What the United States Should Do
In its policy toward Europe, the U.S. should:
* Avoid any tacit, public, or diplomatic en*dorsement of the European Reform Treaty. U.S. leaders and diplomats at all levels must not give EU members or EU elites the impression-- in public or in private--that the U.S. supports further European integration.
* Understand that the Lisbon Treaty is a politi*cal process intended to realize a United States of Europe. This treaty is not about the function*ing of the European Union, but rather an evolu*tion of political integration. The U.S. must abandon the long-held view that the European Union is a valuable global partner.
* Recognize that further European integration and the relentless and unstinting drive behind ever closer union threatens U.S. stra*tegic interests. Congress should hold hearings to analyze the Lisbon Treaty's implications for the transatlantic alliance.
* Explicitly state that building enduring bilateral alliances is a U.S. foreign policy priority. The Administration should build bridges between peoples by facilitating safe and secure travel by implementing legislation passed in 2007 to reform and expand the Visa Waiver Program. Congress and the Administration should encourage com*mercial and political interchange between Amer*ica and its friends and allies on a bilateral basis as an important foreign policy priority.
* Work with key European allies, especially the United Kingdom, to reaffirm NATO as the cornerstone of transatlantic security and to ensure that the Bucharest Summit in early April is successful in putting NATO once again at the forefront of the transatlantic alliance. At the Bucharest Summit, the United States should spe*cifically reaffirm the minimum benchmark for NATO members' defense spending (2 percent of GDP). It should also make the Allied Command Transformation Initiative the primary agent in determining members' military transformations. The Administration should make clear both that the U.S. will not back the ESDP as the price for French re-admittance into NATO's military com*mand structure and that re-admittance will impose certain obligations on France.
* Support calls for the United Kingdom and other European Union member states to hold referenda on the Lisbon Treaty as part of the ratification process. In line with the Labour Party's commitment and as part of a strategy to reinvigorate public trust in government, Prime Minister Gordon Brown should undertake a free and fair referendum in the United Kingdom.
Conclusion
The Reform Treaty contains major advances for the European Union's capacity to act. Indeed, in some areas we even went further than in the Constitutional Treaty.
--German Chancellor Angela Merkel[80]
If there was ever a time for the White House to become unnerved about further European integra*tion, this is it. The Lisbon Treaty is like no other. It spells out the central political goal of ever-closer union, which will ultimately distance London from Washington.
The European Commission's comment that "Europe has changed, the world has changed" is correct. The world faces both unprecedented threats and unprecedented opportunities that require greater flexibility for member states to act. The Reform Treaty denies sovereign states the ability to do that and further limits their right to build alli*ances with the United States.
The Reform Treaty calls for swift ratification with a view to coming into force on January 1, 2009. Britain is uniquely positioned to fashion a European Union that better serves British and American inter*ests, and its reluctant signature of the Reform Treaty in Lisbon can be reversed. America should send its special ally a clear message that the U.S. will sup*port Britain in reasserting its sovereignty.
Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in Euro*pean Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Free*dom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Erica Munkwitz, an intern in the Davis Institute, assisted in preparing this paper.