The Wehmarcht could be defeated in may 1940 ?

[Belisaire_]

Or the french and british had no chance to stop the Blitzkrieg ?

Here a good and brief explanation about the battle of 1940

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJ74HakQZTo

[Pious Agnost]

That is an excellent presentation. I think if the French had better tactics and generals, they would've been able to effectively halt the Wermacht, but not defeat it, no that would've taken a lot more manpower, determination and resources than France had

[Applesmack]

The French and British were fighting World War 1 and the Germans were fighting World War 2. That is the biggest reason for the loss.

[Ulf]

If France and G.B. could have stopped them, They would have.

[The Friend]

There is a proposition that during the Polish Campaign (the Blitzkrieg) , the French Army simply waited at the borders and didnot start a counter offensive . This is supposed to have given the Wehrmacht a much needed lifeline.

[Nik]

I recomend Friesers "Blitzkrieg-Legende" / "The Blitzkrieg Legend", probably the definitve scholary work about Case Yellow.
The german operation was a huge gamble, furthermore a gamble that Hitler himself and a lot of the higher commanders like Halder or Rundstedt did not even understand to its full extent.
Of course, the french army was behind doctrinally and waited for its update programm to finish, on the other hand, the course of the operation shows several instances, where a little bit of luck could have spelled doom for the german plan.
Some examples would be:
-The dyle plan, rejected even by most of Gamelins subordinates, assigning the bulk of the french first line troops to the struggle in belgium. A more cautious plan employing the french reserves later would have given them the potential to deal some heavy blows to the german advance.
- The german advance to the ardennes. It wasn't a smooth sight-seeing ride through the countryside, but rather a traffic jam sometimes as long as 250 km. A lucky reconnaissance flight detecting the german concentrations, resulting aerial ground attacks and a french counter concentration in the exit area of the german advance (augmenting the 30+ old reserve units stationed at sedan).
- Hitler actually succeeding with his first stopping order at sedan, again giving the allies valuable time.
- A concentrated french counterattack in the timewindow when Guderian only left half a tank division at sedan while continuing his "recon" advance (when in reality the french commander disobeyed clear orders and dug his troops in instead of attacking).
- Weygand not canceling Gamelins pincer attacks from the north and south on the 17th of may (only to reorder it on the 19th).
Lots of potential for what-ifs.

[Sphere]

The French and British were fighting World War 1 and the Germans were fighting World War 2. That is the biggest reason for the loss.

I think in the broad strategic sense, this is correct. The French and the British were expecting a slow paced conflict with relatively stagnant lines. Indeed, one of the reasons why France/Britian were prepared to defend Norway was to keep the main battle lines away from France and Britian to limit damage and devastation. Really, if they had been thinking more dynamically, fighting WWII as it were, the war could have gone much differently.

[touchmaster]

I think in the broad strategic sense, this is correct. The French and the British were expecting a slow paced conflict with relatively stagnant lines. Indeed, one of the reasons why France/Britian were prepared to defend Norway was to keep the main battle lines away from France and Britian to limit damage and devastation. Really, if they had been thinking more dynamically, fighting WWII as it were, the war could have gone much differently.

To sum that up the Germans didn't want to fight a WW1 war... Hence the Blitzkrieg. They wanted to get in there quick and kick ass and not having any patients for faul up.s

[Randarkmaan]

The Germans didn't want to fight such a war in WW1 even, they just ended up being halted and lacked the manpower to break through the enemy because they were simultaneously fighting Russia in the East.

[hellheaven1987]

The problem was that German kindly got "lucky" the Allies threw their most mechanized divisions into Belgium instead defending Meuse, German would face far more difficulty than their original expect (although the "lucky" part was due to an incident happened in Janauary, which caused Allies learned all details of German's original plan).

On 10 January 1940, a German Messerschmitt Bf 108 made a forced landing at Maasmechelen, north of Maastricht, in Belgium (the so-called "Mechelen Incident"). Among the occupants of the aircraft was a Luftwaffe major, Hellmuth Reinberger, who was carrying a copy of the latest version of Aufmarschanweisung N°2. Reinberger was unable to destroy the documents, which quickly fell into the hands of the Belgian intelligence services.[11] It has often been suggested this incident was the cause of a drastic change in German plans, but this is incorrect; in fact a reformulation of them on 30 January, Aufmarschanweisung N°3, Fall Gelb, basically conformed to the earlier versions.[12] On 27 January, von Manstein was relieved of his appointment as Chief of Staff of Army Group A and appointed commander of an army corps in Prussia, to begin his command in Stettin on 9 February. This move was instigated by Halder to remove von Manstein from influence. Von Manstein's indignant staff then brought his case to the attention of Hitler, who was informed of it on 2 February. Von Manstein was invited to explain his proposal to the Führer personally in Berlin on 17 February. Hitler was much impressed by it, and the next day he ordered the plans to be changed in accordance with von Manstein's ideas. They appealed to Hitler mainly because they at last offered some real hope of a cheap victory.

This is from Wiki, more information can be found from Liddell Hart's "The Second World War".

[Domen123]

I think in the broad strategic sense, this is correct. The French and the British were expecting a slow paced conflict with relatively stagnant lines.

They couldn't be more stupid than they were, because they saw what was happening in Poland in 1939, and they also were given a huge several-volumes report about all aspects of the Polish Campaign and the German tactics in the Polish campaign by the Poles - but they didn't even want to read it.

If they were still expecting such a kind of war - after they saw what war was fought in Poland in 1939 -, they were simply idiots.

[Nik]

They couldn't be more stupid than they were, because they saw what was happening in Poland in 1939, and they also were given a huge several-volumes report about all aspects of the Polish Campaign and the German tactics in the Polish campaign by the Poles - but they didn't even want to read it.

If they were still expecting such a kind of war - after they saw what war was fought in Poland in 1939 -, they were simply idiots.

Typical armchair strategy reply.
Getting a report of unkown quality is one thing, drawing the correct conclusions from it, another.
Completely reversing order of battles, small unit tactics, operational plans, cooperation modes and staff work, now that would simply be idiotic.

[Odovacar]

The german operation was a huge gamble, furthermore a gamble that Hitler himself and a lot of the higher commanders like Halder or Rundstedt did not even understand to its full extent.

Who cares that? The greatest generals of history were gamblers..Alexander..Hannibal..If you succeed, its no matter.
There is no winning without risk.

[motiv-8]

Who cares that? The greatest generals of history were gamblers..Alexander..Hannibal..If you succeed, its no matter.
There is no winning without risk.

How many generals in history took big risks and lost out big? For every Alexander there's a Pyrrhus, Crassus, Nikephorus, and so on. The value of impetuousness on the battlefield is a matter of circumstance. History records successful generals who were generally cautious as well.

[Heinz Guderian]

Germany invaded Poland in SEPTEMBER 1939. France declared war and had armour superiority. It did practically nothing. By APRIL 1940, Germany had swept up Denmark and Norway. France (and Britian) still did not attack the Ruhr region. Come MAY 1940, it was all gonna be inevitable.

If the French or British knew what they knew in September 1940, they would be more positive

[KaerMorhen]

The Wehmarcht could be defeated in may 1940 ?

by whom???, the French???, Brits don't be riduculous. Althougt both have tools to do so but they lacked in minds and guts. If anyone could face Wehrmacht with succes it were the Soviets.

[Georgy Zhukov]

by whom???, the French???, Brits don't be riduculous. Althougt both have tools to do so but they lacked in minds and guts. If anyone could face Wehrmacht with succes it were the Soviets.

Let forth the Dogs of nationalism.

[KaerMorhen]

Let forth the Dogs of nationalism.

you could not be less accurate actually

In 1940? Yeah, because the Soviets did excellent in the first 6 months of the war with the Germans in 1941. All those millions dead or captured, the huge swathes of lost territory, the enourmous amount of equipment lost was all part of a cunning plan.
And their performance against the Finns was even more outstanding.
Yeap, the Red Army in 1940 would have posed a serious threat to ze Germans. In fact, the Russkies could have won singlehandedly.

Please.. let's not kid ourselves. The Wehrmacht in 1940 was the most efficient fighting force the world had yet seen. Their innovative tactics, the lessons they had learnt from WW1, caught everyone completely off guard.

this whole debate is about if in the first place. what makes you so sure what would happen if Stalin suddenly stab Hitler in the back. Soviet forces were numerous in manpower and equipment, sure we can debate their effectivness and such (Winter War) but still they had better chances than anybody elses

[Visna]

you could not be less accurate actually

Welcome to VV.

this whole debate is about if in the first place. what makes you so sure what would happen if Stalin suddenly stab Hitler in the back. Soviet forces were numerous in manpower and equipment, sure we can debate their effectivness and such (Winter War) but still they had better chances than anybody elses

Surprisingly enough, most debates here turn into if-questions.
And the simple fact that Stalin did not stab Hitler in the back should provide a clue to his ambitions in that regard in 1940. The Soviet army was completely unprepared in 1941, and they were even more unprepared in 1940. Stalin showed on a lot of occassions, that he couldn't give a flying fudge about millions of lives if the objective was met. And yet he chose not to stab Hitler in the back.

[KaerMorhen]

Welcome to VV.




Surprisingly enough, most debates here turn into if-questions.
And the simple fact that Stalin did not stab Hitler in the back should provide a clue to his ambitions in that regard in 1940. The Soviet army was completely unprepared in 1941, and they were even more unprepared in 1940. Stalin showed on a lot of occassions, that he couldn't give a flying fudge about millions of lives if the objective was met. And yet he chose not to stab Hitler in the back.

maybe after all he possessed the ability to learn from his own failures. And once again I'm not saying that Soviets would destroy the III Reich but if anything they have more chances for upper hand than Western Allies