Hello everybody.
Great username! Sounds like something out of the lovely vernacular of
Seán Ó Ríordáin.
Eire, what makes you believe the Greeks won the Battle of Artemision (or Artemisium)? I think Kolokotrones gave us a very cogent assessment with post #2. The Greek holding forces at Thermopylae and Artemision in the summer of 480 B.C., particularly the former, are archetypes of bravery and heroism, and their plights against the Great King's huge numbers raised the stakes of everything to come (remember, though wars are not won per se by events like the evacuating side such as that at Dunkirk, they can certainly restore a state's pride and will to resist), but the Greeks were indeed defeated at that line of defense; Thermopylae was cleared, the Greek fleet withdrew (though only after both defensive forces clung to their positions tenaciously for three days), and the Royal Army entered central Greece with much support from
Medizers, thus
Xerxes' objective was fulfilled. Nor can it be stated that the Thermopyale-Artemision successes, though costly, were
Pyrrhic Victories, in the sense that the victor was weakened to the point he could not continue unimpeded;
Xerxes' forces were still much more quantitatively stronger than the Greeks, and the Greeks knew it. The pass at Thermopylae provided a veritable choke-hold for a defensive strategic point leading to central Greece, and the placement of the Greek fleet was soundly chosen (covering modern Pevki Bay), as the Persian fleet could not attempt an advance into the Malian Gulf until they eliminated the threat of a flank attack upon them by the Greeks, who adopted a defensive position (
Herodotus,
the Histories, Book 8.16); a frontal assault was compelled upon the Persians.
The famous Troezen Decree, or Decree of
Temistocles (published, 1960), probably one of several decrees passed during the wake of the severe Persian threat, seems to invite a plausible assessment that Attica was already to be evacuated before the Thermopylae-Artemision campaign. But that hardly means the campaign was not intended to be an all-out effort, nor that
Herodotus' account of the operations themselves are not acceptable, more or less, as they stand.
By no means to the discredit of many of the ancient annalists, ancient historiography contains many loose ends (we can't expect accounts akin to 20th century war correspondents, etc.), and often we must extrapolate from bits of data often scattered amid many of the writers' accounts. I feel it can be inferred from
Themistocles' deportment over what he admonished to be the correct tactical conduct by the Greeks at Salamis, as well as an error, most likely, from
Herodotus (always a risk of hoisting ourselves from our own petard when questioning the verdict of such an authoritative source) that the Greeks were worsted off the Artemision (a beach, not a promontory: part of the Greek fleet’s objective was to prevent Persian landings on northern Euboea).
Herodotus,
the Histories, Book 8.70,
"...When the command to put out to sea was given, they [the Royal Fleet] set sail for Salamis and were calmly marshaled in line. There was not enough daylight left for them to fight, since night came on, so they made preparations for the next day. Fear and dread possessed the Hellenes, especially those from the Peloponnese. They were afraid because they were stationed in Salamis and were about to fight at sea on behalf of the land of the Athenians, and if they were defeated they would be trapped on an island and besieged, leaving their own land unguarded..."
More likely, the Persians would have allowed time for a battle to be fought out in the open, as was the case up at Artemision; the battle wasn't fought while they were 'marshaled in line' because the Greeks simply wouldn't oblige because they were 'afraid' to fight Persian led ships which were lighter, faster, and sailed better (cf.
Herodotus,
the Histories, Book 8.10), thus the Greeks would be disadvantaged in more open waters, something they indeed learned well at Artemisium.
Herodotus,
the Histories, Book 8.60a, attributing
Themistocles' argument to the overall commander of the fleet, the Spartan
Eurybiades,
"...'It is in your hands to save Hellas, if you will obey me and remain here to fight, and not obey the words of these others and move your ships back to the Isthmus. Compare each plan after you have heard. If you join battle at the Isthmus, you will fight in the open sea where it is least to our advantage, since our ships are heavier and fewer in number. You will also lose Salamis and Megara and Aegina, even if we succeed in all else. Their land army will accompany their fleet, and so you will lead them to the Peloponnese and risk all Hellas'..."
It is not surprising, then, that we read from none other than
Thucydides when reporting of the exhorting words of an Athenian envoy arguing against the Corinthians' pleas before a Spartan embassy in 432 B.C., amid the breakdowns of peace which led to the 'Archidamian War':
Thucydides,
History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1.74,
"...'The event [defense against Xerxes' invasion] proved undeniably that the fate of Hellas depended on her navy. And the three chief elements of success were contributed by us; namely, the greatest number of ships, the ablest general, the most devoted patriotism. The ships in all numbered 400, and of these, our own contingent amounted to nearly two-thirds*. To the influence of Themistocles our general it was chiefly due that we fought in the strait, which was confessedly our salvation'..."
*this is a clear exaggeration from the Athenian speaker to support his polemics: Athens actually had a little less than half of the Greek ships at Salamis, providing 180 of the total 380 (including the two deserters from the Royal fleet, one Tenian and an earlier Lemnian ship), if we accept
Herodotus over
Aeschylus (who was a participant at the great battle, but that doesn’t necessarily mean he studied a muster roll), whose lower figures for the Greek fleet at 310 (
Persae, Lines 338-340) are likely imprecise amid his poetic writing. The reason for the famous discrepancy of twelve ships can be surmised:
Herodotus writes that 'the Hellenic fleet reached its full number of 380 ships' (
The Histories, Book 8.82.2), but when the totals are enumerated they add to 368. This can be explained by
Herodotus' earlier statement amid his list, contingent by contingent, that Aegina had 'other manned ships', which 'guarded their own land'. Aegina 'fought at Salamis with the thirty most seaworthy' (
Herodotus, the Histories, Book 8.46). The twelve must be the Aeginetan ships which stayed to guard their own land (still a theory though
). The Aeginetans would fight at Salamis holding the most exposed position on the right of the Greek line, hence they were awarded the first prize for valor.
Peter Green, from his overall fine
The Greco-Persian Wars, pg. 146,
"…the sea battle off Artemisium had proved an invaluable experience. It denied the myth of Persian naval superiority; it acclimatized the Greeks to facing an unfamiliar - and therefore frightening - enemy on equal terms…
…Naval operations in the straits, aided by two highly obliging storms, had destroyed so many Persian ships and men that Xerxes henceforth carefully avoided the one strategy almost guaranteed to win him the campaign: a division of his forces…"
Mmmm. That's basically a good overview, but in my opinion,
Green downplays the effect of the 'obliging storms', which far more than merely 'aided' the Greek fleet: some 600 Persian led ships were lost in the two devastatingly affecting storms, and the fighting off Artemisium, not in the confined conditions as at Salamis, still favored the superior rowing of the Egyptian and Phoenician contingents, who could at this time administer with superior capacity than the Greeks the
diekplous method of ancient sea fighting - 'crossing the T' to assault the vulnerable sides and sterns of enemy warships. The difficulties imposed upon the Persian contingents in bringing such a large fleet up to that position, and the losses which they sustained in the process, less at the hands of the Greeks than by two terrible storms (perhaps for which there was good reason to hope for, given their knowledge of the nature of their homelands), allowed the Greeks to hold up well enough to retire without disastrous results. But after the third day of clashing, the Greeks were indeed no longer in a condition to renew the fight, and they fell back on their bases and towards their reserves. Moreover,
Xerxes still could divide his forces for the campaign on land the following year.
Herodotus,
the Histories, Book 8.16-18, describing the third day at Artemisium,
"...while the forces of Xerxes were sailing in order towards them, the Hellenes kept quiet at Artemision; and the Barbarians, having made a crescent of their ships that they might enclose them, were endeavoring to surround them. Then the Hellenes put out to sea and engaged with them; and in this battle the two sides were nearly equal to one another; for the fleet of Xerxes by reason of its great size and numbers suffered damage from itself, since the ships were thrown into confusion and ran into one another: nevertheless it stood out and did not give way, for they disdained to be turned to flight by so few ships. Many ships therefore of the Hellenes were destroyed and many men perished, but many more ships and men of the Barbarians.
In this sea-fight the Egyptians did best of the men who fought for Xerxes; and these, besides other great deeds which they displayed, captured five ships of the Hellenes together with their crews: while of the Hellenes those who did best on this day were the Athenians, and of the Athenians Cleinias the son of Alcibiades, who was serving with 200 men and a ship of his own, furnishing the expense at his own proper cost.
Having parted, both sides gladly hastened to their moorings; and after they had separated and got away out of the sea-fight, although the Hellenes had possession of the bodies of the dead and of the wrecks of the ships, yet having suffered severely (and especially the Athenians, of whose ships half had been disabled), they were deliberating now about retreating to the inner parts of Hellas..."
The narrative above tells us that the Persian losses were much heavier, and that the Greeks were roughly handled; this leads many to suppose the Persians were mauled by the Greeks themselves proportionately worse - this is a mistake, IMHO. It seems the heavier losses suffered by the Royal Navy were not due to any superior fighting capacity by the Greeks in these conditions. In the actual fighting between Persian led contingents against Greeks, the latter realized they could be out-rowed, and held on in the fighting mainly because the Persians suffered from hitting each other (as well as the storms which afflicted them), something they could exploit to even things out: but they were potentially outclassed, and couldn't risk another engagement relying on terrible storms and more self inflictions among the Persian ships between themselves, a result primarily, probably, of a lack of smooth communications among a heterogeneous armada of unprecedented quantity. Adaptive measures were paramount.
Above: the Battle of Salamis: the ingenious foresight of
Themistocles, coupled with the hot-headed conduct of
Xerxes (not taking the advice of
Artemisia more a more discerning ear, in effecting a blockade), led to the Greek fleet withdrawing the center of their line of ships, effectively luring the contingents of the Royal Navy (the Egyptians were wasted) into the narrow straits, reversing the advantageous tactical conditions to their own.
The Greeks' patriotic vigor at Thermopylae and Artemision raised the stakes against
Xerxes' chances to conquer Greece; Salamis was ultra-decisive, but mainly in that it maintained the Greek coalition; it was the great Battle of Plataea which may have decided the course of European history...
Some invaluable modern sources for this breathtaking backdrop, all varied and scholarly:
Lazenby is wonderfully cogent, and
Briant's massive work is a singular tour-de-force of scholarship.
Andrew Burn,
Persia and the Greeks: The Defence of the West, C. 546- 478 B.C (1962)
Charles Hignett,
Xerxes' Invasion of Greece (1963)
John Lazenby,
The Defence of Greece, 490-479 B.C., (1993)
Peter Green,
The Greco-Persian Wars (1996)
Pierre Briant,
From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire (English edition, 2002)
Philip de Souza,
The Greek and Persian Wars, 499-386 B.C. (2003)
George Cawkwell,
The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia (2005)
Thanks, James
Thermistocles at Artemisium Straits
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Originally Posted by Kolokotrones
) Nicholas G. Hammond doesn't question the expedition of the 200 ships (The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. 4: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c.525 to 479 B.C., pg. 553). These 200 ships were wrecked at a place called 'the Hollows of Euboea' (τὰ Κοῖλα τῆς Εὐβοίης) the night before the second naval clash off Artemision (the Histories, Book 8.12-14). As quoted above, they left Aphetai and rounded the islands of Skiathos to avoid being seen by the Greeks (which asks us again to believe they weren't too discerning, as it seems improbable they could slip past the Greeks with so many ships without being spotted). Judging by the broader context of the intense events occurring, this was the same day they sailed out after the Persians arrived at Aphetai at the beginning of the afternoon (maybe late morning). 
Seriously, let's see.
