
Originally Posted by
persianfan247
So it seems to me that there is only two reasons for punishment. One seems to be for simple revenge and the other reason is to prevent future occurances of the act that you are punishing for. Yet I don't see the point of the first reason, so can anyone tell me what purpose vengence surves? Why should we want revenge?
Because people always talk about someone receiving their just deserts, but surly it dosn't matter once a crime is done, it is done and getting revenge changes nothing. But it shoud matter about future prevention of the crime not the crimminal, who should be punished as a warning to others not so they can feel some of the pain they have meeted out themselves, which seems like a purposless objective. So purpose do you guys think punishment surves.
P.S this thread is kind of stupid, with obvious answers, but Im bored.
There are a couple arguments you see for the retributive theory of punishment, but I think the best one is one from elimination. The argument essentially says that the retributive theory is correct because the other, results oriented, theories justify obviously immoral behavior. We can put the argument like this:
Suppose for a moment that you're right, and whether we're justified in punishing someone has only to do with whether the punishment will prevent future crimes and nothing to do with whether the punishment is "deserved" because of a past crime. Then it should follow that when we're thinking about punishing someone we only ask whether doing so will stop future crimes at a sufficiently low cost. We don't care about whether the person we're punishing actually did anything, so long as the preventative effect of the punishment is the same.
So let's say you're the sheriff in a town where a crime's been committed. You know you can't catch the real criminal but there's a vagrant passing through town who you can convincingly frame. If you frame and then punish the vagrant you'll get the same deterrent effect that you would have gotten from punishing the actual criminal. (And stipulate that no one will catch you: For example, say you live in the American South during the 1930's and the vagrant is black. People will think he did it just because of the color of his skin.)
If the results oriented justification of punishment is correct, then, there's no reason no to punish the vagrant. In fact, so long as you know the deterrent effect would be the same, you have no more reason to punish the actual criminal than the vagrant, even when could catch the actual criminal.
But punishing the vagrant is obviously wrong - he didn't do anything. Thus, the results of punishment can't actually be the real source of the justification of punishment.
Another, faster, way to put the argument goes like this: If punishment is justified because of its results, then whenever you have the same result from a punishment you ought to be equally justified in imposing it. But there are cases where the results are the same but you're nonetheless justified in imposing the punishment on one party but not the other (e.g. the example above). So punishment isn't justified by its results.
In any case, the point is that the retributive theory of punishment becomes attractive because it avoids the conclusions we saw in the hypothetical above. We don't want to say its OK to use innocent people by punishing them to deter others, so adopt a theory that recognizes the importance of desert.