U.S. promises (not always kept) of protection end up sidelining more prudent, diplomatic paths and protracting war.
…Quasi-allyship is a murky status, created by official rhetoric, such as overzealous Congressmen or speechifying presidents talking
falsely — calling states “allies,” speaking of “
enduring bonds,” and “
ironclad” commitments. Heavy
arms sales and
talk of
formal commitments exacerbate the trouble. Quasi-ally status generally applies to states — Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Ukraine, Georgia, and Taiwan, and probably Israel, which is arguably so close to an actual ally that it is one — but can also describe relations with sub-state entities like the Mujahideen fighting the Soviet-backed government in 1980s Afghanistan or the Kurds in Syria today.
…the U.S. interest in defending quasi-allies is generally dubious, which is typically a reason why the U.S. has no treaty obligation to these states.
So why, you might ask, would the next quasi-ally under duress be deluded into thinking the U.S. cavalry would arrive? For one, they might think that the mere threat of U.S. intervention in adversaries’ minds will be enough to protect them. Further, leaders under pressure, and buoyed by nationalistic politics, may tend toward dangerously wishful thinking.
Ukraine is a tragic example. The United States has continually and deliberately encouraged Kyiv’s hopes that they will get U.S. protection, causing Ukraine to take a harder line in relations with Russia than it otherwise would have.
In 1994, with the
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, the United States seemed to commit to protect Ukraine, though the text actually commits signatories only to not violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and complain at the United Nations if someone else does. In 2008, at the
Bucharest Summit, the United States pushed NATO to say Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join, though neither got Membership Action plans, the standard first step toward membership.
Instead, Ukraine got increased U.S. military support, especially after Russia seized Crimea in 2014 and a
NATO “Enhanced Opportunities Partner” designation in 2020.
…But it seems likely that Ukraine might have made more concessions to Russian demands, most importantly
committing to
neutrality and fully
implementing the Minsk II accords.
The partial U.S. embrace of quasi-allies has proven quite dangerous.
It encourages confusion and excessive risk-taking in the United States, though U.S. geography and power let us opt out of danger at the
last minute, as generally occurs.
This leaves quasi-allies like Ukraine in the lurch, encouraged to hope for protection that never arrives and thus overly cavalier as dangers mount.
Sometimes it is vital to be clear who you won’t help.