Ukraine, Russia and NATO...

[tullyccro]

I have a few questions for people a bit more familiar with this issue than myself.

First of all, I know that Ukrainian membership has been on the table for a decade or so and I know that the old Russian Mama Bear isn't too happy at the thought of losing another one of her cubs.

On a serious note though, I've heard that Russians (or at least Putin) have reservations because in their mind the Ukraine has always been a contentious region, invasions typically streamed through Ukraine or Poland, and so on... In other words, legitimate security concerns to be taken into account, though obviously the matter is up to the people of Ukraine.

I know a lot of geo-strategists predict that this is a potential hotkey issue that is going to have to be dealt with in the next few years.

More or less I'd like to open this up to discussion for our friends in central and eastern Europe as well as Russia, to get their perspective on the issue, if any.

I've heard parts of the historical security argument, I've heard parts of the economic strategy argument, and I've heard the "fear of encirclement" argument. If anyone wants to elaborate, please do.

[michael123]

Ultimately I can't see much changing. Russia will always want to be surrounded by those under its dominion/protection/side, and will always resent any further US encroachment into its surroundings. The US will always mistrust Russia, and try to hem it in with US allies/NATO members. What's needed is for both sides to lay their mistrust aside and have open talks, deciding on a fair comprimise, but again - not going to happen. It also doesn't help that some people have legitimate concerns that Russia may be sliding once again away from democracy, which puts the west off and perpetuates all the problems.

[Pavlik the Rus]

tullyccro
Do you really want to debate? If so, then please, try to ignore those flooders, who will appear here soon. You will see countless pages of stamps, stereotypes, historical cowardness and so on.
You've showed one of he stereotype by yourself with your mama bear, btw.
About your question
We, Russians, don't trust NATO.
When USSR collapsed western countries, members of NATO, promised that NATO will not move east. You know the result
We all have seen a "mass destruction weapons" in Iraq. Meantime the single reason was - resourses of that country. What linkage with NATO, will you ask? Simple - there are no other USA and GB in the world
We see an AMS not far from our borders breaking old treaty.
We see undoubt support to the Georgia from NATO. Georgia is not a member of NATO. Georgia launched attack on our troops, killed our soldiers. NATO took Georgia's side.
And why we must be happy about NATO at our borders?

[Kavhan Isbul]

And why we must be happy about NATO at our borders?

Your happiness or unhappiness has little to do with what sovereign countries on Russia's border choose to do for their protection. If Ukraine wants to follow the rest of the Eastern European countries and join NATO, it should be up to its government and not up to Kremlin to decide this. Unless of course you are implying that Russia should meddle in its neighbors affairs? If you do, then there is yet another reason for them to join NATO in order to guard their freedom.

[tullyccro]

tullyccro
Do you really want to debate? If so, then please, try to ignore those flooders, who will appear here soon. You will see countless pages of stamps, stereotypes, historical cowardness and so on.
You've showed one of he stereotype by yourself with your mama bear, btw.
About your question
We, Russians, don't trust NATO.
When USSR collapsed western countries, members of NATO, promised that NATO will not move east. You know the result
We all have seen a "mass destruction weapons" in Iraq. Meantime the single reason was - resourses of that country. What linkage with NATO, will you ask? Simple - there are no other USA and GB in the world
We see an AMS not far from our borders breaking old treaty.
We see undoubt support to the Georgia from NATO. Georgia is not a member of NATO. Georgia launched attack on our troops, killed our soldiers. NATO took Georgia's side.
And why we must be happy about NATO at our borders?

Pavlik, first off thanks for the response. My apologies for the bear comment if it caused offense, just trying to be humorous by playing on a very old analogy. I appreciate your comments and would very much like to have a real discussion about the fears, concerns, motivations, etc... from all sides. With this in mind, I don't want to be more general than necessary and will avoid all the old nonsensical stereotypes.

I absolutely agree with you about Russians having the impression that they are being hemmed in, and having good reasons for believing so, especially when this involves extending missiles into Eastern Europe, but I think that at this point, from the perspective of many of these countries, especially Poland, and from the perspective of U.S. leadership, it seems to me that they (former Soviet satellites) are some of the most energetic contributors to NATO, especially outside of Europe, as in Afghanistan and Iraq for example.

I'm just wondering whether or not this kind of cooperation outside of Europe, using NATO as a basis, is more of an issue than countering any kind of Russian security concerns or encroaching on Russia's sphere of influence. What I mean to say is, Central and Eastern European countries as well as Russia, often have more in common with western Europe and the United States than either side is willing to admit.

Also, to expand the issue a bit more. I know that Iranian membership in the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) is of concern to the U.S. and other western European nations. I'm wondering if Russian leadership has held off on full membership for Iran so long as the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO is postponed as well. What's your take on Russian/Iranian relations compared with NATO/Georgian or NATO/Ukrainian relations?

Cheers,

[Acco]

When USSR collapsed western countries, members of NATO, promised that NATO will not move east. You know the result

It is alleged that the United States promised that NATO would not further advance into Eastern and Central Europe, however now that crucial details of the 1990 negotiations have been de-classified this claim has now been refuted. No Western leader has ever pledged that NATO would not expand, and in fact the issue never arose during the 1990 negotiations, not even the Soviet officials who were present for the negotiations have claimed that such a pledge was achieved. Various Western leaders did however make commitments about what role NATO would play in East Germany, but no Western leader had offered any sort of pledge concerning the expansion of NATO beyond Germany.

We see undoubt support to the Georgia from NATO. Georgia is not a member of NATO. Georgia launched attack on our troops, killed our soldiers. NATO took Georgia's side.

Georgia is a country that is engaged in bilateral relations with NATO and has been granted a communiqué promising the country future NATO membership, and Russia knows this, so it's no surprise that NATO stood behind Georgia while another power trampled over its territorial integrity. Georgia did not launch an attack on the Russian Federation, it launched an attack on the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, a rebel movement within Georgian territory, similar to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria located in Russia. Russia then claimed some sort of legitimacy in attacking Georgia and proceeded to combat Georgian forces in South Ossetia. I somewhat understand Russia's justification for invading South Ossetia, but it's still controversial no matter how you look at it, but invading both mainstream Georgia and its other breakaway state, Abkhazia, were actions Russia had no legitimacy to, and reveals that 'protecting our soldiers and our citizens' was merely a weak ploy at getting involved in a frozen conflict and expanding Russian influence in the Caucasus region. I assure you that if, say, Georgia launched an attack on Russia itself (just take it as an example), NATO would severely reprimand Georgia and most likely cut back on resources in order to pressure them to halt the offensive. But I can also assure you that invading a sovereign country engaging in its internal affairs, with flimsy reasons for doing so, is not going to get Russia support from any nation, let alone NATO.

What linkage with NATO, will you ask? Simple - there are no other USA and GB in the world

Just because a few NATO nations were involved in the war doesn't mean that NATO itself authorized the use of force. Actually, the use of force in Iraq was justified by the U.S. and U.K. on account of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1444, which was a resolution Russia approved of (The resolution didn't authorize force per se, but served as a last opportunity for Saddam Hussein to halt the production and use of weapons of mass destruction, and would serve as an end to the diplomatic period of searching for an end to the Iraqi problem.)

[Pavlik the Rus]

You are right. I remind you that question was

to get their perspective on the issue

Here is ours.

[Pavlik the Rus]

My apologies for the bear comment if it caused offense

No, there is no offence. This is a stereotype, simpy i don't like any of stereotypes, it makes a normal dialog impossible.

it seems to me that they (former Soviet satellites) are some of the most energetic contributors to NATO, especially outside of Europe, as in Afghanistan and Iraq for example.

Well, i think that activity (Poland for example) is more influenced by inner political situation, more than fear on Russia. I mean if Russo-Polish relations will be perfect, Poland will show such activity as well.
I quess many reasons for that - economical, political and so on at first place
I think so because in reality Russia indicates no agressive intensions. For example our modern military reform will rebuild our military system from 4 rank to 2 ranks.
In soviet army there was 4 types of units.
1type - troops of constant readyness to combat. They must to be involved in to the battle from first minutes of war
2nd 4th types - partyally ready to war troops with conservated amunition. As war continues more and more troops involved into the battle.

Now we have only two ranks - 1st and 2nd. Russia wants to say - look, we have no plans about long wars

Also, to expand the issue a bit more. I know that Iranian membership in the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) is of concern to the U.S. and other western European nations.

It is only a counter move after NATO expanding and all that AMS thing.

I'm wondering if Russian leadership has held off on full membership for Iran so long as the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO is postponed as well. What's your take on Russian/Iranian relations compared with NATO/Georgian or NATO/Ukrainian relations?

The difference is - Russo-Iranian relations have not caused any war (yet at least) Meantime it was clear for many years what final will have NATO-Georgian cooperation.
I doubt that exactly Russian militaryequipment will cause assault on Israel (for example), beacuse (as i know) most of military exports to the Iran are defence weapons - AA, radars and so on.

[tullyccro]

No, there is no offence. This is a stereotype, simpy i don't like any of stereotypes, it makes a normal dialog impossible.


Well, i think that activity (Poland for example) is more influenced by inner political situation, more than fear on Russia. I mean if Russo-Polish relations will be perfect, Poland will show such activity as well.
I quess many reasons for that - economical, political and so on at first place
I think so because in reality Russia indicates no agressive intensions. For example our modern military reform will rebuild our military system from 4 rank to 2 ranks.
In soviet army there was 4 types of units.
1type - troops of constant readyness to combat. They must to be involved in to the battle from first minutes of war
2nd 4th types - partyally ready to war troops with conservated amunition. As war continues more and more troops involved into the battle.

Now we have only two ranks - 1st and 2nd. Russia wants to say - look, we have no plans about long wars


It is only a counter move after NATO expanding and all that AMS thing.


The difference is - Russo-Iranian relations have not caused any war (yet at least) Meantime it was clear for many years what final will have NATO-Georgian cooperation.
I doubt that exactly Russian militaryequipment will cause assault on Israel (for example), beacuse (as i know) most of military exports to the Iran are defence weapons - AA, radars and so on.

Pavlik,

Thanks again for the response. Hopefully we can avoid all the old talking points/stereotypes altogether.

To get more into the diplomatic give and take between Russia/Iran and NATO/Ukraine, it seems to me that U.S. very much wants Russia to take a harder line with the Iranian nuclear issue and in return I think that NATO membership to Ukraine will be superseded by EU integration first and foremost, and then larger cooperative efforts.

But on that issue. If Russia's concerns about Ukraine are primarily security-related, as you say, do you think that any part of Russia's leadership would take issue with the EU or the United States forging closer economic ties with the Ukraine? I know that the recent gas disputes were a major issue and I know that both Germany and France are concerned with securing resource arrangements with both Russia and Ukraine. I also understand that Russian energy giants are very similar to their American, French and British counterparts, which is to say that they wield a great deal of political power and military power. They guide policy to a large degree. How integral do Russians view the Ukraine as part of their economic security? Or would powerful Russian investors be able to relax their interest or control?

Also, I want to put out there that I think that Russia has always played a unique role in world diplomacy, straddling Europe, Asia and the Middle East. I know that the continued existence of NATO reflects a lot of outmoded attitudes about security and from an Eastern European stance, it provides protection against very old and deep fears which may or may not be substantiated today.

It's crazy to think that all the old relationships were so quickly replaced. For example, France and the United States being old allies, Great Britain and Russia, Russia and it's slavic neighbors, but now everything is almost precisely the opposite. I guess as I said before, it seems to me that Russia, Europe as a whole, and the United States have a great deal more in common, in terms of industrial management, resources, politics, culture, than we are willing to let on, mostly due to the events and the resentments of the Cold War and it's confused, spastic aftermath. I guess I'm saying it seems to me that the Cold War was a family struggle in many ways, and Russia and the West have a great deal in common that they need to be worrying about, where new entities, like NATO but inclusive of Russia, should be in the works.

In what respect does Russia view itself as part of Europe? I'm not trying to be offensive here, but to be honest, relatively speaking, it seems to me that Russia is very much a focal part of the European tradition, in terms of religion, culture, politics, and so on. Do you think Russians view themselves as Europeans or is the Russian identity very separate from Europe?

[Pavlik the Rus]

To get more into the diplomatic give and take between Russia/Iran and NATO/Ukraine, it seems to me that U.S. very much wants Russia to take a harder line with the Iranian nuclear issue and in return I think that NATO membership to Ukraine will be superseded by EU integration first and foremost, and then larger cooperative efforts.

Well, i have different opinion. You see, modern Ukrainean top politicians and businessmen don't want to be a NATO member, and SCO as well. They have big profit from their "neutral" postion. It calls сплясать и нашим и вашим - dance with two partners. Before Yushenko Ukraine's economy relied on very cheap (politically cheap) resourses from Russia and Russian market for their goods.
Now situation differs not so much. Instead of building normal economy Ukrainean leaders continues to gain prefernces from the west, as "anti-Russian forpost"
To take one side finnaly - is a suicide to such rullers.

do you think that any part of Russia's leadership would take issue with the EU or the United States forging closer economic ties with the Ukraine?

What exactly economical ties do you mean? Transit country of our resources or something else?

How integral do Russians view the Ukraine as part of their economic security? Or would powerful Russian investors be able to relax their interest or control?

Well i can not tell you from position of the energy giants
But i doubt that huge business will leave possibility to gain more profit and influence

Also, I want to put out there that I think that Russia has always played a unique role in world diplomacy, straddling Europe, Asia and the Middle East. I know that the continued existence of NATO reflects a lot of outmoded attitudes about security and from an Eastern European stance, it provides protection against very old and deep fears which may or may not be substantiated today.

That's why i don't liek stereotypical way of thinking. Fears, stereotypes, prejustice are irrational.

It's crazy to think that all the old relationships were so quickly replaced. For example, France and the United States being old allies, Great Britain and Russia, Russia and it's slavic neighbors, but now everything is almost precisely the opposite. I guess as I said before, it seems to me that Russia, Europe as a whole, and the United States have a great deal more in common, in terms of industrial management, resources, politics, culture, than we are willing to let on, mostly due to the events and the resentments of the Cold War and it's confused, spastic aftermath. I guess I'm saying it seems to me that the Cold War was a family struggle in many ways, and Russia and the West have a great deal in common that they need to be worrying about, where new entities, like NATO but inclusive of Russia, should be in the works.

After collapse of SU, people here was shured that new era begins. No more military race with west, no more military blocks against each other. But....
Russian society was prowestern not so long time ago, now it is anti-western. I am speaking not only about military aspects and NATO, i mean entire, let say, "western" view on Russia.

For example - last resolution of OSCE about nacizm and comunizm. According to that resolution those dead millions of our ancestors are the criminals automatically. Those 600000 dead soviet soldiers in Poland had no idea about future regime in Poland, but now they are the same bad as nazi. Also there is a call to Russia in that resolution - something like "Russia must stop comunisic parades" They means parades of 9 may.
It is a deepest insult. If you don't understand why, i can explain, but tomorrow. It is too late now (here in Moscow)
Good buy

[corpse helvetica]

For example - last resolution of OSCE about nacizm and comunizm. According to that resolution those dead millions of our ancestors are the criminals automatically. Those 600000 dead soviet soldiers in Poland had no idea about future regime in Poland, but now they are the same bad as nazi. Also there is a call to Russia in that resolution - something like "Russia must stop comunisic parades" They means parades of 9 may.
It is a deepest insult. If you don't understand why, i can explain, but tomorrow. It is too late now (here in Moscow)
Good buy

OSCE resolution condemned nazism and STALINISM. Stalinism was not only ww2 but much longer period. IMO Russians were in ww2 winners not because of stalin but in spite of stalin.

Stalin and Hitler did not bother to ask what soldiers think- they were sent to battle and that is all. whether a soldier viewed it as justifiable or not was not for totalitarian regimes important.

[s.rwitt]

We all have seen a "mass destruction weapons" in Iraq.

Not from NATO you didn't. You should probably read a bit more about the war in Iraq.

[ivan_the_terrible]

Not from NATO you didn't. You should probably read a bit more about the war in Iraq.

He already explained this: the Iraq business was orchestrated outside of NATO, but by the biggest decision makers of NATO.

[Sphere]

The main fears in the US is that Russia has aims at creating a military/economic sphere of influence in the former Soviet Republics that didn't join the RF. The most prominant cases are Ukraine and Georgia, but the real action is actually in the "XXX-stan" nations (Uzbek, Kazak, Krygz etc), which are oil/gas rich and not politically stable by western standards. America's fears a Central Asian/Eurasian OPEC run by GAZPROM.

The worst case scenario from a US perspective being Russia military/political intervention in these area's to influence economic control over oil/gas resources. The Georgia conflict was a mixed signal in that some oil transportation by rail was distrupted (the rail lines were bombed.), but the construction of the new pipeline was only distrubted briefly and the old pipeline was left intact.

With these concerns, the US doesn't want to shut the door to Ukranian & Georgian NATO membership, which might signal concession to an RF sphere of influnence. However, NATO membership is a very serious commitment, with the US carrying most of the burden, so it is not handed out lightly. It is certainly not a credible tool to use with the "XXX-stan" nations, as they are too volitile. Instead the US and RF have entered a bidding war to lease military bases in this countries.

Again from a US perspective, these moves, along with the missile defense program are not an attempt to encircle the RF and gain a military advantage (though on the surface it is understandable how this can be taken as such). Thats Cold War thinking that is far overshadowed by US energy concerns, along with concerns about combating terrorism (take the F-22 cuts as a prime example, they are planes whose primary utility would be agaisnt the RF airforce, yet they are top priority to be cut).

[s.rwitt]

That's what you got from this?

What linkage with NATO, will you ask? Simple - there are no other USA and GB in the world

[ivan_the_terrible]

.....

He's saying that USA and GB orchestrated Iraq, and the same USA and GB are the major members of NATO...

[s.rwitt]

You must be a mind reader.

[tullyccro]

Thanks to everyone who has participated thus far.

On the issue of NATO supervision or participation in Iraq and Afghanistan, I would point out, as one poster did, the "mind-reader" I believe, that NATO in the past two decades has served as the apparatus that allows European/American cooperation in terms of weapons research, funding, and military activity in general and not simply limited to Europe. To this degree, NATO has somewhat evolved from it's original purpose, which was strategic planning against Soviet interests in Germany and across Europe and the world and instead allowed for a near seamless integration of many forces into the Anglo-American strategic efforts during the invasion and occupation of both Iraq and Afghanistan. I won't debate the merits of both operations here or the size of any of the respective national contingents and their contributions.

Part of the reason I decided to bring up this issue is because American foreign policy leadership in particular is guided by a faction which is seeking new accommodations with Russia in light of more recent events of the past 10 years and not more belligerence or competition over former "satellites" as we saw with the Bush administration.

To reiterate, my particular interest in this particular issue is based on the fact that there are basically two approaches to post-Cold War relations in the United States and a significant part of current American diplomatic leadership surely takes a different approach than the Bush administration.

One faction seems to want to draw former Soviet satellites (and their resources) away from Russian control as much as possible, by inviting confrontation, encouraging Cold War resentments, playing Russia against her former satellites in terms of economics or ideology, and often encouraging far right-wing ethnic nationalism, typically at the expense of liberalism, democracy, and the mass of people living under these new regimes. If there is actually one sphere where Obama's foreign policy drastically differs from his predecessor's, this is it. And I'll not argue the merits of that claim here and now. Just let it be said that alternatives are in the works in terms of U.S./NATO/Russian relations that haven't been for some time.

The faction which I believe to be tenuously in control of diplomacy at the moment, sees a different alternative which involves cooperation and integration with former Soviet satellites as well as Russia itself, emphasizing common problems and interests, those shared traditions occurring before the Cold War, and the possibility of a strong, coordinated, and cooperative European, Russian and American front. Obviously this isn't going to be always and everywhere the case, of course any intelligent person recognizes the very real differences between the nations of Europe, Central Asia and the United States, but new cooperative frameworks are being sought for those instances where our interests do converge, and the feeling is that they might imitate but replace older institutions like NATO. In other words, Russian concessions on Iran, Ukraine or both, would be understood as a step down the road of concerted Russian/European security arrangements. That's what many people in Washington are after and intent on pursuing over the next 4 or 8 years.

My questions are basically these:

Can Russia and her former satellites be reconciled to this idea of reconciliation with each other, as well as cooperation with "the West?"

Can Russia accept European involvement in those areas beyond her modern borders where instability often breaks out into violations of UN human rights standards, or international law agreements? Which is to say, can Russia resist the urge to intervene unilaterally along her borders and instead cooperate with her former satellites, the United States, and Europe when crises arise?

Obviously, I don't mean will Russia accept U.S. or British soldiers actively policing her borders. I think a lot of planners envision Russia taking the lead but conferring with many of her old allies and enemies to comprehensively handle crises, which are certain to break out of Central Asia at virtually any time. Consider the notion of a multi-national force of Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, etc... basically Eastern European nations as well as Russia, handling diplomatic and security concerns in concert with one another. A kind of unofficial, Baltic, Black, and Caspian Sea counterpart to NATO, presumably on the road to transcending NATO. Will Russia and her former satellites ever be able to enjoy diplomatic relations that could allow for such a scenario?

I think the second question is the most vital. The question on everyone's lips seems to be this: "Is it a matter of securing resources, or is it a matter of integrity and actual security from perceived offenses or threats?"

To me, that term, "The West," is imprecise, and as of yet very few international institutions exist to give any kind of meaning to it.

I suppose I consider, as I said before, that Russia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe, and the United States, have far more in common with each other than they do with anyone else, in terms of culture, religion, politics, etc... and so it is natural that we should want to work together on many things. I think the UN is a bit over-ambitious, NATO is a bit under, and it excludes Russia while playing a divisive game with her former states.

Yet today there still exists many barriers between Eastern Europe and Western Europe, Europe and the United States, Russia and Europe, Russia and it's former satellites, and on and on, when the Cold War has been ended now for some 20 years and new challenges await, Islamic extremism throughout the Middle East and Central Asia being just one such example where cooperation and coordination, materially, militarily, and diplomatically, would serve every one of these parties much better than the current framework of NATO, the SCO, the EU, the UN and so on.

What are the chances that these diplomatic and political obstacles of the 19th and 20th centuries will be surmounted in this generation? What are the chances that they won't? Will Western European, American and Russian diplomats forever be triangulating their efforts against one another, typically to the harm of the people in former Soviet states?

And in direct re: to Pavlik, I think you're right about demonizing the soldiers of those conflicts. I know that there is deep resentment and a lot of hostility on the part of many former satellite states towards Russia for the repression and violence that occurred during the Cold War or World War II. It's worth pointing out, as JFK did in 1960, that no nation suffered as much in terms of lives lost during the second World War as did the Soviet Union. And not only militarily, but I think that Russians have made clear for some time that Stalin was perhaps the greatest enemy of the Russian people, even as he threw them unarmed against Hitler. If anything, the average Soviet's experience during World War II is a testament to human endurance and resilience, that they could withstand the foreign and the domestic assaults against them. Atrocities were committed by nearly every major power during that conflict. I'm not saying that to spread guilt so thin that it isn't felt, or absolve Stalin by suggesting that he was only as guilty as the next, but I'm saying that we could easily spend the next 50 years sorting through the atrocities committed by our grandfathers, or we could focus on our commonalities instead and simply let the record show what it will.

As much as the dissolution of the USSR did to start down the path of reconciliation, it seems that we are not much closer than where we were 20 years ago, but nevertheless some progress has been made. I know that the opening up of the Soviet archives is one example of Russian leadership and the Russian people attempting to show their good faith and honesty about the historical record by making available information that is incriminating in many ways. Moving forward involves acknowledging mistakes, and I personally think that Russia has done many important things in helping Russians as well as former Soviets move forward by gaining the facts.

I think a good comparison is to revolutionary France. Essentially you had one of the oldest nations in Europe giving birth to a new, even purging itself of it's once vital elements such as the aristocracy, the church, and so on, and the reaction from neighbors was not welcome acceptance, forgiveness of old rivalries, new diplomacy, etc... Understandably so, you can't simply wipe the slate clean after all, no matter how many heads you chop off. But still, rather than allow for new relations in light of new developments, the trend was to revive every old grievance that existed, denounce the attempt at change, deny that the character of the nation had changed, and in some cases demand submission. Hence militant populism provided the only answer to a nation attacked by all it's neighbors, unstable due to lack of foreign investment and support, as well as ideologically unstable of course, but nevertheless, you get the idea.

To me, this is precisely the case with Russia in a lot of respects. If you look at the European reception of Obama, it's amazing that public opinion could so quickly swing from being anti-American to pro-Obama, and pro-U.S. in so many ways and in so little time. Yet no substantial change has really taken place, just a scheduled changing of the guard.

Compare that with the self-dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reception of the world. Was it admitting that change had taken place, was it suspicious of intentions, was it refusing to forgive old grievances or willing to reach new accommodations? I think from the U.S. standpoint the answer is "yes" to all of those questions. Having finally outlasted their opponents, I think many U.S. military and financial strategists went into the project of Russian economic integration with less than sincere efforts, hence the political and economic power vacuum which allowed industry giants and leadership to quickly seize the reins of government. Sure, Western mismanagement and bad investment weren't the only cause of the Russian economic collapse and instability of the 90's, but I think that it was significant enough to cry foul.

At any rate, would like to hear from more posters on the topics above.

Cheers and good night

[corpse helvetica]

Can Russia and her former satellites be reconciled to this idea of reconciliation with each other, as well as cooperation with "the West?"

you have two important questions here.
1. You have to take into account that in relation with Russia vs former satellites Russia 100% dictates policy due of being Great Power. When Moscow says we do not want this or that what you are gonna do? Declare a war on Russia? There are very few ways to put pressure on Kremlin and all those ways belongs to Washington. In policy with former satellites Kremlin uses divide et impera guidance.

Moscow has made very clear that for former satellites is for good relations only one condition: to recognize Kremlin sphere of influence. For xxx-stans tyrants this policy suits: it helps to keep them in power. Caucasus has always been troublesome for Kremlin, Ukraine is divided and Baltic states want to incorporate to west as quickly as possible.

2. A cooperation with west- should it be based on Moscow or West conditions?
Great Powers in Europe-Germany, Great Britain and France want from Russia natural resources and they do not care how or who governs Russia.

In the name of oil and gas and other resources from Russia Germany and France probably wouldn't mind selling former USSR "republics" back to Kremlin. THE problem is that USA opposes such appeasement because of in long term it is bad policy. Hopefully I do not have to explain why - a hint: back to square one.

[Pavlik the Rus]

s.rwitt
Ivan absolutly right. It is a sence of my words.

Sphere
Generally i agree with you, with few exceptions

The Georgia conflict was a mixed signal in that some oil transportation by rail was distrupted (the rail lines were bombed.), but the construction of the new pipeline was only distrubted briefly and the old pipeline was left intact.

Debatable statement. Bombing of rail roads is does not mean "anti oil" orientation of air strike. Rail roads are important part of military system of any country, except the smalest like Vatican or San-Marion.

Again from a US perspective, these moves, along with the missile defense program are not an attempt to encircle the RF and gain a military advantage

It is very close - military pressure and energy concerns. Without military pressure you hardly can achieve such serious goals.

Fortinbras

Georgia did not launch an attack on the Russian Federation

How can you name attack on our troops if not an attack on RF? Those troops was based there not in the role of occupants, but peacekeapers. It is absolutly normal action of any country to protect their soldiers, and in controverse, it is a crime to attack a peacekeaping forces. This example shows a moral principes of NATO. You can be a criminal, but you are a good man if you against Russia.

invading both mainstream Georgia and its other breakaway state, Abkhazia, were actions Russia had no legitimacy to, and reveals that 'protecting our soldiers and our citizens' was merely a weak ploy at getting involved in a frozen conflict and expanding Russian influence in the Caucasus region.

It's very debatable. Russia have no legitimacy to go inside Georgia, but it was a Georgia first who had no any right to attack peacekeapers.
That "invasion" was a purly military action. I mean that the goals was - to destroy or damage hard military structure of Georgia, not the spheres of influence.

I assure you that if, say, Georgia launched an attack on Russia itself (just take it as an example), NATO would severely reprimand Georgia and most likely cut back on resources in order to pressure them to halt the offensive.

Geogia allready done this, and we can see more resources going to the Georgia now.

with flimsy reasons for doing so

Allright, lives of citizens and soldiers is "fimsy" reason. Can you name a real reason then?

corpse helvetica

1. You have to take into account that in relation with Russia vs former satellites Russia 100% dictates policy due of being Great Power. When Moscow says we do not want this or that what you are gonna do? Declare a war on Russia? There are very few ways to put pressure on Kremlin and all those ways belongs to Washington. In policy with former satellites Kremlin uses divide et impera guidance.

As i can remember, it was not a Russia after collapse of SU, who took anti baltic position, but Baltic states was anti-Russian from start. All that demandings for for compensations from RF is not an event of 21 century

tullyccro

Can Russia and her former satellites be reconciled to this idea of reconciliation with each other, as well as cooperation with "the West?"

Probably. But not so soon. To many mistrust to each others, to many reflexing, to many problemms. Only after (let say) 10 years of calm situation (without such rude political games, without "justified" assaults on legal side and so on) it can be posible.

And not only militarily, but I think that Russians have made clear for some time that Stalin was perhaps the greatest enemy of the Russian people, even as he threw them unarmed against Hitler.

I guess that you don't understand completly that situation. Most people went to army on their own will. There was a real patriotic boom. Even kids run away from homes, trying to join the troops in the battlefield. That was war for exetrmination, not for misterious political spheres
And about unarmed, here was many many debates about levels of armament

If you look at the European reception of Obama, it's amazing that public opinion could so quickly swing from being anti-American to pro-Obama, and pro-U.S. in so many ways and in so little time. Yet no substantial change has really taken place, just a scheduled changing of the guard.

It's more look like on credit, ahope that strong man will be sane and pleasant after what the last strong man done before. Abama risking high.... If he fails, he will be more unpopular than Bush imo.
And about Russia, well... I guess that the same situation is hardly posible. History allready showed that no matter who is in charge here - Eltsin or Putin, no matter what Russia's foreign policy today - our neighborhoods looks on us via prism of old days. Now it is even worser. That situation, as i said, called massive anti-western minds. It is a reation. Our reaction will cause more anti-russain minds in close states and so on.
I see no man in international policy, who will be brave enough, to brake this situation in eastern europe.

Good post btw.