Having now suffered two costly defeats, the Gauls deliberated about what they should do. They called in men who knew the terrain and ascertained from them the positions of our higher camps and the state of their defenses. On the north side of Alesia there was a hill that our men had not been able to include in the circle of our siege works because its circumference was too great. They had had to build the camp there on a gentle slope, and this was slightly to our disadvantage. The legates Gaius Antistius Reginus and Gaius Caninius Rebilus held this camp with two legions.
The enemy commanders had scouts reconnoiter the position. They then chose from their entire force 60,000 men from the tribes that had the greatest reputation for valor, secretly decided what ought to be done and how it should be carried out, and fixed noon as the time for starting their attack. The Arvernian Vercassivellaunus, one of their four chief commanders and a relative of Vercingetorix, was put in command of this force.
He left camp soon after sunset and had almost completed his march before dawn. He concealed his men behind the hill, telling them to rest after that night's hard work. When he could see that it was almost midday, he marched towards that camp of ours described above. At the same time, the Gallic cavalry began to advance towards our fortifications in the plain and the rest of their forces appeared in front of their camp.
From the citadel of Alesia Vercingetorix could see these fellow Gauls. He therefore came out of the oppidum, bringing with him the wattles, poles, protective sheds, hooks, and other equipment he had prepared for the sortie. There was simultaneous fighting all along our lines and every sort of method was tried by the Gauls; they concentrated at any point where the defenses seemed most vulnerable.
The extent of our fortifications meant that the troops had to be thinly spread along them, and this made it difficult for them to meet the attacks that were being made at many different points. They were greatly unsettled by the noise of shouting they could hear behind them as they fought; it made them aware that their own safety depended on what happened to others. And, of course, people are almost always more unnerved by dangers they cannot see. Caesar found a good place from which he could see what was happening at any point; where our men were in difficulties he sent up reinforcements.
Both sides knew only too well that this was the moment when a supreme effort was called for. The Gauls realized they had no hope of surviving unless they broke through our lines of defense; we knew all our hardships would be over if only we could hold out.
The difficulties were greatest at the fortifications on the hill, where, as already mentioned, Vercassivellaunus had been sent. The unfavorable downward slope of the ground was a factor seriously to our disadvantage. Some of the enemy hurled spears, others advanced on us with their shields held up to form a protective shell, and as their men became exhausted, fresh troops came up to relieve them. Their entire force threw earth against our fortifications, which allowed them to climb on to the rampart and also covered up the devices we had hidden in the ground. Our men were beginning to run out of weapons, and their stamina was failing too.
Caesar saw what was happening and the difficulties they were experiencing, so he sent Labienus and six cohorts to their relief. He told him that if it proved impossible for him to hold the position, he was to withdraw his cohorts and fight his way out. But Caesar made it clear to him he was not to do that unless absolutely necessary.
Caesar went to other parts of the line in person, and urged the men there not to give in under the pressure. He told them that the fruits of all their previous battles depended on that day, and on that very hour.
Re: [FRRE AAR]Caesar's Battles(58 BC Caesar Imperator AAR by Octavius vatco Azura)
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