Waterloo....

[AqD]

I just watched, not so good IMO..... Some questions:

- Why must their infantry fight in tight formation? Doesn't it make them perfect targets for cannons and muskets?

- Why didn't their cavalry (both english and french) carry pistols for short-range shooting?

- There was a big raining at the night before the battle, why didn't the french make assault? The english were outnumbered and not so high-morale, and without reinforcement and the firearms they should lose! (and the mud would be bad for french artillery next day!)

[Juvenal]

I just watched, not so good IMO.....

Do you mean the de Laurentis/Bondarchuk film? Maybe the dialogue wasn't great (lots of quotes though), but still I quite liked the potrayals by Rod Stieger and Christopher Plummer. Anyway, it is the battle sequences the film is famous for, and they were superb (no CGI back then).

- Why must their infantry fight in tight formation? Doesn't it make them perfect targets for cannons and muskets?

This formation gives greatest firepower and best cohesion and highest morale. Smooth-bore muskets were short-ranged and not accurate, so the formation wasn't as suicidal as you might think. Formed infantry tended to try to stay away from cannons (skirmishers and cavalry should be used against artillery).

- Why didn't their cavalry (both english and french) carry pistols for short-range shooting?

Napoleonic cavalry charged home, reuters-style shooting would nullify the shock effect of the charge (actually I think they did carry pistols as well).

- There was a big raining at the night before the battle, why didn't the french make assault? The english were outnumbered and not so high-morale, and without reinforcement and the firearms they should lose! (and the mud would be bad for french artillery next day!)

It rained all day on the 17th and the French didn't advance to the battlefield late in the day. This was partly because Napoleon thought Wellington would retreat west rather than north. Napoleon viewed Waterloo as an opportunity to to smash Wellington before he could retreat to Antwerp, so he needed his grand battery deployed and dry ground for the bombardment and pursuit.

[AqD]

This formation gives greatest firepower and best cohesion and highest morale. Smooth-bore muskets were short-ranged and not accurate, so the formation wasn't as suicidal as you might think. Formed infantry tended to try to stay away from cannons (skirmishers and cavalry should be used against artillery).

I see. BTW where were the skirmishers? miss them in the movie.....

Napoleonic cavalry charged home, reuters-style shooting would nullify the shock effect of the charge (actually I think they did carry pistols as well).

I wondered that when they tried to pursue the running english cavalry and failed to kill all but two officers.... A pistol would just be handy at that moment!

It rained all day on the 17th and the French didn't advance to the battlefield late in the day. This was partly because Napoleon thought Wellington would retreat west rather than north. Napoleon viewed Waterloo as an opportunity to to smash Wellington before he could retreat to Antwerp, so he needed his grand battery deployed and dry ground for the bombardment and pursuit.

But he knew the mud to be caused by raining and the possible reinforcement, isn't his plan rather risky? But if he made assault at night, no bombardment, no firearm, no reinforcement. All hand-to-hand combat followed by cavalry pursuit (and the english would run - I know they would! ). Wouldn't it be much better?

[Juvenal]

I see. BTW where were the skirmishers? miss them in the movie.....

I suppose skirmishers aren't very photogenic, Bondarchuk had a whole Soviet Division for extras and wanted to show off the big formations. The nearest thing to skirmisher combat depicted was the fighting at Hougomont and La Haye Sainte.

I wondered that when they tried to pursue the running english cavalry and failed to kill all but two officers.... A pistol would just be handy at that moment!

I don't recall Ponsonby's brigade being used again after that charge (could be wrong here), so they must have suffered severely. I believe that Ponsonby himself was killed by French Lancers after he had surrendered. His captors saw some British cavalry who they thought were going to try to save him, so they killed him.

But he knew the mud to be caused by raining and the possible reinforcement, isn't his plan rather risky? But if he made assault at night, no bombardment, no firearm, no reinforcement. All hand-to-hand combat followed by cavalry pursuit (and the english would run - I know they would! ). Wouldn't it be much better?

Napoleon's plan for the campaign was very risky, but he thought it had already succeeded after defeating Blucher. He didn't rate Wellington's army highly at all and wasn't expecting the Prussians to intervene (Grouchy was supposed to be chasing them back to Liege).

I can't think of any major Napoleonic battle that took place at night. A siege assault might work, but not a field battle.

[Tiberius Tosi]

A battle on the field at night is a good way to get your army split up and killed. It's hard enough to organize men in lines at night and advance, let alone doing it at night with no artillery cover and cavalry blindly charging. The risk of a night attack would have been worse than the risks he took.

[Poach]

Battles of that era would have been a slaughter at night. The French cavalry would have ended up killing as many of their own troops as British, if they ever actually found anyone to charge at.

As mentioned, Napoleon thought he'd already pretty much won once Blucher was defeated. He didn't quite realise that the Prussian army was defeated but still in good order. Their formations were intact and ready to fight again in short notice, as they did.

Napoleon expected, as mentioned, the British to retreat rather than fight without the Prussians. Wellington knew that he wouldn't have to fight without the Prussians, and thought he had a fair chance of holding the field long enough to allow for the Prussian arrival, which he did.

And what's all this about knowing the British would run for their lives against French cavalry? We showed their cavalry who was boss during that very battle! It's the French that are bad at fighting wars, isn't that a running gag on both sides of the Atlantic?

[Tiberius Tosi]

It's the French that are bad at fighting wars, isn't that a running gag on both sides of the Atlantic?

Oh yeah. Half of the French Army's basic training consists of putting your hands in the air and learning how to say "I surrender" in 10 various languages.

[Watchman]

That's obviously why they've spent (depending on how you count) the last few thousand years fighting just about everybody around rather succesfully, overall...

That running gag, AFAIK, is about six years old and the product of the 'Muricans getting their pants all a-twist over French scepticism over the whole Iraq thing... which as it happens proved entirely justified. Not really surprising, given the amount of practical experience the French have of *succesfully* messing with third-world countries - they presumably knew a poorly-conceived cluster**** in the making when they saw it.

So yeah.

Anyway, Napoleonic cavalry pretty much universally carried pistols (and in some cases carbines too, or detachable stocks which turned the pistols into carbines of sorts; the rifled ones were apparently quite useful for seeing off infantry skirmishers) but those weren't their main shock weapon. They're quite often shown being used during some clorious melee or another in the period paintings, however; AFAIK one common method of using them was firing a volley into the faces of attacking enemy horse before counter-charging with the blade (or receiving the attack at rest).

[Tiberius Tosi]

That's obviously why they've spent (depending on how you count) the last few thousand years fighting just about everybody around rather succesfully, overall...

That running gag, AFAIK, is about six years old and the product of the 'Muricans getting their pants all a-twist over French scepticism over the whole Iraq thing... which as it happens proved entirely justified. Not really surprising, given the amount of practical experience the French have of *succesfully* messing with third-world countries - they presumably knew a poorly-conceived cluster**** in the making when they saw it.

So yeah.

First, we were kidding; everyone knows its not true. Second, making fun of French people is about as old as time and we have been doing it since LONG before Iraq. That may have made it a bit more frequent but certainly wasn't what made us start.

[Juvenal]

The French had fought and beaten innumerable European armies for the previous 20 years. It wasn't bravery or even competence they were short of.

Napoleon took a big risk in trying to knock out the Prussian and Anglo-Allied armies with his Strategy of the Central Position. The Armee du Nord had been hastily assembled, Ney actually joined it on the march. There was considerable distrust of the senior officers by the common soldiers, who feared Royalist traitors. Indeed a division commander and his whole staff went over to the Allies just before Ligny. So the French army was strong but fragile, it also wasn't big enough for the task.

Napoleon was facing two of the three best Allied commanders (the other being the Arch-Duke Charles). After his victory at Ligny, Napoleon chose to interpret the mass desertion of the Saxon contingent as the whole Prussian army fleeing towards Namur.

It should not have been a surprise that Blucher returned quickly, still full of fight. he had done this many times before and had always been the most aggressive of the Allied leaders.

Napoleon also mishandled Waterloo. He let Jerome waste the best infantry at Hougomont (which was supposed to be a feint). He decided on a crude frontal attack against Wellington, a leader famous for defensive battles, and sensitive to the slightest threat to his communications. He failed to withdraw when the Prussians arrived, he allowed Ney to use up the cavalry without artillery support (even giving Ney more cavalry), and finally he committed the Guard to a lost cause.

The fact is that Napoleon was a man in a hurry, he gambled his army for a quick victory, and lost.

[Watchman]

Napoleon also had a bit of a problem in that his somewhat poorly thought-out Russian excursion had effectively wiped out the hard, well-trained, veteran core of his field army, and the increasingly hastily trained replacements just weren't up to the same standards.

And his numerous opponents certainly hadn't seen much reason to give him a breather for the necessary drill sessions...

[Mangalore]

...
Napoleon also mishandled Waterloo. He let Jerome waste the best infantry at Hougomont (which was supposed to be a feint). ...

Actually, both Wellington and Napoleon seemed to have believed the battle would be decided there. The claim of a diversion came afterwards. At least some of the quote I read recently concerning the battle where about this and the fact that both commander stated the importance of Hougomont for winning the battle. So actually the fighting and the ressources there were actually justified given that both sides considered it essential.

[Legu]

Napoleon also mishandled Waterloo. He let Jerome waste the best infantry at Hougomont (which was supposed to be a feint). He decided on a crude frontal attack against Wellington, a leader famous for defensive battles, and sensitive to the slightest threat to his communications. He failed to withdraw when the Prussians arrived, he allowed Ney to use up the cavalry without artillery support (even giving Ney more cavalry), and finally he committed the Guard to a lost cause.

"Crude frontal attack"? Again, an attack on the flanks wouldn't have been exactly wise. Wellington's right? Would have pushed his line further close to the Prussians and we all know what would have happened then. Wellington's left? The terrain was unsuitable for cavalry and his attack could have been intercepted by Blücher. And, perhaps most importantly, Napoléon didn't have the time to maneuver. The ground was muddy from rain and he had already been forced to delay the battle by waiting until 01:30 PM for the artillery to move on the roads. Any further delay would have meant his defeat at the hands of the combined Anglo-Allied-Prussian army. But it's true that he underestimated Wellington.

And, no, he didn't allow Ney to attack but instead remarked that Ney had attacked with the cavalry an hour too early. As for sending more cavalry, what else was he supposed to send? He had only them and the Guard available and the Guard was needed as a reserve to hold off the Prussians if they arrived. Besides, the decision to send in more cavalry had been successful at Eylau.

[AqD]

A battle on the field at night is a good way to get your army split up and killed. It's hard enough to organize men in lines at night and advance, let alone doing it at night with no artillery cover and cavalry blindly charging. The risk of a night attack would have been worse than the risks he took.

Except it was heavy raining! They cannot fire guns under raining right?

So here we're: no organization, no guns, no artillery, nothing but melee combat by courage, fists and teeth! It'd be all madness!

with relation to the point about why he did not attack earlier it is because his cavalry would be not well utilised at night in the mud and the huge amounts of cannon are what gave him his main advantage so he wanted to be able to at least try and use them on a open field.

So were the enemies His advantage? The night assault would be unexcepted, and completely unpreparable to the english thanks to raining and lack of melee training, and they'd run!


Too bad he's not as mad as we were

[Garrigan]

Watchman, I've been calling the French cowards for over 6 years...It may have started in America over the Iraq war, but its been around much longer in england.

[Tiberius Tosi]

Honestly I know little about Waterloo, but what would have been his best option in the battle itself? By just studying the maps and enemy positions it seems flanking right would probably have been best. The left was too well positioned and Hougomont was a waste.

What was his best option?

[Poach]

Juvenal, are you French?

As this is exactly why we do it! In Britain anyway. Frenchmen get so worked up about it, it's hilarious.

[Optimus Marcus Ulpius Traianus]

with relation to the point about why he did not attack earlier it is because his cavalry would be not well utilised at night in the mud and the huge amounts of cannon are what gave him his main advantage so he wanted to be able to at least try and use them on a open field.

[Juvenal]

Juvenal, are you French?

I wear Union Jack underpants... 'nuff said.

Actually, both Wellington and Napoleon seemed to have believed the battle would be decided there. The claim of a diversion came afterwards.

My understanding was that Napoleon attacked Hougomont to draw off Allied reserves while he waited for the Grand Battery to be assembled. He allowed Jerome to commit more than 10,000 men (his own division and that of Foy). Wellington allocated only 3000 (Byng's Guards brigade and the Hanoverian Jaeger battalion), although part of Adam's brigade was later fed in.

Hougomont was essential to Wellington's position, because artillery posted there would enfilade the ridge where his centre was deployed.

These French forces might have been better deployed in a flanking manoeuvre. Wellington was so concerned about his communications (running west) that he deployed most of his reserves on the right, together with a large detachment (10,000?) a few miles west at Hal and Tubize.

Wellington had a lot of troops of dubious (Hanovarian Landwehr) or unknown (Dutch-Belgians) quality. A flank attack would have brought these into battle around the village of Braine Le-Alleud. Jerome, on the other hand, had lots of Legere (light) infantry, ideal for village fighting.

[EireEmerald]

what were the exact numbers on each side. Didn't the french initially outnumber the Brits?