Why was the CSA so unsuccessful in the Western theater?

[Nikos]

If you look at the history of the American Civil War, you find early successes in the East for the Confederate Army and successes in the Western theater for the Union Army. Why was this? The Generals? Terrain? Troop quality?
I think it was the lack of Lee and Jackson Caliber generals in the Western theater.

[Steel of Fury]

Grant.

[Antagonist88]

The CSA considered the east coast to be more decisive to win the war, therefore they didn't focus that much on the west.

All the importand ports for European supply and many early industrial centers were situated in the east, while the west wasn't that much populated and developed compared to the east coast.

The Yanks had no need to conquer industrial centers, they already had a good amount of industry up in the north, while the south was agrarian-oriented and needed to compensate this lack.

[Sphere]

It was the confederates B team ( Beauregard, Johnston ) against the Unions A team (Grant, Sherman).

In all theaters the Union was superior in men and material, so the south could not fair well without superior generalship. Also, the use of Gunboats, especially during the Vicksburg campaign, provided an extra edge that the Confederates did not have.

[Xerrop]

The CSA considered the east coast to be more decisive to win the war, therefore they didn't focus that much on the west.

That´s the same I was thinking.

And additionaly they had not the manpower (and more important the equipment) to fight successful on two fronts.

[Fiyenyaa]

The CSA considered the east coast to be more decisive to win the war, therefore they didn't focus that much on the west.

All the importand ports for European supply and many early industrial centers were situated in the east, while the west wasn't that much populated and developed compared to the east coast.

The Yanks had no need to conquer industrial centers, they already had a good amount of industry up in the north, while the south was agrarian-oriented and needed to compensate this lack.

I think you've got it right - the CSA could hardly sustain two campaigns to the same degree that they sustained the eastern front - and the eastern one was clearly more important to them; It's where the CSAs industrial centers (for what they were) were, and it's where the population was, for the most part.
It wouldn't make sense for them to pile resources into the western front - although the fact that the USA consistently won meant that there was a constant source of morale for the north, and a constant drain for the south, so damaging in the long run really.

[Viking Prince]

Some thoughts:

Union forces were more successful in the west due to the ease with occupation. Confederate forces were not occupation oriented -- no real goals can be achieved in the west without occupation.

As someone had already noted -- the Mississippi River seperated a great deal of land from CSA productive control. I say productive since the CSA was only able to survive by remaining in the field and with interior lines of support. The Mississippi thus restricted the CSA to operations east of the river for any strategic importance lest the forcess be cut off from supply. The west was on its own -- and this included areas east of the river but close enough for Union forces to resupply from the river.

The only real limitation on the Union forces was the huge numbers required for occupation. Numbers that did not exist. Otherwise all port cities would have fallen quickly. The same problem the British had a few years earlier.

[Sphere]

Wait, are we talking about the "Western Campaigns" roughly around the Mississippi (Vicksburg and the like), or the small battles in the far-west? In both cases the Union did well, but the fighting in the far-western provinces was on a much smaller scale and rather insignificant.

The "Western Campaigns" with Grant and Sherman were rarely west of the Mississippi (Only the early battles in Missouri if I remember correctly), the rest was all east of the river or on it.

[Nikos]

Wait, are we talking about the "Western Campaigns" roughly around the Mississippi (Vicksburg and the like), or the small battles in the far-west? In both cases the Union did well, but the fighting in the far-western provinces was on a much smaller scale and rather insignificant.

The "Western Campaigns" with Grant and Sherman were rarely west of the Mississippi (Only the early battles in Missouri if I remember correctly), the rest was all east of the river or on it.

Western theater does not just mean West of the Mississippi.

[nate895]

The Confederacy had bad generals in the West. This is primarily because Davis liked Braxton Bragg and would shut up any dissent in the general ranks against him. That was until he couldn't politically maintain him in command after Chattanooga, which should have been an easy Confederate victory but turned to disaster, and since Grant and Sherman were in that army, they'd have surrendered with it.

It wasn't until he placed Hood in command that Davis had a decent general. By that point, however, it was too late. Hood didn't have the resources to carry on a good enough offensive like that which was needed to force Sherman out of Georgia. Hood was forced to make a frontal assault at Franklin that failed in its objective. Historians attack him for not blocking Union retreat by going around the line, but that was virtually impossible given the circumstances. It would have left any attacking force exposed for several hours, and probably would have been an even worse disaster than the possible alternative.

[MAJR]

It wasn't until he placed Hood in command that Davis had a decent general. By that point, however, it was too late. Hood didn't have the resources to carry on a good enough offensive like that which was needed to force Sherman out of Georgia. Hood was forced to make a frontal assault at Franklin that failed in its objective. Historians attack him for not blocking Union retreat by going around the line, but that was virtually impossible given the circumstances. It would have left any attacking force exposed for several hours, and probably would have been an even worse disaster than the possible alternative.

Hood was not a decent Army general. Lee said the most telling assessment of Hood when asked by Davis who should replace Johnston, Lee said Hood was industrious on the battlefield, careless off. Hood carelessness had already been seen when he was Johnston's Corps Commander.

At Resaca following the initial success of the attack Hood decided to waste the night building a redoubt in the middle of the battlefield where he placed some artillery pieces and when the Union attack the next day he was easilly driven off and lost some irreplacable guns, at Cassville Hood got spooked by reports of Federals to his rear and called off the attack without checking to see if the reports were true, at Kolb's Farm he convinced himself he had found the exposed flank of the enemy and attacked without reconnassiance and having driven some pickets off he hit Hooker's forces entrenched and was driven off with relatively heavy casualties.

When Hood took over from Johnston the Army of Tennessee still numbered some 60,000 men. Within weeks his rash, poorly executed attacks had whittled that army down by 20,000 and Davis had to order him not to attack anymore.

When he learnt that Johnston was to be replaced by Hood, Sherman inquied of Schofield (I think it was) as to what kind of man Hood was. He was told that Hood was brave and couragous to an extreme and this, Sherman took to mean "fight" and he couldn't have been more happy about it. Sherman had longed for the Confederates to face him in open battle because he was convinced that they could not stand up to his three armies and he had been constantly frustraited with his attempts to advance his campaign by Johnston careful management of the Army of Tennessee.

Sherman never gave Hood any respect as an Army Commander, in fact he treated Hood as an adverary with complete disregard and contempt. Grant too wasn't worried in the slightest about what Hood was doing - even when he almost replaced Thomas it was only because he thought Hood should have been whipped sooner, not because he thought Hood was doing something dangerous.

[motiv-8]

What role did the use of brown water navy and control of the rivers play in the Western campaign?

[hellheaven1987]

What role did the use of brown water navy and control of the rivers play in the Western campaign?

Basically it cut CSA into half, and enable Union to occupy a strong middle ground with a great supplyline (even though later on Union commanders would find Mississippi River was not enough to satisfy their push into inner eastern CSA, hence change their strategy to economical scorched warfare, using multiple infantry raids to burn CSA down).

Other than that, amphibious operations were generally used in small scale in sea invasion, mostly aimed to occupy CSA ports. There were, however, large scale amphibious operations such as Peninsula Campaign.

They had commanders whilst the Union forces had brilliant ones. Kinda the opposite of the eastern front.

That was not true; in comparison Union and Confederation commanders had roughly equal quality; what caused CSA defeated was the great difference of resource between Union and Confederation (for example, majority of CSA force had to march without shoes, as the industry simply could not provide enough for all soldiers).

[jackwei]

Some can say if the CSA won the battle of shiloh, which was prehaps one of the closet near run battles of the war as some could say that the south should of won it if beauguard realised how exposed the union flanks were in the hornet's nest. If the Union Army of Tennesse was destroyed before the army of ohio arrived then prehaps it would of stopped or delayed the union from advancing into the Northern Mississippi that eventually in years to come led to union victory at Vicksburg, which cut the confederacy in half.

As some can say Shiloh indeed was a missed opportunity for the South.

[Prince Odysseus]

Bragg ran a brilliant Tennessee/Kentucky campaign, but for some reason claimed the offensive as a failure and retreated.

EDIT: Wow, I didn't realize how old this thread was.

[hellheaven1987]

Bragg ran a brilliant Tennessee/Kentucky campaign, but for some reason claimed the offensive as a failure and retreated.

Well, that was largely because the nature of that campaign was a large raid, which means the invaders had to be constantly moving around as their supplies were relying on foraging. Hence, Battle of Stones River, which created a stalemate, forced Confederate force to retreat due to the lack of local supplies.

Southern Kentucky was a very difficult region for operation as it was hilly, lack of roads and most important, far away from major railroad, hence both Union and Confederacy assumed that region was not suitable for large operation that aimed to permanent occupation. Hence it is understandable why Bragg used raid instead standard operation for that campaign.

[Dr. Croccer]

They had commanders whilst the Union forces had brilliant ones. Kinda the opposite of the eastern front.