Why early legions were better to deal with Guerilla warfare than Hoplite formations?

[jo the greek]

The greatested hoplite defeats were those against guerilla warfare this is also a reason why Rome reformed their early army according to many.

So what exactly made a early legion better in dealing skirmishers and etc??

[Delta228]

Well, I would bet it would have to do with the much better tactical mobility of legionaries, when compared to hoplites? I guess that the legions could better ward off attacks against their flanks and rear, while the hoplites in phalanx could not turn to either side, or risk destroying the formation and being cut to pieces.

Just a guess

[jo the greek]

Well, I would bet it would have to do with the much better tactical mobility of legionaries, when compared to hoplites? I guess that the legions could better ward off attacks against their flanks and rear, while the hoplites in phalanx could not turn to either side, or risk destroying the formation and being cut to pieces.

Just a guess

well hoplites were trained to turn faces surely they must be slower to legions.
But in my mind i was refering more in the hit and run tactics of Thracian peltasts similar to those Iphicrates copied and forced the creation ekdromoi hoplite.

[conon394]

Something of a myth in my opinion - at least there was any inherent advantage for Legions vs Hoplites.

After all the Legions even professional late ones had their share of defeats against various types on non linear set piece battle - in Germany and Parthia etc.

In general I would say things like overall trainning and professionalism (and experienced officers) makes the real diffrence. Thus an experienced hoplite force with good officers like the 10,000 was quite flexible and able to deal with all the threats it faced. A an early classical hoplite army from a small city that was all militia and fought nobody to often would likely have problems facing any and every type of opponent not just 'guerrilla' tactics.

Another thing to remember is that Romans, Greeks and even the persians were basically state forces so when faced with and enemy like the Germans or Scythian; they all had issues with that kind of enemy who often had little in the way of fixed sited that could be objective or means to force a pitched battle.

Finally what exactly do you mean by 'guerrilla' tactics many example that you might be thinking of are more often simple better executed combined arms affairs and not Hoplites loosing to 'guerrilla' tactics.

But in my mind i was refering more in the hit and run tactics of Thracian peltasts similar to those Iphicrates copied and forced the creation ekdromoi hoplite.

ahh as I thought. But that is not what Iphicrates did he led a combined force of peltasts and hoplites, and bested a combined force of cavalry and hoplites. Ipicrates did exploit an initial disconnect between the the Spartan cavalry and hoplites, and benefited from the poor use of the cavalry did return, but I don't think you can say he used 'guerrilla' tactics. His plan however fully depended on hoplites to work.

Nor would I really agree his attack produced any ken hoplits - he failed with Peltasts on several occasions to halt or deflect Epaminondas in his attacks on sparta even though He (Iphicrates) was defending the rough terrain around the Ithmus. Furth according Plutarch Epaminondas is specifically noted as mocking new style peltasts and using traditinal hoplites. Even in Xenpohon's narrative it is age class not equipment that defines thosehoplites sent to charge the peltasts

[hellheaven1987]

Thus an experienced hoplite force with good officers like the 10,000 was quite flexible and able to deal with all the threats it faced.

Ya, except Xenophon would probably argue that it was rather the mercy of Persia king that allowed them to survive.

[conon394]

Ya, except Xenophon would probably argue that it was rather the mercy of Persia king that allowed them to survive.

Bah - the 10,000 offered battle on the day of Cunixa and the King refused (and I suppose the forced defeated by the 10,000 was rather planned fake withdrawal as well?). In any case I was thinking more of the latter encounters where the 10,000 showed continued operational flexibility in many types of terrain and situations.

[jo the greek]

I mean the use of mobility manoeuvres and of terrain to wear of the opponent .

Like Iphicrates did like Thracian and Samnites


edit Xenophon they used cooperation with ligh infantry and cavalry in order to overcome guerllla warfare.


And tactics that soon after forgoten

[conon394]

edit Xenophon they used cooperation with ligh infantry and cavalry in order to overcome guerllla warfare.

That does not change the underlying mobility, and flexibility displayed by the vast bulk of the force - hoplites - as good as anything the Legions managed.

And tactics that soon after forgoten

No

I mean the use of mobility manoeuvres and of terrain to wear of the opponent .

Like Iphicrates did

The key problem is that you are myopically focusing on just one aspect of the one battle of Iphicrates and missing the forest for the trees.

Iphicrates and his most notable victory are first and foremost a victory of the principle of concentration of forces, not maneuver and not guerrilla warfare.

I cannot recollect the source correctly at the moment but I believe the evidence suggests the Athenian mercenary peltast force was around 2000 men, add to that XX Athenian Hoplites (certainly more than the the one Spartan regiment) and compare to a small Spartan force of 300 600 with only minimal cavalry support.

Overall the Athenians concentrated all their available forces against a detached unit and archived a crushing victory. Numbers do tell and especially when the enemy handles his troops badly, the Spartans initially allowed their cavalry and infantry to become separated and handled their cavalry baldy when it did return.

The main point remains the Athenians had an overwhelming numerical advantage (quite likely ~9 or 10:1 over 5:1) and the Spartans were caught away from any real means to negate it. At those odd an all hoplite Athenian force could have won or all cavalry or the Persians or the Corinthians or just about anyone. Also Xenophon is clear it is the final advance of the Athenian hoplites that routes the Spartans.

A victory for a well led combined arms force, with massive local superiority in numbers - not a victory of a small band of guerrillas over hoplites...

To put it another way Herodotus informs us that 300 Spartans were wiped out during the helot revolt following the earthquake mid 5th century. What does that mean - it certainly does not mean that lightly armed helots are superior to Spartan hoplites. It as Spartan hoplites that conquered the helots and held them to bondage until Epaminodas and his hoplites made the diffrence.

Again don't forget that against Epaminondas and his very Hoplite army, Iphicrates never succeeded in either blocking E's advance nor retreat across the isthmus, with peltasts.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

The Romans probably never had the chance of employing Peltasts in their army since it was a relatively late innovation. An all Hoplite army of Citizens would thus be equipped and fight in the old linear style, which was poor in the combined arms aspect in every situation. Thus there was a more or less radical reform by the early IV century BC, when a "junta" of military tribunes assumed power in Rome and is thought to have been the originator of the "Camillan" legion, which included a disproportionate amount of light troops but was less stringent on equipment requirements (only a minority would be able to afford the "Classical" panoply at this time) while retaining flexibility, speed and staying power in rough ground.

If I'm not mistaken it was rough ground that also compelled a radical change in Macedonian tactics - when Alexander invaded Baktria, he used a disproportionate number of Peltasts, who were nothing more than pikemen versed in a more fluid and loose fighting style. Since most trained pikemen of the time were also versed in skirmishing and flexible "maniple" formations, it is assumed that when facing rough ground or less linear combat a proportion of the pikemen would be able to just switch to a better stance of peltastai or lighter tureophoroi, therefore precluding the need of any "legion-like" reform for the effectiveness of Greek armies on the field.

[jo the greek]

Similar example of hoplite failure is dimostenes invasion Aetolia and Sicily were geurilla warfare beat hoplite forces.

A fact that made legionaires better versus guerilla warfare is the fact they had lighter equipment and use javelins that could counterattack enemies javelins.

[removeduser_487563287433]

The greatested hoplite defeats were those against guerilla warfare this is also a reason why Rome reformed their early army according to many.

So what exactly made a early legion better in dealing skirmishers and etc??

The Battle of Lake Trasimine instantly seems to fly in the face of this.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

The Battle of Lake Trasimine instantly seems to fly in the face of this.

And how exactly?

[rez]

Another thing to remember is that Romans, Greeks and even the persians were basically state forces

Even?

Ya, except Xenophon would probably argue that it was rather the mercy of Persia king that allowed them to survive.

Given Xenophon's deliciously belligerent temperament towards the Persians I think you'd find that he would be the last person to make that case.

[frontier-auxilia]

From my reading of Xenophon, the hoplites were technically getting savaged by the skirmishers. Sure they played a bit of role but it was really the skirmishers that saved them from being slowly bleed to death by hit and run attacks.

In a head on fight, both are pretty much equal but the earlier legion do have an advantage of the maniple system that allowed them to constantly feed in fresh troops.

[Andurath]

My information is dated and I have not researched this issue in some time, but I thought it was the early Roman Army we are talking about here. Isn't that an army that was versed in fighting small battles in hilly terrain ,I am talking before the full conquest of the Italian peninsula? That army 'beat' Phyrrus , well in a sence. I think that is where much of the 'myth' of the Roman superiority may have originally come from. I think in origin the Roman Army was a bit guerilla itself. Smaller rounder shields, shorter swords and all armed with javelins they kept a looser formation and were used to fighting in rough terrain. Later that all changed I am sure.

[conon394]

rez

Even?

Yep I can see how that looks at first glance but... What I meant was even though they did not use heavy infantry as their primary of action like the Romans and Greeks, they all of them in there own way expected and to fight pitched battle dictated by the enemies need to defend non-mobile capital goods (be it cites, built up farm land, etc) and than if victorious often follow up with siege or some negotiated settlement. In other words I more or less trying to say that a not 'heavy infantry focus' does not mean not the same mind set about what happens in war, and the same problems with Germans or Scythians.