Market Garden failure or defeat ?

[Belisaire_]

Market Garden was one of the big allied blunder in WW2, do you think it was just a failure or a clear defeat ?

[Azog 150]

Well its wasn't a defeat seeing as we did gain land. However, it was a failure as we didn't complete our objectives and didn't gain as much ground as we wanted (And we also suffered heavier casualties then expected)

[gaius valerius]

A strategical failure. Totally underestimated the situation (couldn't know/believe some German elite troops were taking a holiday of course). Those troops in Arnhem were pretty much screwed. Defeat/failure... Don't know, sounds kinda the same. It wasn't a defeat in the sense that they got their arses handed to them on a silver plate, except for those in Arnhem, but they didn't realise their final objective, so mayhaps failure is the best of the 2 terms.

[Rhaegar1]

I agree it was most of all a strategical failure. Making gamble in order to quickly end the war (which would have saved the netherlands frome a very difficult winter) is allright but not if you're ignoring reports of Heavily armoured SS veterans in the area.

[Visna]

It was not a defeat as such, but it was a gamble that for a lot of reasons failed, when it comes to reaching the ultimate objectives. So out of the two options, I think failure matches it the most.

[Spartacus the Irish]

A multitude of cock-ups, really.

The Americans wanted the drops done on consecutive days for air cover reasons. The British dropped far too far away from Arnhem Bridge, and the four jeeps meant to sprint to the Bridge and hold it were all wrecked on landing. The radio crystals weren't powerful enough. The ferry over the Ijessel was not known about. Polder was abysmal for committing large numbers of armoured vehicles, even tracked ones, over a single raised road. The bridging equipment was at the rear of XXX Corp's miles long column. Dutch intel was ignored or overlooked - perhaps a dozen previous operations to use the airborne troops (the only remaining Allied reserve) had been cancelled in the months preceding Market-Garden; no-one wanted to 'rock the boat' in terms of this operation.

It was an operation that adhered strictly to Murphy's Law in every way. Everything that can go wrong, did go wrong.

[The Super Pope]

It was a very poorly planned operation, in the words of Stephen E. Ambrose, one that could only be conceived by a a command "guilty of supreme over-confidence". The idea that the Allied Ariborne Army could be supplied from one road which at the same time had to supply XXX Corps, and along which the Corps had to advance is ridiculous.

The only realistic chance Colonel Frost's men had of holding both ends of Arnhem bridge was if he had made a coup-de-main operation as was done at Pegasus Bridge. Holding both ends would have greatly reduced his problems but he was still simply too far away

[Spartacus the Irish]

It was a very poorly planned operation, in the words of Stephen E. Ambrose, one that could only be conceived by a a command "guilty of supreme over-confidence".

This I definitely agree with. 1st Airborne was an elite formation which had seen it's sister formation go into battle in Normandy and acquit itself very well, and wished a similar chance - but had thus far been forced to sit on the sidelines and watch Allied armies drive furiously from Normandy to the very border of Germany. It must also be remembered that as many as twenty various airborne operations had been planned and scrapped over the course of the campaign in Northern France, many scrapped with the men sitting in their transport aircraft.

No-one wished to 'rock the boat' with concerns or potential problems. The intelligence officer who raised concerns over German armour in the Arnhem area ordered a Spitfire low-level reconnaissance flight, which took photos of German armour in laager. His name was Brian Urquhart (no relation of Maj-Gen. Roy Urquhart). In one of the saddest events in a very sad affair, Browning sent him on sick leave to Canada; he was so upset that his advice, though vidicted, was ignored, he requested transfer out of the Airborne he had been so quite instrumental in raising (he had also been a major planner during the Overlord airborne landings.

Browning wanted his place in history, and was determined, once he learned of the Market Garden plan, that this would be it - and he was adamant that it would not be scrapped or cancelled.

The only realistic chance Colonel Frost's men had of holding both ends of Arnhem bridge was if he had made a coup-de-main operation as was done at Pegasus Bridge. Holding both ends would have greatly reduced his problems but he was still simply too far away

There was a coup-de-main attempt - but the jeeps comprising this force which rushed for the bridges were ambushed as they made their dash along Leopard route by Krafft's defensive positions and were unable to break through. Frost's men got to the bridge mainly because of the route they took; Lion route, closest to the river (a very agreeable walk in the summer sun, though of course I was walking with my wife and was not anticipating German troops to open fire upon me, rather being far too engrossed in devouring an ice cream).


A dedicated airborne coup-de-main force could have attempted to land on the bridge, but that would perhaps have been a little more bravado and hindsight, than feasibly succesful.

All of this dicussion is moot, however. The reason why the operation failed above all was the failure to take the Nijmegen bridge until 19.10hrs D+3, when it should have been taken before XXX Corps arrived at 8.20hrs D+2; eight miles from Arnhem, and wth six hours remaining (from the time when it was planned that XXX Corps reach Arnhem). People can argue that XXX Corps was cautious and slothly to advance before and after this (and at times they were); but the fact remains that they had reached Nijmegen, making up for the lost time during the drive there, and were held up by the failure to take the bridge, and I personally feel many American historians may have glossed over this fact to highlight and over-emphasise the British failings in the operation (for they were many).

Bottom line, had Nijmegen bridge been taken and held when XXX Corps arrived in the morning of Day 2, then maybe, just maybe, they could have reached Arnhem in enough force, and with Frost's Airborne in good enough shape, to effect a defensible, and more importantly usuable, bridgehead.

[Incontinenta Buttox]

Arnhem was a clear defeat.

The allied airborne army was a waste of resources, when the allied armies, and especially the British, were suffering shortages of infantry.

Market Garden resulted in the destruction of an elite British division, a long, thin, vulnerable salient going nowhere.

The resources used for Market Garden would have been much better employed clearing the approaches to Antwerp.

[Dr. Croccer]

A collection of -ups running back to before the operation itself. After Monty took Antwerp, tens of thousands of German troops retreated across the Scheldt unopposed. These troops would form the bulk of German defences in the Netherlands. The Allies underestimated the German defensive capabilities a lot as well as overestimating their own. The country was hard to conquer if defended properly.

[Hesus de bodemloze]

It was only a defeat because thy did get some of there objectives.

[Farnan]

It was only a defeat because thy did get some of there objectives.

Which was useless without getting all of the objectives.

Worst battle defeat of the Western Allies.

[Spartacus the Irish]

Which was useless without getting all of the objectives.

Worst battle defeat of the Western Allies.

Precisely. It's all right Montgomery calling it '90% successful', but it was an all-or-nothing operation - without acheiving every objective, it was actually detrimental to the Allied strategic position.

Monty was a self-publicising, arrogant, disagreeable man - which was the reason he called it '90% successful'; but he was Britain's best.

[Juvenal]

Market-Garden was 90% successful, and yet also a complete failure.

It was poor planning that doomed the operation. Intelligence about the two SS Panzer Divisions north of Arnhem was ignored. German 15th Army (which had just retreated across the Scheldt) was discounted as an effective force.

British First Airborne with its glider-borne brigade was not suitable for the Arnhem drop but it was put there for reasons of prestige as far as I can tell.

The US 82nd Airborne drop-zones were also rather odd because they failed to drop both sides of Nijmegan bridge (due to the flak positions I think). Although Nijmegan bridge was eventually captured, it was only by blind luck (that the Germans failed to blow it up) and the extraordinary bravery of the US paratroopers assaulting across the river in rubber boats.

Even the assault by 30 Corps was defective. They pushed straight up the road to Eindhoven from the Albert Canal without putting out flanking columns. This meant that small detachments of Germans could hold up the entire corps for hours at a time. And of course the bridging engineers were at the back of the column as mentioned above.

All these failures don't mean the Allies were stupid, it was an error of judgement. They were expecting only light resistance. Flak positions strongly influenced the choice of drop-zones, causing the drops to be further from their objectives than was ideal. The paratroopers were expected to surprise the local defenders, seize the bridges and hold them for a day or so while 30 corps motored smartly up the road and established a bridgehead at Arnhem. It wasn't supposed to be a great battle.

Had the planners actually believed that 9 and 10 SS Panzer were present and not still wrecked from the Normandy battles, then Market-Garden would probably have been called off. Don't forget that Eisenhower had stopped Patton's advance to allow sufficient fuel to be made available for Monty's operation.

Personally I think it could still have succeeded. I used to wargame Market-Garden (using SPI's company-level simluation Highway to the Reich from the early 1980's). I would have swapped First Airborne and US 82nd Airborne, allowing US 82nd to actually drop at Arnhem, including south of the bridge, rather than several miles to the west. I would then have First Airborne drop both sides of Nijmegan bridge and at Grave.

30 Corps had some strong recon units that could have spearheaded flanking columns while the tanks pushed up the main highway. Having the bridge engineers to hand might also have been useful.

If Market-Garden had succeeded, the whole of German 15th Army would have been trapped and captured and the Allies would have been able to sweep across the North German Plain before the German Army in the West could be rebuilt. Maybe the war really would have been over by Christmas.

[MAJR]

Worst battle defeat of the Western Allies.

Hardly.

Turn your gaze to the Hurtgen Forest and Bradley/Hodges' offensive operation there in. The single most pointless battle of the whole war, arguably started by Bradley for the sole purpose of tying up the 1st US Army in battle so it couldn't support MARKET GARDEN even if it was ordered to, costing the Allies more than double the manpower, material and time lost in MARKET GARDEN for gains no where near those minor ones achieved in Montgomery's offensive and acheiving none of the aims originally set for it.

Or the Battle for Metz where Patton unimaginatively and foolishly launch frontal assault after frontal assault against a well fortified enemy and accomplished nothing. Once the battle was over Patton had achieved none of his aims while the outnumbered Germans had achieved their aim of halting his advance. The Battle for Metz also cost the Allies more than double the manpower, material and time than MARKET GARDEN did, again for lesser gains.

Of course MARKER GARDEN was a failure and aguably can be called a defeat but it was far from the biggest or worst Allied failure or defeat of WW2.

[Farnan]

Hardly.

Turn your gaze to the Hurtgen Forest and Bradley/Hodges' offensive operation there in. The single most pointless battle of the whole war, arguably started by Bradley for the sole purpose of tying up the 1st US Army in battle so it couldn't support MARKET GARDEN even if it was ordered to, costing the Allies more than double the manpower, material and time lost in MARKET GARDEN for gains no where near those minor ones achieved in Montgomery's offensive and acheiving none of the aims originally set for it.

Or the Battle for Metz where Patton unimaginatively and foolishly launch frontal assault after frontal assault against a well fortified enemy and accomplished nothing. Once the battle was over Patton had achieved none of his aims while the outnumbered Germans had achieved their aim of halting his advance. The Battle for Metz also cost the Allies more than double the manpower, material and time than MARKET GARDEN did, again for lesser gains.

Of course MARKER GARDEN was a failure and aguably can be called a defeat but it was far from the biggest or worst Allied failure or defeat of WW2.

Hurtgen Forest was a Pyhrric Victory, not a defeat. And your conspiracy theory is pure idiocy. (also the losses were higher but it was over a 7 month battle, Market Garden was 5 days). And we won the Battle of Metz.

We lost the Battle of Market Garden .

[Azog 150]

British First Airborne with its glider-borne brigade was not suitable for the Arnhem drop but it was put there for reasons of prestige as far as I can tell.

Not suitable in what way? They were the most battle hardened airborne division the Allies had (Bar maybe the 6th Airborne). Their performance at Arnhem was outstanding.

You also suggest that the 82nd would have done a better job. How were they any more suited to the job?

[Juvenal]

Not suitable in what way? They were the most battle hardened airborne division the Allies had (Bar maybe the 6th Airborne). Their performance at Arnhem was outstanding.

You also suggest that the 82nd would have done a better job. How were they any more suited to the job?

I have no issue with the bravery of the Red Devils, I've read Cornelius Ryan's Bridge Too Far so I know the history to some extent.

The really important bridges were those at Nijmegen and Arnhem. They spanned wide rivers which would be difficult to cross with the bridging equipment carried by XXX Corps. Of the three divisions, First Airborne was most dependent on gliders (their strongest brigade was glider-borne). This meant they needed a large open space in which to drop. The nearest such area to Arnhem was several miles west of it. Once landed, sending everyone to Arnhem was not even an option due to the need to defend the drop-zone until the rest of the Division arrived the following day in the second lift. Although 82nd Airborne also had gliders for heavy equipment, they were much more capable of dropping significant forces near to the bridge at Arnhem.

I don't believe First Airborne had fought before (as a division) so there was bound to be a certain amount of delay and confusion getting organised after the drop. In the event, there were very serious problems. For example most of the division's radios were not usable due to having been tuned to the wrong frequencies, and in any case being of insufficient power to reach the 8 kilometres from the main drop-zone to Arnhem bridge. The two special high-frequency radio sets provided for calling in air-strikes also didn't work, so as a result First Airborne received practically no air support despite the Allies having air supremacy!

The fact is that the choice of the solitary drop-zone for First Airborne made no sense. Even if the Germans had had no significant forces in the area, they would still have plenty of time to demolish the bridge, unless the British flying jeep-column got through completely unopposed. In the event, the main route to Arnhem was blocked by Krafft's SS training battalion, and it was sheer luck that Frost's battalion, marching along the river bank, got to the bridge at all.

There was an airfield to the east of Arnhem, I believe at one point the Polish Brigade were intended to land near there and capture it, but they were bumped from the first day flight schedule due to lack of aircraft. Given that the whole object of the campaign was to capture the bridges, this seems an odd decision. Sosabowski's own plan to land at the south end of the bridge (as explained above by Domen123) makes much more sense.

I also find it odd that no troops were dropped between Arnhem and Nijmegen. Admittedly the area was not suitable for gliders, but even a couple of paratroop battalions might have made all the difference, capturing the south end of Arnhem bridge, and the north end of Nijmegen bridge.

I find the whole campaign very frustrating because it constituted a real chance of breaking through into Germany and ending the War at least 3 months earlier. A little more humility within the senior command and another week of planning might have fixed a lot of the problems that led to its failure. If the Allied advance had continued after Market-Garden, Germany would never have been able to rebuild their armies in the West and their reinforcements would have been defeated piecemeal. Imagine no Battle of the Bulge! Surely that was a result to justify Monty sacrificing a little of his ego to put Market-Garden on a more practical footing.

[Captain Blackadder]

Which was useless without getting all of the objectives.

Worst battle defeat of the Western Allies.

I wouldn't say that, Singapore was a far worse defeat

[Farnan]

I wouldn't say that, Singapore was a far worse defeat

As was Bataan.

Should have qualified it with "in the ETO"