the last attempt by the Austrians to relieve Mantua, and was the last great battle of Napoleon's first invasion of Italy. It effectively destroyed d'Alvintzi's army, left the force under Wurmser at Mantua completely cut off and walled in, and gave Napoleon a clear opening through which to attack deep into Austria. With little choice left, Wurmser surrendered Mantua on 2 February with little more than half of his original garrison still living. The battle of Rivoli sealed the fate on Mantua, and the fall of Mantua sealed the fate on the Italian Campaign. After Mantua, there was no doubt that Napoleon was the master of Northern Italy. With little threat from the Austrians, Napoleon once again attacked the Pope, winning a quick victory, and securing nearly 30 million francs for the Directory from the Pope. While the Italian Campaign had been won, the war had not, and Napoleon's job therefore was not yet finished.

Victory


Napoleon's entry into Venice

After the fall of Mantua, Napoleon could not yet hope to push on to Vienna, as he had little over 50,000 men under his command. But after securing 30 million francs from the Pope, the Directory sent him reinforcements so that his numbers totalled some 80,000 troops, and the Italian front was now considered the primary front in the war. Yet again, the Austrians had amassed another large army, of about 50,000, under the command of Archduke Charles to attack Napoleon and prevent him from driving into Austria. Napoleon split his force into two, a covering force under Joubert would hold the area around Tyrol, while Napoleon led 60,000 troops through Frioul and on to Vienna. The two advancing forces would be able to aid the other if one came under attack, but ideally the two would advance parallel to each other until they would link up and drive on Vienna.
The operation began in late February, with the first shots fired on 1 March. Napoleon and Joubert succeeded in engaging small detatchments of Charles' forces, and on numerous occasions took hundreds or thousands of Austrian prisoners. No major threat came to the French until they closed in on Vienna and communications and supply lines became overstretched. To solve this, Napoleon called for a five day long ceasefire on 7 April. On 13 April, Napoleon called for an succeeded in getting an extension of the ceasefire for five more days. On 16 April, Napoleon proposed that formal negotiations begin, and the Austrian nerve broke when they realized Moreau and Hoche were on the verge of crossing the Rhine again. Peace negotiations were established, and Napoleon, without the formal approval of the Directory, worked out a peace negotiation with Austria. This negotiation was modified slightly by the Treaty of Campo Formio, which was signed on 17 October 1797 and officially ended the war. But in all, most of the agreements that Napoleon suggested were adopted into the treaty. The treaty essentially recognized France's land in the Netherlands, land occupied near the Rhine, the Ionian Islands, and the Cisalpine Republic. It gave back some land to Austria, which was obvious even at the time would lead to another war in the near future. With the signing of the Treaty, Napoleon's campaign in Italy came to a very successful close. He had in twelve months defeated numerous armies, fought with little break, and marched across Northern Italy and pacified it in the process.

Conclusion


Napoleon during the 18 Brumaire coup d'etat. Some argue without the
Italian Campaign, such coup would have been inconceivable.

The Italian Campaign shaped Napoleon in every way possible, militarily, politically, and personally. It was his first major command, one that he took with very little prior experience of actual leadership other than theory, and he showed exceptional command skills and genius understanding of tactics and war. While it can be argued that Napoleon faced second rate commanders in Italy, it must be remembered that his army was on the brink of starvation, and resembled nothing of what one pictures an army to have looked like. He received little help from the Directory, and was on his own to face his enemies.
The campaign marked the end of the old style warfare, and gave birth to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic style of warfare. Napoleon's ideas on war prior to Italy had only been in theory, but in Italy he was able to put his theory to practice, and as an obvious result overcame his opponents despite serious challenges and setbacks.
The campaign was not just important in the rise of Napoleon's practise of war, but also his political future. The success of the campaign made Napoleon, ironically, an enemy of the Directory which he had defended and achieved victory for. Many within the Directory began to fear such a successful general, and it was their primary reasoning for sending Napoleon to Egypt. This strain in relations would eventually lead to Napoleon's successful coup d'etat against he Directory on 18 Brumaire in 1799 and the establishment of the Consulate.
In conclusion, the Invasion of Italy was Napoleon's baptism by fire. It was the first time he led an army, and he did so with passion, excellence, and most of support from his troops. Rather he realized it or not (which he almost certainly did not) at the time, Napoleon was changing the way warfare was waged when he invaded Italy.

NOTE: Most maps are from the History Department of the United States Military Academy at West Point, which can be found here

[Tiberius Tosi]

Updated and wrote the Introduction. The next part will probably cover the Battle of Montenotte and Mondovi

[Darsh]

Good job, +rep

[Tiberius Tosi]

Updated to the Battles of Montenotte and Mondovi.

Sorry it took me so long. About 4 days ago I had the next 2 sections types up and was ready to save changes, when all of a suddent i hit the back button on the wrong tab, and deleted about 4 hours worth of work lol. I got so pissed that I didn't type anything until tonight lol.

[Lone rider]

well writen + rep

[BasileII]

Latter, when asked about his ancestors, Napoleon was used to answer that his nobility began with Montenotte...

[wearenemesis]

Great stuff, I be looking forward to the rest of this! +rep

[DAVIDE]

me too especially the part with Venice. Tiberius, if u need help about the relation between Napoleon and Venice ask me. Venetians didnt forget some things

[Tiberius Tosi]

Wow, got lazy. Finally updated with the next part. It's kind of awkward were I stopped just before Castiglione, but I did not have enough time to include it. So it will be in the next part even though it should be in this one.

[Tiberius Tosi]

Finished! Man I really got lazy on this one for the longest time. Eventually I will edit the conclusion and more events after Rivoli, admittedly the sources I do have are sort of limited on that; as they pertain to the military aspect of the campaign(s).

[Stavroforos]

This is looking really great, and I'm going to be thanking you in a few days when I have to probably take a test or two on Napoleon!

+reps.

[wearenemesis]

Awesome write up. I'm glad you finally finished. Looking forward to any thing in the future you may write up!

[motiv-8]

Those maps are damn good, I love West Point's military history and atlas series.