A Guide to the Age of Sail

[BattleDrumz]

A Guide to the Age of Sail

[Abraham Storck; center: the stern of Admiral de Ruyter's flagship Zeven Provincien during the first day of the "Four Day's battle" June 1666. painting in the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam]

CONTENTS:

A Brief History of The Age of the Sail
Seapower
Basic Terminology
Historical Tactics and Stratagems
The Evolution of Armament and Tonnage


**Writer's note: This guide's main purpose is to help familiarize you, the reader, with 18th century naval stratagems and curiosities. In the very least, I hope a general better understanding of terminologies from the Age of the Sail will aid future debates and questions about the features of Empire: Total War. Please note that I do not profess to being an expert on the subject nor do I solicit my own opinion unless otherwise stated. I hope to provide a solid bibliography for the benefit of future study.**



THE AGE OF THE SAIL: (circa 1650-1850):

It is generally agreed by historians that the age of sail (referring to the fighting "tall-ships" of the period) began with the signing of the Navigation Act in August 1651 and officially ended with the first all-steam ship, the French Le Napoleon, completed in 1851.
Prior to 1652, the Dutch were considered the masters of the sea (both in trade and in warfare). The Navigation Act limited their power and primarily benefited England. This led to the first Anglo-Dutch War in 1652. A war that would set a standard in ship tactics and design for the next 200 years.

This was an age of global trade and of global empires. All because of the greatest navies to have ever sailed the globe.

SEAPOWER:

Despite all our fascination, the "decisive" battles of this century, Naval battles were, in fact, decidedly indecisive. With a victory at sea, no territory, resources, or manpower is gained except for the capture of enemy ships. With the rare exception, a battle would not guarantee one nation's prolonged dominance over the sea. Only a continual aggregate victory over one's enemy could produce such a strategic advantage.

"Seapower could not overthrow a major European stare. Seapower is attritional, with battles and campaigns forming part of the gradual, cumulative process that wears down an enemy's resources….that can be turned to strategic advantage." [War at Sea in the Age of Sail, Lambert, Andrew p.23]

A successful battle often gave temporary dominance of an area of sea. This in turn denied access to resources as in the capitalist understanding, not the narrow naval meaning he gives it. Britain's dominant world role in the 19th cent was firmly built on a series of naval victories. The 18-19th centuries were fundamentally different from previous ones, power came from control of resources and markets. Denying meaningful access to the oceans in denied access to them and thus denied the excersice of real power. Throwing armies around is still possible but not sustainable in the long run without access to the capital to fund them - the French experience?

A DISTINCTION BETWEEN MARITIME AND NAVAL POWERS:

The organization of different countries' navies depended greatly on their view and need of seapower. Maritime powers used the sea for their very survival (needing sea trade to maintain life), whereas Naval Powers exploited the sea to increase national strength and deny it to others.

"While…. most nations fall between the two extremes, it is important to recognize that the navy built by a maritime trading empire will be quite different from that of a land-based power with continental ambitions. The very different histories of the British Royal Navy and the Russian Imperial Navy in this period reflect that fact." [Lambert p.23]

SOME BASIC TERMINOLOGY:

Weather Gauge¹ (archaic of Windward): It is any position upwind of the other vessel. An upwind vessel is able to maneuver at will toward any downwind point, since in doing so the relative wind moves aft. A vessel downwind of another, however, in attempting to attack upwind, is constrained to trim sail as the relative wind moves forward and cannot point too far into the wind for fear of being headed. In sailing warfare, when beating to windward, the vessel heels under the sideward pressure of the wind. This restricts gunnery, as cannon on the windward side are now elevated, while the leeward gun ports aim into the sea, or in heavy weather may be awash.

Lee Gauge (archaic of Leeward): The fleet with the lee gauge could avoid battle by withdrawing to leeward, but could not force action. Even retreating downwind could be difficult once two fleets were at close quarters because the ships risked being raked as they turned downwind. A second disadvantage of the leeward gauge was that in anything more than a light wind, a sailing ship that is sailing close hauled (or beating) will heel to leeward under the pressure of the wind on its sails. The ships of a fleet on the leeward gauge heel away from their opponents, exposing part of their bottoms to shot.

Ship rating: "The system of dividing up the Navy's combatant warships into six groups of "Rates"....was revised in 1677 by Samuel Pepys, then Secretary to the Admiralty, who laid it down as a "solemn, universal and unalterable" classification. The Rating of a ship was of administrative and military use. The number and weight of guns determined the size of crew needed, and hence the amount of pay and rations needed. It also indicated whether a ship was powerful enough to stand in the line of battle....A First to Third Rate ship was regarded as a "ship-of-the-line". The Fourth Rate, of about 50 guns on two decks, was a ship-of-the-line until 1756, when it was felt that such ships were now too small for pitched battles." [wikipedia]

• 1st rate : 100 to 120 guns (3 decks) ship of the line
• 2nd rate : 98 guns (3 decks) ship of the line
• 3rd rate : 64 to 80 guns (2 decks) ship of the line
• 4th rate : 50 guns (2 decks) ship of the line
• 5th rate : 32 to 44 guns (1 deck) frigate
• 6th rate : 20 to 28 guns (1 deck) frigate
• unrated : <20 guns (1 deck) sloops, brigs, cutters, and various fire ships

Fleet Tonnage:

Hull volume is tonnage. A ton is nominally 100 cubic feet, but the tonnage of a ship is arrived at by multiplying together certain measurements, and making certain assumptions and allowances, so that it can be significantly different from the actual volume of the hull, especially in unusual ships.
The HMS Victory, Nelson's flagship, was a three-decker ship of the line, a 104. The typical ship of the line of 1812 was a 74, with a deck of long 32-pounders, and two decks of carronades, plus chasers and other miscellaneous armament. The more common frigate, such as HMS Shannon, was a 38, carrying long 18-pounders. Most ships of this period also had carronades; those with only carronades were at a disadvantage at long range and in good weather. The Royal Navy made the mistake of too much reliance on carronades as primary armament. All these large ships were ship- or square-rigged on three masts. The masts were made up of three parts, a sturdy lower part well fixed in the hull, a topmast spliced to it, and a topgallant mast spliced to that. The upper parts of the masts were often torn off by gales or gunfire, and could be replaced from spares carried on the ship. Hundreds of men were required to man the sails and the guns; a crew of 300 was not unusual on a frigate.

TACTICS AND STRATAGEM:

Beginning in 1650, the Dutch preferred "close rang melee action" [Lambert p.48] however, "…by 1672 the line of battle had been established as the standard formation, to maximize the use of heavy guns, and impose discipline on the fleet." [Lambert p.48]

But what is a battle line?

The battle line was first formally employed by the British during the battle of Scheveningen, August 1653. Quite simply, a line (as would also be called in land warfare) of ships using the "line ahead" movement to bring as many guns onto the enemy force as possible. Unlike land-based tactical movements, formations like squares or wedges do not work at sea. The enemy fleets would either advance side by side in the same direction or in opposite directions, constantly trying to adjust the lines strategic position without breaking it. It should be noted that there were rare exceptions to the rule of the battle line, but these cases are usually explained by circumstances such as reefs, blockade breakouts, etc.

A NOTE ON THE ADVANTAGES OF LEEWARD AND WINDWARD:

A fleet in the windward position had the distinct advantage of engaging the enemy at their choosing, however the leeward fleet could withdraw from the enemy if the battle was going poorly for them.

> Historically, the French preferred to fight from the leeward side, leaving the option for retreat open. The English, on the other hand, would attempt to break the French line and take the leeward side, forcing the French to stay and fight. The battle of Saintes (1782) was an excellent example of these strategies.

BLOCKADES:

Historically, there are two forms of blockade---each requiring different size and number of ships---and each obtaining different goals.

• A Commercial Blockade prevented trade to a nation via the sea.
• A Military Blockade trapped an enemy fleet within harbor (usually to stall the movement of troops for an invasion).

"The two types of blockade have often been confused under a single heading.... The former necessarily relied on dispersed fleets, mainly comprising cruisers, to watch every small harbor; the latter required battle fleets to watch the main enemy bases." [Lambert p.24,25]

THE EVOLUTION OF ARMAMENT AND FLEET TONNAGE:

Navies were both an expensive and longterm investment, meaning that most nations tried to use their fleets as a deterrence rather than loose them to battle. It was for this very reason that a sort of European "arms race" began, eventually creating the worlds first global conflict. The ships got heavier and carried more guns. Sound familiar?

NEW!!!
Effective useable tonnage (in thousands of tons)
[Navies and Nations, Navies and State Building in Europe and America; J. Glete]

Image by BattleDrumz

> Heres a Link to the cross-section of the H.M.S. Victory.

A carefully constructed ship would have a moisture content in the timber of about 20%. This took a lot of time. The average ship took at least 3 years to be constructed with a service life of 50 years. If necessary, a ship of the Line could be constructed in 18 months but their short service life (only 10 years) and high maintenance costs made the option unsavory except in dire circumstances.

The danger of dry rot on an uncured vessel was a very real problem. Not to mention a ship with a higher moisture content has less buoyancy, making it more likely to flood in poor weather or sink in battle. As it was, though, properly cured vessels were nearly impossible to sink. Only when a battleship caught fire would it flounder (if her crew could not drench the flames). Fire on a dry, wooden ship full of explosives all too often proved disastrous.

(lower deck of the H.M.S. Victory showing a row of 32-pounder long guns.²)

GUNS:

By the mid-17th century, nearly all ship guns were cast in bronze due to the fact that they were both lighter and more durable than Iron. However, with the rise of huge "global" fleets in the beginning of the 18th century, it became too expensive. From then on, only "...the smallest or most prestigious applications afloat after 1700 [used bronze pieces]." [Lambert p.45] Over time, new machining advances reduced the weight and size of iron guns while increasing their powder charges, allowing ships to carry a larger amount of more accurate guns.

"Britain, France, Russia, and America favoured heavy guns on the lower decks of their battleships.... The British landed their last....42-pounders in the 1780's, the French persevered with 40-pounders until the 1820's, while the Americans adopted the 42-pounder in 1815. By contrast, the 24-pounder was the heaviest gun in general use by the Dutch and Scandinavian navies." [Lambert p.47]

What this demonstrates is the variety of naval doctrine between these navies. Heavier guns did more damage at close range, but took much longer to reload in a rapid volley. Also, smaller calibers had more penetrating power, making them more efficient against punching through enemy hulls (whereas larger calibers laid waist to enemy sails, rigging, and crew).

Cannons were normally placed in rows along the sides of the ship, on the gun deck or decks, and fired through ports in the side of the hull that could be stopped when not in use. They were on wooden carriages with four small wheels, and restrained by block and tackle in recoil. Powder was brought to them as needed from a magazine deeper in the ship where it was safe from fire and sparks. The armament was primary in the rating of ships. Ships were rated by number of gun decks, number of guns, or hull volume. A single-decker, or frigate, had one gun deck (in the hull) covered by a weather deck, which most people would think of as the deck. A ship of the line had three decks, usually a deck of long guns, then two decks of carronades. A razee (from French, rasée, shaved) had had the top gun deck removed, so that it was now a two-decker and easier to handle and man. The number of guns was generally the conventional total number of guns firing through gun ports in the sides of the ship, so was an even number. There were actually more guns on a ship than this. Not included were bow and stern chasers(so called because they bow chasers would be used to fire on a fleeing ship and the aft guns were used to protect the ship while fleeing), cannon, often on swivels, that fired forward and backwards, respectively, extra guns on the quarters, and guns that stuck through odd holes, as well as guns on the weather deck

Carronades:

"...[i]mproved foundry practice in the 1760s meant that guns were no longer cast hollow. Instead they were cast solid, and then bored out by.... lathes which provided a more accurate bore..." [Lambert, p46]

This meant guns were more powder-efficient. More importantly, it led to the invention of the carronade.

(Carronade aboard the H.M.S. Victory²)

Developed in Scotland during the 1770s, the carronade was a high caliber, short range gun that weighed a tenth of a similar long bore gun. They replaced small caliber light guns on Britain's upper decks and greatly improved short range effectiveness.

Cheers

[Agent Provocateur]

Nice post, however I have a few issues with it.

SEAPOWER:

Despite all of our fascination, the "decisive" battles of this century, Naval battles were, in fact, decidedly indecisive. With a victory at sea, no territory, resources, or manpower is gained except for the capture of enemy ships. What is gained, though it may not be apparent at the time, can be much more important that those aforementioned.

"Seapower could not overthrow a major European stare. Seapower is attritional, with battles and campaigns forming part of the gradual, cumulative process that wears down an enemy's resources….that can be turned to strategic advantage." [War at Sea in the Age of Sail, Lambert, Andrew p.23]

Well other authors would say that actually victory at sea had fundamental impacts on long term strategic considerations. It depends what this guy means by "resources". A successful battle often gave temporary dominance of an area of sea. This in turn denied access to resources as in the capitalist understanding, not the narrow naval meaning he gives it. Britain's dominant world role in the 19th cent was firmly built on a series of naval victories. The 18-19th centuries were fundamentally different from previous ones, power came from control of resources and markets. Denying meaningful access to the oceans in denied access to them and thus denied the excersice of real power. Throwing armies around is still possible but not sustainable in the long run without access to the capital to fund them - the French experience?

TACTICS AND STRATAGEM:

Beginning in 1650, the Dutch preferred "close rang melee action" [Lambert p.48] however, "…by 1672 the line of battle had been established as the standard formation, to maximize the use of heavy guns, and impose discipline on the fleet." [Lambert p.48]

But what is a battle line?

The battle line was first formally employed by the British during the battle of Scheveningen, August 1653. Quite simply, a line (as would also be called in land warfare) of ships using the "line ahead" movement to bring as many guns onto the enemy force as possible. Unlike land-based tactical movements, formations like squares or wedges do not work at sea. The enemy fleets would either advance side by side in the same direction or in opposite directions, constantly trying to adjust the lines strategic position without breaking it. It should be noted that there were rare exceptions to the rule of the battle line, but these cases are usually explained by circumstances such as reefs, blockade breakouts, etc.

The text and the illustration of Nelson's attack at Traflager worry me for the game. On the one hand you have the accepted view of tactics and naval warfare (line of battle) and other the picture clearly illustrates the greatest naval leader of the time's complete disregard for them. Nelson specifically didn't want to get into line shooting engagements, he urged his captains to get close in to batter and board as quickly as possible. In the picture his two divisions are having their "T" crossed a big no-no for naval tacticians at the time. How will the game square that circle?

BLOCKADES:

Historically, there are two forms of blockade---each requiring different size and number of ships---and each obtaining different goals. A Commercial Blockade prevented trade to a nation via the sea. A Military Blockade trapped an enemy fleet within harbor (usually to stall the movement of troops for an invasion). "The two types of blockade have often been confused under a single heading.... The former necessarily relied on dispersed fleets, mainly comprising cruisers, to watch every small harbor; the latter required battle fleets to watch the main enemy bases." [Lambert p.24,25]

Again this is simplistic. The British established a year round military blockade of French naval units. At the same time they effected a commercial one by organising commerce raiding patrols up and down the French coastline. The two operated in conjunction and were part of a single strategy.

It also goes back to my point in the tactics bit. Nelson knew that British naval gunnery, close in sailing and general effectiveness were higher than that of the French and Spanish. This was because British sailors had been at sea all year round and trained regularly, at sea, with their weapons. The French and Spanish were stuck in port by the British.

In my view, a successful blockade in the game should severly impact income and rapidly decrease the efficiency of the blockaded navies. Conversely, it should increase the experience / effectiveness of the blockader allowing you Nelson's confidence in his men. At the same time, it should increase revenues as you deny markets to the enemy and acquire them for yourself.

[BattleDrumz]

Well other authors would say that actually victory at sea had fundamental impacts on long term strategic considerations. It depends what this guy means by "resources". A successful battle often gave temporary dominance of an area of sea. This in turn denied access to resources as in the capitalist understanding, not the narrow naval meaning he gives it. Britain's dominant world role in the 19th cent was firmly built on a series of naval victories. The 18-19th centuries were fundamentally different from previous ones, power came from control of resources and markets. Denying meaningful access to the oceans in denied access to them and thus denied the excersice of real power. Throwing armies around is still possible but not sustainable in the long run without access to the capital to fund them - the French experience?

I think you and I are in agreement, and also that I did not clearly state a fairly complex naval point adequately. Your first line is precisely what Dr. Lambert is stating in the quote, and by resources, he is referring to the "Capitalist" idea rather than a "narrow naval meaning" (I am not sure what this is meant to be other than a reference to timber, manpower, and supplies required by every navy). Yet, my original point stands. Mainly, that naval warfare was attritional in nature. With the rare exception, a battle would not guarantee one nation's prolonged dominance over the sea. Only a continual aggregate victory over one's enemy could produce such a strategic advantage.

However, I do commend you in stating this and will quote you within the guide because it may well be helpful to getting the author's point across with more than the brief quote I included.

The text and the illustration of Nelson's attack at Traflager worry me for the game. On the one hand you have the accepted view of tactics and naval warfare (line of battle) and other the picture clearly illustrates the greatest naval leader of the time's complete disregard for them. Nelson specifically didn't want to get into line shooting engagements, he urged his captains to get close in to batter and board as quickly as possible. In the picture his two divisions are having their "T" crossed a big no-no for naval tacticians at the time. How will the game square that circle?

Honestly, I put the battle plan map of Trafalgar in this part of the guide merely to add "flavor" and because I thought the image extremely exciting. However, it does contradict the point being made in the text (mainly, about the use of battle lines), therefore, I will replace it with a similar map that may be less confusing to the layman reader of this guide.

As to how the game will deal with the battle line as well as strategies such as Nelson's valiant charge (shown in the image), I can only imagine. In fact, I am quite excited to learn how CA will offer players control over their fleets, etc.

Again this is simplistic. The British established a year round military blockade of French naval units. At the same time they effected a commercial one by organising commerce raiding patrols up and down the French coastline. The two operated in conjunction and were part of a single strategy.

It also goes back to my point in the tactics bit. Nelson knew that British naval gunnery, close in sailing and general effectiveness were higher than that of the French and Spanish. This was because British sailors had been at sea all year round and trained regularly, at sea, with their weapons. The French and Spanish were stuck in port by the British.

In my view, a successful blockade in the game should severly impact income and rapidly decrease the efficiency of the blockaded navies. Conversely, it should increase the experience / effectiveness of the blockader allowing you Nelson's confidence in his men. At the same time, it should increase revenues as you deny markets to the enemy and acquire them for yourself.

A simple definition does not exclude or hamper its truth. You point about the Brittish sea-denial of the French after the battle of Trafalgar is true. After the virtual destruction of the French and Spanish combined fleet, Britain gained a strategic advantage.

However, i do not want to be misunderstood. The two types of blockades outlined in the guide are not mutually exclusive. In fact, after Trafalgar, the British employed both strategies. They used swarms of Frigates to patrol the French coast, denying trade. And they used they battle fleets to block in what was left of the French fleet; maintaining an unchallenged dominance of the sea. And yet, the distinction is important because each type of blockade (whether used in tandem or separate) requires different ships, different tactics, and performs different goals.

How this will be represented (if at all) ingame, I do not know. Yet another feature I am excited for CA to expand upon.


Thanks for the reply.

[Aristarchus]

The text and the illustration of Nelson's attack at Traflager worry me for the game. On the one hand you have the accepted view of tactics and naval warfare (line of battle) and other the picture clearly illustrates the greatest naval leader of the time's complete disregard for them. Nelson specifically didn't want to get into line shooting engagements, he urged his captains to get close in to batter and board as quickly as possible. In the picture his two divisions are having their "T" crossed a big no-no for naval tacticians at the time.

Indeed, Nelson's most important concern was getting at them as quickly as possible, for he was afraid the French would escape after such a long chase. Plunging through the center instead of "crossing the T" was unwise, but the only way to engage before the French could withdraw leeward. Nelson relied first on demoralizing the enemy by intrepid action, second on superior British gunnery, and perhaps most of all, he had a unique advantage in the close relationship he had with his captains, communicating his intentions well, so each could make his own decisions as necessary. Trafalgar could have been a disaster and is probably not the right strategy to emulate in the game without a corresponding advantage in morale and skill. This kind of foolish bravery, influenced by Nelson (just go at 'em), was evident in the daringly successful exploits of Admiral Lord Cochrane (the model for Hornblower). The British Admiralty was skeptical and would not trust Cochrane with a command in later life after he returned to England from South America - afraid he would go at 'em once too often.

Very impressive post! I appreciate your effort putting this all together.

[P. Tackett]

The text and the illustration of Nelson's attack at Traflager worry me for the game. On the one hand you have the accepted view of tactics and naval warfare (line of battle) and other the picture clearly illustrates the greatest naval leader of the time's complete disregard for them. Nelson specifically didn't want to get into line shooting engagements, he urged his captains to get close in to batter and board as quickly as possible. In the picture his two divisions are having their "T" crossed a big no-no for naval tacticians at the time. How will the game square that circle?

I don't know about the realism of it, but in-game I'll occasionally allow the enemy fleet to cross the T of both my lines. If there's enough space between enemy ships for the lines to slip between it gives me multiple devastating close range broadsides to the ships on both sides of each line... often these broadsides hit the enemy ships in the bow or stern and damage morale and hull hugely. I -may- lose a fifth rate or two, but the pros seem to outweigh the cons in many situations.

[scottishranger]

For basic terminolgy you could add in some of the following:

Weather Gauge:It is any position upwind of the other vessel. An upwind vessel is able to maneuver at will toward any downwind point, since in doing so the relative wind moves aft. A vessel downwind of another, however, in attempting to attack upwind, is constrained to trim sail as the relative wind moves forward and cannot point too far into the wind for fear of being headed. In sailing warfare, when beating to windward, the vessel heels under the sideward pressure of the wind. This restricts gunnery, as cannon on the windward side are now elevated, while the leeward gun ports aim into the sea, or in heavy weather may be awash.

Source Wikipedia Here

Only in heavy weather could the windward gauge become a disadvantage, because the lower gun ports on the leeward side of a ship would be awash, preventing her from opening her lower-deck ports to use the guns – or risking being swamped if she did. So, in strong winds, a ship attacking from windward would not be able to bring her heavy lower-deck guns into action, while the enemy ship to leeward would have no such problem as the guns on her windward side would be raised by the heel. For this reason, Admiral Rodney ordered his ships to attack the Spanish from leeward in the stormy weather at the Cape St. Vincent in 1780.

Lee Gauge:The fleet with the lee gauge could avoid battle by withdrawing to leeward, but could not force action. Even retreating downwind could be difficult once two fleets were at close quarters because the ships risked being raked as they turned downwind. A second disadvantage of the leeward gauge was that in anything more than a light wind, a sailing ship that is sailing close hauled (or beating) will heel to leeward under the pressure of the wind on its sails. The ships of a fleet on the leeward gauge heel away from their opponents, exposing part of their bottoms to shot. If a ship is penetrated in an area of the hull that is normally under water, she is then in danger of taking on water or even sinking when on the other tack. This is known as "hulled between wind and water". Finally, smoke from the gunfire of the ships to windward would blow down on the fleet on the leeward gauge. So it was common for battles to involve days of manoeuvring as one admiral strove to take the weather gauge from his opponent in order to force him to action, as at the battles of Ushant (1778), St Lucia Channel (1780) and the First of June (1794).

The French preferred the Lee gauge as it gave them the chance to escape from a decisive action. This was brought on by France's numerical disadvantage to Britain throughout the 18th Century.


Also, here is something I wrote for this site about a year ago.

Cannons and Cannon Tactics in the Navy


The invention of the cannon in the Late Medieval Ages brought forth many new tactics both to land, where it could destroy in week fortresses that had previously taken years to conquer, and the high seas. This article will be about the use of Cannons and its tactic at sea in the Age of The Sail (1800-1870)

When the cannon was first introduced to Europe it completely revolutionized and reversed naval warfare, gone was the age where ship had close with the enemy and rely on luck on weight of number to board the enemy ship and take her. Now the Cannon ushered in a new age of warfare.





The first stages of combat began with shots at long range(1000 yards), with barely a hope of hitting anything at such a distance. Once the ships had maneuvered to within a few hundred yards the fire would be directed towards the enemy ship masts with the frightfully effective chain shot, in hopes of breaking a mast and thus taking away the enemy ship’s maneuverability. Now once the two ships had closed to within 150 yards the deadly broadside was fired, all the cannons on the side facing the enemy were fired in unison with deadly solid shot into the hull of the enemy. The cannons of the broadside did horrible deeds to the sailors and gun crews, sometimes tearing off limbs and horribly mangling bodies, not to mention the sometimes gigantic splinters sent flailing by the breaking wood of the hull. While this is all going on in the hull marine sharpshooter in the masts brought down their enemies on the deck by accurate musket fire, especially officers if they could be found. Heroism demanded that the officers be on deck in full uniform, of course, so they fell.
Sometimes a cannonball would find the ships main powder magazine, if this happened and the gunpowder stored there ignited it meant a quick and fiery death for all hands on the ship, this is what is believed to have happened to Napoleon’s flagship, L’Orient a 153 gun ship of the line, at Abukir Bay(Battle of the Nile).


Sometimes this action could repeated for hours without end, broadside after broadside being rammed home into both ships until either a ship struck her colors(pulled down her flag, thus signifying the surrender of the ship) or one ship boarded the another. If the ship was boarded, the detachment of marines armed with musket and the bayonet would usually be first across to engage the enemy followed by the various sailors of all kinds armed with cutlasses and pistols. What followed was fierce hand to hand fighting in which normally the crew with the most numbers was victorious.





The heaviest guns of the ship were placed on the main gun deck, low in the ship. Lighter guns were placed on higher decks, and sometimes on the top deck. The heavier guns fired the broadside, so the ship had to be maneuvered to direct their fire. Guns on the weather deck could be aimed more flexibly, and the cannon placed at the bows and the stern were especially valuable to protect the ship from attack from these directions, which were favored by attackers since they were not then exposed to the ship's broadside. It was found that ships of greater armament (weight of broadside), competently handled, could always defeat a ship of lighter armament, but that the more lightly armed ships, if competently designed, could always outrun a more heavily armed ship.



A Carronade



Cannons were normally placed in rows along the sides of the ship, on the gun deck or decks, and fired through ports in the side of the hull that could be stopped when not in use. They were on wooden carriages with four small wheels, and restrained by block and tackle in recoil. Powder was brought to them as needed from a magazine deeper in the ship where it was safe from fire and sparks. The armament was primary in the rating of ships. Ships were rated by number of gun decks, number of guns, or hull volume. A single-decker, or frigate, had one gun deck (in the hull) covered by a weather deck, which most people would think of as the deck. A ship of the line had three decks, usually a deck of long guns, then two decks of carronades. A razee (from French, rasée, shaved) had had the top gun deck removed, so that it was now a two-decker and easier to handle and man. The number of guns was generally the conventional total number of guns firing through gun ports in the sides of the ship, so was an even number. There were actually more guns on a ship than this. Not included were bow and stern chasers(so called because they bow chasers would be used to fire on a fleeing ship and the aft guns were used to protect the ship while fleeing), cannon, often on swivels, that fired forward and backwards, respectively, extra guns on the quarters, and guns that stuck through odd holes, as well as guns on the weather deck







Types of ships:
Hull volume is tonnage. A ton is nominally 100 cubic feet, but the tonnage of a ship is arrived at by multiplying together certain measurements, and making certain assumptions and allowances, so that it can be significantly different from the actual volume of the hull, especially in unusual ships.
The HMS Victory, Nelson's flagship, was a three-decker ship of the line, a 104. The typical ship of the line of 1812 was a 74, with a deck of long 32-pounders, and two decks of carronades, plus chasers and other miscellaneous armament. The more common frigate, such as HMS Shannon, was a 38, carrying long 18-pounders. Most ships of this period also had carronades; those with only carronades were at a disadvantage at long range and in good weather. The Royal Navy made the mistake of too much reliance on carronades as primary armament. All these large ships were ship- or square-rigged on three masts. The masts were made up of three parts, a sturdy lower part well fixed in the hull, a topmast spliced to it, and a topgallant mast spliced to that. The upper parts of the masts were often torn off by gales or gunfire, and could be replaced from spares carried on the ship. Hundreds of men were required to man the sails and the guns; a crew of 300 was not unusual on a frigate.
Brigs and brigantines were smaller, two-masted ships, handy smaller versions of frigates. The brig was square-rigged on both masts, the brigantine was schooner-rigged on the mainmast. They had perhaps 22 guns. They had to be nimble sailers to stay out of trouble; their mobility and speed were their chief advantages. They were especially useful as commerce raiders, and were favored by the more prominent privateers. Leaving port, they would be stuffed with men to man the prizes they took during their cruise.
Sloops of war were single-masted ships, fore-and-aft (schooner) rigged, mounting a few guns, often on swivels, and relying on their speed and surprise for their effectiveness. They were used in cutting expeditions, where men in boats would sneak up on a craft and take it by boarding.

[Ludicus]

1750-1815: The Seven Years War, Revolution, and Napoleon
Warships of the period:

Warships of this period were categorized into rates, or designated as one of a number of types of smaller vessels. Ships at this time were undergoing a revolution, making ready for the final days of the sailing warship.

Man'o'Wars (first + second rates)
First rates were some of the the biggest wooden sailing ships ever created, being around 200 ft long, 120 cannon on three decks, and crews of about 850. Probably the most famous of these ships was that under the command of British naval hero, Lord-Admiral Horatio Nelson. Nelson's Victory, of about 108 cannon, flew his flag at the battle of Trafalgar and Sir John Jervis' flag at St. Vincent.
2nd rates had about 90 to 100 cannon, and were much similar to 1st rate ships. There were three gun decks, but the ship itself was slightly smaller than its first-rate cousin.
Ships of the Line (third + fourth rates)
Third rate ships were the standard fighting ships and there were more of these in the Napoleonic Royal Navy than any other large class of ship. A ship of the line ranged from 64 to 80 guns, but a standard ship of the line had about 74 guns, and crews of about 650. Ships of the line were the main warships used in conflicts and battles, and the backbone of the Royal Navy.
Frigates (fifth + sixth rates)
The 5th and 6th rates were reserved for frigates, which were never really used in any of the major battles of the time. These ships had between 50 and 28 guns and patrolled alone, or acted as scouts for the main fleet. Several frigate actions during the Napoleonic era have had an international impact, such as when the Constitution defeated the Guerierre during the War of 1812.
Ship-Sloops (unrated)
These ships were ship rigged and were used as small frigates. They had 24 guns or less. Such ships represented the ultimate warship on the lakes and rivers of North America, such as the Ontario on the Great Lakes.
Sloops (unrated)
Ship-sloops of the revolutionary era were like small, 24 gun frigates. They were very fast and consumed a great deal less crew than anything larger. They had one gun deck, and a hold. This eliminated the luxury of a closed deck for captains and crew, but did make them extremely cheap to build and operate. They acted on many duties: message relay, convoy protection, coastal protection, and patrolling.
Brigs and Schooners
These small ships were not of great importance, but defended local trade in areas like the Channel and coastal areas. They carried out many actions, but did not engage in major battles. Small battles between these small ships did occur in North America, but none of note. There were battles that they participated in, but usually larger ships like ship-sloops won the day.
Carronade Brig
The Bomb Ketch
Corvette
Goelette
Polacre
Snow
The Xebec
This ship was a fast, low-freeboard Mediterranean ship. It was used heavily by Islamic states and Christian powers in that particular sea. The Spanish, French, and even the English used them. The xebec was a three-masted ship with three lateen sails, one on each mast. The main mast carried the largest. The difference between a xebec and a pink was that the xebec had a hull shaped like a galley. It was long and thin, as the prow extended far forwards while the quarterdeck was greatly extended in the stern, far over the keel. This ship was strong enough to carry up to 22 guns, or on the smaller ones, about 6. The rig could also be alternated so that the main mast would carry two square sails. Other names for this ship were zebec and chebec.
Lugger
Merchant Ships
The largest of the merchant ships were the Eastindiamen. These ships not only carried valuable spices, but also the ordinance of a warship, sometimes as heavily armed as a frigate. There were some merchantment of various sizes, usually ship-rigged. Smaller mercant ships varied greatly. Such ships were involved in trading with small coastal ports or transportation. Others were involved in the assistance of other merchantile activities.
A Note on Colouring
In the beginning, ships of the line had no paint at all, except some of the frills and fancy artwork. This caused great confusion in battle, though, since one could not distinguish which ships were freind or foe. This caused friendly fire to hit allied ships. Eventually, each nation had its own colouring scheme:
England had a black hull, with a white or yellow stripe along the gun decks, and black gun ports. There were also white or yellow and black stripes on the masts. Spain had black stripes with red gun decks, and black gun ports. The United States used black with a white stripe on the gun deck and black gun ports. France and the lesser powers left their ships unpainted, because they preferred the traditional ways, and it was more cost effective. Sometimes merchant ships were painted in this manner to fool enemies, causing them to believe that it was a warship.

From :Maritime Archives

[Didz]

The French preferred the Lee gauge as it gave them the chance to escape from a decisive action. This was brought on by France's numerical disadvantage to Britain throughout the 18th Century.

Thats actually the Anglo-centric explanation of the French tactic's, which of course has the advantage of implying that the French were cowards and planning their escape from battle even before it started.

A more sympathetic explanation and the one that applies more appropriately to ETW, is that French ships tended to have a higher compliment of long guns than their British counterparts, especially when the British began to remove long guns from the broadsides and replace them with relatively short range carronades.

Thus, on a ship by ship basis, French ships had an advantage in gunnery only as long as they could keep their British opponents at a relatively long range. Conversely, the British ships needed to get in close and personal to make maximum use of their high powered carronades.

Consequently, it made perfect tactical sense for the French to deploy to leeward as this would allow them to maneouvre freely to manage the distance between themselves and the enemy. (This is also true in ETW, and its actually my preferred tactic) The French also made much greater use of dismantling and bar shot than the British simply because disabling the enemy vessel meant that it would find it much harder to close the range and retained the French advantage for longer.

[BattleDrumz]

I've updated the topic thread. Thanks to all who contributed to this guide! Obviously, it's a work in progress, but I hope some of this information will be useful to the ETW fan and/or potential modders.

BTW, things I've added include a terminology section and the gun section (a few additions elsewhere too).
Cheers

[Lusted]

The typical ship of the line of 1812 was a 74, with a deck of long 32-pounders, and two decks of carronades, plus chasers and other miscellaneous armament.

I'd question that. Whilst the royal Navy was in the habit of replacing the long guns on the quaterdeck with carronades, the top gun deck was usually long guns(18 pounders if memory serves will have to check later). Whilst the British did favour close range hitting power, they would not replace an entire gun deck with carronades. For instance the victory had a lower deck of 32 pownders, mid deck of 24 pounders, and top deck of 18 pounders. The 64 pounder carronades were located on the fo'castle, and the quaterdeck had 12 pounders at the time of Trafalgar if i remember correctly.

[BattleDrumz]

@ Lusted

(circa 1776-82) With the invention of the carronade, the Brittish replaced two decks of 6-pounder long guns with the 32-pounder carronades. They did this primarily because the combined bourbon fleet was numerically larger than theirs.

"The Royal Navy used 32-pownder carronades to replace 6-pounder long guns on the upper decks of warships, this increase in close range firepower complementing British tactical doctrine." [Andrew Lambert, p131]

By the close of the century, doctrine changed again and overwhelming closerange firepower at the expence of long range was no longer viable. However, it still was not uncommen for the top deck to be 32-pownders instead of, say, 18-pownder long guns.

Perhaps someone else could offer some documentation on the subject. I just woke up and I'd rather go get my coffee.

Cheers

[Lusted]

Notice that says 6 pounders, not the 18 pounders used on the upper gun deck of a 74. The 12 pounders on a 3 decker, 9 pounders on 74s/64s, and 6 pounders on frigates were located on the quaterdeck and did not constitute a full gun deck.

[BattleDrumz]

Update!

I have added a chart and graph of major naval powers' fleet tonnage from 1650-1830. I think it is pretty interesting and I hope you will too. Check out the corrolations between fleet size and the major wars of the time...

Enjoy and Cheers,


Image by BattleDrumz

[Captain Jin]

Also, of important note is that individual nations usually had different styles of fighting. The British were superb with gunnery but they often closed with as quickly as possible and carried much of the action over into boarding. That was their prime way of fighting, and not just a Nelson way of doing things. The French from what I've read, while inexperienced sailors, had great ships and they used their maneuverability to fight from a distance, playing havoc on the enemy ships by shooting away rigging, sails, crosstrees, spars and so forth.

[masterbaker]

> Historically, the French preferred to fight from the leeward side, leaving the option for retreat open. The English, on the other hand, would attempt to break the French line and take the leeward side, forcing the French to stay and fight. The battle of Saintes (1782) was an excellent example of these strategies.

This made me laugh. The French leaving the option for surrender open? Quelle surprise you might say.

[Scandinavisksoldat]

Yeah! A Naval mod!

"If there is anything better than the Army, it is the Navy."

[Duke_of_Bavaria]

Mod? It's not a mod it's a whole new game .

[Scandinavisksoldat]

Mod? It's not a mod it's a whole new game .

Well, as long as it deals with Naval matters, I like the idea of it, no matter what it is.

[BattleDrumz]

I am trying to build this thread into a source of information concerning Naval Warfare for any potential modders (such as myself). If anyone has some good info or comments, please add them so I can get more feedback!

Thanks,
Cheers

[Roman Knight]

No offence but all fourth rates were frigates not commonly used for line of battle manouvers