Was Cannae genius?

[Blarni]

Cannae is often cited as tactical genius.

Yet from a layman's point of view what I see illustrated and described is more a perfectly executed, but tactically rather simple, double envelopment of the enemy force. At a glance it seems Roman/allied incompetence (don't lose your flanks is tactics 101) and cavalry inferiority is more to blame than any great feat of tactics. I know the Carthaginian infantry gave way in the centre to draw the Romans in, but that's happened it other battles, though more often by accident.

So what in your opinion makes this the military masterpiece it's celebrated as? And which Roman casualty figures do you think are most likely? - they appear to range from about 11-70,000

[DAVIDE]

Romans thought they won, just seeing the Carthaginian battle formation and numbers. Arrogance , presumption and self-confidence mistakes. Tactically, u cannot say anything against Romans. They won lots of battles in that way and it was their way to fight, breaking enemy lines with a massive central infantry charge

[A pimp named Slickback]

Romans thought they won, just seeing the Carthaginian battle formation and numbers. Arrogance , presumption and self-confidence mistakes. Tactically, u cannot say anything against Romans. They won lots of battles in that way and it was their way to fight, breaking enemy lines with a massive central infantry charge

Thats amazing!

[Timoleon of Korinthos]

Well, if you think about it, most tactically celebrated battles of antiquity were rather simple in their conception: Mantineia, Chaeroneia, Gaugamela etc. Breaking away from the norms is what makes them special. In the case of Cannae, none else ever manged to pull off a double envelopment and even more so despite being heavily outnumbered; this speaks volumes about the difficulty of such a maneuver in my book. And the very fact that Hannibal accepted a battle on his enemies' terms and managed to come up with this plan, when regular Carthaginian sentiment would call for holding to the strategy of ambushing or retereating to the high grounds, but in any case NOT facing 80,000 Romans out in the open, shows his genious.

I know the Carthaginian infantry gave way in the centre to draw the Romans in, but that's happened it other battles, though more often by accident.

You overlook that Hannibal formed his infantry in the shape of a reversed crescent, not only a revolutionary move, but also one which suggests he had predicted, accepted and that he took advantage of the course of the battle in the center; he did not command the infantry to give ground, he sensed it would do so (this is also pointed out by the Celts suffering by far the greatest losses).

don't lose your flanks is tactics 101

Does not equal defeat, however. Philopoemen won a battle in Mantineia against the Spartans with proper use of center and reserves despite losing his flanks and the Romans themselves lost the entire left in Magnesia. In Cannae, they still held an overwheling numerical advantage after the cavalry was gone.

And which Roman casualty figures do you think are most likely?

I am only aware of Polybius' figures, who, if my memory serves me right, states that out of roughly 80000 Romans, 5000 broke through the center and escaped and another 10000, who were guarding the camp, were captured after the battle. The rest were killed.

So what in your opinion makes this the military masterpiece it's celebrated as?

1) Maintaining clarity of thought instead of being overrun by panick and coming up with innovative moves and a simple, yet unprecedented plan on behalf of the general.
2) Perfect execution of maneuvers on behalf of the soldiers.
3) The huge Roman casualties

[Entropy Judge]

Cannae is often cited as tactical genius.

Yet from a layman's point of view what I see illustrated and described is more a perfectly executed, but tactically rather simple, double envelopment of the enemy force.

I'm not sure that I've ever heard Cannae referred to as "tactical" genius, but that's neither here nor there. Part of what makes the double envelopment so difficult to pull off successfully is the lack of Command and Control - until the advent of radios, you're limited by line of sight (flag system, for example), hearing (drums and other musical instruments), although this can be impractical), or how fast your messengers are (and the larger the battlefield, the greater the time lag, meaning you'd better know what you're doing).

For example, if the Carthaginian cavalry had dealt with the Roman cavalry too soon, and attacked the Romans before they were far enough into the trap, it wouldn't have been as effective an envelopment. If the Carthaginian center had broken, it would probably have failed entirely. That Hannibal was able to correctly forecast the actions of the Romans and plan on using those actions in a believable manner (the 'failing' center) is the mark of his genius.

Edit:

Hannibal accepted a battle on his enemies' terms

I'd thought that Hannibal was leading them into battle on *his* terms, and that he'd planned on the terrain forcing the Romans to abandon their looser formations and clump up into a denser mass?

[Timoleon of Korinthos]

I'd thought that Hannibal was leading them into battle on *his* terms, and that he'd planned on the terrain forcing the Romans to abandon their looser formations and clump up into a denser mass?

Well, I would say it was a bright example of his genious that he made his terms appeal so much to his enemies that they thought they were theirs. It is certain he had been trying for ages to lure the Romans into another large battle and must have been well aware of the fact that the plains favoured him because of his superior cavalry, but the Romans did not realise that or if they did, they did not show the proper caution, because the only thought crossing their mind after Trebia and Trassimene was not to fight on grounds that could support the possibility of another ambush; and Cannae did not. Other than that they were very confident on their victory and density became a problem only when they started being pressed from all sides, I think.
Furthermore, Polybious notes that the Romans fought with 8 armies that day and Hannibal probably wouldn't have anticipated such a huge force when initiating the manuevers that eventually culminated in the battle, since they had never done it before (and never did afterwards).
For these reasons I believe the Roman staff would be convinced that everything was working to their advantage (and with a better generalship this might have been true). That's what I meant before

[Blarni]

Wow, thanks everyone for the effort of some full and excellent answers.

With the casualties there are of course modern historians who believe they know better, dismissing typical ancient 'exaggeration' and dropping the Roman losses down to as little a 10,000. I don't buy that because whatever the actual number it was clearly large enough to create the palpable shock you see in the Roman sources of the time.

[Homeros]

The Romans knew the skills of Hannibal, but they were completely confident that the largest army ever assembled by the Romans would be victorious no matter what Hannibal had come up with. Their biggest problem was the lack of a supreme commander. The Carthaginians were commanded by one (brilliant) man, the Romans had multiple commanders. Aemilius commanded the strong right flank, two former Consuls including Servilius commanded the massive centre and Varro lead the (weak) roman cavalry at the left. They had no idea what the others were doing and had no plan of how to attack. They simply moved forward, straight at the Carthaginian centre.

It wasn't just the briliance of Hannibal that ensured victory, but the outright stupidity of the Romans. Confidently charging forward they eventually found themselves completely surrounded. The Carthaginians steadily pushed them together until the Romans could hardly move. It was a massacre. The Romans lost at least 50,000 men that day including 80 senators.

[bleach]

Complexity and genius are not the same thing. Like Walter Sobchek said, once a plan gets too complex there is always something that goes wrong. All the most important innovations, theories, etc. tend to be elegantly simple, and widely applicable.

[Homeros]

Complexity and genius are not the same thing. Like Walter Sobchek said, once a plan gets too complex there is always something that goes wrong. All the most important innovations, theories, etc. tend to be elegantly simple, and widely applicable.

True.

The tactics used by Hannibal were extremely simple, but everything was executed almost perfectly. And thats really difficult.

[CBR]

I don't see why the Romans were stupid. IMO Cannae shows both sides had learned from their last set piece battle (Trebia)

The Romans were careful to not just march forward and tire themselves before having breakfast. They also made sure to fight in a place where they could not be surprised by hidden enemy forces, nor fight in a too open place, to limit the effectiveness of the enemy cavalry. They also had an even larger army than at Trebia. From Polybius I'm guessing that the Romans decided to act more defensively with their cavalry as they now knew they would not stand a chance if they just charged forward.

In that sense, everything looked much better from the Roman perspective: They had limited their own weaknesses and reinforced what they were good at, remember they did manage to break through the center at Trebia.

Unfortunately they faced a commander who also had learned from his weaknesses and had the skill and courage to take some calculated risks that he was forced to do because both of the battlefield size and the Roman plan and/or size of army.

Hannibals formation was most likely designed to not only delay the defeat, but ultimately to suck in the Roman center and especially the wings (which is what happened according to Polybius) By having what appears to be a dedicated infantry reserve to hit the Romans in the flank, he also had prepared himself for the inevitable Roman breakthrough (something he had not done at Trebia)

But what is perhaps the most important element is that he put all his heavy cavalry on his left wing and let his Numidians handle the right wing. That was surely a risky move as the Numidians would not have been able to stop all the Roman allied cavalry. But Hannibal most likely predicted that the Romans would act very defensively and with the fog of war (dust etc) the Roman allies would not notice it and stick to the plan of protecting the flank.

So although he had a rather constricted front, his cavalry still managed to win on the left wing. In Hasdrubal he had a great cavalry commander to ensure that his victorious cavalry would not just dissolve into a mass pursuit (which we can see happen in countless battles) but use it to quickly win on the right wing and attack the Roman infantry.

So to sum it up: IMO both sides had adapted their plans according to earlier experiences but Hannibal had just taken it one step further as can be seen with his cavalry deployment and he ultimately outsmarted the Romans. That I guess can be considered genius.


CBR

[Homeros]

I don't see why the Romans were stupid. IMO Cannae shows both sides had learned from their last set piece battle (Trebia)

The moment the Carthaginian center started to pull back, the Romans smelled victory and disbanded caution. They sent in their entire force. If they had kept a strong force in reserve to guard their rear, they would probably have won the battle. They didn't.

[CBR]

The moment the Carthaginian center started to pull back, the Romans smelled victory and disbanded caution. They sent in their entire force. If they had kept a strong force in reserve to guard their rear, they would probably have won the battle. They didn't.

The Romans thought they had the flanks covered with the cavalry. Their smallest cavalry force, the Roman on the right wing, had flank protection with the river nearby. Both wings had a Roman commander attached, so they did what they could to do well on the flanks.

And as they knew the key to victory was to smash the enemy infantry fast, there would be little purpose in removing forces to cover the rear. And the rear might actually have been covered by the third line (the Triarii) but the advance against the special Carthaginian formation could have disrupted that.

I'd say the Romans had several reason to feel confident as the army size, terrain and tactical plan all made sense. They just faced a guy who used several rather risky or at least unorthodox elements and who had some high quality units and leaders who performed well.

Also remember that Scipio appears to be the first commander who really managed to produce some well trained legions, so maybe we should not expect earlier Legions to be that great in more than just advancing forward. So the Roman commanders merely used what they had in their toolbox as well as possible.


CBR

[conon394]

The moment the Carthaginian center started to pull back, the Romans smelled victory and disbanded caution. They sent in their entire force. If they had kept a strong force in reserve to guard their rear, they would probably have won the battle. They didn't.

Perhaps but not fully exploiting a center breech was the failure of Trebia

edit: I mean It may well be genius aranging everything just so, but what if the Carthy center had folded just like before. In a similar way sure the Theban commander made good use of his last cavalry reserses at Delium but it also require the Athenioans to see it a the vangueard of a new army other wise thay easiy ignore it and turn of the Thebans and win...

Somebody almost always makes a mistake and in hindsight thay are easy to note, but even with a resever the Romans faced a difficult task of being overmatching in cavalry, and not perhapse having a good handel on Hellenistic defensive cavalry drill - have or create hamippoi to reinforce your cavalry or perhpase just have your cavalry draw away but remain a force in being.

[Sphere]

Also remember that Scipio appears to be the first commander who really managed to produce some well trained legions, so maybe we should not expect earlier Legions to be that great in more than just advancing forward. So the Roman commanders merely used what they had in their toolbox as well as possible.

IIRC, the bulk of the Roman forces where completely green due to previous losses to Hannibal, and the doubling (I think) of the standard army size. To compensate for the huge size and inexperience, the Roman commander compacted his overall formation to keep cohesion. So it wasn't just that legions around this time where not as well trained, the specific units used at cannae were sub-par to begin with.

[CBR]

Yeah they might have been worse than normal but still I think they had many months to build up the army. But recruiting such a large army could have meant a lack of good officers so overall they might not have been as good. IIRC the regular practice was to recruit legions for just a year at a time so legions were generally not as good as a standing army would have been. As the war dragged on Scipio did have access to units that had several years of experience incl some of the survivors from Cannae IIRC.

The reason for the extra depth at Cannae were AFAIK that there was not room for deploying the whole army in ordinary depth. Even if they had the room the infantry line might have been more than 3 Km wide, which is rather unwieldy and not something they had much experience with anyway. Better to keep it simple and compact for the big attack.

Although about double the size of the army at Trebia it would have had about same frontage and that could easily be done with each maniple deployed in column, as they appear to have done anyway when in open/reserve formation, then just let all maniples move sideways to contract the frontage. Or maybe do what they normally did but have each century half its files and double its ranks. Its rather simple to do IMO, so it is something one could expect a newly recruited army could do. Adrian Goldsworthy even thinks they deployed with 4 times their regular depth. In my totally non-scholar opinion I don't buy that though

CBR

[Claudius Gothicus]

Cannae was groundbreaking and tactically perfect, but in the end it didn't have any strategical relevance to Carthage.
Now Ilipa was as genius as Cannae and decided the Second Punic War.

[Holger Danske]

It's a classical example of how you could defeat a vastly larger enemy force but utilzing it's own size against it. It's nothing short of brilliant. Just like how Alexander created the gap in the Persian lines at Gaugamela.

[Mangalore]

Cannae is often cited as tactical genius.

Yet from a layman's point of view what I see illustrated and described is more a perfectly executed, but tactically rather simple, double envelopment of the enemy force. At a glance it seems Roman/allied incompetence (don't lose your flanks is tactics 101) and cavalry inferiority is more to blame than any great feat of tactics. I know the Carthaginian infantry gave way in the centre to draw the Romans in, but that's happened it other battles, though more often by accident.

So what in your opinion makes this the military masterpiece it's celebrated as? And which Roman casualty figures do you think are most likely? - they appear to range from about 11-70,000

The genius was that a vastly inferior force (in numbers and partly quality) did this double envelopment. It wouldn't have been that special if Hannibal had the numbers but the odds were 2:1 against him and except his African infantry the quality of his infantry was very varied.

So what makes it special is that he planned this encirclement, consciously deployed each of his forces in a way to maximize their effect. Tthe crescent shape of the Gallic and Iberian units so they could trade space for time in changing ranks so the Romans had to deal with two different fighting styles, the African units to kill the forward drive of the Romans by taking them in the flanks, the distribution of his cavalry forces to overwhelm one wing and harras the other. On top of things his forces were not a unified army but a collection of various cultures, people and languages. To get such a force to maneuver in such a sophisticated way needs quite thought.




Never heard as low as 11000 in casualties. It seems certain to me that if all accounts are correct that the deployed Roman forces were completely destroyed as a force so numbers between 30000-50000 seem likely.

[Spartan JKM]

Excellent discussion

...which Roman casualty figures do you think are most likely? - they appear to range from about 11-70,000

This is an unusual case where Livy is to be preferred over Polybius, who, for whatever reason, became confused with untenable explanations:

Polybius, Book 3.117,

c. 70,000 infantry killed and over 5,600 cavalry either killed or captured; about 10,000 infantry captured; about 3,000 infantry and 370 cavalry escape.

Total: c. 85, 630 killed or captured. NO. Polybius states the Roman army numbered 80,000 infantry and over 6,000 cavalry (which is to be accepted, IMHO), thus stating that 89,000 were killed, captured, and escaped doesn't fit. But being this is where we lose Polybius' works at this point, perhaps something more cogent was part of what was lost.

Livy, Book 22.49-50,

45,000 infantry and 2,700 cavalry killed; 3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry captured on the battlefield; 2,000 men fled to Cannae before rounded up by the Carthaginian cavalry under one Carthalo (no fortifications), 7,000 escaped to the smaller camp, and 10,000 to the larger camp; 600 valiantly broke from the smaller to join the larger camp, and were part of 10,000 total who finally made it to Canusium; 4,550 men, including the consul Varro, made it to Venusia; Hannibal took 18,700 prisoners total after besieging the smaller camp, with the remaining fugitives in the larger camp surrendering; total Roman survivors who escaped numbered 14,550. Many cavalrymen became dismounted amid the action, thus many riderless horses were either captured or simply rode away. Regarding 'reserves', the Roman compact order, as with a phalanx, offered the rear ranks to serve somewhat as such. 10,000 were left to guard the Roman large camp, which was situated on the left bank of the Aufidus (probabaly one legion with it's ala), and for what it is worth, Appian tells us that 5,000 in the smaller camp 'were captured by Hannibal the following day' (Roman History, Book 7.26).

Romans thought they won, just seeing the Carthaginian battle formation and numbers. Arrogance , presumption and self-confidence mistakes. Tactically, u cannot say anything against Romans. They won lots of battles in that way and it was their way to fight, breaking enemy lines with a massive central infantry charge

I don't see why the Romans were stupid. IMO Cannae shows both sides had learned from their last set piece battle (Trebia)

The Romans were careful to not just march forward and tire themselves before having breakfast. They also made sure to fight in a place where they could not be surprised by hidden enemy forces, nor fight in a too open place, to limit the effectiveness of the enemy cavalry. They also had an even larger army than at Trebia. From Polybius I'm guessing that the Romans decided to act more defensively with their cavalry as they now knew they would not stand a chance if they just charged forward.

In that sense, everything looked much better from the Roman perspective: They had limited their own weaknesses and reinforced what they were good at, remember they did manage to break through the center at Trebia.

Unfortunately they faced a commander who also had learned from his weaknesses and had the skill and courage to take some calculated risks that he was forced to do because both of the battlefield size and the Roman plan and/or size of army.

Hannibals formation was most likely designed to not only delay the defeat, but ultimately to suck in the Roman center and especially the wings (which is what happened according to Polybius) By having what appears to be a dedicated infantry reserve to hit the Romans in the flank, he also had prepared himself for the inevitable Roman breakthrough (something he had not done at Trebia)

But what is perhaps the most important element is that he put all his heavy cavalry on his left wing and let his Numidians handle the right wing. That was surely a risky move as the Numidians would not have been able to stop all the Roman allied cavalry. But Hannibal most likely predicted that the Romans would act very defensively and with the fog of war (dust etc) the Roman allies would not notice it and stick to the plan of protecting the flank.

So although he had a rather constricted front, his cavalry still managed to win on the left wing. In Hasdrubal he had a great cavalry commander to ensure that his victorious cavalry would not just dissolve into a mass pursuit (which we can see happen in countless battles) but use it to quickly win on the right wing and attack the Roman infantry.

So to sum it up: IMO both sides had adapted their plans according to earlier experiences but Hannibal had just taken it one step further as can be seen with his cavalry deployment and he ultimately outsmarted the Romans. That I guess can be considered genius.

The genius was that a vastly inferior force (in numbers and partly quality) did this double envelopment. It wouldn't have been that special if Hannibal had the numbers but the odds were 2:1 against him and except his African infantry the quality of his infantry was very varied.

So what makes it special is that he planned this encirclement, consciously deployed each of his forces in a way to maximize their effect. Tthe crescent shape of the Gallic and Iberian units so they could trade space for time in changing ranks so the Romans had to deal with two different fighting styles, the African units to kill the forward drive of the Romans by taking them in the flanks, the distribution of his cavalry forces to overwhelm one wing and harras the other. On top of things his forces were not a unified army but a collection of various cultures, people and languages. To get such a force to maneuver in such a sophisticated way needs quite thought.

Well, Blarni, the course of the Battle of Cannae from Hannibal's tactical design seems 'simple' in that there weren't any sophisticated maneuvers employed which specifically involved infantry maneuver (he didn't make use of any oblique or swinging moves, or cavalry wedges, etc.) The simplicity lay in that Carthaginian armies were not atypical of any style, and the nature of their mercenaries would not have been conducive to building standing forces under any systematic form of evolving drill. It was Hannibal's adept leadership of men which was paramount, and exemplified how elastically hinged wings of cavalry could exploit the disorganization created in the enemy's center by a brilliant commander. Cannae remains an ideal of any commander resolving to effect the tactical destruction of an enemy, and carries a resonance far beyond its own age. The very name of 'Cannae' would become a generic noun to generals, soldiers, and militarists of all ages. Scipio the Younger was at Cannae as a young tribune, and certainly was affected by such tactics; the 'stupid' Roman commanders who faced Hannibal before were never provided with such valuable blueprints. This, of course, is all arguable, and hindsight always allows a clarity they didn't have in the exigencies of the moment. The great Dutch system of drill and discipline instituted in the late 16the century involved a relevant correspondence in 1595: Jan VI van Nassau, Maurits van Nassau, and Willem Lodewijk van Nassau devised methods involving flexibility and greater firepower, taken to more elaborate steps later by the great Gustav II of Sweden. The three eminent Dutchmen (Jan was Mauritz's uncle, Willem the son of Jan and cousin of Mauritz) diligently studied Cannae and Scipio's victories (obviously for balance), as the treatise entitled Annibal et Scipion ou les Grands Capitains enjoyed considerable circulation. But the battles of Turnhout (1597) and Nieuwpoort (1600), impressive tactical displays over the powerful Spanish army of Flanders, were not nearly akin to formulas for total victory.

The Prussian General Staff of the late 19th century seemingly became obsessed with Cannae, and the 1914 Schlieffen Plan was inspired by the battle, though the strategic scale was much more vast. The conceptualization of Graf Alfred von Schlieffen's bold proposal in WW1 was taking into consideration that lack of manpower for a 'colossal Cannae' forced the substitution of a 'right hook' for Hannibal's 'double-envelopment'. This scheme brought Germany close to victory early in WW1, but turned out not to be feasible with the arrival in France, among other issues (such as Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger being at loggerheads with each other), of the British Expeditionary Force. Sorry, this isn't the place for this, but basically, Cannae would become an ideal of many future commanders, and the Wehrmacht's vast envelopments of the Soviet forces at the start of 'Barbarossa' were called 'super-Cannaes'. Gregori Shtern, the Far East Army commander under Georgi Zhukov, said of the great Soviet envelopment of the Japanese in the summer of 1939, at the Battle of Khalkin-Gol (Nomonhan),

"...I think we have won the second perfect battle of encirclement in all history."

Actually, Scipio's victory at Campi Magni (the 'Great Plains') was also as close a display of tactical perfection we may come across: unlike at Ilipa three years earlier, Scipio effectively engaged the enemy center after encircling it with his principes and triarii acting as battlefield reserves. However, it's nearly impossible to believe that Gaius Laelius and Masinissa routed some 26,000 enemy soldiers by themselves, as Polybius (14.8) and Livy (30.8) succinctly imply. Khalid ibn-al Walid, 'the Sword of Allah', achieved a variation of a model pincer movement against the Sassanids in 633, with his victory over them at Walaja, which including similar dispositions as Hannibal had deployed at the Battle of the Trebbia. Another great double envelopment was administered by the Swedish leader Carl Gustav Rehnskjold in 1706 (soon to be a Count and Field Marshal); in a brilliant tactical win over an allied army of Saxons, Poles, and Russians, Rehnskjold utilized his superior cavalry (he was outnumbered heavily in infantry) with his subordinate Ernst von Krassow, who was to him which one Hasdrubal (not a Barca) was for Hannibal at Cannae - to lure the enemy into terrain suitable for a pincer movement (literally, a 'pinching' movement) to be realized. This event was the Battle of Fraustadt (Wschowa), fought in SW Poland.



Above: taken from hannibalthewarrior.com

If there was a single (double, actually) astounding key to Hannibal's military genius, it was perhaps those 'variations of a trap' - his subtle uses of bluff and even 'double' bluff; even though Hannibal seemed to lay all his cards on the table at the onset of Cannae, his plan still constituted a colossal trap. Examples of simple bluff was his brushing aside the Volcae, on the Rhone (reminiscent of Alexander's amazing tactical prowess, amid a windswept rain no less, on the Hydaspes River in the Punjab in 326 B.C., albeit not nearly on such a scale), the Allobroges around the Gorge de la Bourne in the Alps, and the Battle of the Trebbia, where he effected a partial trap on the Roman army in an area where concealing 2,000 didn't seem possible. But his classic breakout at the Ager Falernus, where Quintus Fabius Maximus thought he had Hannibal inexorably trapped after soundly deploying forces to guard the passes leading out, was a paradigm of superb stratagem. The entire operation was intended to look like a trick against a cautious commander in Fabius, thus Hannibal sent 2,000 oxen, their heads ignited by fire at night (after reaching the slopes of Mt. Callicula), up the pass near the 4,000 or so Romans guarding the nearest exiting defile. The Romans rushed towards them, ready to engage what they thought were enemy soldiers trying to escape. Instead they found writhing cattle! I sure hope any upcoming movie includes that scene! Hannibal not only extricated himself with negligible losses (always relative), but sent Iberian troops, superb mountain fighters, back to aid the African spearmen who had overcome the Romans after surprising them amid their dazed state upon seeing the cattle. The methods of Fabius grew increasingly unpopular, and when Hannibal captured the supply-depot at Cannae, the Senate decreed an aggressive approach, leading to the Battle of Cannae.

Double-bluff was well exemplified at the stratagem implemented by Hannibal at Battle of Lake Trasimene, following his great turning movement on the Roman positions. Roman historiography has labeled Gaius Flaminius a fool for marching into a trap in an area which Livy describes in Book 22.4,

"...Hannibal laid waste with all the horrors of war the land between Cortona and Lake Trasumennus. He had now reached a position eminently adapted for surprise tactics, where the lake comes up close under the hills of Cortona. There is only a very narrow road here between the hills and the lake, as though a space had been purposely left far it...."'

But Gaius Flaminius, a seasoned commander who had recently defeated the Cisalpine Celts (hence he surely wasn't a stranger to ambushes), could very well thought this was too obvious - in any case, how could anyone in command of an army of some 25,000 men or so expect to be ambushed? But his lack of 'reconnaissance' (probably known as mere 'scouting' back then) seems inexcusable. Professor John F, Lazenby astutely touches on these considerations (Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War, pg. 65).

Hannibal's approach march to Tarentum in 212 B.C. was masterful - and another display of superb 'double' bluff. Instead of completely trying to conceal his movements, which would have been practically impossible, he dispatched two parties of Numidian horsemen, one on either side of his approach to scour the countryside. Thus anyone who spotted them would either be taken prisoner or simply report a Numidian plundering raid. He reached Tarentum and swiftly took the great port with the help of some nobles inside.

The consuls beaten badly by Hannibal have all been branded as inept in some form or another. They certainly were not innovative thinkers, but these men were simply attempting to bring about decisive engagements, and waiting would not improve the situation. Much can be said for Tiberius Sempronius Longus' attempt to crush Hannibal before the Carthaginian's strength grew with Gallic acquisition, which was fomenting rapidly at the time.

I feel it is also a mistake to think the 'professionals' under Hannibal were superior soldiers per se to the 'amateurs' of the Roman Republic's citizen militia. Despite the inexperience of the soldiers and stodgy concept of conventional warfare on the part of the Romans, we should not underestimate their fighting qualities. Once they found the measure of Hannibal's more mobile and flexible methods, they would prove themselves capable of supreme celerity and complicated maneuvers, evidenced under Gaius Claudius Nero and Publius Cornelius Scipio the Younger (later Africanus). Remember that Rome was a nation-at-arms, and these 'amateurs' were trained primarily men who handled farm equipment and were for war from youth. Hannibal's tactics were centered around grand tactical maneuvering to strike at enemy flanks and rear with his cavalry, hence gaining a massive psychological edge.

Hannibal's alleged and near-ubiquitous citing as possessing 'superiority in cavalry' than the Romans is superficial at best, other than the important issue that quantity is itself a quality if utilized viably. His outstanding Numidians excelled only at harassment and agile maneuver, as well as the paramount aspect of foraging (Hannibal knew he had to be self-sufficient for a long time), and his 'heavy' horse of Iberian and Celts were certainly not faster nor as adept as shock horsemen as were those developed by Philip II of Macedon amid his great career spanning over two decades: Alexander the Great possessed supreme horsemen who were lighter than their Persian counterparts of even 'heavier' elite cavalry (armor for the horse and rider). The Companions (εταιροι, or hetairoi) were akin to the great husaria of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for their time - supremely fast and singularly effective at delivering shock. The great Polish-Lithuanian victory at Kircholm in 1605 over the Swedes may be one of a few true examples in military history where shock horsemen veritably mowed over ready infantry armed with pikes. Hannibal could not 'pin' his Roman enemy as the great Macedonians could; he had to be more subtle, devising his infantry with even more defensive measures of absorption. When not facing Hannibal, Roman equites and their alae defeated numerically superior Celts, Iberians and African cavalry in quite a few battles from 225 to 202 B.C. (eg, Telamon, Dertosa, the Great Plains,).

From a practical point of view regarding Gaius Terentius Varro, who was just as willing to wait when he was in full command on July 31 as Lucius Aemilius Paullus was on August 1, smartly moved the huge Roman army to the right (east) bank of the Aufidus on August 2, where the terrain was still good for infantry and cavalry, but less so for Hannibal's cavalry. The Romans had the sea at their rear, the rising ground from the sea on their left, and the Aufidus on their right. Hannibal could not outflank them, and their infantry, they figured, would simply smash through him (not a stupid assumption at the time). Varro was no wily and original thinker, but we can see his presumably practical plan; he and Paullus were mounted in personal command of the horse units, obviously to hold up as much spirit as possible, as they knew they couldn't win the battle here. The infantry would smash Hannibal, thus whatever happened on the wings, albeit most of the enemy horse would get away, would be of little consequence. Hannibal simply came up with the answer. But before the battle Varro stoutly stymied Hannibal's attack on his vanguard, and after the battle he received a vote of thanks from the Assembly of the People; he continued to serve in important commands in Italy, and after the war was sent on diplomatic missions to Greece and Africa.

However, in perusing the battle, perhaps the Romans could have adopted a defensive dismounted action on their side of the Aufidus: with their right flank protected by the river, Hannibal would have been compelled to face a defensive line of spearmen. Food for thought.

Hannibal's extraordinary and novel adoption of a convex deployment with his Gauls and Spaniards in the center invited the Romans to surge forward (he knew his enemy). But he didn't dispose his troops in the manner the Athenians did at the Battle of Marathon, which he certainly studied; that victory by the Greeks naturally developed into a double-envelopment of the Persians. Miltiades, Callimachus, Arimnestus, and Co. thinned their front of hoplites to match the length of the Persian front (Herodotus, The Histories, Book 6.111), and advanced at a faster pace than usual to get under the enemy bowshots; once in close quarters, they certainly felt confident about their chances. But the converging of the Hellenic wings upon Persian center, which was pushing back the thinner ranks of Athenian hoplites in their center, happened probably by an automatic response to what was unfolding, as the inner files of the Athenian/Plataean wings would naturally 'hinge' on their center as it gave way (Herodotus, Book 6.113); at Cannae, Hannibal elaborately formed a wedge with his center, calculatingly holding back his two blocks of African infantry on the wings (perhaps the first deployment of 'offensive reserves' on the battlefield), which meant that not only would the Romans, who decided to have no wings to facilitate a forward surge, tend to be lured into the center, but if things went amiss, fugitives from the Gallic/Spanish center would also be funneled into the center too, where they would become bunched and automatically aid in slowing the Roman advance, even if they didn't completely know what was happening around them!

Hannibal also dealt brilliantly with the cavalry issue, with whom this time he couldn't ride around the Romans, as he had done so in earlier clashes. By heavily disproportioning the quantity of his cavalry wings, the heavier 'shock' horsemen being more numerous on one side with the light and proficiently maneuverable Numidians on the other, meant he could both checkmate the ala on the Roman left with slightly numerically less but more agile horsemen, and quickly vanquish the Roman cavalry on their right (Hannibal's left) with mostly pure shock (many men on both sides, however, , and have them free for the task against the other side, where they could disperse the Italic ala, who were busy with the Numidians, and then fall on the Roman infantry’s rear while the Numidians gave chase to the Italic horsemen, an action they excelled at. A note about the fighting on the Roman right/Hannibal's left: the fighting turned into a melee, which saw both sides actually dismounting. The sheer weight of numbers handicapped the Romans, not fighting without any valor, in this part of the battle, it all basically manifesting as Hannibal had designed (cf. Polybius, The Histories, Book 3.115).

Whatever Hannibal's detailed reforms of his infantry involved, mainly with his crack Africans, after his success at Trasimene and subsequent plundering circumvention (heading SE in the campaign of 217 B.C.) of Rome herself, he developed a greater degree of elasticity into what had always been a comparatively rigid linear deployment. Polybius specifically uses the term speira (σπείραις), denoting 'alternate companies', in connection with Hannibal's tactical units of infantry at Cannae (Book 3.114.4), and later in describing the Roman manipuli, we read the terms σπεῖραν (Book 6.24.5 and 6.24.7) and σπείρας (Book 11.23.1). These are synonymous, in terms of basic infantry close-order formation, with the Macedonian syntagma - the sub-divisional 256-man tactical unit of close order phalangitae deployed, on paper, 16 ranks (across) and 16 deep (files). The nomenclature of syntagma and speira can be distinguished, it seems, in a regional, not mechanical, basis: the former was termed when employed outside Hellas, the latter the 'Greek version' of the Hellenic tactical unit (cf. Peter Connolly, Greece and Rome at War, pg. 77). But Hannibal, not building on national grounds, achieved this with a motley force of men who had been hitherto fighting for him for a short period of time (again, Polybius, Book 11.19), and he achieved a tactical masterpiece, just a year later, which has resonated beyond its own time as an ideal for tactical study. Scipio the Younger was at Cannae as a young tribune, and certainly was affected by such tactics; the 'stupid' Roman commanders who faced Hannibal before were never provided with such valuable blueprints. This, of course, is all arguable, and hindsight always allows a clarity they didn't have in the exigencies of the moment.

Perhaps no aspect displays a commander's ability as a leader of men, in the heat of battle, better than Hannibal at Cannae, specifically in the center with his infantry: his Gauls and Spaniards were more noted for their ferocity and mercurial temperament than any sustained discipline on their part. Hannibal, exploiting this 'brittleness' to his advantage, had them fall back before the Roman juggernaut in a most difficult maneuver to pull of on the battlefield - to fall back under pressure without breaking, resisting the enemy battle corps for as long as possible, necessitated a high degree of guidance, precision, and coherence. In all but particularly in this time-period of military history, the majority of battle losses were inflicted upon the enemy as they fled in rout, and those who fled first had the best chance of survival. Thus for an army to fight with success under these conditions, each soldier had to trust that his comrades would not leave them in the lurch - a level of trust which was tested to the uttermost when the battle line was moving backwards. Again, this tactical concept was utilized by the great Dutch leader Mauritz van Nassau (one among several examples of military commanders drawing on Cannae) in his civil defense against the Spanish army of Flanders in 1600, at the Battle of Nieuwpoort. But he hardly effected a battle of destruction, and had well-drilled troops conditioned for such a purpose. In terms of raw leadership skills, Hannibal doubtless possessed a level of battlefield genius rarely matched in military history (IMHO, of course). His ability to maintain a polyglot, re-shuffled army for so long in Italy, comprised of men who felt no allegiance to Carthage herself, is astonishing.

As pressed often, and accurately, the only way to significantly seduce Rome's allies, or at least compel them to forsake Rome on a neutral basis, was to first destroy Roman armies, not just 'best' them, as Pyrrhus had merely done over seven decades prior, yet rendered too weak afterwards to be in a strong position, hence the term Pyrrhic Victory. No victory could have been greater for this purpose than Cannae. Hannibal had to wait to see how the protectorates of Rome would react. As it turned out, in the long run, Cannae simply cemented the loyalty of Rome's core allies - something nobody could predict without applying such a test. This was on major key to Rome's ultimate victory in this conflict: the steadfast decision to remain loyal and furnish Rome by the (slight) majority of the Latins and socii, even in the darkest times. But even the most loyal of these northern and central Italic communities, those who would never think of joining Carthage's cause in any manner, began to become disgruntled and consider defecting by 209 B.C., and even more so upon the arrival of Hasdrubal into Italy, in the spring of 207 B.C., where some of the Etrurian and Umbrian communities actually helped him in some manner.

It's too bad for Hannibal's cause the Cisalpine Gauls didn't apply pressure from the north on Rome after Cannae. Maybe the Gauls had a legitimate beef with him, as he exploited their 'brittleness' to bear the brunt of his battles where they were fought in the front for him, thus suffering the highest losses within his composite force. Maybe they felt kind of used, and resented it. But they could gain from his command too, to undertake what they sought most of all in war, plunder and booty. Hypothetically, though, just like with a Macedonian landing in southern Italy as of 215 B.C., a swoop from Gallic forces, as they did in 390 B.C., from the north at this critical juncture after Cannae, after the Boii ambushed and wiped out the only main Roman army in their regions near modern Modena, roughly 25,000 men under the consul-elect for 215 B.C. Lucius Postumius Albinus (Polybius, Book 3.118 and Livy, Book 23.24), Rome would have almost certainly have had to come to the conference table. Hannibal soon gained possession of Casilinum, an important strategic point on the Volturnus River (a little to the NW of Capua). But maybe it's just not that simple, and perhaps the Gallic tribes just wanted to now be left alone. They weren't besiegers of towns, apt to often go far off their lands, particularly if the Romans wouldn't be able to replace Albinus' army (at least not for a while). Perhaps they figured Rome was doomed against Hannibal anyway, thus figured their lands were safe. But in 200 B.C., a Carthaginian officer by the name of Hamilcar, who stayed in northern Italy from either the encroaching armies of Hasdrubal Barca or the other brother Mago Barca, effectively co-organized and co-led a huge uprising against Rome (Livy, Book 31.10), who could now far more ably to deal with them than in late 216 B.C. Though they were focused on affairs in Greece, Rome could still mobilize and send forces into northern Italy, also unlike in late 216/early 215 B.C. This showed a Carthaginian officer could influence the Celts to be hostile to Rome quite easily.

Moreover, at any time as of 215 B.C. a Carthaginian army, seemingly, could have marched to Italy if it had taken the western route over the Pyrennes - the very one Hasdrubal Barca ephemerally took in 208 B.C. However, a large one could not have marched over due to the problems Carthage was having with their Spanish domain due to the successful Roman incursion by the elder Scipios. But the Romans never really 'blocked' the route to Italy, if the Carthaginians applied a more coherent national strategy as Rome did in the war. Hasdrubal received 4,500 men from Carthage (Livy, Book 23.26) to quell a revolt, ordered to Italy as early as possible (23.27), and a 'complete army' was reinforced to Spain under Himilco (23.28); then, in one of the most decisive battles in western history with vast strategic consequences, Hasdrubal, who could have just swung around the Scipios and headed to Italy, was outright defeated in straight clash of relatively equal forces by the Scipio brothers off the mouth of the Ebro, near Dertosa (modern Tortosa). It's remarkable how some critics, however tacit, think this was somehow Hannibal's fault. Livy even tells us that as late as 210 B.C the leaders in Carthage still ordered an army to Italy:

Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, Book 27.5, 210 B.C.,

"...Marcus Valerius, meanwhile, having reached the African shore with his fifty ships before daybreak, made a sudden descent on the territory of Utica. Extending his depredations far and wide he secured plunder of every kind including a large number of prisoners. With these spoils he returned to his ships and sailed back to Sicily, entering the port of Lilybaeum, within a fortnight of his departure. The prisoners were subjected to a close examination, and the following facts were elicited and duly forwarded to Laevinus that he might understand the position in Africa: 5,000 Numidians were at Carthage with Gala's son, Masinissa, a young man of great energy and enterprise; other mercenary troops were being raised throughout Africa to be sent over to Spain to reinforce Hasdrubal, so that he might have as large a force as possible with which to cross over into Italy and join his brother, Hannibal. The Carthaginians, believed that in adopting this plan they were sure of victory. In addition to these preparations an immense fleet was being fitted out to recover Sicily, and it was expected to appear off the island in a short time..."

The above is one of many tantalizing aspects to read from Livy's works.

...not fully exploiting a center breech was the failure of Trebia...

I disagree; the Roman flanks and rear were assailed before the frontal breakthrough was achieved by the 10,000 Roman legionnaires, thus the center breach could not be exploited for anything other than for their escape.

Cannae was groundbreaking and tactically perfect, but in the end it didn't have any strategical relevance to Carthage.
Now Ilipa was as genius as Cannae and decided the Second Punic War.

Not even close, IMHO. The Second Punic War was won by Rome, overall, due to amazing feats of unprecedented endurance on their part: the past offered no clear refutation that Hannibal's grand strategy was hopeless, and the ROmans hardly won in the other theaters due solely to superior fighting skills (Bona Fortuna was there for them). Even if we take Polybius, who understandably had to toe the line of the Scipionic Circle, at face value, Scipio effected a 'fix and hold' of the uncommitted African center of infantry; if a violent cloudburst had not ended the battle, it is doubtful he could have swung inwards and destroyed them with the numerically meager cavalry he possessed against a block of apprehensive but yet uncommitted crack footmen. It's just very difficult to accept that the symmetrically complex maneuvers attributed to Scipio on his wings were carried out with such precision by some 25,000 men, and if they were, why would the Carthaginian wings, with these maneuvers being undertaken right before them and outwards before they wheeled towards the enemy contingents, stand there like stuffed ducks? We read nothing of the 4,000+ Carthaginian led cavalry in the battle from either Polybius or Livy, though the former states the panic-stricken elephants 'did much damage to their own side as to the enemy' (the Histories, Book 11.24). Masinissa, we read, was part of the preliminary skirmishing against the Romans (Livy, Book 28.13), but we next read his name as he 'came to a secret understanding with Marcus Silanus' (Livy, Book 28.16). Perhaps Masinissa simply didn't take part in the main battle - and if Scipio knew it, that would justify such risky maneuvers. It must remain loose conjecture, though. If the African center had charged home, with Scipio's much weaker center left isolated, the result might have been akin to a Carthaginian Austerlitz. But that would entail supreme leadership, and the one commander comparable to Napoleon for Carthage was in presently in Italy.

Ilipa was unquestionably a decisive victory, but Scipio still had to defeat a major revolt on the Ebro, as well as deal with a mutiny by his own men at Sucro. The strategic consequences of these battles are far less emblematic of the tactical dispositions and conduct of the generals in assessing how they may weigh against each other. Some of Hannibal's severe critics seem to think he should have wielded a magic wand or something!The result of Cannae enabled him to establish a broad alliance system against Rome.

It's a classical example of how you could defeat a vastly larger enemy force but utilzing it's own size against it. It's nothing short of brilliant. Just like how Alexander created the gap in the Persian lines at Gaugamela.

However, two units, one of Persian Horse Guards and one of Indian cavalry, perhaps numbering 1,000 each, rode through the Macedonian gap created because Alexander shifted so far to his right. What would Hannibal have charged them with doing, rather than riding forward to attack the enemy baggage or camp (we don't know for sure from Arrian's strange story regarding that action, Anabasis Alexandri, Book 3.14 )? But Alexander was in a precarious position at the start, which Darius III, as with the Romans at Cannae, showed a degree of pragmatism with his strategic plan: with 34,000+ front-line cavalry against 7,250 under Alexander, and no mountains on one flank and/or sea on the other (as at Issus) for protection, Alexander was going to be outflanked unless he came up with something spectacular - he did.

Forgive the rambling, James