White David vs. Red Goliath, the Winter War, 1939-1940

[Guderian's Duck]

I was bored and decided to write up a little something on the Winter War while at work. I'll be adding chapters as I have time as I doubt my boss would appreciate me writing about Finland when I should be filing grants.


**UPDATED AUGUST 3RD**
See page 2.

The Winter War, 1939-1940

i. Causes
ii. The Armies
iii. The First Days

Causes

The Karelian Isthmus is situated directly between the Gulf of Finland in the eastern most portion of the Baltic Sea and the rather sizeable Lake Ladoga in northwestern Russia. Apart from what is lovely scenic countryside during the summer months, the Karelian Isthmus holds no significant natural resources and is poor farmland. Despite this, the area has been a spot of intense anxiety for the past three hundred years since Russia’s Peter the Great--the reason being that it stands as a land bridge between greater Russia and all of Scandinavia. The terrain serves as a convenient route between Scandinavia and Russia that is not found anywhere else. The northern and eastern borders of Finland are heavily forested and remote. They are hard to travel through for most modern vehicles and most anything but aircraft and skis.

Ever since May of 1703 when Peter the Great began to construct his new capital city just south of the Karelian Isthmus, the area has concerned Russia’s generals. The Isthmus could serve as a defensive buffer against potential aggressors coming from Sweden and later Finland—or a conduit for aggressors to attack Russia. The construction of St. Petersburg in this location ensured that at some point the area would become the focus of a conflict.

Such was the case in late 1939. Months prior in August of that year, Hitler’s Germany had signed a pact with Stalin’s Soviet Union which contained several secret protocols. This pact—the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—divided up parts of Europe and Scandinavia into mutual ‘spheres of influence’ between the two nations and guaranteed that the two nations would not attack each other. In the Soviet’s sphere lay eastern Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland.

A week after the pact had been signed, Germany invaded Poland with lightning speed. On September 17, the Soviets, as per the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, invaded from the east and carved Poland in half to create a buffer zone against Germany. Soon after, the foreign ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland were invited to Moscow to discuss ‘mutual assistance’ pacts with the Soviets and other concessions. In early October, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania signed a ‘mutual assistance’ agreement with the Soviets allowing the Soviets to base planes, ships, and troops inside their countries. All three were effectively under Stalin’s thumb and well within the Soviet’s ‘sphere of influence’ now.

Stalin’s demands of the Finns were different. Europe had become engulfed in a large war and Stalin worried about the security of his nation. Due to mounting concerns, he had secured the non-aggression pact with Hitler to create buffer zones against potential enemies. Leningrad (formerly St. Petersburg) was dangerously close to the Finnish border. Given that Finland had previously accepted help from Germany during their 1918 civil war and that the Finnish government was fairly anti-Bolshevik in nature, Stalin wanted to gain a northern buffer zone against possible aggression and to protect Leningrad.

In his first meeting with the Finnish delegation, Stalin sat down and immediately laid out his demands. First, he wanted the border between Finland and the Soviet Union on Karelia moved north around 20 miles. Second, he demanded that several islands in the Gulf of Finland and two peninsulas in northern and southern Finland opened to Soviet naval forces. In exchange, Stalin would agree to give Finland a large portion of the land above Lake Ladoga (to the east of the Karelian Isthmus) to Finland. The Finns, having just recently become an independent nation in 1918 and having no ill-intent against the Soviet Union refused. They offered counter-terms but Stalin refused these in turn.

The Finnish refusal to Stalin’s terms caught the Soviets flat-footed. Stalin, the cynical and paranoid politician he was, wondered what gave the Finns such a strong backbone to refuse his demands. The Finnish armed forces were small and poorly-equipped while the Red Army was a mechanized behemoth. They could not hope to secure their sovereignty by force and had no alliances with any foreign powers. Naturally, he suspected the Finns perhaps had a secret alliance with Hitler’s Germany or something equally underhanded. The Finns, in coming to the negotiating table, suspected that if they agreed to Stalin’s terms now, it would only open the door for Stalin to demand more outrageous things in the future. The Finns and Soviets met for over a month to discuss the issues at hand. The Finns refused Stalin’s demands and still Stalin refused their counter offers. On November 3rd, Molotov, Stalin’s foreign minister ended a session of talks with a veiled threat of military action if the talks continued as they had been. On November 9th, the talks ended entirely and the Finnish delegation left Moscow. The Finns prepared for the worst.

Shortly afterwards, Stalin met in his apartment with close members of his ruling elite: Molotov the foreign minister, Zhdanov the Leningrad party chief, Krushchev, and the Finnish communist exile, Kuusinen. They discussed plans to attack Finland and set up a puppet communist government under Kuusinen.

Days later, on November 26th, several artillery shots were reported by Finnish border posts. The shots landed in Soviet Karelia close to the Finnish border. Stalin ordered Molotov to send a strongly worded note to the Finnish government in Helsinki, the Finnish capital, accusing Finland of attacking and killing Soviet troops with artillery fire. Finland responded with claims of their innocence and citing an order issued days earlier by Field Marshall Mannerheim, commander of the Finnish forces, to pull all artillery back from the front lines. Stalin and Molotov were not impressed and responded with what amounted to a declaration of war against Finland.

Hours later, Soviet bombers flew out from cloud cover and began to bomb Helsinki. Finland and the Soviet Union were now at war.

[Guderian's Duck]

The Armies

On the eve of the Winter War, the Finnish armed forces could muster a total of ten fully equipped infantry divisions. Mobilization of the nation by Field Marshall Mannerheim would allow for another two divisions to be raised. These, however, could not be fully equipped and were comprised of mostly home guard militia types with sketchy training. Each division numbered 14,000 men and could call upon support from roughly 30 artillery pieces of various sizes and nearly 24 mortars.

Ammunition was extremely scarce as well. Finnish stockpiles contained about two months’ worth of ammunition for small arms and about one month of ammunition for mortars and artillery. With so little ammunition and such a small pre-war budget allocated to the armed forces, Finnish gunners had taken enormous pains to prepare for potential war. Potential battlefields in Finland and on the border were identified and mapped for the gunners. These areas were preregistered ahead of time. Finnish artillery would be deadly accurate when compared with their Soviet counter parts. Soviet gunners would suffer from poor fire control throughout the fight. The Soviets, who could call upon infinitely more firepower, would at times simply fire blindly.

Unlike the Finns, the Soviets did not adequately prepare for the coming war. Soviet artillery brought as many direct fire guns to the field as howitzers and mortars. Under normal circumstances, this would pose little problem to Soviet operations. The Finnish forests were deep and heavily wooded. Finnish artillery concentrated on guns with arced trajectories to negate the problems posed by the dense forest.
This could be blamed on one of Stalin’s cronies by the name of Kulik. Deputy-Commissar and an artillery officer from the Russian Civil War, Kulik was responsible for a number of serious blunders that plagued the Red Army not only in the Winter War, but also the war against Germany. During the years leading up to the war with Germany, Kulik, possessing Stalin’s favor, overruled several more knowledgeable artillery officers during discussions of how to rearm the Red Army’s artillery branches. N.N. Voronov, a high ranking artillery officer of the Red Army, had the courage to stand up and argue for more modern artillery over the non-sense Kulik was advising Stalin to purchase. Stalin placed his faith in Kulik—which ended up being a poor decision—and dismissed the pleas of Voronov.
Kulik was ordered north with another sketchy favorite of Stalin, the Commissar Mekhlis. Mekhlis would later make a name for himself during the German invasion by being sent from front to front terrorizes Red Army generals and arrested many of them for no good reason causing even more chaos on the front. He was later responsible for the collapse of the entire Crimean front in 1942. This, however, finally earned him Stalin’s wrath and a serious demotion.

Mekhlis and Kulik soon made themselves nuisances. The timetable for the invasion of Finland gave for about 10 days of combat before Finland would fall. Anyone who disagreed with this was mocked by both Commissars ruthlessly. Kulik not only extremely underestimated the Finns, but he also ordered barely any ammunition be brought forward for the coming attack. Voronov, by this time, chief marshall of artillery was called to give estimates on how much ammunition would be required for the offensive. To answer the question, Voronov would need to know how long the operation would last. Kulik gave the answer: ten days. Voronov wasn’t stupid, he could look at a map and see that it’d take at least ten days to move through the Finnish forests. Voronov replied, “I’ll be happy if everything can be resolved in two or three months.” He was mocked by both Mekhlis and Kulik.

Voronov wasn’t the only Red Army officer that could read a map however. Red Army chief of staff Shaposhnikov prepared a fairly extensive report on the challenges of invading Finland and the forces and timetable required for such an operation. The Red Army could bring to bear large amounts of armor and artillery and supporting infantry. However, these things required favorable terrain. Shaposhnikov could see that Finland was heavily forested and would be covered under a deep blanket of snow during the winter months. Combat would favor close up infantry battles. The report was submitted to Stalin but apparently ignored.

Very little effort was expended to train Red Army troops to use skis or other necessities of winter warfare in Finland. Meanwhile, the Finnish army was hard at work creating tactics to emphasize the terrain advantages offered by the Finnish forests and snow. Ambush tactics, lightning fast ski assaults—these were the main focus of Finnish infantry training in the years leading up to the Winter War. With such an emphasis on infantry, small arms would play an extremely important role. Here, the Finnish army had an advantage over the Red Army. While their standard service rifle was simply a variant of the Russian Mosin-Nagant, the Finns possessed and excellent submachine gun: the Suomi KP-31. The KP was a sturdy platform firing 9mm rounds at nearly 900rpm. It was accurate to nearly 200 meters and was extremely reliable in the cold weather. Its size and weight made it excellent for ski troops to use quickly. The Soviets came to fear the gun and would eventually take the design and copy it to create the famous PPSh-41 submachine gun.

The Finns also had a reliable and powerful light machine gun called the Lahti. It was close in function to the American B.A.R. but could survive in much colder temperatures. Rare amongst weapons of the time, the Lahti could also be switched between semi- and fully-automatic fire. It fired 7.62mm rounds and could be fired either shouldered or from an attachable bipod. The main advantage here was that it was mobile firepower for fast moving Finnish troops unlike the Finns mainstay machine gun, a water-cooled Maxim variant. The Maxim was heavy, weighing nearly 23 pounds. It was, however, rugged and reliable even in the horrific conditions of the Finnish winter. The Finns would make excellent use of these throughout the war as make-shift artillery. Due to the lack of shells and artillery pieces, to reduce strong points, Finnish troops would wheel a Maxim up to ludicrously close ranges and blast away until the position vanished. Other armies would have called upon mortars or artillery. Finland had to make the most out of the few things they had.

Unlike Finland, the Soviets could call upon large amounts of armor to support their attacks or force breakthroughs. Finland had no armor whatsoever. In fact, Finland didn’t even have obsolete armor for troops to train against. Finnish troops would get a rude shock during the opening days of the war by both the Soviet artillery and armor. Most Finnish troops hadn’t seen a single tank, let alone the massed armor the Soviets would use. Finnish troops made excellent use of the very few 37mm Bofors anti-tank guns they had and would improvise with anything they had on hand to destroy tanks. The Finns created the famous “Molotov Cocktail” gas bomb or bundled grenades together to attack tanks. Despite the Finns having no armor whatsoever, the Soviets brought forward many anti-tank guns and wheeled them into the Finnish forests. Lucky for the Finns, these were quickly captured and made good use of.

Soviet armor would cause many problems for Finnish troops throughout the war, but the breakthroughs they created were seldom exploited by Soviet infantry. Communication between armor, artillery, and infantry in 1939’s Red Army was limited to attacking in the same direction. Whether or not infantry and tanks got there at the same time, no one knew, or seemed to care. The Red Army had a long way to go before it became the mechanized juggernaught of 1945. First they had to shake off the oppressive yoke of the Commissar and needed to get their hands dirty with some actual combat experience. The stereotypical massed charges against machine guns and through minefields to clear them for Soviet armor most certainly applied here. Finnish machine gunners would sometimes have to be rotated off the frontlines at strong points in the line after mowing downs literally hundreds of Soviet soldiers in the space of 20 minutes. The senseless slaughter would fray the nerves of troops.

This was the state of both armies as Soviet troops massed on the Finnish border and Finnish troops frantically continued to fortify the Mannerheim defense line. In terms of manpower and materiel available to both sides, this couldn’t have appeared as anything less than a foregone conclusion on paper. The Finns, however, had Soviet incompetence, the terrain, and some of the best officers in any army to help to even the odds. Despite this, no one was holding their breath.

[Guderian's Duck]

So it may be a while before I can finish this. Feel free to add your own information and what not or make fun of me.

[Theseus1234]

So it may be a while before I can finish this. Feel free to add your own information and what not or make fun of me.

Very intriguing, and it must have taken a lot of time to put all of that down

[bushbush]

OF COURSE i bet my money on USSR....there is no way finland can win...

oh wait.....

[Draksen]

OF COURSE i bet my money on USSR....there is no way finland can win...

oh wait.....

You do know that Finland lost, right?
Finland was defeated. They simply managed to prevent a total invasion by blocking the red army in Carelia.
In Finland, the whole war (winter war and also Continuation war) are presented as semi-victories.
In fact they are, as Finland managed to keep its independance, and didnt fell under soviet control after 1945.

But Both battles, were lost by the Finns. Armisitice after the Winter War (losing freshly invaded Carelia) and Armisitice and unconditional surrendering of the finns after the continuation war (after they break with Germany) which forced them to fight the Germans in Lapland.

My grand'pa fought there, in JR5 regiment on the Mannerheim line.

Lets face it. If soviet union launch full assult, Finland would collapes. They destroy the germans, Why wouldn't they destroy little finland?

You know what really saved the finns there?
Apart from their courage ofc.
The weather. Frost. -50 deg C on the Isthm of Kannas (between Viipuri and Leningrad) when the war begun: russian aviation and tanks blocked. The oil was frozen!
And the russian troops (mainly divisions from Kazakstan) werent prepared to a winter offensive.
Stalin believed in quantity not quality

[Tiwaz]

But Both battles, were lost by the Finns. Armisitice after the Winter War (losing freshly invaded Carelia) and Armisitice and unconditional surrendering of the finns after the continuation war (after they break with Germany) which forced them to fight the Germans in Lapland.

You should study the conflict more before you make such fallacious claims.

Finland NEVER surrendered. Not conditionally and specially not unconditionally.

Each and every conflict was ended through armistice and peace treaty. Of course they were unfavorable to Finns, but there is VERY significant difference between unfavorable armistice/peace treaty and surrendering conditionally or unconditionally.

[Tiberios]

Besides, one of the most important facts is that Finland was spared becomming a USSR puppet like Poland or Hungary.

[Draksen]

Besides, one of the most important facts is that Finland was spared becomming a USSR puppet like Poland or Hungary.

Finland had very little to none political liberty during the cold war.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization
And how many times did I hear even myself when I was younger (70s) that the SF tag on finnish cars was known as Soviet Finland...

You should study the conflict more before you make such fallacious claims.

Finland NEVER surrendered. Not conditionally and specially not unconditionally.

Each and every conflict was ended through armistice and peace treaty. Of course they were unfavorable to Finns, but there is VERY significant difference between unfavorable armistice/peace treaty and surrendering conditionally or unconditionally.

There's no difference. Or have I missed something, you didnt lose Carelia? And what about the gold debt to the USSR after the continuation war? And the "military contract" you still had in the 80s which forced you to buy exclusively Russian material? And the so called finlandization? A myth probably?
You either win a war, or you lose it.
In Finland's case, it was a loss. A very honorable loss, but a loss.

Touchy subject ot finns, even these days.
The way they manage to almost make you believe they won is simply awesome.

Tiwaz, älä ymmärrä minua väärin: en sanonut, että Suomi olisi huonosti taistellut, päin vastoin!
Mutta ihan suoraan suomenkielelläkin, Suomi hävisi molemmat sodat. Ainoastaan Mannerheimin taktiset ja hyvin ajoistetut rauhasopimusket, sekä sopiva liittoutuminen Saksan kanssa, teki, että Neuvostoliitto ei kaapannut Suomea kokonaan sodan (1945) jälkeen.
Pappani taisteli Kannaksella talvisodan aikana, ja olen paljonkin tutkinut, lukenut ja jopa suoraan Papan kanssa niistä asioista puhunut. Anteeksi jos tässä tuli kielioppivirheitä.
t: Suomessa asuva ranskalainen

[Tiwaz]

There's no difference. Or have I missed something, you didnt lose Carelia? And what about the gold debt to the USSR after the continuation war? And the "military contract" you still had in the 80s which forced you to buy exclusively Russian material? And the so called finlandization? A myth probably?
You either win a war, or you lose it.
In Finland's case, it was a loss. A very honorable loss, but a loss.

Touchy subject ot finns, even these days.
The way they manage to almost make you believe they won is simply awesome.

Tiwaz, älä ymmärrä minua väärin: en sanonut, että Suomi olisi huonosti taistellut, päin vastoin!
Mutta ihan suoraan suomenkielelläkin, Suomi hävisi molemmat sodat. Ainoastaan Mannerheimin taktiset ja hyvin ajoistetut rauhasopimusket, sekä sopiva liittoutuminen Saksan kanssa, teki, että Neuvostoliitto ei kaapannut Suomea kokonaan sodan (1945) jälkeen.
Pappani taisteli Kannaksella talvisodan aikana, ja olen paljonkin tutkinut, lukenut ja jopa suoraan Papan kanssa niistä asioista puhunut. Anteeksi jos tässä tuli kielioppivirheitä.
t: Suomessa asuva ranskalainen

How about learning about differences?


Unconditional surrender:
[quote]Unconditional surrender is a surrender without conditions, in which no guarantees are given to the surrendering party except for those provided by international law. Announcing that only unconditional surrender is acceptable puts psychological pressure on a weaker adversary. The most notable uses of the term have been by the Confederate States of America to the United States in the American Civil War and by the Axis powers in World War II./quote]

What Finland did, was negotiate armistice and peace. There was NO SURRENDER.

Here is what surrender is:

Surrender is when soldiers, nations or other combatants stop fighting and eventually become prisoners of war, either as individuals or when ordered to by their officers. A white flag is a common symbol of surrender, as is the gesture of raising one's hands empty and open above one's head.

Now, clearly you have not read your history. At no point did Finland surrender conditionally or unconditionally.

Negotiating armistice and peace, even if you have to cede territory, is NOT surrendering. In peace negotiations both sides agree to terms upon which hostilities cease.

Armistice:

An armistice is a situation in a war where the warring parties agree to stop fighting. It is not necessarily the end of a war, but may be just a cessation of hostilities while an attempt is made to negotiate a lasting peace. It is derived from the Latin arma, meaning weapons and statium, meaning a stopping.

You should notice that in Paris peace treaty terms of peace were negotiated with Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland .

Notice something? Absence of Japan and Germany? That's right! Those countries SURRENDERED. They had no ability to negotiate ANYTHING. After you surrender, you throw your gloves to the ground and place yourself at mercy of winner.

In armistice and peace treaty, both sides agree that continuation of hostilities is pointless and negotiate terms upon which they end.



No offense meant, but you really should read more about what terms mean. Losing war does not equal surrender, and getting shorter stick in peace treaty does not equal surrender.


Here is little something which was declared regarding German government by, notice, powers it surrendered to.

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect[14] the annexation of Germany.
—US Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 1520.[15]

As you can see, they assumed supreme authority over everything. Everything. Germans did not have any power over their own country because they had surrendered unconditionally.

Compare this to Finland. Are you even aware that Finland was NOT occupied? Finland remained fully in control of Finnish government and Finnish armed forces. Bases WERE leased to Russia, but they did not have any official authority outside those bases.

[Tiberios]

Finland had very little to none political liberty during the cold war.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization
And how many times did I hear even myself when I was younger (70s) that the SF tag on finnish cars was known as Soviet Finland...

Still, the Finns managed to avoid being a puppet of the USSR and having forced communism on it. Yes it lost the war and lost Karelia, but it remained independent and free of Soviet oppression. Considereing what fate the Baltic states, Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe got, I thinks Finns are quite happy that they didn't have to share that fate.

[wilpuri]

Finland had very little to none political liberty during the cold war.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization
And how many times did I hear even myself when I was younger (70s) that the SF tag on finnish cars was known as Soviet Finland...

Finlandization was regrettable. Even more regrettable that it carries on to this day, albeit in different form. However, Finland did always have a will of its own, and its statesmen, especially Kekkonen, were quite adept at balancing between east and west (regardless of how you view Kekkonen otherwise).

There's no difference. Or have I missed something, you didnt lose Carelia? And what about the gold debt to the USSR after the continuation war? And the "military contract" you still had in the 80s which forced you to buy exclusively Russian material? And the so called finlandization? A myth probably?

There is a very real difference between negotiated and unconditional surrender.

And Finland never had to buy exclusively Soviet equipment. 1/3 was purchased from the Soviets, 1/3 from the West and 1/3 from "neutrals".

So, Arvoisa Suomessa asuva ranskalainen, drop the disrespectful tone and get your facts straight. We Finns take pride in the fight our grandparents and parents put up, which ultimately ensured a happier fate for us than for the majority of Soviet neighbours. Although, I can see why it would be tempting to equate all military losses with each other. I mean, that would make the French defence of 1940 comparable to the Winter and Continuation Wars. We can all dream.

[Yoda Twin]

The Winter War was one of the soviets biggest mistakes IMO.

[shadyrome]

Lets face it. If soviet union launch full assult, Finland would collapes. They destroy the germans, Why wouldn't they destroy little finland?

[Guderian's Duck]

Lets face it. If soviet union launch full assult, Finland would collapes. They destroy the germans, Why wouldn't they destroy little finland?

They did launch a full assault. For the first two months, they were simply incompetent. Eventually, Timoshenko took over and revamped the entire thing. Tactics were changed and especially communication and cooperation between the infantry, artillery, and tank forces. The Finns managed to hold on for another month or so before negotiations finally ran their course.

During the Continuation War, the Soviets launched another major offensive in 1944 with a well trained, well led, and well equipped force. Despite being pushed back all along the front, the Finns somehow managed to hold on.

What happened here, is simply one of the greatest upsets in all of military history. I can't really think of anything like this since Thermopolyae.

[Tiberios]

Have to agree with you. The Finnish ability to make so competent and potent defence against the Russians both in the Winter War and the Continuation was simply amazing.

[Dodge]

And then there's Simo Hayha, the sniper who shot 500 Russians using iron sights and a machine gun.

[conon394]

What happened here, is simply one of the greatest upsets in all of military history. I can't really think of anything like this since Thermopolyae.

Still too bad the Swedes did not formally aid the Finns, real Swedish troops and access to more anti tank weapons might just have made Timoshenko''s second try not worth the effort.

[Salem1]

Still too bad the Swedes did not formally aid the Finns, real Swedish troops and access to more anti tank weapons might just have made Timoshenko''s second try not worth the effort.

Yes, one of the biggest mistakes in our history was not to directly go to Finland's aid in the winter and continuation wars.

[Romanos IV]

If it wasn't for Voroshilov, the worst Soviet general ever, whose decisions radically denied all the avantages the Red Army enjoyed, I'm sure that war would have a different ending.