Grande armée or Wehrmacht ?

[Dr. Croccer]

And the other half would think the Wehrmacht was some kind of sausage. People are stoopid.

Depends on who you ask, Young guys, Americans and Japanese people might think its a bratwurst but if you ask Europeans and older people you'd get a valid response.

[Markas]

Depends on who you ask, Young guys, Americans and Japanese people might think its a bratwurst but if you ask Europeans and older people you'd get a valid response.

I suppose. Though I had a night out with friends a few weeks ago (all have degrees and two have masters) when a question on a quiz machine came up 'What was the wehrmacht?' there was a collective pause and I thought they were just being slow but not one of them knew what it was! I felt like I was teaching at primary school as I pressed the screen. This either means a) People are dumb or b) I need smarter friends.

[Sh3rpa]

Depends on who you ask, Young guys, Americans and Japanese people might think its a bratwurst but if you ask Europeans and older people you'd get a valid response.

So Americans and Japanese people are stupid? Or do you think that only Europeans remember the western front of WWII?

How about educated people know what the Wehrmacht is, and uneducated people dont. Your nationality has NO GOD DAMN BEARING on knowing this, save for the fact of being German, in which case you better know wtf the Wehrmacht is.

I love barely veiled put-downs of generalized groups. They endlessly deny individualism. There's and idiot in every village bud.

[Janissary]

The most succesfull were the Mongolian and Ottoman armies.

[Icefrisco]

The question is if Hitler's Army is better than Napoleon one, How many victories the Wehrmacht had and why we don't name it the Hitler wars?.

The number of victories never matter. Some of the greatest generals are the ones who dont always win. What really matters is wether someone wins the war. Giap might have only won one great victory(Dien Bien Phu) but he succeeded in winning 3 wars against 3 different first world states. He also set the standard for the Vietnamese army which was later able to conquer Cambodia.

[Belisaire_]

The number of victories never matter. Some of the greatest generals are the ones who dont always win. What really matters is wether someone wins the war. Giap might have only won one great victory(Dien Bien Phu) but he succeeded in winning 3 wars against 3 different first world states. He also set the standard for the Vietnamese army which was later able to conquer Cambodia.

It's very different, Vietnam wars weren't conventional wars.

Originally Posted by Icefrisco
They were great innovators. Napoleon wasnt. He was a great general not a great innovator.

Ulm Maneuver ?

The most succesfull were the Mongolian and Ottoman armies.

[Darsh]

The number of victories never matter. Some of the greatest generals are the ones who dont always win. What really matters is wether someone wins the war. Giap might have only won one great victory(Dien Bien Phu) but he succeeded in winning 3 wars against 3 different first world states. He also set the standard for the Vietnamese army which was later able to conquer Cambodia.

This topic is about the comparison between La Grande Armée and the Wehrmacht and not the Vietnamese army. The point is we can't compare La Grande Armée and the Wehrmatch by the quality of the armies because they were very differents one used horse and men whereas the other use tanks, planes and men.
But we can compare the number of success between the two armies and La Grande Armée had more successes than the Wehrmatch. The only Wehrmacht true shinning victory is during the Battle for France against French and British and next??? killing million Russian civilians, invading weak countries like Poland, Yougoslavia, Greece?
La Grande Armée in contrary have the Austerlitz, Ulm, Friedland, Iena, Auerstaedt, Eylau, Wagram, Borodino the Campaign for France etc with the crushing of the 1rst, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th European Coalitions.

[Kara Kolyo]

Dr. Croccer - the myth about the SU unpreparadness for war was overturned in the past years. They weren't ready for deffencive war, wich is different than not beiing ready for war at all. Looking at the number of russian armies, aviation, tanks, navies so close to the border in the summer of 1941 shows a different picture than what the soviet propaganda made us believe. At the end it was the red flag wich flew over Berlin and not the red flag with black cross over Moscow.... So who was more ready for war and who picked the better allies?

[Dr. Croccer]

Dr. Croccer - the myth about the SU unpreparadness for war was overturned in the past years. They weren't ready for deffencive war, wich is different than not beiing ready for war at all. Looking at the number of russian armies, aviation, tanks, navies so close to the border in the summer of 1941 shows a different picture than what the soviet propaganda made us believe. At the end it was the red flag wich flew over Berlin and not the red flag with black cross over Moscow.... So who was more ready for war and who picked the better allies?

They weren't ready for defensive nor offensive. Numbers and Russia itself were their main advantages. Attacking Germany would be stupid, especially with millions of German soldiers still inside Germany. And the border was way too vast to succesfully defend against a Blitzkrieg.

And the Germans destroyed a lot of the Russian vehicles during their invasion, destroying quite a few of tanks and planes. Most of Barbarossa was fought on foot or in tanks by the Russians.

And the Russians had huge luck. The weather was one advantage, the sheer size of Russia meant that the Germans had to spread their troops out. And the other was Hitler's stupid decisions. He could have sent an army to Moscow and take it but instead sent it to the Soviet forces. He believed that he cripple the USSR by destroying their armies. Its like trying to burn fire, honestly. The USSR could draft millions of people so attempting to destroy their armies was futile, if they took Moscow instead then the Germans would have had a massive advantage.

[Kara Kolyo]

So what for were the ten paradrop corpuses that SU had in 1941? The joy of sky diving? Indeed those units presented very well in the war as plain infantry, starting with the defence of Kiev in 1941, and were the first Guards divisions, but they weren't created for this job, just like the german paratroopres in Monte Casino. You don't build all airfields just miles from the border if you plan to be on the defencive. The examples can continue in many more pages and you don't need some memo from Stalin hidden in an archive to see these things

[OTZ]

More off topic, but I see I need to reply...

So what for were the ten paradrop corpuses that SU had in 1941? The joy of sky diving?

I'm not sure what the link between training for paradrops and actual readiness for war is.

Indeed those units presented very well in the war as plain infantry, starting with the defence of Kiev in 1941, and were the first Guards divisions, but they weren't created for this job, just like the german paratroopres in Monte Casino.

A couple things, 1) I didn't know that 1st through 4th Guards Divisions were formed from Airborne units, and 2) How the designation of Guards units has anything to do with the Russian preparation for war escapes me.

You don't build all airfields just miles from the border if you plan to be on the defencive.

Says you.

Given Russian defensive doctirne was linear and not echeloned nor deep, everything was positioned as close to the front as possible (factor in the relatively short range of the majority of its air force, is it any wonder they wanted to be nearer to the action?) Not that this even matters, since Russian aerodromes were scattered all over the frontier regions and were not established with the intent of conducting war against Western Europe

The examples can continue in many more pages and you don't need some memo from Stalin hidden in an archive to see these things

I find it hard to beleive you (or anyone) could supply pages of examples (let alone actual evidence) that the Russians were totally ready for war (of either a defensive or offensive nature) in June 1941.

You mentioned this "myth" has been disproven recently, can you get back to my question and tell me whom is re-writing the history of the Red Army in 1940/1941?

[Kara Kolyo]

Dude please use the edit button instead of multiple posts

[Kara Kolyo]

Attacking Germany would be stupid, especially with millions of German soldiers still inside Germany.

You mean like in 1944?

And the Russians had huge luck. The weather was one advantage, the sheer size of Russia meant that the Germans had to spread their troops out. And the other was Hitler's stupid decisions. He could have sent an army to Moscow and take it but instead sent it to the Soviet forces.

I wouldn't call that luck - simply reality. If you are going to invade Egypt you know that you have to prepare sand filters and sunscreen, right? If you are going to invade Russia you need more troops and warm clothing, simple as that.

And the Germans destroyed a lot of the Russian vehicles during their invasion, destroying quite a few of tanks and planes. Most of Barbarossa was fought on foot or in tanks by the Russians.

This simply means that the russians were more prepared and had so many that even after the big loses they managed to finish the war in Berlin. The great Wernach had to walk and use horses too...

Getting back on topic, atleast Napoleon could warm on the fires of Moscow, so it's a point for him

[Icefrisco]

I think they have influenced warfare more than Germany has as well. Germany had contributed certain tactical doctrines, but the French ideas were pretty much universally adopted.

?????
France has produced great generals (my sig) not great innovators. Frederick the Great(organization), Molke(types of weapons used), and Manstein(manuevers) revolutionized warfare much more then any French commander. That doesnt mean French generals were bad it just means that they focused on winning battles more then actually improving warfare.

It's very different, Vietnam wars weren't conventional wars.

Partially but there were pitched battles at Bein Dien Phu(sp), Hue, Da Nang, ect.

Also it was just an example. What about the Phyrric Wars? Rome lost the battles but won the war.

Ulm Maneuver ?

That wasnt revolutionary it was just smart.

By innovative I mean new and never or barely seen before.

e.g. American Sharpshooters during the American Revolution were innovative

This topic is about the comparison between La Grande Armée and the Wehrmacht and not the Vietnamese army.

I understand I was using an example.

The point is we can't compare La Grande Armée and the Wehrmatch by the quality of the armies because they were very differents one used horse and men whereas the other use tanks, planes and men.

You can compare the quality of the armies for their time. In comparison most historians I know of would say the Werhmacht was of very high quality while the Grande armee wasnt.

The only Wehrmacht true shinning victory is during the Battle for France against French and British and next???

Kiev? Karkov?

[Bwaho]

And the Germans destroyed a lot of the Russian vehicles during their invasion, destroying quite a few of tanks and planes.

yeah, the hundreds of thousands of soviet troops positioned right next to the german border were encircled at the early stages of operation barbarossa.

Most of Barbarossa was fought on foot or in tanks by the Russians.

and how did the germans fight?

He could have sent an army to Moscow and take it but instead sent it to the Soviet forces.

ever heard of operation typhoon?

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

That wasnt revolutionary it was just smart.

By innovative I mean new and never or barely seen before.

e.g. American Sharpshooters during the American Revolution were innovative

Really ? How many commanders brought about the Anhilation of whole armies primarily by Strategic marching instead of tactical combat ?

[Darsh]

?????
France has produced great generals (my sig) not great innovators. Frederick the Great(organization), Molke(types of weapons used), and Manstein(manuevers) revolutionized warfare much more then any French commander. That doesnt mean French generals were bad it just means that they focused on winning battles more then actually improving warfare.

Napoleon and the Grande Armée: Military Innovations Leading to a Revolution in 19th Century Military Affairs
By David J. Gibson

Napoleon Bonaparte is the embodiment of the right man at the right time. His innovations in the art of warfare were firmly grounded on the great military thinkers that preceded him and whom he studied. But this alone was not enough to catapult him to the rank of military genius he is held by so many to be. Rather, it was the confluence of his study and aggressive instincts with a new "technology" - the Republican Army.

I hope to demonstrate that the great innovations represented by the Grande Armée gave Napoleon a tool that fit perfectly with his emphasis on speed, maneuver, and maintaining the offensive (and conversely, influenced his thinking to include that emphasis). I will begin by examining the state of the Grande Armée prior to his assumption of command as well as some of its innovations that provided the foundations for his transformation of strategy. Next, I will examine Napoleon's development of a new type of warfare made possible by such an army. I will illustrate his new style of warfare by briefly describing the Maneuver of Ulm in the Austrian campaign.



State of the French Army Prior to 1763
The French Royal Army of the Ancien Régime was typical of armies of the continent at that time. The nobility dominated the officer corps and enlisted soldiers were culled primarily from the lower classes and often joined to escape poverty, unemployment, and sometimes the law. These soldiers felt little loyalty to the crown and desertion was a severe problem. [1] Consequently harsh punishment and brutal discipline were the norm.

The infantry weapon these soldiers carried into battle was the smoothbore flintlock musket. Under optimum conditions a trained soldier could expect to fire his weapon two to three times a minute and with luck, hit a target up to 150 yards. To make the most out of this short range, inaccurate, slow firing weapon, troops were typically arrayed in linear formation three ranks deep to bring the greatest volume of fire to bear. The key to training then was to move the troops rapidly from marching columns to linear formations using rapid volley fire. [2] Soldiers were discouraged from showing individual initiative and officers focused their efforts on keeping formations aligned and directing its fire.

While infantry was the centerpiece of warfare at the time, specially formed light infantry units performed a support function. Their tasks included scouting, capturing prisoners and deserters, and harassing a retreating enemy. These light troops were not integrated into the line battalions and seldom participated directly in major battles.

Cavalry regiments served on the army's flanks and were employed as a shock force, focused on breaking the rigid discipline inherent in maintaining and moving the linear formations, to be exploited by the infantry. The cavalry was a socially prestigious organization but were for all intents and purposes, a support for the infantry. [3]

Artillery was dominated by unwieldy heavy guns. These guns usually provided a preliminary bombardment but fell silent when the army was fully engaged. The French Royal Army did have lighter regimental guns that moved with the infantry but were few in number and significance.

Ancien Régime battles were marked by rigid tactics, with the linearly arrayed troops exchanging volleys at close range until on side broke. At close range, typically against unconcealed targets, volley fire was punishing to victors and vanquished alike. Battles were rarely decisive since the victors were usually too "beaten up" to effectively pursue and finish off the defeated army. The vanquished could usually escape annihilation and live to fight again. The very nature of this costly and punishing warfare made commanders reluctant to risk all-out battle. Therefore, battles were rare and wars often inconclusive.

Reforms in the French Army After the Seven Year's War
For France, the beginning of reforms followed in the wake of the Seven Year's war. The Seven Year's war ended in French disaster in 1763. Clearly reform was necessary to field an army that could defend French honor and interests. The government called for an increase in light infantry. This would later lead to efforts to train conventional infantry in light infantry tactics, creating a soldier who could fight in either close or open order. For the artillery corps, the numerous gun calibers were reduced to four. New guns were introduced which were lighter and more mobile than their predecessors and featured standardized parts and packaged rounds. According to Lidell-Hart, Jean du Teil argued that "light mobile field guns used in large concentrations against infantry rather than in counter-battery work would be decisive in combat." Napoleon no doubt imbibed this doctrine while serving as an artillery officer under Du Teil's older brother.

Another major reform was the emphasis on developing combined arms doctrine. In 1776, the War Ministry divided France into sixteen (later eighteen) military districts. Each district had a permanent garrison with the three services branches (infantry, cavalry, and artillery) represented. Inspector generals were appointed and empowered to conduct combined arms maneuvers. In campaigns, they could create task forces composed of two or more branches.

Reforms in the Army After the Revolution
The first few years after the 1789 Revolution saw a continuation of the reforms of the Ancien Régime. Infantry drill regulations still detailed line and column formations but encouraged commanders to tailor formations to the geographic and tactical circumstances. The artillery corps introduced horse batteries with mounted gunners accompanying their guns into battle, dramatically increasing mobility and responsiveness in artillery support. However, it was the war that began in 1792, coupled with counterrevolutionary insurrections in various provinces of the country that forced the government to make the dramatic reforms to save the nation (i.e., save the revolution).

Expanding the army was paramount if Revolutionary France was to face her coalition enemies. The volunteer system was insufficient so France turned to conscription. The levée en masse decree made all French men and women liable for requisition for the duration of hostilities. Conscription was very effective since so many men and women had a personal stake in the Republic's survival and were willing to participate in the defense of France. By the end of 1794, the Republic boasted 1,108,000 troops, compared to the roughly 150,000 in the pre-Revolution regular army. Of the roughly 1.1 million troops, 850,000 served in the field armies and with the remainder either in training or functioning as a home guard.

Rather than seed its 150,000 strong regular army into the conscript units, the Republic choose to establish demi-brigades consisting of one battalion from the old regular army and two conscript battalions. Commanders began to combine two or more demi-brigades with supporting artillery under a single commander forming a division. This was to lead to the formation of permanent divisions. This allowed the "...fractionating of the army into self-contained parts which, while operating separately, could co-operate to a common goal." [4] This idea was not completely new. It had been put forth by Bourcet in theory and applied to a limited extent by Marshal de Broglie in 1759. It was incorporated more fully by Guibert in the reforms of 1787, two years prior to the revolution. The divisional system reached its maturity with the Army of the Republic.

The division could march and fight independently as well as a part of a greater force. This meant that commanders could seize the opportunity to wage battles quickly if the opportunity arose. The independence engendered by the divisional structure allowed contact battles where divisions could be thrown into the fray as they came on-line rather than forcing commanders to wait until their full force was deployed. The divisional system also allowed a change in military logistics. Where conventional wisdom held that one was dependent upon one's supply lines, the divisional structure, coupled with the chaotic supply system during the revolution, saw a reversion to "living off the land." Divisions would move along separate routes, de-conflicting foraging areas. This created an efficiency to living off the land unheard of in the past by a large army. Further, by traveling light (i.e., without the cumbersome logistics train), the Republican Army achieved a dramatic advantage in mobility over its adversaries.

Coupled with the increase in mobility from living off the land, the French abandoned the orthodox 70 paces per minute line of march espoused in the drill books for a quick step of 120 paces per minute. This allowed the French to march 20-30 kilometers per day. This may seem a simplistic change, but in the days before the railroad or internal combustion engine, the change was dramatic. In theory, any army could replicate the new French doctrine. But in reality, it was revolutionary spirit of the citizen army, the sense of threat to the survival to the "new" France, and the sense of French nationalism [5] that inspired the French Army to perform such feats impossible to emulate by other armies of the time.

Using the Reforms
It is against this backdrop of doctrinal and practical military reforms that Napoleon sprung to command. To a large extent it was fortune that placed Napoleon in command of the Grande Armée. A scion of an obscure lesser noble Corsican family, Napoleon received a commission as a sub-lieutenant in the artillery in 1785. His career was relatively undistinguished until the revolution. It was a stroke of luck that saw him escorting a convoy of powder wagons from Marseilles to Nice. During the trip, while stopping to visit an old comrade who had soared through the ranks in revolution-style, Napoleon found himself appointed commander of artillery during the siege of Toulon. Successful due in large part of his efforts, Napoleon was promoted to Brigadier General.

We next find Napoleon in command of the Army of Italy in 1796. Italy was a secondary theater, locked in a defensive strategy at the time Napoleon assumed command. His strategy clearly was to divide the Piedmontese Army from their Austrian senior partners. Initially, his campaign against the Piedmontese was unsuccessful and wasteful. His frontal assaults at Ceva were futile. This is not the Napoleon of legend; the aggressiveness is there, but not the tactical finesse. Italy was Napoleon's "on-the-job training." He did not spring, fully developed, into the great military mind that history holds him. But the seeds of military genius are present in this campaign. He was eventually able to neutralize the Piedmont Army by a threatened movement against Turin. His subsequent campaigns against the Austrian Army in Italy further honed his strategic and tactical skills.

Napoleon was campaigning in Egypt in 1798 when the Second Coalition against France (Russia, Austria, England, Turkey, Portugal, Naples, and the Papacy) threatened the nation. Napoleon returned to France, overthrew the Directorate, and became First Consul. His campaign against the Second Coalition culminated in victory at the Battle of Marengo. But the peace after Marengo left Coalition armies intact.

The Wars of the Revolution ended, however after a few years of uneasy peace, the Third Coalition again threatened France. The Napoleonic Wars were commencing. The year 1805 saw Napoleon's 200,000-strong Grande Armée on the coast of the English Channel threatening England. Whether it was a feint designed at pinning down English troops to defend against an invasion, or he changed his strategy in moving eastward, is unclear. What is clear is that Emperor Napoleon was head of the Nation as well the Grande Armée; an enviable position for any commander, with the resources of the state at your disposal.

One of Napoleon's oft-quoted Maxims of War states that: "The principles of war are the same as those of a siege. Fire must be concentrated at one point..." Liddell Hart argues that where Napoleon had referred to one point, he might well have used the word "joint" or "hinge." [6] The Austrian Campaign began with a forced march to the Rhine. Napoleon's strategy was to strike at the joint between coalition forces, knowing full well the difficulty of command and control in coalition warfare. His goal was to separate Austria from her Russian allies.

The Austrian Campaign began with a forced march to the Rhine. Napoleon fixed the troops of Austrian General Mack in place by feigning a line of march along the expected route through the Black Forest. Using the brilliant speed and independent lines of march made possible by the corps system, [7] the French maneuvered north of the Black Forest, south towards Augsburg, and behind General Mack's army. After some major skirmishing, Mack, realizing that his lines of communication were cut off, and the French were between him and his Russian allies, was forced to surrender 27,000 troops. This is the high water mark for Napoleon as a commander. Ulm was not even a battle, but is more rightly called "The Maneuver of Ulm." The elimination of the Austrian threat set the stage for Napoleon's decisive victory over the Russians at Austerlitz and the Prussians at Jena.

The defeat of the Third Coalition is Napoleon at his finest. In the later years, with a blank check on French manpower, the Emperor on many occasions, abandoned his strategic finesse in favor of more costly frontal engagements. One can see the influence of the campaign to defeat of the Third Coalition on military theorists such as Jomini and Clauswitz. This is the legacy of Napoleon, the influence of which is found to this day in U.S. military doctrine emphasizing speed, maneuver, surprise, offensive, and maintaining the initiative. But it was the instrument that Napoleon wielded, the new "technology" embodied in the organization of the Grande Armée, that enabled him to employ these doctrinal principles.

http://www.napoleon-series.org/milit...ion/c_rma.html

[imb39]

Which is the most impressive for you ? the most successful ?

Both lost. 'Nuff said...

Best army? The Red Army.

Man for man both were excellent. The German army was the best trained overall, all ranks, I believe.

[Icefrisco]

Really ? How many commanders brought about the Anhilation of whole armies primarily by Strategic marching instead of tactical combat ?

Hannibal (Cannae), Basil II (Kleidion), Alp Arslan (Manzikert), Saladin (Hattin), ect. Those are just a few commanders and their battles which were won primarily by marhcing and manuevering.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

Hannibal (Cannae), Basil II (Kleidion), Alp Arslan (Manzikert), Saladin (Hattin), ect. Those are just a few commanders and their battles which were won primarily by marhcing and manuevering.

On the tactical scale. Im not sure you know the difference between strategic and tactical.