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    Default RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six





    FOE Preview Six

    Carthage and Iberia


    Contents



    Introduction

    Welcome to the sixth and last of our faction based FOE Previews. To complete our look at the factions featured in the FOE campaign we are reprising our Carthaginian and Iberian friends from TIC. While most of the units will be familiar to you, there are a couple of surprises. One of these, is the late Punic Reform African Infantry Unit - and hereby hangs a tale. We had a bit of a disaster! A couple of new units, including this one, were irretreviably lost due to a complete hard disk failure. However, the cavalry has come to our rescue in the form of Tone and his Roma Surrectum team. When he heard of our plight, he offered us the use of their Punic Reform African Unit, which some of you will have seen in their recent previews. We not only accepted the offer with gratitude but with enthusiasm, because it is a finely crafted unit indeed. So, from the RTR team as a whole, our thanks go out to Tone and his RS buddies.

    Also in this preview, you will find details of the new Carthaginian Government System, which we will be implementing in FOE, and news that will be of interest to modders: the RTR VII Grand Campaign map is going to be made available to any who wish to use it in their work - see the Afterword for details.

    Before we finally get under way, my usual thanks to the team for helping me put this preview together and, in particular, to HamilcarBarca for the effort he has put in to producing the wealth of historical information contained herein.


    Carthage: Constitution

    Dido Building Carthage, Turner, 1815 (National Gallery, London)

    Unlike the other Phoenician-Tyrian settlements in the west, Carthage had been created, or at least nurtured after c. 750 BC, for an explicitly political rather than mercantile purpose. That purpose was to serve as a Tyrian refuge for those Phoenician elements departing their homeland as it progressively succumbed to the violence and chaos that engulfed Phoenicia during the collapse of the Assyrian Empire and the ensuing contest between Egypt and Babylon, as well as to protect Tyre’s trade with the western Mediterranean from the encroaching waves of Greek colonists settling in Sicily and Magna Graecia (‘Greater Greece’, i.e. southern Italy). The developing Greek threat during 600-550 BC would explain Carthage’s development of a military role, and its determination to establish its role as a naval power in the Phoenician sphere of influence in the West. These factors, when considered together, explain how Carthage was able to assume, and was accepted, as the leader of the Phoenicians of the West when Tyre ceased to be able to provide either protection or legitimate authority after the siege of Tyre by Nebuchadnezzar in 586-573 BC. Carthage was the legitimate inheritor of Tyrian hegemony over the old Tyrian enclaves in the West. Now, with the challenge posed by the Phocaean Greeks in the northern Tyrrhenian Sea and land-hungry Greek colonists encroaching on western Sicily, the Phoenicians of the West felt threatened and sought leadership from Carthage.

    Although the foundation myth of the city-state of Carthage features the royal princess Elissa/Dido, by c. 500 the city was clearly governed as a republic. Punic epigraphic sources always mention republic-type magistracies. Carthage had stable institutions with many Greek-like features; elected magistrates, a senate and a citizen assembly. Aristotle observed that “The Carthaginians also are regarded as managing their constitution successfully, and in many respects in a distinctive manner, though in some particulars closely resembling the Lacedaemonians [i.e. Spartans]” (Aristotle, Pol. 2.11, 1272b24). The government of Carthage was highly regarded by ancient writers; Strabo declared that the Carthaginians could not be considered “barbarians” because they were well governed, and Polybius declared the Carthaginian constitution the best outside Greece. Aristotle deemed the Carthaginians “governed, from many points of view, in a way superior to other people.” Aristotle approved of the oligarchic quality of the Carthaginian government; it was ‘aristocratic’, meaning government by the best men.

    At the head of the Carthaginian republic were two annually elected magistrates, the “suffete” (Punic: sptm or shouphetim, suffete in the Latin, a kin-word to the Hebrew shopet, meaning ‘Judge’), who convoked and presided over the Carthaginian senate. The magistracy of suffete is often named as basileus by the Greek sources; they are equated with Roman consuls by Livy (Livy, 30.7.5). Robert Drews even suggests that the Phoenician double-magistracy of suffete may have inspired the Spartan dyarachy (double-kingship). “When we recall that the Spartan basileus had no palaces, wore no royal garb, and ate at the common messes (no matter that they received larger portions of food) we may be readier to admit their status was not much different from that of the basileus in republican Carthage” (Robert Drews, ‘Phoenicians, Carthage and the Spartan Eunomia’, The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 100, No. 1, Tekmhpion. A Special Issue in Honor of James Henry Oliver, Spring 1979, pp. 45-58).


    Carthaginian coin, 4th century BC

    Unusually, however, the suffetes were not entrusted with military responsibilities, this responsibility instead being delegated to influential public figures who were elected as generals. Certainly by the third century BC we do not hear of suffete’s also being elected as generals. These generals were elected by the citizens for particular theatres of campaigning or a specific military task, and their tenure was not annual, but rather for the duration of the campaign. It appears that Punic generals had ‘kingly’ (i.e. absolute) authority while they were on campaign; the record shows that generals could make pacts with foreign states (although these were required to be ratified at Carthage). These extensive powers were matched by the risk they ran if they failed. Unusually in a republic, a defeated general was liable to be recalled and executed: this was the fate of Hanno who lost the decisive sea battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 BC.

    The senate’s formal name was ‘The Mighty Ones’ (Punic: h’drm or hadirim), and it was comprised of representatives of Carthage’s noble families. The senate was the centre of Carthage’s government, and served as its legislature. The senate promulgated laws, established foreign policy, waged war and made peace, received foreign delegations and kept watch over the conduct of the city’s generals. The senate had a inner council of thirty, which Livy names the sanctius consilium, and which likely acted as an executive committee of senior senators. Powerful bodies known as Boards of Five (named “pentarchies” by Aristotle) appear to have played an important administrative function within the republic; they were likely subcommittees of the senate. There were various minor magistracies and officials attested within the republic, such as rab (a title much attested on Punic inscriptions, perhaps responsible for finances, though its functions are not clear), public scribe (sprm) and market inspector.

    One of the responsibilities of the Boards of Five was to select from among the senators the membership of a tribunal known as “The Hundred and Four” or simply “The Hundred”. It appears that such an appointment was irrevocable and for life. This body had been established in the fifth century BC to serve as a high court of justice whose primary task was to check the conduct of Carthage’s generals, but later expanding its prerogatives to include civil justice, and scrutinizing the work of other magistrates, including the suffetes. By the third century BC “The Hundred” ruled the public life of the city, so that Livy speaks of the “reign” of its members.

    Although the government of Carthage was dominated by these oligarchic institutions, it is also reported that there was an assembly of Carthaginian citizens too. If the suffetes and the senate agreed on referring a matter to the people, this was done. Likewise, if the suffetes and the senate could not agree on a matter, it would be resolved by the citizen assembly. In this way, the oligarchic institutions of the republic were under pressure to reach agreement or else the matter would be settled by the assembly. It is unclear which Carthaginians were regarded as citizens; clearly women and slaves were excluded, and so too perhaps were Punic men of low economic status. Inhabitants of other Phoenician cities like Utica were not citizens; nor were the subject Libyans. It was the citizen assembly that elected suffetes, generals, and even on occasion passed laws.

    “What procedures were followed and what determined a candidate’s eligibility for office are predictably unknown, but the lavish spending which our informants insist was taken for granted meant that only rich men could compete. This in turn is a clue, both to sharply marked patron-client relationships between the powerful few in public life and many if not most ordinary voters, and at the same time to constantly fluctuating political cliques and followings – the great men manoeuvring for allies and against opponents; friendships, enmities (and clientships) very changeable; and voters on the lookout for the biggest or most ingratiating offers” (Dexter Hoyos, Hannibal’s Dynasty. Power and politics in the western Mediterranean, 247-183 BC, Routledge, 2005, Oxon, p. 31).


    Hannibal Barca

    While in theory Carthaginian generals were elected by the citizen assembly, in practice it seems that the assembly merely ratified the army’s own choice. This may have always been the case but the Xanthippus incident in the First Punic War may have marked the beginning of a change:

    “But the troops, eager as they were for battle, collecting in groups and calling on Xanthippus by name, clearly indicated their opinion that he should lead them forward at once. The generals when they saw the enthusiasm and keenness of the soldiers, Xanthippus at the same time imploring them not to let the opportunity slip, ordered the troops to get ready and gave Xanthippus authority to conduct operations as he himself thought most advantageous” ( Polybius, 1.33.4-5.)

    After this incident there are several occasions where the Carthaginian army selected their general. During the Mercenary War the generals Hamilcar Barca and Hanno quarrelled, and the Carthaginian army was asked to reject one of them (Polybius, 1.82.5, 12). This may reflect the unusual situation of there being a high proportion of citizens in the Carthaginian army at that time, but later, when Hamilcar was killed in Iberia, Hasdrubal was “acclaimed as general by the army and by the Carthaginians alike”. When Hasdrubal was killed Polybius records that the Carthaginians:

    “at first waited for a pronouncement on the part of the troops, and when news reached them from their armies that the soldiers had unanimously chosen Hannibal as their commander, they hastened to summon a general assembly of the commons, which unanimously ratified the choice of the soldiers” (Polybius, 3.13.3-4).

    By c. 500 BC the city-state of Carthage had established its political leadership over its Phoenician kin in the colonies of North Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, Iberia and the Balearic Islands. It appears that the various Phoenician settlements of the West also possessed civic institutions similar to that existing at Carthage. Suffete magistracies existed up until Roman times in many Punic cities of North Africa, and epigraphic sources attest the presence of this sort of public institution both in Sicily (Eryx) and in Sardinia (Bithia, Sulcis, Tharros). For Malta and Gades in Iberia, the existence of suffetes is deduced from, respectively, a Greek inscription mentioning two “archons” (the Greek equivalent of a suffete magistrate) and a passage from Livy. The existence of a senate is attested at not only Carthage, but also at Utica, Sulcis and Malta, and a citizen’s assembly is documented both in North Africa (at Leptis) and in the overseas territories (Gozo in the Maltese archipelago, Bithia and Olbia in Sardinia). The evidence strongly suggests that while Carthage extended its hegemony over the whole Phoenician world of the West, the individual centres maintained their traditional forms of civil independence.


    Carthage: Empire and Aristocracy

    Carthage and territories, circa 264 B.C. (before the First Punic War)

    The ‘traditional’ picture of the Carthaginians being fundamentally peaceful seafarers and merchants, keenly interested in exchange and political stability, rather than war and conquest, is a dramatic oversimplification of the truth. While it is true that Carthaginian citizens appear to have been exempt from military service, and Carthage relied upon mercenary, allied and levy troops throughout the First and Second Punic Wars, this is not to say that the Carthaginian aristocracy were not as militaristic as other Mediterranean states. There was clearly a tradition of military command among many Carthaginian aristocrats, such as the Mago family in the fifth century BC and the Barcid family in the third century BC. In the fifth century we hear of formations of heavy infantry such as the Sacred Band that were reputedly recruited from among Carthaginian noblemen. Aristotle observed that “In some places there are also laws designed to foster military virtue, as at Carthage, where men reputedly receive decorations in the form of armlets to the number of campaigns in which they have served” (Aristotle, Pol. 7.2, 1324b5). Further, it should be remembered that the oarsmen, sailors, marines and officers that crewed the Carthaginian fleet were mostly recruited from among the Carthaginian citizens themselves, and in a fleet of 120 quinqueremes this would have totalled more than 50,000 men. Given that Carthage had a total population that likely did not exceed 400,000 men, women and children, to launch such a fleet was a very great commitment of manpower indeed! Hence, the notion that the Carthaginians were largely peaceful traders and merchants that hired others to fight their wars should not be exaggerated.

    In both Sardinia and much of modern Tunisia the Carthaginians ruthlessly annexed the most fertile lands from the native Sardinian (Nuragic Phase IV) and Libyan chiefdoms through ruthless military conquest. Carthaginian grandees were installed as the privileged landowners of large agricultural estates, estates worked by native serfs. The frequency of Libyan revolts informs us as to the popularity of these aristocratic Carthaginian overlords.

    This system of Punic conquest in Sardinia and Libya segregated the interior from the coastal exterior, and controlled the principal lines of communication between the two worlds, the largely but not exclusively pastoral world of the interior (i.e. Numidian and Nuragic Phase V chiefdoms), from the agricultural and maritime world of the Carthaginians. The forts of this system served as centres of control and as points of contact between the two civilizations, the urban civilization of the Carthaginians and the village and tribal-centre world of the Nuragic folk and Numidian tribes. The enormous wealth and prosperity of the Carthaginian aristocracy was derived from the agricultural produce that was ruthlessly extracted from native serfs and great estates, together with tax and tribute, as much as it was derived from the commercial and trading activities of its merchants and seafarers.


    Carthage

    Yet there was no such conquest in southern Iberia. The Phoenicians (and Liby-Phoenicians?) of the ‘Gaditanean sphere’ did not embark upon any such conquest into the hinterland of the Iberian Peninsula. Instead, the;

    “…population of Punic origin lived on the coast, sponsored an open market for a variety of commodities, and maintained a different cultural personality from the natives of the interior. The natives, in turn, took advantage of this foreign presence and developed control over the means of production and transport of those commodities. If problems arose between and within the indigenous groups they jostled for control of a system more complicated than anything that had been seen before in the Iberian Peninsula” (Teresa Chapa Brunet, ‘Models of Interaction between Punic Colonies and Native Iberians: The Funerary Evidence’, in Miriam S Balmuth & Lourdes Prados-Torreira (eds.), Encounters and Transformations. The Archaeology of Iberia in Transition, Sheffield Acadmic Press, Sheffield, 1997, p. 149),

    Hence, the Phoenician-Punic population in Iberia largely interacted peacefully with the neighbouring native polities. There is evidence of Iberian populations actually living within the Punic-Phoenician settlements in Iberia. Important Phoenician settlements like Balsa (named after ‘Baal Saphon’, the Phoenician deity of thunder and sea, at modern Tavira, in the Algarve, Portugal) and Dona Blanca (modern Castillo de Santa Maria, Cadiz) were protected by strong defensive systems, including fortifications, bastions and ditches. Indeed, Balsa was destroyed by violence in c. 550 BC (during the ‘Crisis of Tartessos’?), and refounded as an indigenous Tartessian centre, before the site was finally abandoned at the end of the fourth century BC, and the population relocated to a nearby fortified hill of Cerro do Cavaco. Hence, there is evidence of episodes of violence between the Phoenicians and native Tartessians, but these were symptoms of the unequal exchange and collaboration between the Phoenicians and warlike native elites, rather than evidence of any Phoenician conquest of ancient Tartessos. Certainly, the Phoenicians employed native Iberian mercenaries for service in their armies in Sicily, and perhaps even interfered in native conflicts. There was, however, no colonial conquest or territorial annexation by the Phoenicians in the Far West.

    “Unlike the policy that it pursued in the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, Carthage does not seem to have maintained direct and tight control over the internal development of these so-called ‘Punic colonies’ in Spain. Although Carthaginian policy in Iberia and Eivissa [i.e. Ibiza] might have been developed in response to a strategy focused on military campaigns [in Sicily], there was no Carthaginian war in the Iberian Peninsula, nor any evidence of hostilities until Hamilcar Barca took the initiative and began his conquest, once Carthage had been defeated in the first Punic war (241 BC)” (Maria Cruz Fernandez Castro, Iberia in Prehistory, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Cambridge, 1995, p. 250; see also C R Whittaker, ‘Carthaginian imperialism in the fifth and fourth century’, in P D A Garnsey & C R Whitttaker (eds.), Imperialism in the Ancient World, University Press, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 83-84).

    The Phoenician colonies of the Iberian Peninsula and Ebusus (modern Ibiza) became a part of Punic trade system directed by the city-state of Carthage from c. 500 BC. Punic monopoly trade in its zone of influence was recognised by the polities of the Western Mediterranean, including Rome and the Etruscan city-states, through formal treaties from at least the fourth century BC. The Phocaean Greeks of Massalia and Emporion maintained a strong trading network that interacted with the Iberian polities of the Iber river valley (modern river Ebro) and the Levantine coast of Iberia, as well as southern Gaul. These Phocaean Greeks were both rivals and participants in trade with the Punic sphere; there is ample evidence of trade between Gades and Emporion, and between Massalia and the Punic city of Tharros, in western Sardinia.


    Carthage: Government System in RTR: FOE


    B1 Occupation
    Requirements - None (Buildable anywhere)
    Build Time 1

    The occupation of a settlement marks the establishment of Carthaginian Martial power over the province. Here the conqueror is left to impose whichever conditions he pleases upon the vanquished. No established form of government is in place and thus the occupying power has no organizational means to develop or otherwise administer the province until this first step is taken.

    Law 5%

    B2 Epikrateia I
    Build Time 2

    The ancient Greeks referred to the Carthaginian zone in western Sicily as Carthage’s Epikrateia (Greek: 'Predominance'); meaning its sphere of influence. The Epikrateia is where local communities submit to Carthaginian authority in matters of trade and foreign policy, and effectively join the Punic confederacy of allies and subjects that are coordinated from Carthage. Local communities remain autonomous, governed by their own laws and rulers, but they are obliged to provide Carthage with levies in times of war, and to subordinate their own trade interests to Carthage

    Happiness +5%
    Income -5%
    Limited AOR Recruitment

    B3 Epikrateia II
    Build Time 6

    The Epikrateia is now a trusted friend and ally of Carthage. The native rulers are clients of the republic of Carthage; while they enjoy local autonomy, it is Carthage that speaks for them in matters of trade and war, the former nation effectively stripped of all political identity. Local rulers and aristocrats in the Epikrateia, while holding no formal legislative or constitutional sway over the policies of Carthage, are linked to the Carthaginian aristocracy through ties of marriage and hospitality as well as formal alliance. The children of the local elites are often educated at Carthage as youths and become future citizens.

    Happiness 5%
    Law 5%
    Improved AOR recruitment

    B4 Hegemonia I
    Build Time 4

    The beginning of Carthaginian hegemonic rule also commences the annexation of the province and the overthrow of indigenous government. The settlement must give its populace for obligatory military service and pay large tributes and suffer heavy tax on trade. Carthaginian authority is given the power to create laws and conduct all internal affairs. Many cities under such government were forced to destroy their walls and submit to harsh military rule under large garrisons. However, even though military service is obligatory for subjects, it is difficult to draw upon local fighting elites, other than mercenaries, due to the resistance they provide.

    Happiness -15%
    Growth -5%
    Income +10%
    Limited AOR Recruitment


    B5 Hegemonia II
    Build Time 8

    The establishment of hegemonic government marks the end of the grim phase of harsh suppression resulting from rapid change, having one power stripped and another established, and the beginning of a concrete system of government. The general disregard for the needs, desires and rights of the local populace still remains as they are still considered subjects of the city of Carthage. Likewise the harsh penalties on trade are still present; all local wealth being heavily taxed and a tribute usually demanded. However a proper taxation and judicial system, now well enforced and policed by Carthaginian officials, is set up allowing more complete control over the public. Nevertheless the military force drawn from this province remains only as that from conscription, usually being to provide little more than organized levies.

    Happiness -10%
    Law +5%
    Growth -5%
    Income +15%
    Improved AOR Recruitment

    B6 Punic Colony
    Requires the Liby-Phoenician HR to be present
    Build Time 4

    During the period 900-750 BC the cities of Phoenicia – particularly Tyre – established a trade network anchored with trading posts and settlements throughout the central and western Mediterranean, in Sicily, Italy, Sardinia, Spain and North Africa, accessing, connecting with and even monopolizing indigenous trade systems. The magnet that drew the Phoenician seafarers into the West was the precious metals in the Iberian Peninsula. It is for this reason that the earliest Phoenician foundation was made in the far west, at Gadir on the Atlantic coastline of Spain.

    Phoenician urban foundations were typified by the establishment of a temple to Melkart, the chief Tyrian deity, and the consecration of a ‘tophet’, an open air sacred enclosure lying at the edge of colonial centres, in which sacrifice was practised and very young children were cremated. The ‘tophet’ was the site where the ‘molk’ ritual was conducted, whereby young children were sacrificed to the Phoenician-Punic deities by fire. Carthage possessed the most impressive tophet, at Salammbo, which was in continuous use for 600 years, and for the period between 400 and 200 BC has yielded more than 20,000 cremation urns. Interestingly, the Phoenician-Punic settlements in southern Spain are unique in not having a ‘tophet’.

    The Phoenicians drew the most profit from trade with backward tribes, from whom gold, silver, tin and iron were acquired in exchange for articles of small value. Phoenicians were also carriers of others trade goods, and the western Mediterranean trade included Greek pottery, olive oil, wine, cereals and Egyptian goods.

    In contrast to Greek colonization, the Phoenician foundations did not form independent political communities. Instead, the Tyrian foundations supported and sustained Tyre’s prosperity – and enabled its rulers to make payment of large tributes to their Assyrian overlords.

    The tradition in the ancient sources is that the first Phoenician establishments in the west were at Lixus, Gadir and Utica, all founded in around 1100 BC. Archaeology, however, suggests these places were established in the eighth century BC. This discrepancy can be readily explained by the fact that our ancient sources – Greek and Roman historians – have made every effort to place the foundation dates into the chronology of Homer and the legendary Trojan War.

    The Phoenician network grew, as the Tyre-Gadir route flourished, and addition Phoenician colonies were founded in Malta, Sardinia, western Sicily, the Balearic Islands, and, of course, Carthage itself in North Africa. These settlements were conveniently located so that they could strengthen the Tyre-Gadir sea route, while also accessing rich hinterlands and new markets. The greatest of these was Carthage in North Africa.

    In around 580 BC Tyre succumbed to the power of the Babylonian Empire, and so the Phoenician trading network in the western Mediterranean came under the authority of the Carthage, which then emerged as a Mediterranean political power in its own right.

    Founded in around 700 BC by aristocratic elements from the city of Tyre in Phoenicia, Carthage constituted the most important Phoenician settlement in the central Mediterranean.

    Between c. 580-500 the Phoenician enclaves throughout the western and central Mediterranean were brought together into a “Punic confederacy” led by Carthage. Unlike the Phoenicians, however, seafaring, transit trade and the procurement of metals no longer formed the exclusive focus. Instead, the aristocracy of Carthage sought to acquire land for agriculture, and replace the ancient Phoenician trade in luxuries and prestige goods with a bulk commodity trade. Throughout the Punic zone, particularly in Sardinia and North Africa, the Punic period is marked by a new colonial expansion into the agriculturally desirable lands, at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the establishment of a cereal monoculture therein. Punic North Africa and Sardinia were famous for the large-scale exploitation of agricultural resources, cereal production in particular.

    Law +5%
    Cultural Integration: Eastern Mysticism +10%

    B7 Carthaginian Military Administration
    Requires the Liby-Phoenician HR to be present
    Build Time 40

    A large number of Carthaginians and Liby-Phoenicians are now found in this region, drawn to it through service to the state, the opportunity to work the land, or to exploit the natural resources found here. This new populace is mostly exempt from the harsh measures imposed on the locals and are allowed to form a strong upper class in the new Carthaginian society. Punic culture also has taken root here, in matters of religion, architecture and material culture. The region is now Punic/West Phoenician in both terms of population and by way of life. The military can now be controlled more readily; drawing both upon the incorporation of indigenous mercenaries and fighting styles from the local populace as well as Punic levies.

    Happiness -5%
    Law +10%
    Income +10%
    Cultural Integration: Eastern Mysticism +5%
    Limited Faction Recruitment
    Improved AOR Recruitment


    B8 Carthage (Capital)
    Can only be built in the settlement of Carthage (where the Liby-Phoenician HR is present)
    Requires Capital HR
    Build Time 8

    The city of Carthage herself has full authority and privilege in all the affairs of the Republic and the Confederacy of Punic cities. She may draw the full extent of Punic citizen military prowess, commands considerable trade monopolies and controls vast amounts of fertile land both in Africa and abroad.

    The city of Carthage consisted of a middle class of Liby-Phoenician citizens who had under them considerable wealth; the more opulent middle class families often even owning their own estates, trade enterprises and a large number of African subjects. Furthermore this middle class citizen body also had the power to elect legislators, hold town meetings and form trade unions. In turn they were ruled by an upper class politically represented by a council of one hundred members and two Sophets; likened by Livy to the Roman Senate and Consuls, and by Aristotle to the Spartan Gerousia and King.

    The members of the Carthaginian Senate were chosen from a number of wealthy and long-standing noble Phoenician families whose fortune extended from as far back as the city’s origins as a colony of Tyre. According to Aristotle this task was done by the Pentarchies, a set of five legislators given the privilege of holding office longer than other magistrates and cooperating on and conducting important affairs of the state, perhaps equivalent to a modern supreme court.

    The Senate then in turn elected two Sophets, from the Semitic word meaning judge and likened by Livy to Roman Consuls, from amongst its number. The two Sophets held highest amount of political and juridical sway within the Senate and outside of it, however, if the two bodies could not reach an agreement unanimously the matter was taken before the citizens who then decided the final outcome by referendum. A matter, according to Aristotle, was often taken to the public even when it was not necessary to do so. Polybius stated that the Carthaginian public held more sway over the government than the people of Rome held over theirs.

    Carthage offered to its citizens the opportunity to expand and build their wealth outside of Carthage in the colonies. Once a new colony was established a family could migrate and attempt to form a new upper class and gain political influence and power in this manner. Aristotle mentioned that Carthaginian government “successfully escapes the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the people after another by sending them to their colonies.”

    Cultural Integration: Eastern Mysticism +5%
    Cultural Integration: Eastern Mysticism +5% (Empire Wide)

    Recruitment Full Faction (including elite units)
    Carthaginian Generals


    The Site of Carthage Today (NASA satellite photo, March 2008)

    The Liby-Phoenician HR

    This hidden resource (HR) is only found in 12 regions on the FOE map. These are;
    1. Baetis (Gadir)
    2. Bastuli (Malaka)
    3. Baleares (Ebusus)
    4. Tingitania (Lixus)
    5. Zeugei (Carthage)
    6. Muxsi (Utica)
    7. Metagonia (Hippo)
    8. Byzacium (Hadrumentum)
    9. Tripolitania (Lepcis Magna)
    10. Sicilia Poeni (Lilybaeum)
    11. Epikrateia (Panormus)
    12. Sardinia (Karalis)

    The Carthaginian "empire" is one whereby a single city-state rules a confederation of subordinate allies (Punic-Phoenician cities), client-kings and tyrants (Numidians, Iberians, and even Siciliot Greek tyrants prior to 241 BC). In some places the Carthaginians ruthlessly annexed the land, and had it worked by native serfs (Libyans and Sardinians).

    At no time did the Carthaginians extend their citizenship from beyond the small population resident at the city of Carthage itself.

    They were not interested in sharing political power with their allies - not even those that were closely linked culturally, such as at Gadir (modern Cadiz) or Utica. Carthage did not plant colonies of citizens either (as did Rome and the Greeks).

    Carthaginians did not share.

    So the Carthaginian player can only develop his/her empire on the basis of a very small citizen body in Carthage - and a small, fixed Punic-Phoenician population in places like North Africa, Sardinia, Balaeric Islands and southern Iberia.

    Punic armies ony ever had tiny numbers of Carthaginian citizens in them, usually found as officers. The heart of the army was found in two sources; Africans and mercenaries. The 'Africans' were Libyan serfs conscripted as hoplites and javelinmen, Numidian cavalry, and Liby-Phoenician hoplites. The Mercenaries that were recruited included Greeks, Gauls/Keltoi, Ligurians, Italians (especially Campanians), Iberians, Balearic slingers and, on rare occasions, Sardinians and Etruscans.

    After Hamilcar Barca conquered southern Iberia in 237 BC, the Carthaginians recruited great numbers of Iberian and Celtiberian levies and mercenaries.

    This situation is covered by the "realism" we are creating for the Carthaginian player. Their armies will only ever have a few "Carthaginian" units (Sacred Band, Carthaginian Cavalry), which can only be recruited from Carthage itself, and so the player will heavily depend on regional levies (AOR) and mercenaries.

    The Carthaginian player cannot extend his "culture" so that he can recruit Carthaginian units from outside Carthage; other units in the Carthaginian roster like Liby-Phoenician Hoplites can only be recruited in cities with a Liby-Phoenician population, just as elephants can only be recruited in Africa.

    That is the challenge for Carthage.

    Its different to the Romans. They have several concepts of "citizenship" that were alien to Carthage. Rome imagined that people who were not resident in Rome could still be "Roman citizens". And the Romans extended "citizenship" and land grants to people and communities that were planted in strategic locations, such as retiring veterans.

    This is the "realism" behind the Carthaginian Faction building tree.

    The player can't assimilate foreign people, barbarian or civilized, into being Carthaginians - or even Liby-Phoenicians.


    Carthage Faction Roster
    Punic "Homeland" Units
    Punic Peltasts (Skirmisher)

    Modelled on the Hellenic Peltasts, Punic Peltasts were lightly armed skirmishers, who excelled in ambush, and attacking from a distance with javelins. They were also able to engage in close fighting in close order with their short swords, but were not expected to "hold the line" for long against heavy infantry.

    While the “Peltasts” were originally named after the crescent-shaped wicker shield, called the pelte, these troops were equipped with the larger oval scutum shield, as the pelte had disappeared by the Hellenistic Period. Unarmoured except for a helmet, these men wore a simple brass round-capped helmet of the Coolus type; this helmet was a descendent of earlier Keltoi types, but with advanced features such as a sloped neck guard, projecting ear guards and cheek-pieces.

    Their secondary weapon was a short, straight sword and they wore a simple tunic. The equipment of the Peltasts was less expensive than the traditional hoplite panoply, and more readily available to the poorer members of Carthaginian and Liby-Phoenician society, whence they were recruited.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Peltasts' entered battle armed with a bundle of javelins, which may have had throwing straps to allow more force to be applied to a throw. While their style of fighting originated in Thrace, and then Greece, the Carthaginians proved to be very capable skirmishers and masters of light infantry tactics. The Athenian general Iphikrates proved just how effective javelin-wielding peltasts could be when he destroyed a Spartan phalanx in the Battle of Lechaeum in 390 BC.

    Peltasts were very important in Hellenistic warfare, able to harass the flanks and rear of enemy heavy infantry, protect the flanks of phalanx blocks, in particular from cavalry, and undertake missions that require speed and flexibility. The Carthaginians also employed such troops as marines on her warships.
    Liby-Phoenician Hoplite (Spearmen)

    This Hoplite was armed with a Montefortino helmet, iron mail shirt (with a waistbelt to gird it tightly, despite the Libyan aversion to belts), and a round bronze shield, embossed with a typical blazon of the Hellenistic period. He wore a red tunic, bronze greaves, and was armed with a sword for close-fighting or when his spear broke. His main weapon was the thrusting spear, some nine feet long, with an iron head, used in the overarm thrust. These men fought in the formation of classical hoplites, locking their shields together to form a strong, aggressive infantry line.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Liby-Phoenician Hoplites were effective, loyal soldiers that comprised the best line infantry that Carthage could recruit.

    Livy describes the Liby-Phoenicians as a mixed race, half Punic and half African (Livy, 21.22.3). Liby-Phoenicians inhabited the Phoenician colonies in Africa that submitted to the authority of Carthage in the middle of the sixth century BC, such as Utica, Hadrumentum, Lepcis Magna, Hippo and Lixus. Other Phoenician populations in the western Mediterranean were later also described as "Libiophoenicians", such as the inhabitants of Gadir & southern Spain.

    Liby-Phoenicians could be people of Phoenician race living in these colonies, or simply native Libyans who had adopted Phoenician culture. There is evidence that Carthage transplanted Liby-Phoenician populations to bolster their overseas settlements in southern Spain, the Baleares, south-western Sardinia and westernmost Sicily. In the fifth century BC. Liby-Phoenicians had the same laws, language, religion and cultural traditions as the Carthaginians, but not the same rights. Liby-Phoenician colonies were liable for tribute, dues on imports and exports, and to providing men for military service, whereas Carthaginian citizens seem exempt from military service.

    The Liby-Phoenicians were equipped as hoplites. Carthage had combated Greek hoplites in Sicily since the sixth century BC, and had heavily recruited Greek mercenaries since the fifth century BC, and so was impressed and intimately acquainted with the hoplite style of fighting. They were originally armoured with a linen cuirass of Hellenistic cut, with shoulder-pieces and pteruges at the waist but were later re-equipped with captured Roman mail shirts in 217 BC.

    There was considerable scope for the promotion of Liby-Phoenicians in Hannibal’s army. Between 212 and 210 Hannibal’s commander in Sicily was a Liby-Phoenician named Muttines (Livy, 25.40.5). He must have been a trusted and accomplished soldier to have been given such an important command.
    Punic Thureophoroi (Light Infantry)

    Punic Thureophoroi were formed from the civic levies of Punic cities, and mustered in emergencies to protect their homes and agricultural estates. While Carthage preferred to use mercenaries and subject levies to form her armies, and her citizens were exempt from military service, in emergencies the civic levies were called to arms. These citizen infantry were encountered in the field in the Second Punic War in Ibera (where they are described as “Poeni”), Illipa (“Carthaginians”), and of course Zama.

    Soldiers like these formed the core of the Punic defenders of Carthage in the Third Punic War. They wore the typical knee-length, long-sleeved red tunic, loose and full, and were equipped en masse by the Carthaginian state, and armoured in simple bronze helmets and unadorned, traditional linen cuirasses, cut in the Hellenistic style, with short pteruges and shoulder pieces. They carried the thureos, after which they are named, and oval shields of the western kind, adopted from Gallic or Spanish mercenaries, which replaced the older Phoenician light round shields. They were also armed with longchai, light spears or javelins, and a short, straight sword as a secondary weapon.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Thureophoroi were an extremely flexible unit: fast moving light infantry, they were able to fight at a distance as heavy skirmishers, screening heavier infantry, but when required, were also capable of forming units that could hold a position as line infantry. Although often found fighting hand to hand with other light troops, they could not long stand up against a enemy phalanx or heavy infantry. They were modelled on the Hellenistic thureophoros, who were light troops that succeeded peltasts in the third century BC, and were intermediate between phalanx and skirmishers.

    Carthage lacked a class of small farmers working land outside the city; most of the best agricultural land was formed into large estates owned by Punic aristocrats and worked by harshly treated Libyans. In times of war Carthage was in the practice of levying large numbers of her Libyan "peasants" into her armies, rather than risking the limited Carthaginian manpower that was required to man the Punic fleet and manage the commercial and agricultural enterprises of the Punic economy.
    Sacred Band (Elite Hoplites)

    The Sacred Band was the military elite of Carthage. Lavishly equipped, this formation was comprised of Carthaginian citizens of high rank. As Carthaginians were exempt from military service, the Sacred Band were those who had volunteered for a military life. They fought as a well-drilled phalanx of hoplites, in muscled iron cuirasses with pteruges, plumed Montefortino helmets, greaves and round shields. The large boss-less “Argive” shields are about a metre in diameter, at the high end of the size range for “Argive” shields. They have no blazon, but are simply painted a plain white.

    The Sacred Band’s main weapon was the thrusting spear, some nine feet long, with an iron head, used in the overarm thrust. The secondary weapon was the short, straight sword, similar to early Celtic and Spanish types, and used for close-fighting. The Sacred Band wore white tunics of good quality, reflecting their high social status.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    Diodorus reports the Sacred Band at the battle of Crimesus in 341 “… the Carthaginians who composed the Sacred Battalion, twenty-five hundred in number and drawn from the ranks of those citizens who were distinguished for valour and reputation as well as for wealth, were all cut down after a valiant struggle…” (Diod. 16.80).

    The Sacred Band were highly regarded infantry. Plutarch describes the Sacred Band at Crimesus “… bearing white shields, whom they guessed to be all Carthaginians, from the splendour of their arms” and in close-fighting with Timoleon’s Siciliot hoplites “They Sacred Band, for their part, stoutly received and sustained his first onset, and having their bodies armed with breast-plates of iron, and helmets of brass on their heads, besides great shields to cover and secure them, they could easily repel the charge of Greek spears” (Plutarch, Timoleon).

    Diodorus’ mentions the Punic commander Hanno with the “Sacred Band of selected men” forming the right-wing of the Punic line against Agathocles’ army in Africa in 310 (Diod. 20.10-12), and again describes them as formidable: Agathocles posted himself and his finest "bodyguard" of hoplites opposite them. “A gallant battle developed, and Hanno, who had fighting under him the Sacred Band of selected men and was intent upon gaining the victory by himself, pressed heavily upon the Greeks and slew many of them.”

    Diodorus’ mention of the Sacred Band in Africa in 310 suggests that this elite unit was only encountered overseas very rarely, as the main Carthaginian army was in Sicily at this time.
    Carthaginian Cavalry (Heavy Cavalry)

    Carthage was famous for its cavalry; they were renowned for their steadiness, discipline and deadly, controlled shock charge. They were also regarded as being amongst the very finest heavy cavalry available in the western Mediterranean, and were modelled on the heavy cavalry of Hellenistic type found throughout the kingdoms of the Successors in the eastern Mediterranean.

    These were heavy cavalry, "bridled and steady" rather than skirmishers, who fought in close order, trained to deliver a controlled, shock charge. These Carthaginian Cavalry featured in the Punic victory over Regulus at the battle of Tunis in 255 (Polybius, 1.32-34).

    Their principal weapon was the lance, some ten feet long. For close fighting the Carthaginian Cavalry also carried a straight, medium-length sword. The horse was armoured in the Graeco-Oscan style of the western Mediterranean – a style adopted by the Carthaginians as a result of their contact with Campanian mercenaries in Sicily from the fifth century BC.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Carthaginian Cavalry were both well equipped and well mounted. The Punic estates around Carthage having stables that excelled in horse husbandry, raising strong, powerful mounts. They were seated on a purple saddlecloth, wore shoes, and long sleeved white tunics; they were armoured in a muscled iron cuirass, with pteruges at the waist, Hellenistic in style, together with greaves. The cavalrymen also carried a round shield, with a rounded concave boss and raised rim, and the ubiquitous Gallic-Italic Montefortino helmet, plumed with hinged cheekpieces.

    The Carthaginian Cavalry were recruited from amongst both the citizen aristocracy of Carthage and the social elites of the Liby-Phoenician colonies of the Punic dominions. Polybius speaks of how during the Mercenary War of 240-238, Carthage “… also mustered and drilled their civic cavalry” (Polybius, 1.65). This civic cavalry was recruited from among the Carthaginian elite; “some of them belonging to the wealthy and noble families”, as well as the retainers and clients of the elite. The sources also speak of Liby-Phoenician and Libyan cavalry stationed in Spain that were "bridled and steady" (Polybius, 3.33.15);

    Livy believes this force was entirely Liby-Phoenician (Livy, 21.22.3). Livy describes the Liby-Phoenicians as a mixed race, half Punic and half African (Livy, 21.22.3). Born from a nobility accustomed to ruling large agricultural estates worked by subject Libyans, the aristocracy that form the Carthaginian Cavalry were born horsemen and politically loyal, with a high morale.
    Sacred Band Cavalry (Elite Heavy Cavalry)

    The Sacred Band Cavalry were modelled on the heavy cavalry of Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic kingdoms of the east. Their equipment, training and discipline was such that they were ranked among the world’s finest heavy cavalry. They were shield-less, and fought with a lance, the xyston (sometimes called a dory), some 7-10 feet long, with a bronze butt-spike. The xyston was able to be used as a thrusting weapon with two hands, yet was also light enough to be manipulated with one hand in close combat, when a cavalryman needed to strike to his rear and flanks. When the xyston broke, the rider sometimes used the butt-spike as a weapon.

    The Sacred Bank Cavalry typically tried to strike the enemy riders in the face and chest with the lance. They fought in close order and delivered a shock charge to the enemy.

    These were formidable cavalry, lavishly equipped, with cuirasses of hardened linen (linothrax) worn over their white tunics, plumed helmets of the Montefortino-style, greaves and a slashing cavalry sword made in the Spanish fashion. They were particularly well mounted, on large, strong horses, raised on the agricultural estates around Carthage - good horse breeding country. Their superbly bred horses were barded with fine lacquered lamellar, and so unlike other Punic cavalry, were armoured.

    They were the military elite of Carthage. As Carthaginians were exempt from military service, the Sacred Band comprised of men who had volunteered for a military life. They were Carthaginian citizens of the highest rank; the landed aristocracy and their kinsmen.
    African Only Punic Units
    Libyan Javelinmen (Skirmisher)

    The Libyan Javelinmen were highly valued as hardy, flexible skirmishers by their Punic commanders.

    The javelin was the traditional Libyan weapon (Herodotus, 7.71) and the Libyan Javelinmen carried a bundle of them into battle, and would discharge them with great accuracy and speed. Barefooted and wearing red tunics like Carthaginians, the Libyans were noted for not wearing belts.

    Libyans were famed for their livid all-body tattoos, body-paint and hairstyles. The Javelinmen carried small, light round boss-less shields, but relied upon distance and their great agility for defence. They also carried a short sword or long dagger on a shoulder strap for close-fighting when their javelins are spent.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The indigenous inhabitants of North Africa who were subjects of Carthage were referred to as "Libyans" or even "Africans" by Polybius and Livy respectively. In the sixth century BC the Carthaginians ruthlessly conquered the native Libyan petty-kingdoms amongst whom they had settled in Africa (modern Tunisia). These Libyans were populous and practised a more settled form of agriculture than their pastoralist cousins in the hinterland, the Numidians and Moors.

    The term "Libyan" describes the lighter-skinned inhabitants of North Africa, to distinguish them from the black-skinned "Ethiopians" to the south. They were of Libyco-Berber ethnic background – Berber stock with some Negro admixture. They had their own non-Punic local language, probably with many dialects, which they spoke in addition to the Punic language.

    Carthage harshly treated her Libyan subjects. Carthage lacked a class of small farmers working land outside the city; most of the best agricultural land was formed into large estates owned by Punic aristocrats and worked by harshly treated Libyans. Libyan villages were forced to pay a crushing level of taxes to Carthage; apparently a quarter of the Libyan crops were demanded in tribute in times of peace, and half in times of war (Polybius 1.72.1-2). In times of war Carthage was in the practice of levying large numbers of her Libyan "peasants" into her armies.

    Libyans were known for their agility and powers of endurance.
    Libyan Hoplite (Spearmen)

    The Libyan Hoplites were the standard line infantry of Carthaginian armies who fought as a spear-armed phalanx and were highly valued as hardy spearmen by Punic commanders.

    The Libyan levies wore red tunics, and had the distinctively livid, all-body tattoos, body-paint and hairstyles found amongst the Libyans.

    They were equipped with the 1-diameter large, round Argive shield typical of the Carthaginians, a thrusting spear some 6-7 feet long, bronze greaves, and a linen cuirass cut in the typical Hellenistic style, with pteruges and cut shoulder-pieces. The shield was decorated with a pattern used by Greek artists to represent the aigis of Athene; Herodotus says the aegis was derived from Libyan garments of fringed goatskin.

    The helmet was a typical Hellenistic type, with cheek-pieces and without crest. The secondary weapon of the Libyan hoplite was a falcata-style sword, modelled on Spanish swords, for close-fighting or when the spear broke.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The indigenous inhabitants of North Africa who were subjects of Carthage were referred to as "Libyans" or even "Africans" by Polybius and Livy respectively. In the sixth century BC the Carthaginians ruthlessly conquered the native Libyan petty-kingdoms amongst whom they had settled in Africa (modern Tunisia). These Libyans were populous and practised a more settled form of agriculture than their pastoralist cousins in the hinterland, the Numidians and Moors.

    The term "Libyan" describes the lighter-skinned inhabitants of North Africa, to distinguish them from the black-skinned "Ethiopians" to the south. They were of Libyco-Berber ethnic background – Berber stock with some Negro admixture. They had their own non-Punic local language, probably with many dialects, which they spoke in addition to the Punic language.

    Carthage treated her Libyan subjects harshly. Carthage lacked a class of small farmers working land outside the city; most of the best agricultural land was formed into large estates owned by Punic aristocrats and worked by harshly treated Libyans. Libyan villages were forced to pay a crushing level of taxes to Carthage. Apparently a quarter of the Libyan crops were demanded in tribute in times of peace, and half in times of war (Polybius 1.72.1-2). In times of war Carthage was in the practice of levying large numbers of her Libyan "peasants" into her armies.

    The Libyan Hoplites were trained to fight in a phalanx like the Carthaginians themselves: the Spartan mercenary-general Xanthippus famously drilled Carthage’s Libyan levies in the First Punic War (Polybius, 1.32.7). The Libyan hoplites were armed by the Punic state in their hoplite panoply, rather than being responsible for supplying their own equipment. For this reason, Carthage stockpiled the required equipment with which to arm her Libyan levies (Polybius, 36.6.7; App., Pun. 80). In this way large numbers of Libyan levies could be quickly equipped from Carthage’s vast arsenals. Carthage was after all reluctant to give a subject people weapons – and the frequent Libyan revolts demonstrated the wisdom of this!

    Libyans were known for their agility and powers of endurance.
    Numidian Cavalry (Missile Cavalry)

    The Numidian Cavalry were lightly armed and unprepossessing in appearance. They wore no armour, but only light, baggy, sleeveless tunics of undyed wool. They carried small, light, boss-less and rimless leather shields, and rode into battle with a bundle of javelins with iron heads, which enabled them to skirmish like mounted peltasts.

    They also carriedy short swords, 2 feet long, as secondary weapons for close fighting. Livy reports that the Numidians who fought at Cannae carried concealed swords (Livy, 22.48.2).

    Numidian Cavalry were skirmishers, harassing the enemy with a rain of javelins, outflanking and surrounding them, but scattering to avoid enemy charges. They would retire swiftly from an enemy charge, but return quickly to the attack. This method of skirmishing combat was used regardless of whether the enemy was on foot or mounted.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    Numidian Cavalry were the finest and most feared skirmisher cavalry in the western Mediterranean, famed for their endurance (Polybius, 3.71.10; App. Pun. 11, 71) and their persistent, deadly harassing tactics.

    The ‘Numidians’ were those peoples of Libyco-Berber stock who inhabited North Africa. Unlike those known as ‘Libyans’, the Numidians and Moors practised a nomadic form of pastoralism rather than a more settled form of agriculture. The Numidian Cavalry had a reputation for being hot-tempered and violent (Livy, 25.41.4, 28.44.5, 29.23.4, 30.12.18).

    Numidian Cavalry were expert ambushers, able to hide in undergrowth or folds in the landscape, and make sudden attacks upon unsuspecting enemies. "The Numidians had stationed themselves and their horses among the thickets and although they were not completely hidden by the low trees, it was difficult to distinguish just what was there since the men and their standards were concealed both by their surroundings and by camouflage" (Sallust, The Jugurthine War. 49).

    "Whenever a squadron of Roman cavalry began to charge, instead of retiring in a body in one direction, they (the Numidian Cavalry) retreated independently, scattering as widely as possible. In this way they could take advantage of their numerical superiority. If they failed to check their enemies' charge, they would wait until the Romans lost their formation and then cut them off" (Sallust, The Jugurthine War. 51).

    Even in formal battles as auxiliaries for Carthage or Rome, the Numidian Cavalry retained this loose manner of fighting; any charge would not be resisted, but rather the flanks and rear of the enemy would be savaged as the attack ran out of steam. The aim was to cut off the victim and force him to stand or run. Numidian Cavalry were particularly deadly and effective when pursuing a broken and flying foe.

    Polybius gives an excellent account of this style of fighting in his account of the battle of Cannae. "The Numidian horse on the Carthaginian right were meanwhile charging through the cavalry on the Roman left; and though, from the peculiar nature of their mode of fighting, they neither inflicted nor received much harm, they yet rendered the enemy's horse useless by keeping them occupied, and charging them first on one side and then another. But when Hasdrubal, after all but annihilating the cavalry by the river, came from the left to the support of the Numidians, the Roman allied cavalry, seeing his charge approaching, broke and fled. At that point Hasdrubal appears to have acted with great skill and discretion. Seeing the Numidians to be strong in numbers, and more effective and formidable to troops that had once been forced from their ground, he left the pursuit to them; while he himself hastened to the part of the field where the infantry were engaged, and brought his men up to support the Libyans." (Polybius Book 3, 116.5)

    The Numidian Cavalry were not the fastest of cavalry, but their small horses were small, lean, hardy ponies that were agile and very manoeuvrable (Livy, 35.11.6-11; Strabo, 17.3.7), and could also scramble through or over terrain that brought other mounted units to a halt. "Numidians found it more convenient to retreat to the hill rather than the plain, their horses being used to the ground, made their way easily through the thickets" (Sallust, The Jugurthine War. 51). The Numidian Cavalry rode bareback, without bit or bridles or saddles, instead relying on their knees plus a riding crop\stick to control their mounts.

    The Numidians were not a single nation, but were divided into many tribes such as the Maccoei, and Areacidae, and even several larger supra-tribal kingdoms, such as Masaesyli in the west and the Massyli in the east, adjacent to Carthage’s own territory.

    The Moorish tribes of the far west formed a single nation under King Baga. The Gaetulians lived to the south of the Numidians and Moors (Pliny, Nat. Hist., 5.17), and fought in an identical fashion (Livy, 23.18; Caes., B Afr 32, 56, 61); so too the Garamantes and Nasamones, other important Libyco-Berber tribes found in North Africa.

    Numidian Cavalry were found as both allies and mercenaries in the armies of Carthage, usually serving under their own princes, famous examples being Navaras (Polybius, 1.78.1-11), Tychaeus (Polybius, 15.3.5) and above all Masinissa.
    Carthaginian African Elephants

    The African “forest” elephants (Loxodonta Africana cyclotis), being 7-8 feet at the shoulder, were smaller than the better known African bush elephants (13 feet) or the Indian elephants (10 feet). The distinctive features of the forest elephant was the low posture of the head, the line of its back was concave or flat, small rounded ears, small, straight tusks and a ridged trunk that ends in two “fingers”. The forest elephant was extinct by the sixth century AD (Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, 12.2.16).

    The tactical deployment of war elephants was a subtle military art. The elephants had a highly-strung nervous system which was easily upset. Unlike a tank, an elephant is made of flesh and blood, and resents becoming an animated pin cushion, and when pelted with javelins and arrows would panic, turn and bolt. A wounded, maddened elephant that was out of control would become as great a danger to his own side as to the enemy!

    Whereas it was correct to mass men against cavalry, for a horse will not charge home against a firm body of men, a charging war elephant was another matter. When a commander had not enough elephants to cover his front, like a screen of tanks, it was best to concentrate them on the wings. Elephants had a damaging effect on horses’ nerves, and were an effective anti-cavalry screen.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Carthaginians first encountered war elephants when they fought King Pyrrhos of Epeiros in Sicily during 278-275 BC. Pyrrhus “… totally routed the Phoenicians…” (Plutarch, Pyrrhus), and the Punic forces found that their traditional weapon, the war chariot, was now obsolete. Carthage, realizing the military possibilities of the elephant, and quick to copy Hellenistic military innovations, then raised an elephant corps from the African “forest” elephants (Loxodonta Africana cyclotis) that roamed aplenty in the forests of the Atlas Mountains in Numidia and Mauretania.

    Carthage first deployed its corps of 50 war elephants in 262 BC, against Rome at the battle of Akragas (Agrigentum), in the First Punic War. The original elephant trainers may have been brought to Carthage from India; Polybius (1.40; 3.461) calls the Punic mahouts at Panormus, at the passage of the Rhone and at the battle of Metaurus, “Indians”. Vegetius (3.24) speaks of Indos per quos regebantur elephanti as if Indians had a monopoly on elephant management. However, the term “Indian” may have been a literary convention, as the word had become synonymous with “elephant-rider”.

    War elephants were very expensive to train and maintain, and only a royal exchequer or an oligarchy of rich merchant princes could afford to maintain a war stud of these great beasts.

    The war elephant had a far greater shock value than cavalry; not only was he bigger, but he had weapons of his own with which he fought. He trampled the men he felled, or gored them with his tusks, or he might kick, and an elephant’s kick, as quick as a pony’s, will send a man flying (Polybius, 1.74). With a good mahout to guide him into battle, the elephant was perfectly competent to do his own fighting – shock action applied en masse.

    It was folly to use elephants against fortifications, as they cannot jump, and could be immobilized by trenches. When elephants fought other elephants; “They get their tusks entangled and jammed and then push against one another with all their might, trying to make each other yield ground until one of them proving superior in strength has pushed aside the other’s trunk; and when once he can get a side-blow at his opponent, he pierces them as a bull would with his horns” (Polybius, 5.84).
    Carthaginian Towered Elephant

    The African “forest” elephants (Loxodonta Africana cyclotis), being 7-8 feet at the shoulder, were smaller than the better known African bush elephants (13 feet) or the Indian elephants (10 feet). The distinctive features of the forest elephant was the low posture of the head, the line of its back was concave or flat, small rounded ears, small, straight tusks and a ridged trunk that ends in two “fingers”. The forest elephant was extinct by the sixth century AD (Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, 12.2.16).

    The tactical deployment of war elephants was a subtle military art. The elephants had a highly-strung nervous system which was easily upset. Unlike a tank, an elephant is made of flesh and blood, and resents becoming an animated pin cushion, and when pelted with javelins and arrows would panic, turn and bolt. A wounded, maddened elephant that was out of control would become as great a danger to his own side as to the enemy!

    The war elephant had a far greater shock value than cavalry; not only was he bigger, but he had weapons of his own with which he fought. He trampled the men he felled, or gored them with his tusks, or he might kick, and an elephant’s kick, as quick as a pony’s, will send a man flying (Polybius, 1.74). In addition, the elephant may carry armed riders. Copying Pyrrhos, the Ptolemies and Seleucids, the war elephants of the Carthaginians carried howdahs (“towers” the ancients called them) with a crew of four men (Livy, 37.40). The towers were made of hides stitched over a wooden framework. The crews might be armed with arrows, javelins, or pikes.

    Polybius reports the African forest elephants at Raphia in 217 being equipped with towers (Polybius, 5.84-85). The elephant was sometimes partly protected by armour, and the Carthaginians are said to have adopted from the East the practice of fixing iron points on the tusks. But towers and crews were not essential. Give a good mahout to guide him into battle, the elephant was perfectly competent to do his own fighting – shock action applied en masse.

    Whereas it was correct to mass men against cavalry, for a horse will not charge home against a firm body of men, a charging war elephant was another matter. When a commander had not enough elephants to cover his front, like a screen of tanks, it was best to concentrate them on the wings. Elephants had a damaging effect on horses’ nerves, and were an effective anti-cavalry screen.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Carthaginians first encountered war elephants when they fought King Pyrrhos of Epeiros in Sicily during 278-275 BC. Pyrrhos “… totally routed the Phoenicians…” (Plutarch, Pyrrhos), and the Punic forces found that their traditional weapon, the war chariot, was now obsolete. Carthage, realizing the military possibilities of the elephant, and quick to copy Hellenistic military innovations, then raised an elephant corps from the African “forest” elephants (Loxodonta Africana cyclotis) that roamed aplenty in the forests of the Atlas Mountains in Numidia and Mauretania.

    Carthage first deployed its corps of 50 war elephants in 262 BC, against Rome at the battle of Akragas (Agrigentum), in the First Punic War. The original elephant trainers may have been brought to Carthage from India; Polybius (1.40; 3.461) calls the Punic mahouts at Panormus, at the passage of the Rhone and at the battle of Metaurus, “Indians”. Vegetius (3.24) speaks of Indos per quos regebantur elephanti as if Indians had a monopoly on elephant management. However, the term “Indian” may have been a literary convention, as the word had become synonymous with “elephant-rider”.

    War elephants were very expensive to train and maintain, and only a royal exchequer or an oligarchy of rich merchant princes could afford to maintain a war stud of these great beasts.

    The war elephant had a far greater shock value than cavalry; not only was he bigger, but he had weapons of his own with which he fought. He trampled the men he felled, or gored them with his tusks, or he might kick, and an elephant’s kick, as quick as a pony’s, will send a man flying (Polybius, 1.74). With a good mahout to guide him into battle, the elephant was perfectly competent to do his own fighting – shock action applied en masse.

    It was folly to use elephants against fortifications, as they cannot jump, and could be immobilized by trenches. When elephants fought other elephants; “They get their tusks entangled and jammed and then push against one another with all their might, trying to make each other yield ground until one of them proving superior in strength has pushed aside the other’s trunk; and when once he can get a side-blow at his opponent, he pierces them as a bull would with his horns” (Polybius, 5.84).

    It was folly to use elephants against fortifications, as they cannot jump, and could be immobilized by trenches. When elephants fought other elephants; “They get their tusks entangled and jammed and then push against one another with all their might, trying to make each other yield ground until one of them proving superior in strength has pushed aside the other’s trunk; and when once he can get a side-blow at his opponent, he pierces them as a bull would with his horns” (Polybius, 5.84).
    Punic Reform/Other Units
    African Infantry (Heavy Infantry)

    The African Infantry were the most effective line infantry fielded by Carthage during the period of the Second Punic War. They were largely recruited from among the native Libyan population of Africa, but also from among the ‘Poeni’ and ‘Carthaginenses’, these being the Punic and Liby-Phoenician populations of Carthage and the Phoenician colonies in the West.

    The panoply of the African Infantry included the Gallic-style large oval or oblong shield (Latin: ‘scutum’; Greek: ‘thueros’), and a coat of chainmail (lorica). More open helmet types, enabling better sight and sound, became common, such as the Montefortino helmet, derived from Gallic helmets, and found both with and without cheek-pieces. It was now important for heavy infantry to have better sight and sound on the battlefield, given the new emphasis of individual combat and more complex tactical manoeuvres on the battlefield. While the main hoplite weapon, the thrusting spear (Latin: ‘hastae’; Greek ‘dory’), continued to be found in the equipment of heavy infantry, it was slowly superseded in importance by the cut-and-thrust sword. In addition, heavy infantry were now armed with heavy throwing spears (pilum or the Iberian all-iron soliferrum) and javelins. In this way, heavy infantry came to combine the roles of classical peltasts (heavy skirmishers) and hoplites. Given that it is sometimes thought the Romans themselves adopted the pilum and gladius from the Iberian mercenaries they encountered during the First Punic War, it is no surprise that such equipment was also adopted by the Carthaginians.

    Hence, in the 240s and 230s, Hamilcar Barca and his Carthaginian successors built their armies around a heavy infantry core that more closely resembled that of their Roman enemies rather than close-order spearmen.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    Throughout the third century BC there was a steady homogenisation of military tactics and equipment throughout the Western Mediterranean. This had led to the evolution of a ‘western military tradition’ in the Hellenistic Age, a military tradition that was distinct from the Macedonian-style phalanx warfare that predominated in Greece, Egypt and Asia following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC. This 'western military tradition' was marked by a largely homogenous panoply and fighting style by the middle of the third century BC, which was the product of Italian, Spanish and Gallic influences, and which was exemplified by the Roman armies of the Republican period. The First Punic War (264-241 BC) and the Barcid conquests in Iberia (237-219 BC) consolidated Carthage as a practitioner of this ‘western military tradition’ of warfare.

    Throughout the western Mediterranean the traditional classical hoplite phalanx that featured in Roman, Punic and Etruscan armies in the fifth and fourth centuries BC was steadily abandoned in favour of more flexible tactical formations, which required more flexible heavy infantry, and a fighting style that emphasised swordsmanship and heavy throwing spears.

    Until c. 240 BC the Carthaginian army essentially fought as a hoplite army; to enable Carthage to field reliable heavy infantry with which to combat the hoplite armies of the Siciliot-Greeks, she relied upon several sources of military manpower; her own citizens, Libyan subjects, “barbarian” mercenaries (such as Gallic, Ligurian and Iberian) and Greek mercenaries. Carthage employed mercenary Greek hoplites to provide it with reliable heavy infantry throughout its wars in Sicily in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. This practice continued during the First Punic War with Rome; Greek mercenaries are specifically mentioned as forming a part of the Punic garrison at Lilybaeum in 250 BC (Polybius, 1.43.1), and Carthaginian recruiting agents in Greece famously recruited a company of Greek mercenaries that included the Spartan mercenary Xanthippos. However, the practice of hiring large numbers of Greek mercenaries had probably ceased by the end of the First Punic War, and had most certainly ceased completely by the end of the Mercenary War in 237 BC.

    Some scholars persist in imagining that Carthaginian and Libyan heavy infantry fought in the manner of classical hoplites or even as Macedonian-style pikemen during the Second Punic War because Polybius often describes bodies of Punic infantry as a ‘phalanx’ (Polybius, 1.33.6; 15.12.7), yet this is anachronistic; Polybius clearly uses the term ‘phalanx’ to describe bodies of men fighting en masse – and he also uses the term to describe Roman hastati (15.12.7). Asclepiodotus also describes bodies of cavalry and light infantry as ‘phalanxes’, suggesting that by the second century BC the term ‘phalanx’ had become synonymous with the term ‘unit’ (Asclep. 1.4).

    Unlike Hellenistic Greece and the Successor Kingdoms of Asia and Egypt, the Carthaginians did not adopt the ‘Macedonian Phalanx’. Instead, the classical hoplite heavy infantry fielded by Carthage in the fourth century BC disappeared in favour of the flexible heavy infantry, infantry armed in the increasingly homogenous panoply prevailing throughout the Western Mediterranean in this period. It should be noted that the classical hoplite panoply also disappeared at this time from the Roman (and Etruscan) armies in Italy in the fourth century BC, in large measure as a result of the Roman experience of fighting its Gallic and Oscan (especially Samnite) enemies in the Italian peninsula.

    It was the native subjects of Carthage, referred to respectively by Polybius and Livy as ‘Libyans’ (Libyes) and ‘Africans’ (Afri), that supplied the heavy infantry core of Punic armies after the First Punic War. In the sixth century BC the Carthaginians had ruthlessly conquered the native Libyan chiefdoms located in modern Tunisia; these Libyans were populous, and practised a more settled form of agriculture than their pastoralist cousins, such as the Numidians, Moors and Gaetulians. Carthage was notorious for harshly treating her Libyan subjects, and Carthage had suffered major revolts among her Libyan subjects at various times – including during the Mercenary War of 241-237 BC. Carthage lacked a class of small farmers working land outside the city, and so most of the best agricultural land had been formed into large estates owned by Carthaginian aristocrats and worked by harshly treated Libyan peasants. Libyan villages were forced to pay a crushing level of taxes to Carthage; apparently a quarter of the Libyan crops were demanded in tribute in times of peace, and half in times of war (Polybius 1.72.1-2). In addition, Carthage levied her subject Libyan communities for military manpower, and these conscripts seem to have been equipped by the Carthaginian state, rather than being responsible for supplying their own gear, if the surrender of 200,000 Carthaginian cuirasses to Rome during the Third Punic War is historical (Polybius, 36.6.7; App. Pun. 80). Carthage would never have required so many cuirasses, given that its total population of men, women and children probably did not exceed 400,000. Instead, these cuirasses were likely intended for Carthage’s subject levies.

    In describing the battle of Illipa, fought in 206 BC during the Second Punic War, Livy asserts that the ‘Carthaginian’ and ‘African’ heavy infantry were “fairly matched in courage and arms” with the Romans; at one critical stage Livy says “the veteran Carthaginians and Africans, the strength of the enemy army, had not even reached the point when they could throw their spears (Livy, 28.14).” This literary evidence strongly suggests that the ‘Carthaginians’ and ‘Africans’ were equipped and fought like their Roman adversaries; certainly neither hoplites nor phalangites would “throw their spears” prior to engaging. It is for this reason that Hannibal's ‘Africans’ could so readily be re-equipped with Roman spoils, the best of Roman arms, after the battles of Trebia and Lake Trasimene (Polybius, 3.87.3; 1.14.1; Livy, 22.46.4). Indeed, Livy describes a re-equipment so complete that the Carthaginians could have been mistaken for Roman troops. “One might have taken the Africans to be a Roman battle line, for they were armed with captured weapons, some taken at the Trebia, but most of them at Trasimene” (22.46.4). The accounts of Livy and Polybius of the fighting at Lake Trasimene certainly support the hypothesis that the Libyan infantry fought as swordsmen; it is difficult to believe that troops armed as either classical hoplites or Macedonian-style phalangites could have charged downhill from ambush to attack the Romans from all sides (Polybius, 3.84.1-4; Livy, 22.4).

    It is hard to imagine how the African Infantry could be mistaken for Romans unless they fought with the scutum (theuros) shield. If the Africans fought as classical hoplites (with the large, round hoplon shield) or as Macedonian-style pikemen (phalangites) with the long pike (sarissa) then it is impossible that they could have been mistaken for a Roman battle line. Nor could they have been re-equipped so readily with Roman arms and armour. If Hannibal’s infantry were trained to fight as close-order phalangites in the ‘Macedonian system’, then he would hardly have embarked upon the task of re-equipping them to fight in a completely new manner in 217 BC, while in the middle of a campaign, in enemy territory!

    In order for the Africans to have the same appearance as a Roman battle line required not only that they were equipped in similar panoply as the Romans, but that they also used a similar tactical deployment. Like Roman legionaries, the African Infantry were organised into small, maniple-type formations; the ancient sources refer to such formations as speirai. Such formations made extensive use of standards and officers to command and control the battle line; Livy mentions Punic standards in Carthaginian armies (i.e. Livy, 30.18) and as being taken by the Romans as trophies. The presence of standards and the ability to replace or reinforce tired infantry on the battle line with fresh troops (i.e. Livy, 27.2), in a manner similar to that of the Roman infantry, strongly suggest that the Carthaginians organised their African Infantry into a system of units and sub-units. The officers of these Libyan units and sub-units were likely citizens of Carthage. Interestingly, it must be noted that Greek armies did not use standards at all during the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Hence the very presence of standards in the Punic army suggests the absence of troops equipped and drilled as ‘Macedonian-style’ pikemen.

    There are references in Livy to bodies of ‘Poeni’ and ‘Carthaginenses’ also serving in the Punic armies in the Iberian Peninsula; these were likely civic levies from the Punic-Phoenician towns of Iberia, but they may have also included heavy infantry recruited from among the citizens of Carthage itself (Livy, 28.14.4). Just as Carthaginians and Libyans were equipped and fought in the same manner at the Crimesus in 341 BC, so too is it likely that they were equipped and fought in the same manner in the Second Punic War.
    Roman Deserters

    Roman Deserters formed small but highly valued contingents in the armies of Rome's enemies. They were equipped in the typical Roman panoply, but when fighting Roman troops they had a fanatical morale - they knew they would be scourged and beheaded if captured!

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Roman army of the early and middle republic was - in contrast to its Punic, Hellenic and barbarian enemies - an army comprised of conscripts. One of the disadvantages of having an army of conscripts, where savage discipline and heavy losses could be expected, was desertion. In search of refuge, many of these deserters joined the enemy, where they were valued. And for good reason. Well equipped and well trained, these troops fought to the death rather than risk capture, flogging and execution.

    In addition, Rome often stubbornly refused to ransom or exchange prisoners to secure the release of captured Roman soldiers, and sometimes, in desperation, these Roman prisoners took service with Rome's enemies to avoid captivity and slavery.

    There are many and varied mentions of Roman deserters in the ancient sources; as one reads through the sources telling of the wars of the Republican period, you find again and again references to units of Roman deserters serving in the armies of the enemies of Rome. "Desertion was always a problem for the Roman army. Enemy leaders as separated by time and geography as Jugurtha, Tacfarinas and Decebalus, recruited their best men from Roman deserters. According to Dio, men were even willing to desert and join the rebels within the city during the siege of Jerusalem in AD 70 (Dio. 65.5.4). Treaties concluding wars in the second century often seem to have included provision for the return of Roman deserters and prisoners (Dio. 68.9.5)." [Adrian Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War 100 BC-AD 200, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 113]. As one historian has said, "... mutiny and insubordination were suprisingly prevalent in the Roman army." [William Stuart Messer, 'Mutiny in the Roman Army. The Republic', Classical Philology, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1920), pp. 158-175.

    Some notable examples include;

    - In the final peace agreement between Carthage and Rome, in 241 BC, that ended the First Punic War, Hamilcar Barca was renowned for having successfully rejected Roman demands to handover all the deserters serving with him. "He was making peace, the Carthaginian stated, not surrendering."

    - Heiro II of Syracuse, or perhaps his grandson Hieronymus, appears to have been a keen recruiter of Roman deserters "... most of them from the Roman naval crews" (Livy, 23.23); the presence of some 4,000 Roman deserters in the Syracusan army was a keen factor in Hannibal's agents Hippocrates and Epicydes taking control of Syracuse and steering it into alliance with Carthage in 214 BC. Hippocrates and Epicydes encouraged the deserters to support a pro-Carthaginian putsch so as to avoid being surrendered to Roman authorities; the Romans "flogged and decapitated" 2,000 Roman deserters after they stormed Leontini (Livy, 24.30). During the siege of Syracuse the gates and walls of the Achradina were held by deserters "who having no hope of pardon under terms of surrender, permitted no one to approach the walls or to parley" (Livy, 25.25).

    - In 208 BC Hannibal had possession of a fallen consuls' ring; he sent a deserter posing as a Roman messenger to Salapia saying the consul was en route to Salapia; then marched a column to the city "... and at the front of his column were Roman deserters bearing Roman arms. When they reached the gate, these men, all speaking Latin, called out the watchmen and told them to open up since the consul was coming". About 600 of these men were slain, and the remainder driven off (Livy, 27.28).

    - in the peace of 202 BC Carthage was required to hand over all 'Roman prisoners, deserters and runaway slaves'.

    - In 198 BC, Phillip V of Macedon employed a force of Roman deserters and Hannibal's veterans from Italy as his garrison at Sicyon; during the siege they fought fanatically against the Romans, fearing reprisals if taken captive (Livy, 32.23).

    - In 200 BC Roman envoys visited Carthage to complain "... that the Roman deserters had not all been handed over; in fact report said that a large number of them were living at Carthage without concealment"(Livy, 32.36).

    - In the Third Punic War (149-146 BC) the most fanatical defenders of doomed Carthage were the Roman deserters. The Roman deserters - 900 in number at the conclusion of the siege - barricaded themselves in the temple of Aesculpius and committed suicide (Appian, Punic Wars 130-131); Aemilius Scipio would not offer them any terms; Aemilius Scipio had used elephants to trample non-Roman deserters in 167, and threw non-Roman deserters and runaway slaves to beasts in shows at Rome (Val. Max. 2.7.12-4).


    Celtiberia - Historical Background

    The Indo-European, proto-Celtic populations of the Central Meseta and Atlantic façade of Iberia lay on the periphery of the Tartessian zone in southern Spain, and they exchanged raw materials like livestock, grain (and perhaps slaves) for prestige gifts and luxury goods from the Mediterranean economy.

    The Indo-European populations of the Iberian peninsula were remote from the cultural currents which had a decisive effect on the continental Keltoi, such as the Halstatt and La Tene cultures. Nonetheless, there existed a cultural ‘substratum’ embedded in the Atlantic Bronze Age that had already absorbed some linguistic and ideological traits common to the historical Keltoi.

    The expansion of the ‘La Tene’ Celtic culture of Europe, and its local adaptation in Spain into that known to historians as the ‘Celtiberian’ culture, occurred throughout the period 600-300 BC, its distribution being mainly in the Central Meseta and the Atlantic areas of northern and western Iberia. The nature of the Celtic advance is difficult to evaluate, as literary sources are fewer and the archaeology is less clear-cut. It appears that Celtic or Celtiberian groups such as the Celtici (‘Keltikoi’: Strabo 3.1.6) moved into the middle and lower reaches of the River Anas (modern Guadiana) in around the sixth century BC. The chief settlement of the Celtici was Conistorgis (Strabo, 3.2.2; Appian, Iber. 56-60). Other Celts also occupied the region known as Baeturia, an area located between the rivers Anas and Baetis (Pliny, NH, 3.13-14).

    The Celticisation Mosaic Model reveals how important elements of the ‘La Tene’ Culture of Celtic Europe were transmitted into the indigenous Indo-European/proto-Celtic populations that inhabited the North and West of the Iberian Peninsula. The eastern Meseta region at the upper reaches of the Durius (modern Duero) and Tagus (modern Tajo) formed the core lands of the Celtiberian Group. The ‘Celtiberian’ group of tribes were greatly influenced by cultural and societal elements from Celtic Europe, and they, to varying degrees, transmitted this influence into their own periphery of Indo-European neighbours, such as the Vaccaei and Vettones of the western Meseta, the Carpetani of the southern Meseta, and the Lusitani that inhabited the Atlantic coastal lands.

    The Keltoi world in the Iberian Peninsula had a distinctive personality compared with the Keltoi world on the other side of the Pyrenees. This is explained by the fact that the Keltoi populations in the Iberian peninsula – found in the west and north – enjoyed a considerable exposure to the influence of the Iberian culture (itself influenced by Phoenicians and Greeks), displayed in aspects such as the adoption of the potters wheel, metallurgy, weapon types, coinage and writing. The Celtcisation of the Iberian Peninsula occurred from c. 600 BC among an Indo-European population in the peninsula’s west and north that were already Celtic-speakers and could be described as proto-Celtic.

    This ‘proto-Celtic’ culture developed in the highlands of the Iberian Mountains and the Eastern Meseta into the culture of the historical Celtiberians. The epicentre of this distinctive Celtiberian culture is found in the region of the Upper Duero and Upper Tagus. This Celtiberian “homeland” was on the periphery of three cultures, and absorbed elements from them all; to the north lay the Keltoi ‘La Tene’ culture; to the west the loosely linked ‘proto-Celtic’ communities of the Atlantic; to the south and east lay the distinctive Iberian culture, itself influenced by the Mediterranean states, particularly the Phoenicians. By the fourth century BC the Celtiberians were using rotary querns and the potters wheel and had formed large oppida-like settlements; the presence of La Tene torcs and swords hints at the presence of Keltoi warbands and mercenary bands from north of the Pyrenees. In the religious sphere, the Celtiberians worshipped several pan-Celtic deities.

    In a process of migration, expansion, and “Celtiberianisation” of the ‘proto-Celtic’ substrata as local elites assimilated selected cultural elements, the Celtiberian culture spread towards the west of the Iberian Peninsula amongst those tribes that belonged to a common Indo-European substrata, and were noted for their wealth in terms of livestock; particularly the Carpetani, Vettones, Vaccaei and Lusitani. Only in the extreme north-west – the area of the Gallaeci “Castro culture” – did the 'proto-Celtic’ culture remain largely untainted.

    The Celtiberians maintained a mixed pastoral and agricultural economy. The harshness of the Meseta, desiccated during summer, necessitated a degree of long-distance transhumance in the pastoral economy. The flocks and herds were taken to upland mountain pastures before the summer, and then brought down again in autumn. An increase in population and wealth led to greater social complexity and stratification, and the emergence of Celtiberian elites residing in urban ‘oppida’. In the third century BC the Celtiberian territory was politically atomized into various city-states. The Celtiberian culture was characterised by the development of a Celtiberian writing script, coinage, and the establishment of characteristic traditions like hospitum pacts (which are known through the tesserae or incised plaques) – a collateral effect of long-distance transhumance.


    Celtiberia Faction Roster
    Celtiberian Slingers

    The sling was a common missile weapon used throughout the Iberian Peninsula, and so it was customary for Celtiberian chieftains to muster a force of Slingers from among their poorer vassals and clients. Typical slings were made of black tufted rush, hair or sinew, and men carried several of different sizes, designed for long, medium and short range respectively (Strabo, 3.5.1).

    These slings may have been carried wrapped around the head when not in use (Strabo, 3.5.1), or else one would be wrapped around the head, another around the waist, and one carried in the hand (Diod. 5.18.3). Celtiberians did not use lead shot, but rather used pebbles.

    Celtiberian Slingers wore the simple woollen tunics of lower class peasants and pastoralists. They also carried a small buckler, a caetra, strapped to the forearm in order to leave the hands free to load and use the sling, as well as a short sword for when they were forced to engage in close-fighting.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    Celtiberian society was largely pastoralist and transhumant (transferring livestock from one grazing ground to another, from lowlands to highlands, with the changing of seasons), and so young Celtiberian boys became proficient with the sling very early in life, using it to protect livestock and flocks of sheep from natural predators. For this reason, the lower socio-economic strata of Celtiberian society were adept with the sling - an ability that was turned to good use in war.
    Celtiberian Ambacti (Elite Swordsmen)

    The Celtiberian Ambacti were a strong, fast moving heavy infantry, fierce and effective swordsmen in both attack and defence. The Ambacti were the elite warriors of the Celtiberian tribes, the retainers and clients of Celtiberian kings and nobles, sworn to battle and defending the interests of their liege.

    They wore black cloaks, probably the woollen sagum, with sinew greaves, and plumed bronze helmets of the ubiquitous Gallic Montefortino type. The Ambacti were recruited from the warrior elite of Celtiberian society, and they displayed their wealth and social standing in their equipment and dress. They were equipped with a mail shirt, made of interlocking rings, an armour invented by the Keltoi in the third century BC.

    The Celtiberian Ambacti went into battle armed with javelins with distinctive long iron heads, reminiscent of the Iberian soliferrum type. The principal weapon of the Celtiberian warrior is the medium-length straight sword, developed locally antenna-hilted swords of the early Celtic Halstatt culture. Celtiberian steel swords had a famous reputation for strength and flexibility.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Celtiberians were an aristocratic warrior society that inhabited the central-eastern portion of the Spanish Peninsula, and their nations included the Celtiberi, Vaccaei and Carpetani. They were pastoralists, who lived on the periphery of the Mediterranean and Celtic worlds, and were greatly influenced by both.

    By the third century BC they lived in larger supra-tribal kingdoms centred around fortified towns, called oppidum by the Romans. The Celtiberians were very warlike. Cicero (Tusc. 2, 65) claimed that “...the Celtiberians delight in battle and lament if they are ill". Other authors express themselves in similar terms (Val. Max., 2, 6, 11; Sil. Ital. 1, 225, 3, 340-343; Iust., Ep. 44.2; Claud. Elianus 10.22), saying that death in combat was glorious for Celtiberians, and this is shown by the fact that those who fell in combat were rewarded with a specific funerary ritual: the exposure of the corpse to be devoured by the vultures, birds being considered sacred and entrusted with taking the deceased to "The Beyond".

    The Celtiberian warrior preferred death to losing his freedom, as he showed by committing suicide in practices such as the devotio (Val. Max., 2.6.11; 3.2.7; Sall., in Servio, adGeorg. 4.218; Flor., 1.34.11; Plut., Sert. 14), according to which consecrated warriors could not outlive their chieftain.

    Celtiberians valued single combat and the literary sources describe the Celtiberians performing war dances and songs (Sil. Ital., 3, 346-349; Diod., 5, 34, 4; App., Iber. 67). Their purpose would be to embolden the warriors and inspire panic in the enemy. Salustius (2, 92) relates that mothers recounted "the warrior feats of their elders to the men who were preparing for battle or raiding parties, where they sung of their valiant deeds". The war horns of the Numantians (App., Iber. 78), documented archaeologically (Wattenberg 1963, Tables XV-XVI), could be related to these practices.

    In 151 BC in Intercatia, Lucullus, a native warrior on horseback with resplendent weapons challenged any Roman to single combat. Since none took up his challenge, he ridiculed his enemies, withdrew performing a dance, and continued his taunts until the young Scipio took up the challenge and killed him (App., Iber. 53).

    A similar episode is recounted by Valerius Maximus (3, 2, 21) and Livy (pap.Oxiyrh. 164) in 143-142 BC. The protagonists of these duels would have belonged to the social elite (Ciprés 1993: 93). The literary sources refer to the protagonist of the duel with Scipio in Intercatia as rex (Flor. 1, 33, 11), while Valerius Maximus (3, 2, 6) uses the term dux.

    During the third and second centuries BC, war among the Celtiberians changed from being performed between family groups and neighbouring settlements, to a way of resolving conflicts between Celtiberian city-states. The latter, now centres of political and administrative control, were ruled by the most powerful clans, which tried to increase their power and territory by inciting conflicts between neighbouring ethnic groups, as between Segeda and the Titti (App., Iber. 44).

    To the hospitality pacts between gentiliate clans were added alliances between cities or symmachía, like that reached between Segeda and the Numantians (App., Iber., 45) or between Lutia and Numantia (App., Iber., 94).
    Celtiberian Caetrati (Skirmishers)

    The Celtiberian Caetrati were primarily skirmishers, recruited from amongst the commoners of the tribes. Their principal weapon was the javelin, but they were also capable swordsmen and, in a pinch, could serve in an infantry line.

    They wore simple tunics, their armour being greaves, and plumed bronze helmets of the ubiquitous Gallic Montefortino type. The Celtiberian Caetrati was armed with javelins with long iron heads. For close fighting a medium-length straight sword was carried, developed locally from antenna-hilted swords of the early Celtic Halstatt culture. Celtiberian steel swords had a famous reputation for strength and flexibility.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Celtiberians were an aristocratic warrior society that inhabited the central-eastern portion of the Spanish Peninsula, and their nations included the Celtiberi, Vaccaei and Carpetani. They were pastoralists, who lived on the periphery of the Mediterranean and Celtic worlds, and were greatly influenced by both.

    By the third century BC they lived in larger supra-tribal kingdoms centred around fortified towns, called oppidum by the Romans. The Celtiberians were very warlike. Cicero (Tusc. 2, 65) claimed that “...the Celtiberians delight in battle and lament if they are ill". Other authors express themselves in similar terms (Val. Max., 2, 6, 11; Sil. Ital. 1, 225, 3, 340-343; Iust., Ep. 44.2; Claud. Elianus 10.22), saying that death in combat was glorious for Celtiberians, and this is shown by the fact that those who fell in combat were rewarded with a specific funerary ritual: the exposure of the corpse to be devoured by the vultures, birds being considered sacred and entrusted with taking the deceased to "The Beyond".

    The Celtiberian warrior preferred death to losing his freedom, as he showed by committing suicide in practices such as the devotio (Val. Max., 2.6.11; 3.2.7; Sall., in Servio, adGeorg. 4.218; Flor., 1.34.11; Plut., Sert. 14), according to which consecrated warriors could not outlive their chieftain.

    Celtiberians valued single combat and the literary sources describe the Celtiberians performing war dances and songs (Sil. Ital., 3, 346-349; Diod., 5, 34, 4; App., Iber. 67). Their purpose would be to embolden the warriors and inspire panic in the enemy. Salustius (2, 92) relates that mothers recounted "the warrior feats of their elders to the men who were preparing for battle or raiding parties, where they sung of their valiant deeds". The war horns of the Numantians (App., Iber. 78), documented archaeologically (Wattenberg 1963, Tables XV-XVI), could be related to these practices.

    In 151 BC in Intercatia, Lucullus, a native warrior on horseback with resplendent weapons challenged any Roman to single combat. Since none took up his challenge, he ridiculed his enemies, withdrew performing a dance, and continued his taunts until the young Scipio took up the challenge and killed him (App., Iber. 53).

    A similar episode is recounted by Valerius Maximus (3, 2, 21) and Livy (pap.Oxiyrh. 164) in 143-142 BC. The protagonists of these duels would have belonged to the social elite (Ciprés 1993: 93). The literary sources refer to the protagonist of the duel with Scipio in Intercatia as rex (Flor. 1, 33, 11), while Valerius Maximus (3, 2, 6) uses the term dux.
    Celtiberian Scutarii (Swordsmen)

    The Celtiberian Scutarii were a strong, fast moving heavy infantry, fierce and effective swordsmen in both attack and defence.

    Diodorus says that the Celtiberians wore black cloaks, probably the woollen sagum. These warriors also wore sinew greaves and plumed bronze helmets of the ubiquitous Gallic Montefortino type.

    The Celtiberian was armed with javelins with long iron heads, reminiscent of the Iberian soliferrum type. The principal weapon of the Celtiberian warrior was the medium-length straight sword, developed locally antenna-hilted swords of the early Celtic Halstatt culture. Celtiberian steel swords had a famous reputation for strength and flexibility.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Celtiberians were an aristocratic warrior society that inhabited the central-eastern portion of the Spanish Peninsula, and their nations included the Celtiberi, Vaccaei and Carpetani. They were pastoralists, who lived on the periphery of the Mediterranean and Celtic worlds, and were greatly influenced by both; by the third century BC they lived in larger supra-tribal kingdoms centred around fortified towns, called oppidum by the Romans.

    The Celtiberians were very warlike. Cicero (Tusc. 2, 65) claimed that “...the Celtiberians delight in battle and lament if they are ill". Other authors express themselves in similar terms (Val. Max., 2, 6, 11; Sil. Ital. 1, 225, 3, 340-343; Iust., Ep. 44.2; Claud. Elianus 10.22), saying that death in combat was glorious for Celtiberians, and this is shown by the fact that those who fell in combat were rewarded with a specific funerary ritual: the exposure of the corpse to be devoured by the vultures, birds being considered sacred and entrusted with taking the deceased to "The Beyond". The Celtiberian warrior preferred death to losing his freedom, as he showed by committing suicide in practices such as the devotio (Val. Max., 2.6.11; 3.2.7; Sall., in Servio, adGeorg. 4.218; Flor., 1.34.11; Plut., Sert. 14), according to which consecrated warriors could not outlive their chieftain.

    Celtiberians valued single combat and the literary sources describe the Celtiberians performing war dances and songs (Sil. Ital., 3, 346-349; Diod., 5, 34, 4; App., Iber. 67). Their purpose would be to embolden the warriors and inspire panic in the enemy. Salustius (2, 92) relates that mothers recounted "the warrior feats of their elders to the men who were preparing for battle or raiding parties, where they sung of their valiant deeds". The war horns of the Numantians (App., Iber. 78), documented archaeologically (Wattenberg 1963, Tables XV-XVI), could be related to these practices.

    In 151 BC in Intercatia, Lucullus, a native warrior on horseback with resplendent weapons challenged any Roman to single combat. Since none took up his challenge, he ridiculed his enemies, withdrew performing a dance, and continued his taunts until the young Scipio took up the challenge and killed him (App., Iber. 53).

    A similar episode is recounted by Valerius Maximus (3.2.21) and Livy in 143-142 BC. The protagonists of these duels would have belonged to the social elite. The literary sources refer to the protagonist of the duel with Scipio in Intercatia as rex (Flor. 1.33.11), while Valerius Maximus (3.2.6) uses the term dux.

    Celtiberian Scutarii were found throughout the Iberian Peninsula as mercenaries, where they served the Iberian kings in Spain’s south and east (against Rome in 195; Livy, 34.17; against Carthage in 237, Diod. 25.8-16); they were also found in the employ of Carthage, and later even Roman armies. In 213 BC the Romans in Spain succeeded in "enticing the young Celtiberian soldiers to their side, with the same level of pay these had settled on with the Carthaginians"; Livy asserts this was the first time in a campaign that Rome extensively relied upon mercenaries (Livy, 24.49). In 211 BC the Scipios hired an army of 20,000 Celtiberians; they later deserted and returned home in exchange for a large gift of money from Hasdrubal Barca (Livy 25.32-34).

    The Celtiberian prince Allucius, who in 209 thanked Scipio for releasing his betrothed, held hostage in Carthago Nova, by presenting him with 1,400 of his clients' equites (Livy, 26,51,7; Frontinus, str. 2.11.5; Diod. fr. 57.43; Val. Max. 4, 3, 1; Polybius, 19.19). An Indo king with his troops and cavalry was also involved in the wars between Caesar and Pompey's forces in 45 BC (De bell. Hisp. 10). In 207, in order to re-build the Carthaginian field army in Spain, a large Celtiberian contingent of 9,000 was recruited (Livy, 28.1-2). The Carthaginian army defeated at the Great Plains in Africa by Scipio in 206 BC was built around a large contingent of Celtiberians, "... who had come to Africa as hired soldiers..."; they held the centre, and were the only force to hold their ground (Livy 30.8). It is interesting to note that even after Carthage had lost Spain, they were still able to bring large Celtiberian mercenary forces to serve them in Africa.

    During the third and second centuries BC war among the Celtiberians changed from being performed between family groups and neighbouring settlements to a way of resolving conflicts between Celtiberian city-states. The latter, now centres of political and administrative control, were ruled by the most powerful clans, which tried to increase their power and territory by inciting conflicts between neighbouring ethnic groups, as between Segeda and the Titti (App., Iber. 44). To the hospitality pacts between gentiliate clans were added alliances between cities or symmachía, like that reached between Segeda and the Numantians (App., Iber., 45) or between Lutia and Numantia (App., Iber., 94).
    Celtiberian Cavalry (Heavy Cavalry)

    The Celtiberians were renowned for their heavy cavalry: armoured warriors mounted on strong horses that delivered a shock charge with the lance. The most powerful clans among the Celtiberians produced aristocratic warrior lineages, eugeneîs or nobiles, and these mighty chieftains ruled the oppida and Celtiberian polities.

    The Celtiberian Cavalry were formed from the retinues of these nobiles, and they are renowned for both their equipment and warrior ethos. They wore a mail shirt, made of interlocking rings, which was invented by the Keltoi in the fourth century BC, and had overhanging cape-like shoulder defence.

    Their bronze helmet was of the Montefortino-type, with a plume and three-disk cheek-pieces. The main weapon of these cavalry being the lance, but being supplemented with a long slashing sword, some 90 cm long, The sword was the weapon of the high status warrior and Celtiberian swords were a by-word for strength and quality.

    They wore woollen breeches and tunic, woven or embroidered into brightly coloured and rich patterns. The cavalryman also carries a small, round shield.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Celtiberians were an aristocratic warrior society that inhabited the central-eastern portion of the Spanish Peninsula, and their nations included the Celtiberi, Vaccaei and Carpetani. They were cattle-raising pastoralists, living on the periphery of both the Mediterranean and Keltoi worlds, and they were greatly influenced by both.

    By the third century BC they lived in larger supra-tribal kingdoms centred around fortified towns, called oppidum by the Romans. Like the Keltoi, the whole society of the Celtiberians was imbued with a warrior ethos. Celtiberian fighting techniques and the concept of war underwent important changes after the fourth century BC, as Celtiberian polities grew in size and strength, and moved towards full-scale mobilisation in their clashes with the Mediterranean powers from the third century BC onward.

    For the Celtiberians, war constituted a means of achieving prestige and wealth. The frequent raids organised against neighbouring territories and their presence as mercenaries in the service of the Turdetani, Iberians, Carthaginians and Romans can be understood in this context. In the third century BC the Celtiberians were expanding, as their gentiliate warrior society expanded towards the west and north of Iberia.

    The Celtiberians were an aristocratic warrior society whose elite, defined by its nobility, valour and wealth, appears in the sources as eugeneis, nobiles or principes. Their army leaders were elected from amongst these prominent figures, and important military clients were ritually linked to them by the devotio.

    In a competitive society such as the Celtiberian, the clients would be indicators of the prestige of their chieftains or patrons. The Celtiberians were very warlike. Cicero (Tusc. 2, 65) claimed that “...the Celtiberians
    delight in battle and lament if they are ill". Other authors express themselves in similar terms (Val. Max., 2, 6, 11; Sil. Ital. 1, 225, 3, 340-343; Iust., Ep. 44.2; Claud. Elianus 10.22), saying that death in combat was glorious for Celtiberians, and this is shown by the fact that those who fell in combat were rewarded with a specific funerary ritual: the exposure of the corpse to be devoured by the vultures, birds being considered sacred and entrusted with taking the deceased to "The Beyond".

    The Celtiberian warrior preferred death to losing his freedom, as he showed by committing suicide in practices such as the devotio (Val. Max., 2.6.11; 3.2.7; Sall., in Servio, ad Georg. 4.218; Flor., 1.34.11; Plut., Sert. 14), according to which consecrated warriors could not outlive their chieftain.

    The written sources describe this elite cavalry as Moericus or Allucius or the quadraginta nobiles equites that T. Sempronius Gracchus incorporated into his army in Certima ,militari iussi in proof of loyalty (Livy, 40.47). Rome maintained a policy of attracting these equestrian elites that led to their full incorporation into the Roman client system.

    The Celtiberian Cavalry made movement and provisioning more difficult for their enemies, operating as scouts, and pursuing the enemy, such as when Lucullus’ forces were pursued during the night (Appian, Iber. 55). Celtiberian horsemen often dismounted and fought on foot in the heroic tradition, a custom that lasted until Caesar's time.

    Celtiberians valued single combat and the literary sources describe the Celtiberians performing war dances and songs (Sil. Ital., 3, 346-349; Diod., 5, 34, 4; App., Iber. 67). Their purpose would be to embolden the warriors and inspire panic in the enemy.

    Salustius (2, 92) relates that mothers recounted "the warrior feats of their elders to the men who were preparing for battle or raiding parties, where they sung of their valiant deeds". The war horns of the Numantians (App., Iber. 78), documented archaeologically (Wattenberg 1963, Tables XV-XVI), could be related to these practices.

    In 151 BC in Intercatia, Lucullus, a native warrior on horseback with resplendent weapons challenged any Roman to single combat. Since none took up his challenge, he ridiculed his enemies, withdrew performing a dance, and continued his taunts until the young Scipio took up the challenge and killed him (App., Iber. 53).

    A similar episode is recounted by Valerius Maximus (3.2.21) and Livy in 143-142 BC. The protagonists of these duels would have belonged to the social elite. The literary sources refer to the protagonist of the duel with Scipio in Intercatia as rex (Flor. 1.33.11), while Valerius Maximus (3.2.6) uses the term dux.

    Iberia - Historical Background

    The Iberians were a non Indo-European people that inhabited the south and east of the Iberian Peninsula. When the Phoenicians began trading with the south of the Iberian Peninsula in c. 800 BC they found an indigenous people known to history as the “Tartessians”, inhabitants of “Tartessos”. Trade interactions accelerated existing indigenous trends towards a hierarchical, stratified, and urban society. When the Greeks reached the south-western portion of the Iberian Peninsula in around 600 BC they called the land Tartessos. For the Greeks, Tartessos was the mysterious land on the other side of the Pillars of Herkles, the gateway to the terra incognita. Some scholars identify biblical Tarshish with ancient Tartessos.

    Archaeology informs us that there was a long-term trend throughout the Bronze Age in the south-western part of the Iberian Peninsula towards demographic growth, population concentration in fewer settlements, a more diversified economic system with a growing emphasis on mining and metallurgy, social stratification and an increasing emphasis on status and leadership, with an association of leadership with military roles. The Iberian culture of the Hellenistic Period was a result of these indigenous trends being stimulated and transformed through the encounter with Phoenician seafarers and colonists. This transformation that formed the Iberian culture of the Hellenistic Period is called by modern historians and archaeologists “Orientalizing”.

    Between c. 750-550 BC the society of the “Tartessians” or “pre-Iberians” experienced unprecedented changes; an increase in the number of inhabited sites; an increase in mineral output; literacy and writing based on the Phoenician alphabet; wheel turned pottery; and greater social stratification. The “Tartessian” elites or aristocratic groups established their regional control over the mineral and agricultural resources. Evidence of this control is provided by the layout of territory, organized around the exploitation of cultivated land, and the control of communications and the creation of larger urban settlements. Over the years, these native aristocratic groups assimilated many Phoenician features, including eastern gods and goddesses (Melqart-Herkules, Astarte and Reshef-Hadad), adopted “eastern” symbols, such as mythological winged monsters (griffins or sphinxes) or scenes of combat between predators (lions) and prey (gazelles and wild deer), and they demonstrated their wealth and power by securing imported luxury items.

    From the eighth century BC the orientalizing and classicizing effects of intensive trade on the Mediterranean coastal zone of Iberia, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Ebro Valley, contributed to the development of the Iberian culture of the Hellenistic Period. Large nucleated settlements, many of them already occupied in the Late Bronze Age, developed the characteristics of Mediterranean cities; a distinctive art style represented in vase painting, sculpture and metalworking emerged: and the social system developed a degree of complexity which, by the fourth century, can reasonably be called a state system. That distinctive script that emerged to express the Iberian language was no doubt a consequence of increasing socio-economic complexity. It was at this time that military forces, armed with round shields and falcatas (short swords with a single, curved cutting edge), took on the appearance of hoplite armies and were in demand as mercenaries throughout the Mediterranean.

    “Tartessos” vanished in c. 550 BC, and in the ensuing Middle and Late Iberian Periods the unique Iberian culture flowered throughout the southern and eastern reaches of the Iberian Peninsula. The ‘polynuclearization’ of the Iberian hinterland is consistent with the growth of aristocratic power; the Iberian zone became a patchwork of petty kingdoms and cities.

    The Iberian polities were dominated by fortified urban centres or ‘oppida’, where the local aristocrats had their temple-palace residences, enforcing a very rigid control of the surrounding territory (the peasant ‘client’ was obliged to live in the ‘oppida’ rather than smaller villages, and may have been denied the ownership of his means of production), with cereal production the major agricultural activity, and cattle raising as the main class of livestock, together with specialist production, such as mining and pottery. The Iberian oppida show evidence of a highly developed literate culture, with coinage, and an ideological superstructure, including public places, temples and sacred precincts, with a significant degree of Punic and Hellenic acculturation.

    These Iberian oppida developed their own hierarchy, as major centres dominated smaller ones, and formed ethnic-polities or archaic states; in the Hellenistic period these included the Turdetani (in the lands of ancient "Tartessos"), Oretani, Contestani, Edetani, and Illergetes.


    Iberian AOR Roster

    Caetrati Slinger

    The Iberians were accomplished irregular fighters, and well accustomed to a life of raiding and ambush in the rugged terrain of the Iberian Peninsula.

    The petty Iberian kings and chieftains of southern and eastern Iberia were able to muster capable slingers from amongst the lower socio-economic classes in times of war.

    These Slingers carried the caetra, the distinctive small round Iberian shield found throughout the peninsula. For close-fighting these Iberians relied upon a short sword, carried in a richly inlaid scabbard. These men wore a simple tunic; the strapping harness around his torso is found in votive statuettes found in Iberia.

    These men went into battle bare-headed, and tied their long hair into locks. Others tied their hair behind the neck; others gathered it into a net, or even in a pad on top of the skull, for extra protection.
    Caetrati Tribesmen (Skirmisher)

    The Caetrati Tribesmen were good skirmishers, fighting with javelins, and well accustomed to a life of raiding and ambush in the rugged terrain of Spain.

    The petty Iberian kings and chieftains were able to muster large numbers of these Caetrati Tribesmen from amongst their clans and tribes in times of war.

    These Tribesmen carried the caetra, the distinctive small round Iberian shield found throughout the peninsula. The bundle of javelins that this tribesman also carried into battle had iron heads, and were some 4 feet long. For close-fighting the tribesmen relied upon the Spanish falacata, carried in a richly inlaid scabbard. These men wore a characteristic broad, metal-furnished belt; the strapping harness around his torso is found in votive statuettes found in Iberia.

    These men went into battle bare-headed, and tied their long hair into locks. Others tied their hair behind the neck; others gathered it into a net, or even in a pad on top of the skull, for extra protection.
    Caetrati Falcata (Swordsmen)

    The Caetra Falcata were light infantry found throughout Iberia; they were quick moving, ideal for ambush and skirmishing, but also able to serve as line infantry.

    These men fought in a formation similar to that of the Roman maniple, called by Polybius the speirai (Polybius, 3.114.4), which wass the same term he used for maniples (Polybius, 6.24.5-8). These troops firstly threw their javelins to disrupt the enemy line, and then charged to engage in close fighting with their swords.

    These Iberian infantry were completely unarmoured excepting a simple bronze cap helmet, and were armed with a caetra and the falcata sword. The caetra was a small, round buckler, some 1-2 feet in diameter. These warriors were also armed with the soliferreum, the slim all-iron javelin that was a characteristic weapon of the Iberians, and inspired the Roman pilum. According to Strabo it could penetrate helmet, shield and body armour. It was designed to kill, or render useless the enemy shield.

    These men wore a short, woollen white tunic with short sleeves, having a purple border at the hem, neck and sleeves. It was gathered at the waist with a wide leather belt. Polybius and Livy described Hannibal’s Iberians in “dazzling white” tunics edged purple; Polybius says this was the national costume (Polybius, 3.114.2-4). These swordsmen also wore shoes.

    The main weapon for these light infantry was the falcata, a single-edged sword, some 55-63 cm long, which was an excellent cut-and-thrust sword.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Caetra Falcata were recruited from among all the main Iberian tribes and petty kingdoms, including the Turdetani, Bastetani, Oretani, Edetani, Illergetes and Contestani. These Iberians spoke their own Iberian language, but Punic was commonly spoken too.

    These soldiers were commonly found throughout the Iberian Peninsula as mercenaries. From the fifth century BC they are also found in Sicily, where they served the Carthaginians (Diod.14.55.4; Polybius, 1.18.8; 1.19.3). Dionysius I of Syracuse also succeeded in hiring an Iberian contingent (Diod. 14.55.6).
    Scutarii Falcata (Swordsmen)

    The Iberian Scutarii Falcata were so named for their large oval scutarii shields and the distinctive espada falcata sword. They made up the majority Iberian infantry type, and were renowned as flexible, quick-moving and aggressive line infantry.

    The Scutarii Falcata would first hurl their javelins, before engaging the enemy with their swords. These men fought in a formation similar to that of the Roman maniple, called by Polybius the speirai (Polybius, 3.114.4), which is the same term he uses for maniples (Polybius, 6.24.5-8). These troops firstly threw their javelins to disrupt the enemy line, and then charged to engage in close fighting with their swords.

    These Iberian infantry are completely unarmoured excepting their distinctive Iberian headgear, the sinew helmet described by Strabo, with a horsehair crest. They carry the scutarii, a large oval shield, of the Gallic type, with metal edging. These warriors were equipped with the espada falcata sword, a 13-20 inch long blade sharpened to a point, so that it could thrust as well as slash. They were also armed with the soliferreum, the slim all-iron javelin that was a characteristic weapon of the Iberians, and inspired the Roman pilum. According to Strabo it could penetrate helmet, shield and body armour. It is designed to kill, or render useless the enemy shield.

    The Scutarii Falcata wore a short, woollen white tunic with long sleeves, which had a black border at the hem, neck and sleeves. It was gathered at the waist with a wide leather belt. Polybius and Livy describe Hannibal’s Iberians in “dazzling white” tunics edged purple; Polybius says this was the national costume (Polybius, 3.114.2-4). These swordsmen wore sandals.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Scutarii Falcata were recruited from among all the main Iberian tribes and petty kingdoms, including the Turdetani, Bastetani, Oretani, Edetani, Illergetes and Contestani. These Iberians spoke their own Iberian language, but Punic was spoken too.

    These soldiers were commonly found throughout the Iberian Peninsula as mercenaries. From the fifth century BC they were also found in Sicily, where they served the Carthaginians (Diod.14.55.4; Polybius, 1.18.8; 1.19.3). Dionysius I of Syracuse also succeeded in hiring an Iberian contingent (Diod. 14.55.6).
    Iberian Elite Scutarii Warriors (Elite Swordsmen)

    The Iberian Elite Scutarii Warriors represent the most lavishly equipped infantry of the warlike Iberian aristocracies. In their gear and fighting style one can discern a distant echo of the classical hoplites, which reflected centuries of trade and cultural exchange of the Iberians with both Greeks and Phoenicians. Hardened through the endemic warfare of the region, and lavishly equipped by a wealthy society, these warriors formed the elite of any Iberian host.

    This warrior is a reconstruction of the figures illustrated on the famous 2nd/1st century BC "vase of the armoured warriors" found at Liria (Valencia). They wore corselets of mixed construction, including scale armour, iron ring mail and thickly-woven esparto grass matting. They also wore cap-like Iberian helmets of bronze.

    The classic Celtic scutum shields were carried, reflecting cultural contact with their Celtiberian neighbours of the hinterland. They also used the Iberian soliferrum; the all-iron javelin that inspired the Roman pilum. The soliferrum was thrown before the warriors engaged with their falcata swords, with the aim of disrupting the enemy formations and hampering the use of their shields.

    The principal weapon of these warriors, however, was the falcata, the famous curved sabre of the Iberians. Likely inspired by the Greek kopis, the falcata was a sword of great quality, reflecting the high levels of metalworking among the Iberians of Spain. Only the inside edge of the falcata was sharpened, yet its unique shape and quality made it a deadly weapon.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The petty Iberian kingdoms of the region known to ancient cartographers as “Turdetania” were blessed with lands well endowed with precious metals, especially silver, and possessing great agricultural fertility, being watered by the Baetis River. Turdetania and the neighbouring lands of Oretania, Bastetani, Contestani and Edetani were inhabited by a patchwork of native petty kingdoms formed around wealthy, sophisticated and highly stratified urban sites, which engaged in regional and long-distance trade – and endemic warfare.

    Ruled by a warlike aristocracy of warrior princes, the Iberian kingdoms engaged in a never ending struggle for power and supremacy against both one another and their Punic, Celtiberian and Lusitanian neighbours.
    Cantabrian Cavalry (Missile Cavalry)

    The Cantabrian Cavalry were a distinctive Iberian unit, highly regarded as mounted skirmishers and scouts, harassing the enemy with their javelins, and superb for pursuing broken enemy units.

    The shieldless Cantabrian Cavalry were famous for their lightness and mobility. They took their name from the “cantabrian circle”. This Imperial Roman cavalry tactic betrays its origin with its Spanish name. They would gallop around in a circle showering the enemy with javelins, presenting a fast-moving target. The maneuver was designed to harass and taunt the enemy forces, disrupting close formations. This was commonly used against enemy infantry, especially heavily armed and slow moving formations.

    These cavalry rode into battle armed with a bundle of javelins with which to shower the enemy. When engaged in close fighting these men fought with the espada falcata as their weapon. They were only lightly armoured, wearing a pectoral plate hung on a strap harness over their tunic, bronze greaves, and a typical close-fitting ‘bascinet’ shape helmet with emphasised bands of reinforcement around the edge, with a high-stilted crest of black horsehair.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Cantabrian Cavalry were recruited from the petty kingdoms of Iberia, in the south and east of the Iberian Peninsula. Here the small, wealthy and highly stratified Iberian kingdoms like the Turdetani, Bastetani, Edetani, Oretani, Illergetes and Contestani were engaged in regional and long-distance trade – and endemic warfare. Ruled by a warlike aristocracy of warrior princes, the Iberians engaged in a never ending struggle for power and supremacy against both one another and their Punic, Celtiberian and Lusitanian neighbours.

    The Cantabrian Cavalry were recruited from among the Iberian warrior classes, and were typically well mounted, on tough, strong horses. Spain was rich in wild horses, creating mounts that were fast and of great stamina and beauty. It may have been the Iberians that invented the horseshoe in the fourth century BC, which improved the military potential of cavalry. The Iberians decorated their mounts with care, using bells and a prominent, distinctive frontal ornament attached to the brow.
    Caetrati Cavalry (Light Cavalry)

    The Caetrati Cavalry were a distinctive Iberian unit, valued as swift moving scouts and raiders, strong against enemy cavalry: superb for pursuing broken enemy units, and moving against the enemy flanks and rear. They were able to stand off, skirmishing with javelins, or charge with their falcata and caetra.

    The Caetrati Cavalry were famous for their lightness and mobility. They took their name from the “caetra”, the distinctively Iberian small shield, which they were able to sling over the back or on the side of the horse when not in use. They rode into battle equipped with javelins, and engaged in close fighting with the falcata as their principal weapon.

    They were armoured in a mail shirt, together with a round breastplate hung on a strap harness, bronze greaves, and a typical close-fitting "bascinet" shape helmet with emphasised bands of reinforcement around the edge, with a high-stilted crest of red horsehair. They wore a short, woollen white tunic with short sleeves, having a purple border at the hem, neck and sleeves; Polybius and Livy describe Hannibal’s Iberians in “dazzling white” tunics edged purple; Polybius says this was the national costume (Polybius, 3.114.2-4).

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Caetrati Cavalry were recruited from the petty kingdoms of Iberia, in the south and east of the Iberian Peninsula. Here the small, wealthy and highly stratified Iberian kingdoms like the Turdetani, Bastetani, Edetani, Oretani, Illergetes and Contestani engaged in regional and long-distance trade – and endemic warfare. Ruled by a warlike aristocracy of warrior princes, the Iberians embroiled themselves in a never ending struggle for power and supremacy against both one another and their Punic, Celtiberian and Lusitanian neighbours.

    The Caetrati Cavalry were typically well mounted, on tough, strong horses. Spain was rich in wild horses, creating mounts that were fast and of great stamina and beauty. It may have been the Iberians that invented the horseshoe in the fourth century BC, which improved the military potential of cavalry. The Iberians decorated their mounts with care, using bells and a prominent, distinctive frontal ornament attached to the brow.
    Iberian Scutarii Cavalry (Elite Heavy Cavalry)

    The Scutarii Cavalry were formed from among the kin, aristocrats and personal retainers of the Iberian petty kings. They were a warrior elite, lavishly equipped cavalry bred to a life of raiding, warring and vendetta. The horse enjoyed great importance in the social and military life of the Iberian elites, and Spain was rich in wild horses, creating mounts that were fast and of great stamina and beauty. It may have been the Iberians that invented the horseshoe in the fourth century BC, which improved the military potential of cavalry. The Iberians decorated their mounts with care, using bells and a prominent, distinctive frontal ornament attached to the brow.

    In their gear and fighting style one can see the Hellenistic influences transmitted into the Iberians of southern and eastern Spain, through centuries of trade and cultural exchange with both Greeks and Phoenicians. Hardened through the endemic warfare of the region, and lavishly equipped by a wealthy society, these elite cavalry formed the hammer of any Iberian host.

    This warrior is a reconstruction of the figures illustrated on the famous 2nd/1st century BC ‘vase of the armoured warriors’ found at Liria (Valencia). They wore corselets of mixed construction, including scale armour, iron ring mail and thickly-woven esparto grass matting. These warriors also wore cap-like Iberian helmets of bronze.

    They carried large, oval scutum shields, reflecting the cultural contact with their Celtiberian neighbours of the hinterland. Their principal weapon, however, was the lance, with a long iron spearhead. The mounts of these heavy cavalry were also heavily armoured in the distinctive scale armour of these warriors.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The petty Iberian kingdoms of the region known to ancient cartographers as “Turdetania” were blessed with lands well endowed with precious metals, especially silver, and possessing great agricultural fertility, being watered by the Baetis River. Turdetania and the neighbouring lands of Oretania, Bastetani, Contestani and Edetani were inhabited by a patchwork of native petty kingdoms formed around wealthy, sophisticated and highly stratified urban sites that engaged in regional and long-distance trade – and endemic warfare.

    Ruled by a warlike aristocracy of warrior princes, the Iberian kingdoms were engaged in a never ending struggle for power and supremacy against both one another and their Punic, Celtiberian and Lusitanian neighbours.

    The Iberian Scutarii Cavalry were found as mercenaries in eastern and southern Spain; Iberian aristocrats were notoriously fickle in their loyalties, and could be found in the armies of invaders. The Barcids established a hegemonic dominion in Spain because of their capacity to persuade, purchase or coerce contingents from the Iberian aristocrats they made tributaries. In the Second Punic War, success in the Spainish theatre depended upon the number and loyalty of Iberian allies that each protagonist could attract to their banner. When one side was winning, they would attract Iberian kings to their cause, and these allies would then abandon them or even change sides during periods of defeat.

    After his defeat at Hibera in 215, Hasdrubal Barca informed the Carthaginian Senate he was unable to march on Italy for fear that in his absence all Spain would be lost to Rome because Carthage would be abandoned by all its Iberian allies (Livy 23.26.2, 28.2, 32.11). The brothers Indibilis and Mandonius, kings of the powerful Ilergetes, were critical in the Punic victory against the Scipio brothers in 211 (Polybius 10.6.2, 7.1; Livy 25.32-39; Appian, Iber: 16.61-63); their defection to Scipio in 209 was a great blow to Carthage (Polybius 9.11.3-4).

    The Romans and Carthaginians both relied on noble hostages as surety for their Iberian allies. When the Romans succeeded in freeing Iberian hostages from Carthaginian strongholds (as at Saguntum in 217 and Carthago Nova in 209), and made lavish acts of generosity to Iberian noble captives, he succeeded in detaching Iberian allies from Carthage to Rome (just as Hannibal Barca was doing in Italy!)(Polybius 3.97.2-99.9; Livy 22.22.3-21; 24.42.9-10; Zon. 9.1.2-3). Throughout the war in Spain Carthaginian armies were constantly tied up operating against "revolting" Spanish tributaries and allies rather than operating against Rome (i.e. the "Tartessian" revolt 216, Livy 23.26.4-27.8, 24.41.1).
    Lusitanian Caetrati (Heavy Infantry)

    The Lusitanian Caetrati were highly regarded heavy infantry. Fighting as spearmen in maniple-like formations. They were quick moving and reliable line infantry in the native armies of the Lusitani.

    Despite being heavy infantry, the Lusitanians carried the small caetra, a 1-2 foot diameter buckler of embossed bronze; Diodorus remarks on the dexterity with which these infantry whirled the shield round to parry blows.

    The Lusitanian Caetrati were equipped with the distinctive Iberian soliferrum – the slim, all-iron javelin. This was discharged at the enemy to kill or disable their shield, prior to the attack. The principal weapon of the Lusitanian Caetrati was the thrusting spear, their secondary weapon being the distinctive espada falcata; the curved thrusting and slashing sword of the Iberians.

    The Lusitanian Caetrati wore iron mail shirts, adopted from their Celtiberian neighbours, as was the Montefortino helmet with the triple crest often found on Celtic helmets. These soldiers were also equipped with bronze greaves, and wore a quality woollen tunic fringed with red.

    HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    The Lusitanian Caetrati were the elite infantry of the Lusitani and Vettones, tribal groups that lived in the north-west of the Iberian Peninsula, beyond the culturally advanced Mediterranean coastal zone, which included the areas of intensive and long-standing Phoenician and Greek contact.

    The Indo-European Lusitani established themselves in the region of modern Portugal in the sixth century BC; they were an indigenous people who were greatly influenced by Celtic and Celtiberian culture. The Lusitani were mentioned for the first time in 218 BC and were described as Carthaginian mercenaries (Livy, 21.57); they were reported as fighting against Rome in 194 BC, sometimes allied with the Celtiberians.

    The Lusitani were stubborn, fierce opponents of Roman expansion in the Iberian Peninsula; In 179 BC the praetor Lucius Postumius Albinus celebrated a triumph over the Lusitani, but in 155 BC, on the command of Punicus first and Cesarus after, the Lusitani reached Gadir, where they were defeated by the praetor Lucius Mummius. The atrocities of Servius Sulpicius Galba triggered a new Lusitani revolt led by Viriathus in 150 BC, who after many successes against the Romans was murdered killed by Roman-paid assassins in 139 BC. Romans scored other victories with proconsul Decimus Junius Brutus and Marius (113 BC), but still the Lusitani resisted; they later joined Sertorius' troops and were only finally subjugated by Augustus Caesar.


    Battle Images

    Thanks to Brusilov for this excellent selection of battle images.

























    Afterword

    So, after a journey lasting seven months, we finally come to the end of our last preview dedicated to the factions that you will be encountering in FOE. It's been really fun putting these together for you, and an education in what I've learnt from the amazing texts of our learned historians. It's also fascinating to look back at Preview One and recall what a shaky Alpha version of the game we were working with back then, one that would barely run three turns without falling over. Now we have a robust beta, which is only lacking a few of the new gameplay features before we can start the serious process of campaign balance testing.

    While this may be the last big preview it certainly won't be last time that we will be updating you on progress in FOE. Keep an eye on the RTR VII: Fate of Empires - Links to Previews and Beta Progress Reports thread, because we will be using it to bring you tidbits of news of what is happening, and we may very well run mini-previews to explain to you how some of the new gameplay elements work as well.

    However, before I close I would like to mention something that may be of interest to modders, the RTRVII: Grand Campaign map, which is what FOE uses the western half of. After discussions within the team, we have decided to make the template available to you for use in your own mods. If this is something that interests you, contact me initially by PM and we'll take it from there.

    So, until we meet again, happy gaming!
    Last edited by Tony83; February 18, 2009 at 07:28 AM.

  2. #2
    Worm's Avatar Bravo
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    A-M-A-Z-I-N-G

  3. #3
    Horsa's Avatar Artifex
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Great work.

  4. #4
    Athenogoras's Avatar Campidoctor
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    I hesitate to comment. The amount of work put in this must be staggering.
    RTR-team - I salute you!

    Edit: Sorry but I`m such a dramaqueen.
    Last edited by Athenogoras; February 18, 2009 at 11:47 AM.

  5. #5
    Indefinitely Banned
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Thanks guys, glad you like our work.

    @ Daimon. Do yourself favour mate, buy it! You'll not regret it.

    @ Athenogoras. Hah! Competition for my crown, eh!

  6. #6
    Daimon's Avatar Miles
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Awesome! To bad I don't got my RTW copy anymore.. Maybe I should buy a new copy again when this comes out..

  7. #7
    Brusilov's Avatar Local Moderator
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Quote Originally Posted by Daimon View Post
    Awesome! To bad I don't got my RTW copy anymore.. Maybe I should buy a new copy again when this comes out..
    As Tony83 has posted - it's worth acquiring RTW and RTW BI to play the mod. They appear in various budget bins in game shops. If you could get RTW Alexander with the package it's worth it for the 'exe'.

    If you've not done so already it's worth playing RTR VII The Iberian Conflict (TIC). The first battle as Carthage is worth the download alone. You will need RTW BI for that.

    RTR VII TIC will also give you an idea of what RTR VII FoE will be like.

    Local Forum Moderator (Total War: Eras Technical Help, Shogun 2: Total War, RSII, RTR, World Of Tanks) - please no PMs

    War Thunder TWC Player Names: here


  8. #8

    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    All I can say is AMAZING.

    Great work RTR team - I salute you alll

    Best of luck for the remaining work - god bless you all
    "He will die, but you will be destroyed" - Marion. From the AAR "Sword of Albion" by Theodotos I.


  9. #9

    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    One of the finest modding games, in ancient and modern history =)
    Last edited by juanji15; February 18, 2009 at 09:46 PM.

  10. #10
    Dionisy's Avatar Civis
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Excelent work, RTR is the best!

  11. #11
    Indefinitely Banned
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Look at those shrimpy arms.

    Also Punics are darker than Libyans/Numidians?

  12. #12
    Radiso-FIN's Avatar Campidoctor
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Awesome RTR team. Very cool units.
    Can't wait for the release.

  13. #13

    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Good preview and really good skins especially the Roman deserter skin

  14. #14

    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Quote Originally Posted by Flodin View Post
    Good preview and really good skins especially the Roman deserter skin
    That skin was done by our new skinner [user]Carajudo[/user]

  15. #15

    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Quote Originally Posted by Flodin View Post
    Good preview and really good skins especially the Roman deserter skin
    thanks! hehehe
    Have a coffee dude...

  16. #16

    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Its good, looks like a sweet mod. But you should really give reference for what you copy and paste:

    http://www.uwm.edu/Dept/celtic/ekelt...lorrio_6_2.pdf

    For instance, the references the work makes are from you. they are from a very detailed piece of work by the University of Wisconsin. You should have references large parts of this work as what is written here is largely copied from that, with the eception of the pictures.

  17. #17
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Thanks guys.

    Quote Originally Posted by John Sharpe View Post
    Its good, looks like a sweet mod. But you should really give reference for what you copy and paste:

    http://www.uwm.edu/Dept/celtic/ekelt...lorrio_6_2.pdf

    For instance, the references the work makes are from you. they are from a very detailed piece of work by the University of Wisconsin. You should have references large parts of this work as what is written here is largely copied from that, with the eception of the pictures.


    lol - I think I'll let HamilcarBarca respond to this one!

  18. #18

    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Again, another history lesson with a superb presentation. Congratulations RTR team!

  19. #19
    Eat Meat Whale Meat
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    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Am I the only one to back away from the screen a little when looking at those guys with their weapons raised?

  20. #20

    Default Re: RTR: Fate of Empires - Preview Six

    Nice. So if this is the last preview, that means the actaul release is not far away

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