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What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that, and what would it be like in NTW, I remember Kieran saying if your win Waterloo, you can go on to conquer the world, but what does that mean? All other reviews say that at the END of the campaign, you can decide to play a Waterloo scenario, but thats it. Anyway, what would have happened in your opinion if Napoleon won Waterloo, and completely destoryed or captured Wellingtons army. Would he turn and try to destroy the Austria and Russians heading towards France in 1815 as he did in 1805. what do you think?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
He was pretty much doomed from the outset. His only hope was to win the engagements and patch some sort of peace together. I doubt it would have worked at that point.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
But, everything is possible
I think it was still possible, it would be like 1805 all over again, but the enemy was much more capable of war then what France was, the Grand army was full of new recruits.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Napoleon's 'six years for war' were well past by 1815. He was ill during the Waterloo campaign and had to hand over tactical decisions to Ney and the other Marshalls ,which led to the uncoordinated tacticsthat led to the French rout.In 1805 Napoleon was at the height of his powers and was able in 1805-6 to defeat the old fashioned tactics of the Austrians,Prussians and Russians.By the 1813 campaign in Germany the Allies were much better and able to defeat Napoleon's marshalls at battles like Dennewitz,Grossbeeren and Kulm and eventually Napoleon himself at Leipzig.Napoleon was certainly more back to his old form in 1814 on home soil but eventually forced to abdicate.Even with victory at Waterloo he would only have bought himself some time before the final defeat .The allies were determined to remove him in spite of their distrust of each other and the best peace terms he could hope for were a return to the natural French borders.With many enemies at home and in deteriorating health he would have found it difficult to hang on the power in France, let alone indulge in any more attempts to expand his empire.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Napoleon lost Waterloo for one primary reason: His subordinates were poorly assigned. No, I am not one of those who say 'Napoleon was perfect, his subordinates let him down'. Rather my point is that
A. Napoleon picked poor commanders.
B. He did not keep them under tight control.
C. They let him down.
Here is what Napoleon's orginization of the army should have been-
Commander of all Forces-Napoleon
Chief of Staff-Rapp
I Corps-Davout
II Corps-Soult
III Corps-Suchet
IV Corps-Gerard
VI Corps-Vandammene
Guard-Lobou
Artillery-Drout (or however you spell it-he commanded the Guard at Waterloo)
Cavalry-Grouchy.
In the event of the spiltting of the army, either Soult, Suchet or Davout would take command of one of the wings.
All these officers were avilible to Napoleon, but he refused to assign them. He spread them to other less important theatres, theatres where the fighting only began weeks after Waterloo. Why? It could possibly be Napoleon's miscaluculation that it would be a multi front war, or just a mistake. The following is a hypothisis I am not sold on but what I contemplated: What could be the primary reason however was Napoleon wanting Waterloo not to be a battle of the French people but a battle of Napoleon. He wanted the victory to go to no other. Napoleon was by no means a glory seeker, but he did long for the spotlight. Case in point, at the battle of Jena-Auerstedt he gave full credit to Davout for his amazing victory at Auerstedt and added it to his title. At Jena however, not wanting the populous to think one could rival Napoleon, he gave credit soley to himeslf and gave no title to Ney and Lannes who played pivitol roles in the battle. At Waterloo it was the same way: The nation deserted him, Europe was against him, he wanted full credit and removed his better commanders to minute theatres of war, Suchet to command the Army of the Alps, Davout to be minister of war and Soult to chief of staff-all of whom should have been frontline commanders.
One might say these theatres wer eimportant-they were, but not at the present. The whole crux of the Waterloo campaign was a big early victory before the other allies come. In it's very nature, it abandoned focus from all theatres other than the Low countries, than why not abandon all theatre commanders? Imagine how Soult, who faced Wellington before, would have forsaw his reverse slope tactics if he led D'Erlon's attack, imagine if Suchet pursued Blucher at Wavre instead of Grouchy, or if he would have marched to the sound of the guns at Mont St. Jean! But most of all, if Davout commanded D'Erlon's corps on the pivitol day of the 16 of June, imagine how he could have smashed Blucher at Ligny or Wellington at Quatre Bras, if he did what D'Erlon didn't and make that decision to march, like Davout did at Austerlitz.
With such men, how could Napoleon not win?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
The 100 days campaign was a desperate gamble by a desperate man in a desperate situation. Certainly, he took a calculated risk, and he lost, but a victory at Waterloo would hardly have meant peace or rest for the man. After all, not even resounding successes like Austerlitz or Iena granted him much of a break, and by 1815 his enemies were no longer the bewildered monarchs of 1805 -- they had become united, determined and organized in their intent to destroy Napoleon, no matter what. He was pretty much doomed, with that setting.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
Jihada
By the 1813 campaign in Germany the Allies were much better and able to defeat Napoleon's marshalls at battles like Dennewitz,Grossbeeren and Kulm and eventually Napoleon himself at Leipzig.
Napoleon lost Leipzig because his enemies were more capable ?:laughter: 200000 French vs 400000-1mil troops and French held city for 10 hours then they retreated because situation didnt look very well ... so it was a draw not a defeat.
Up to topic tho... like said above even if Napoleon won waterloo it wouldnt mean anything because his enemies would regroup and fight him again and again ... His only chance would be to make peace with his enemies or maybe even aliance with US (very unlikely tho ...) to fight British in america.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
While I certainly don't think Napoleon stood much of a chance even if he won Waterloo, I think people are giving the Coalition too much credit. They had quite the reputation of unwillingness to fight, even in 1814 when they could have easily crossed in to France they instead chose to sit outside the border for months to decide if it was the right thing to do or not. The Coalition still very much feared Napoleon and probably would have sued for peace sooner than most people think, certainly it would have taken quite a few more victories after Waterloo to achieve this however, and Napoleon could almost certainly not have delivered.
The Coalition would have realized the truth, that neither Napoleon's physical or mental state could maintain the necessary measures to continue to operate so far outside of France, something which Napoleon himself realized, nor the political climate in Paris would have supported such measures and Napoleon would have been to fearful to continue long campaigns outside of his consolidated France. Realizing this, they may have been quicker to sue for peace since the alternative of re-instating the Monarchy already had failed once, who was to say that it would succeed after they beat Napoleon...perhaps by that stage, had Napoleon won at Waterloo and continued on a success of a few more victories at the least, the Coalition would have settled with Napoleon in power, but obviously in a weakened state that could no longer bully Europe around as he had before.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Well actually, it would not have been the first time Napoleon had to fight all of Europe at once and win.
Austria and Britian were NOT happy with growing Russian power and may have pulled out after a lukewarm fight.
It realy all depended on Napoleon...
If he went for post 1792 borders then he probably would not be able to get peace talks going.
But its really based on Waterloo's decisiviness and in that subject we have 2 possible outcomes for a French victory.
Outcome 1.
d'Erlorn's Corps fights at Lingy
If d'Erlorn's Corps did infact arrive on Bluchers right flank instead of marching around aimlessly that day, and a Cannae-like anhiliation DID ensue then Grouchy's Corps would not be needed to be dispatched to chase the prussians and that would leave Napoleon with 30,000 MORE men at Waterloo and Wellington with 50,000 LESS troops.
So there would be roughly 102,000 French at Waterloo against Wellington's 68,000 (predominatly German :tongue:) Army.
Instead of the 72,000 French vs 118,000 that actually happend.
We are talking about Napoleon with 102,000 men.
The defeat would have been complete, and Britian would no longer have a standing army on the continent.
Prussia would also be temporarly out of the war and if Napoleon stayed with a defensive strategy with 1792 borders, I strongly doubt any army in the world could step foot in France.
Outcome 2
Grouchy marches to Waterloo.
Say the whole d'Erlorn debacle happens, Grouchy is dispatched to chase the Prussains etc.
Grouchy hears the cannon fire at Waterloo, seizeing the great Desiax's inititive he marches to Waterloo. Since Blucher and Grouchy were roughly similar distance from Waterloo, lets say they both arrive at 4PM with Zeithen and Ohain spear heading Bluchers army.
By 6PM, there are now 102,000 French men and 118,000 Germans (and SOME Brits LOL) at Waterloo.
The French still hold La Haye Saint and Grouchy is now holding a flank gaurd around Placienot.
Napoleon sends in the Guard, Wellington is forced to retreat with some causalties, BUT IS UNITED WITH BLUCHER!
All of the momentum and advantage Napoleon has is lost.
Napoleon still won, but it was a frontal assault and Grouchy was unable to intercept the Prussians.
Napoleon took roughly the same number of causalties as Wellington did, and we know from the 1813 Campaign unless an army is DESTROYED, the allies face no significant setbacks.
I doubt in this scenario Napoleon would be able to consolidate his position.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
the battle of leipzig basically found Napoleon unable to find a strategy to defeat the coalition, if waterloo would have been won Napoleon still needed to deal with the (pretty intact) remains of the Prussian army which undoubtely would try to join the austrian and/or russian army so Napoleon would or have to chase them threatening his own supply lines or wait for a massive army to arrive which would hardly be beatable with his so if he won waterloo the chance of winning was still low but victory was possible
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
I don't get it. People are saying Napoleon could've never won Waterloo when Wellington had famously said after that it was "the closest run thing ever"? Could somebody explain?
But anyway, Napoleon was mentally ill and like several have said, Waterloo was for his gain, not France's. I doubt he could have withstood The Coalition no matter how "dumb" they were.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
No, what they are saying is Napoleon could have won the battle but he had very little chance of winning the war.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Didn't Napoleon offer a peace to the nations of Europe when he came back in 1815 and they just refused and went to war? I think he would have made a quite favorable peace if he had won and be done with it.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
risker
I don't get it. People are saying Napoleon could've never won Waterloo when Wellington had famously said after that it was "the closest run thing ever"? Could somebody explain?
But anyway, Napoleon was mentally ill and like several have said, Waterloo was for his gain, not France's. I doubt he could have withstood The Coalition no matter how "dumb" they were.
No one is saying the Coalition is dumb..
And Napoleon was NOT mentally ill...
If Waterloo was truely for his gain and he was so egocentric at the time why didnt he desolve the assembilies like Davout urged him to in 1815?
Because it would have started a Civil war and he did not want any bloodshed spilt in his name inside France's borders.
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Didn't Napoleon offer a peace to the nations of Europe when he came back in 1815 and they just refused and went to war? I think he would have made a quite favorable peace if he had won and be done with it.
Correct
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Between his health and his falling popularity with the people, Napoleon wouldn't had lasted very much longer. He would had to made peace somewhere down the line and after he did die rest of Europe would have picked apart his empire with ease.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
He invaded Belgium too early. He inherited Louis XVIII's standing-army of just 56,000 men, and - with Joachim Murat's kingdom of Naples -was only able to increase that to 280,000. In contrast, the Allies devoted 800,000-1 million troops to the conflict.
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Originally Posted by wikipedia.org
Upon assumption of the throne, Napoleon found that he was left with little by the Bourbons and that the state of the Army was 56,000 troops of which 46,000 were ready to campaign.
[1] By the end of May the total armed forces available to Napoleon had reached 198,000 with 66,000 more in depots training up but not yet ready for deployment.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
even had napoleon succeeded at waterloo he would have only defeated a minor part of the coalitions armies... russia and austria where hardly involved and england and prussia had significant numbers deployed elsewhere... also GB would have just continued bank-rolling further coalitions until napoleon was defeated
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
Geronimo2006
He invaded Belgium too early. He inherited Louis XVIII's standing-army of just 56,000 men, and - with Joachim Murat's kingdom of Naples -was only able to
increase that to 280,000. In contrast, the Allies devoted 800,000-1 million troops to the conflict.
Had he not taken the initiative however he would have spent his time repeating 1814 and running around France reacting to his enemies, instead of having his enemies react to him. This was Napoleon's gamble, as the latter method had not worked in 1814 then there was no reason it would work in 1815.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Once Napoleon returned from Elba, he offered peace to he other nation of Europe, they all refused and made the final coalition. The Russians and the Austrians are heading towards France, while British and the Prussians are head to France through the Low Nations. Napoleon has a choice, stay back in France building up the army and try to defend France from 4 huge capable armies, or do the old divide and conquer; Defeating all of the enemy armies in turn, one by one. But that would mean he would have to attack immediatly, instead of preparing the army. So Napoleon goes to attack the closest armies, the British and the Prussians, after defeating them he would turn to defeat the Austrians and finnally the closing in Russians in Germany. That was the plan, but he didn't know how capable the british army was, and how badly trained Louis XVIII's army was. But if something change in belgium, and Napoleon defeated the british, and the prussians, would he have a chance of winning the war, having defeated them and forcing all of 'em into peace. i thin so, only if had defeated the Prussians and British. then defeated the Austrians and Russians. See, its a long short but still possible.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
You are aware of course that Spain was also massing at the border with France?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
Ebusitanus
You are aware of course that Spain was also massing at the border with France?
That was the reason for Suchet, argueably Napoleon's best general at that point, being left to defend the border.
Just in passing, no one has yet mentioned the phenomenal Marshal Brune who held off the Austrian Army from Italy with a tiny force (the Allies were so embarrassed that they murdered him when he finally surrendered).
As for Napoleon's choice of senior generals for the Waterloo Campaign, well that was to some extent forced upon him. Berthier was dead (probably assassinated by being thrown out of his own window), so Napoleon needed a good Chief-of-Staff. He chose Soult because he didn't trust Louis's ex-Minister for War enough to leave him in Paris (remember what had happened there in 1814).
Davout was left at Paris because he was the most capable and trustworthy. Marmont, MacDonald and Mortier were not available. Despite criticisms, Grouchy was a good commander, as he demonstrated after Waterloo, winning at Wavre and bringing his Wing back to France intact by a circuitous route. Ney was also good, but not as effective as he had been, especially without Jomini to advise him. But at least he was loyal (remarks about a certain "iron cage" notwithstanding).
The failure of the Waterloo Campaign is down the Napoleon in my opinion, not his subordinates. Ney was not properly briefed, joining his new command on the march north. Ney's orders were to capture Quatre Bra and push north, he needed d'Erlon for this since Wellington actually outnumbered him on the day. Napoleon failed to inform Ney that blocking the road at Quatre Bras was sufficient, and he also failed to tell Ney he was detaching d'Erlon. At Waterloo, Napoleon detached Ney's horse artillery before the famous cavalry charges, and when asked for infantry reinforcements, actually gave Ney more cavalry instead.
Grouchy was fooled by the desertion of the Saxons who looked remarkably like the whole Prussian army retreating on Namur and Liege.
If Napoleon's plan at Ligny had succeeded, then Wellington would not have stood at Waterloo, but would have instead retreated on Antwerp. Napoleon did not have time to pursue Wellington because he needed to get back to face the Austrians and Russians.
As mentioned in an earlier post, a decisive French victory at Waterloo was very unlikely due to Wellington's caution and ability to retreat, and the Prussian's resiliance which allowed them to continue fighting after heavy defeats. The best outcome for Napoleon would have been a decisive Ligny (with d'Erlon delivering the killing blow) followed by a rapid march south to pick up Davout's 125,000 being trained around Paris.
The outcome of the war would then hinge on Napoleon's ability to quickly defeat the Austrians and German Allies before the Russians arrived from the German interior. A decisive Austrian defeat was the only prospect for breaking the Allied Coalition, but Napoleon really needed another Ulm to achieve this, so I think my money would have been on the Allies.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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You are aware of course that Spain was also massing at the border with France?
Ahh yes Spain, but i highly doubt that Spains military capabliity was at the standards of Russia and Austria, well not at least without the British beside them as the did in the Peninsula War. Spain was a great force, but didn't have the disipline or training that other nation did, but thats another topic.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Anyway, remember this thread is also about Waterloo's place in NTW as a end of campaign feature, if you would please elaborate on that fellow members.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
Marshal Beale
Ahh yes Spain, but i highly doubt that Spains military capabliity was at the standards of Russia and Austria, well not at least without the British beside them as the did in the Peninsula War. Spain was a great force, but didn't have the disipline or training that other nation did, but thats another topic.
What do you base this on? 1815 Is not 1808 anymore for either Austria or Spain.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
here is a good website about British battles and Waterloo:
http://www.britishbattles.com/waterl...-june-1815.htm
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
i think Napoleon could have pulled through in one piece if he had won Waterloo. He would have defeated the two best allied armies, the British one and the Prussian one, and the defeat of Wellington and Blucher would have terrified the Austrians and Russians. The British were the only nation that had regularyly beat France, if they were defeated, then the remaining allies would have had a severe blow to morale.
Also rerember that the French still had hundreds of thousands of troops guarding the borders, so even if Napoleon had lost lots of men, he still had plenty of others.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
I don't really think these kinds of "what if" questions matter. What if Hitler won in Stalingrad? What if the Persians won at Thermopylae? What if Custer won at Little Big Horn?
While it may be interesting to think about the opposite outcomes, it doesn't really matter all too much to make assumptions on what might have happened. Instead we should focus on the implications of what actually did happen.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Some strange opinions on here.The Persians did win at Thermopylae ! (Hollywood and history lol http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/300_(film)) and someone further back even claims Leipzig was a draw,even though the French retreated and after Leipzig began the retreat back to France.The allies had a large advantage in numbers but the French had a decent central position and although they defended well ,the battle was a definite defeat.This is almost like claiming Dunkirk 1940 as a draw or even victory for Britain because of a partially successful retreat.
The British historian George Trevelyan wrote an essay before WW1 on 'If Napoleon had won the Battle of Waterloo'.His opinion was that an exhausted France would have offered peace to Britain.This would lead to Russia out of Europe, France dominant and no prospect of German unification during the 19th century and Britain isolated.
I find his conclusions rather naive as I doubt the Allies would allow Napoleon to remain in power even after a possible defeat at Waterloo.
This topic has been discussed many times even on the internet, for instance
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forum....php?p=1388713
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
i think Napoleon could have pulled through in one piece if he had won Waterloo. He would have defeated the two best allied armies, the British one and the Prussian one, and the defeat of Wellington and Blucher would have terrified the Austrians and Russians. The British were the only nation that had regularyly beat France, if they were defeated, then the remaining allies would have had a severe blow to morale.
Also rerember that the French still had hundreds of thousands of troops guarding the borders, so even if Napoleon had lost lots of men, he still had plenty of others.
In 1815 Prussian “excellent” army they started a military reform which was in progress and had a significant negative impact on the Prussian army facing Napoleon in 1815. Arguably it was in a worst shape since 1807.
Prussian line,
“Only part of the Prussian army in 1815 consisted of “old Prussians”. Rhinelanders and to an extent Westphalians which were incorporated into the army were of the questionable quality. Secondly, a number of foreign- non Prussian formations were amalgamated into the line and were considered line only on paper”. (Waterloo myths, 1990.)
Prussain Jagers:
“Undoubtedly many volunteers had a high morale but there were men who volunteered (especially in 1815) to avoid being drafted anyway and who just wanted to take part in privileges given to Jager detachment or avoid being together with ordinary men whom some of them considered riff-raff... Discipline was not as strict as in line and training was not very thorough, so I wouldn’t rank them higher than average. Many of them came from town and had never fired a shot before they bought their rifle and they were not as fit and healthy as the men from the countryside who filled the ranks of the line. (Waterloo myths, 1990.)”
In addition Prussian army included some Saxons whose morale was the lowest and who deserted whenever they had a chance. I think it is also mentioned on this forum here that a whole formation made of Saxons deserted and started to retreat making Grouchy to beleive that the whole Prussian army is leaving.
As for the quality of the “excellent” British army considering that about 70% of that were not British hence I cant even call it “British” so I refer to it as Wellington’s army.
By 1815 significant number of the Peninsular war veterans went to America and Wellington’s army had a lot of recruits.
“British troops in Holland received "scathing criticism from foreign military observers and Allied commanders. There were damning comments on the appalling behaviour of officers, their lack of care for their men and their generally drunken demeanour. The Army as a whole showed up badly in the field. The drill manuals were out of date, the battalions were of poor quality ..." (Haythornthwaite - "Wellington's Infantry (1)" p 6)”
“Nederland’s army was very young and consisted mostly of recruits… The militia was formed partly of volunteers and partly of conscripts…The Belgian components of the army, whose reliability was expected by many to be as doubtful as their loyalty to their new Dutch masters, made up only three cavalry regiments and six of the 38 infantry battalions of the Netherlands army; and in the event not one Belgian soldier deserted to the enemy.” (PTW Notes)
Amongst another weaknesses of the Wellington’s army I can mention arrogant officers corps with majority have their commission bought, rigid cavalry organisation, low artillery to troops ratio, inability to concentrate strategically (In the beginning of the 1815-Campaign the Prussians got 3/4 of their men to the right place at the right time, Wellington only miserable 1/3 of his total forces), slow manoeuvring and excessive dependency on supplies.
The Prussian army under Blucher after defeat at Ligny was a mere 60,000 – 70,000.. British army at Waterloo is around 70,000. These armies cannot even be compared to the size of the Russian and Austrian armies of about 350,000 heading towards Napoleon.
Also British army and in particular senior officer corps did not have that vast experience Russians and Austrians accumulated fighting Napoleon for 16 plus years. Brits were skirmishing French in Spain in favourable conditions on a less than a secondary importance Napoleonic wars theatre and never faced Napoleon himself.
Their war experience especially at operation level cannot be even compared to vast and brutal campaigns raged in Italy, Central in Eastern Europe. British soldiers, well supplied, welcomed by locals, stationed in warm country endured nothing similar to horrors of 1807 Winter campaign in Poland or 1812 war in Russia. Same as British senior staff never experienced a war against Napoleon himself and he was a hard man to play against.
Finally in 1815 at Waterloo arrogant “scum of all earth” (British soldiers as per Wellington himself) faced French army with Napoleon himself the battle was going to turn in to a near run thing if Prussians would not be on time to save Wellington). AND mind you this is all :
- Outnumbering Napoleon 70,000 Brits to 55,000 – 58,000 French (about 12,000-15,000 had to be send against approaching Prussians). Imagine this badly needed infantry dispatched to fight Prussians would support Ney in his massive cavalry attack on Wellington Centre! I bet the battle would end right there. However there was not infantry to support Ney. And the credit goes to Blucher and Prussians definitely not Wellington and his army.
- Having a very strong defensive position (the ridge)
- Facing 1815 mediocre quality French troops.
- At 11-30 am Wellington knew that Blucher is on the way and will arrive soon. All they need to do is to hold for 5 hours.
And ignoring Prussians the result is: “near a run thing” after 5 hours.
Compare this to Situation of the Russian army in 1812 on the Borodino field.
- Outnumbered 10 to 12.
- Facing Grand army with its best Marshals and veteran soldiers at the peak of its might.
- Knowing that no one is going to come and help them after 5 hours , nor after 10 and 20 and 200.
Result is they managed to hold for 14 hours retreating mere 1-2 km maintaining order, discipline and cohesion while slaughtering the third of the Napoleonic army and 47 of his generals, having its own casualty ratio unprecedented in Napoleonic wars and not having nothing near to Wellington’s “near run thing” (there is a written Kutuzov’s order to prepare to continue the battle on the next day).
If one is really interested in the topic of what if scenario i suggest investing some time in reading about the Political situation in 1815 and in particular the role Russian emperor Alexander I played. After reading on this subject I strongly believe that no matter what - Alexander was going to press forward to remove Napoleon from the throne. Strategically destruction of Wellington’s - in coalition terms – minor army would be just a minor set back for Alexander I and defiantly would not stop 350,000 + Russian and Austrians veterans with experienced generals who already tested the victory against napoleon in 1813 and 1814.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
i think Napoleon could have pulled through in one piece if he had won Waterloo. He would have defeated the two best allied armies, the British one and the Prussian one, and the defeat of Wellington and Blucher would have terrified the Austrians and Russians. The British were the only nation that had regularyly beat France, if they were defeated, then the remaining allies would have had a severe blow to morale.
Also rerember that the French still had hundreds of thousands of troops guarding the borders, so even if Napoleon had lost lots of men, he still had plenty of others.
Less than 200,000 actually.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Also British army and in particular senior officer corps did not have that vast experience Russians and Austrians accumulated fighting Napoleon for 16 plus years. Brits were skirmishing French in Spain in favourable conditions on a less than a secondary importance Napoleonic wars theatre and never faced Napoleon himself.
While I started reading with agreement Kolyan´s input, soon enough it seems we have hit with the same partisabn arguments many time seen before. This above is an example where you can detect where his bias is.
Never been a great fan of all things Wellington and his drive for selfpromotion but this here is simply wrong.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ebusitanus
While I started reading with agreement Kolyan´s input, soon enough it seems we have hit with the same partisabn arguments many time seen before. This above is an example where you can detect where his bias is.
Never been a great fan of all things Wellington and his drive for selfpromotion but this here is simply wrong.
The campaign in Spain "was to the Napoleonic wars what North Africa was to the WW2, an arena of British failure, redeemed by victory only when the enemy broke one of the great laws of war: NEVER INVADE RUSSIA."
- 'The Economist' Oct 3rd 2002, London
PS I didnt mean Brits were partisans, byt comparing to main theatres it was a skrimishing (in my biased opinion).
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
I´m not really sure what you mean by that. Most of the greatest French Marshalls fought (and lost) In Spain. 350.000 French troops were tied down for years in this land. Battles fought and won in Spain prompted again and again the renewal of the Coalition (Bailen 1808 or Vitoria 1813). Napoleon himself had to come to Spain to set things right but they never were. The Spanish conflict never stopped (1808-14) and it sapped French forces continuosly while she had made peace with either prussia, austria or russia. The costly defeats in Spain were certainly not the main reason for Napoleon´s demise but to brush it aside as some skirmishing invalidates the rest of your well exposed argument.
The fantastic idea that the fighting taken place in the Peninsula somehow made worse commaders of those who partook in it is astonishing.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ebusitanus
Most of the greatest French Marshalls fought (and lost) In Spain. 350.000 French troops were tied down for years in this land. Battles fought and won in Spain prompted again and again the renewal of the Coalition (Bailen 1808 or Vitoria 1813). Napoleon himself had to come to Spain to set things right but they never were. The Spanish conflict never stopped (1808-14) and it sapped French forces continuosly while she had made peace with either prussia, austria or russia. The costly defeats in Spain were certainly not the main reason for Napoleon´s demise but to brush it aside as some skirmishing invalidates the rest of your well exposed argument.
Agree. I hope you don’t mean that British corps held "350,000 French for years".
As per the Economist quote above the only reason British were not completely expelled from Spain is that Napoleon was too busy fighting Austrians and Russians. However whenever he had a chance to intervene in 1809 it resulted in a humiliating evacuation ala Dunkirk 1940 style.
“The retreat was more properly a flight.”
- C. Robinson
"...we have suffered a shameful disaster."
- The Times, London
Could the Spaniards win the war without British money and Wellington's British-Portuguese army ? Probably. One has only to look at the example of Soviet Invasion of Afganistan (ext.link) to realize that armies - with facilities and innovations beyond anything that Napoleon could ever have dreamt of - were strained by the type of warfare that he encountered in the Peninsula. (http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/cruel_war_in_Spain.html)
Hence was the presence of the British Corps crucial to Napoleonic defeat overall? to me the answer is no.
Could the Spaniards win the war without British money and Wellington's British-Portuguese army ?
Probably. One has only to look at the example of Soviet Invasion of Afganistan (ext.link) to realize that armies - with facilities and innovations beyond anything that Napoleon could ever have dreamt of - were strained by the type of warfare that he encountered in the Peninsula. (http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/cr..._in_Spain.html)
Hence was the presence of the British Corps crucial to Napoleonic defeat overall? to me the answer is no.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Neither the British, nor the Portuguese nor the Spaniards could have won the Peninsular Campaign on their own.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
In 1815 Prussian “excellent” army they started a military reform which was in progress and had a significant negative impact on the Prussian army facing Napoleon in 1815. Arguably it was in a worst shape since 1807.
Despite the "dilution" of the Prussian line, it actually performed remarkably well. Ziethen's and Pirch II's Corps being able to fight at Waterloo just two days after the heavy defeat at Ligny. The desertion of the Saxons was a special case, caused by the recent annexation of Saxony by Prussia, and allowing them to be brigaded together.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
As for the quality of the “excellent” British army considering that about 70% of that were not British hence I cant even call it “British” so I refer to it as Wellington’s army.
Indeed, Wellington's Army was an unknown quantity and Wellington himself did not trust it. In the event it too fought well, witness the Netherlanders holding out alone at Quatre Bras and the bravery of Bijlandt's brigade against d'Erlon's attack at Waterloo.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
Amongst another weaknesses of the Wellington’s army I can mention arrogant officers corps with majority have their commission bought, rigid cavalry organisation, low artillery to troops ratio, inability to concentrate strategically (In the beginning of the 1815-Campaign the Prussians got 3/4 of their men to the right place at the right time, Wellington only miserable 1/3 of his total forces), slow manoeuvring and excessive dependency on supplies.
Purchasing of commissions appears ludicrous to modern eyes, but the system did work. It ensured that the British class system was replicated in the Army, the officer class already being accustomed to command in civilian life. Don't forget also that the British retained a small professional army with no conscription, so the weakness of little promotion "from the ranks" was not overwhelming.
The "vast experience" of the Austrian's and Russians did not prevent them being beaten as late as 1814.
Napoleon's 1815 Army was not of mediocre quality. It had an unprecedented proportion of veterans thanks to the release of French POWs. The actual problem was loyalty. It was riven with fears of betrayal by Royalist sympathisers. Indeed, one of Gerard's division commanders defected to the Allies on the eve of Ligny with his whole staff!
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
The campaign in Spain "was to the Napoleonic wars what North Africa was to the WW2, an arena of British failure, redeemed by victory only when the enemy broke one of the great laws of war: NEVER INVADE RUSSIA."
- 'The Economist' Oct 3rd 2002, London
PS I didnt mean Brits were partisans, byt comparing to main theatres it was a skrimishing (in my biased opinion).
That is a silly quote. Wellington was extremely successful given the small size of his force and the distrust of the Spanish. Also there were many substantial battles. Most of the Peninsula campaign happened outside the time of the invasion of Russia anyway.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ebusitanus
Neither the British, nor the Portuguese nor the Spaniards could have won the Peninsular Campaign on their own.
Spot on!
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
Despite the "dilution" of the Prussian line, it actually performed remarkably well. Ziethen's and Pirch II's Corps being able to fight at Waterloo just two days after the heavy defeat at Ligny. The desertion of the Saxons was a special case, caused by the recent annexation of Saxony by Prussia, and allowing them to be brigaded together.
To get a better impression of what the Prussian army achieved in the 1815 campaign, one needs to study Hofschroer's two books on the 'The Waterloo Campaign'.
Ignoring, the controvertial aspects of Hofschroers account I came away with a new level of respect for the quality of the Prussian staff work and the resilience of the Prussian soldier during this campaign. Together they managed to pull off some amazing feats of maneouvre and competely negate the benefits Napoleon should have gained from his stratetgy of the central position, which by rights should have given him victory.
Most other armies of the period would have literally fallen apart under the pressure. The British for example spent most of the first day just trying to find Quatre Bras, nevermind actually fighting there, whereas the Prussian's managed to achieve a forward concentration by marching the entire of Zieten's Corps directly across the face of the French advance fighting two battles at enroute before they even reached Ligny, and then after their defeat at that battle repeated the maneouvre in reverse through the worst terrain and weather to arrive at Waterloo.
Brilliant.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
Also British army and in particular senior officer corps did not have that vast experience Russians and Austrians accumulated fighting Napoleon for 16 plus years. Brits were skirmishing French in Spain in favourable conditions on a less than a secondary importance Napoleonic wars theatre and never faced Napoleon himself.
Outnumbering Napoleon 70,000 Brits to 55,000 – 58,000 French (about 12,000-15,000 had to be send against approaching Prussians). Imagine this badly needed infantry dispatched to fight Prussians would support Ney in his massive cavalry attack on Wellington Centre! I bet the battle would end right there. However there was not infantry to support Ney. .
Biased a bit are we? :hmm:
First of all the British army did a lot more than skirmish in the Iberian peninsula, secondly they did, under Moore, face Napoleon and performed well at Corunna.
Next point is your figures for Waterloo are very wrong.
Wellington had 53580 infantry, 13350 cavalry and 157 guns for a force of 73200.
Napoleon had 53400 infantry, 15600 cavalry and 246 guns for a force of 77500.
Grouchy was detached with 24000 infantry, 3500 cavalry and 96 guns, for 30000 men.
So Napoleon did (barely) outnumber Wellington. Oh and Ney DID commit infantry to support the cavalry attack, just he ordered them in too late. Bachelu's division and Tissot's brigade numbering 6500 men were sent in.
All figures are from Mark Adkin's Waterloo Companion.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Juvenal,
Quote:
Grouchy was a good commander
,
I concur, he preformed very well in 1814 but during the Waterloo campaign his actions were not that of a good commander.
Thought blame cant be fully his as Soult's order was a maze of words.
Quote:
Ney was also good, but not as effective as he had been, especially without
Jomini to advise him. But at least he was loyal (remarks about a certain "iron cage" notwithstanding).
I agree, Ney is my favorite Marshal.
Quote:
The failure of the Waterloo Campaign is down the Napoleon in my opinion, not his subordinates. Ney was not properly briefed, joining his new command on the march north. Ney's orders were to capture Quatre Bra and push north, he needed d'Erlon for this since Wellington actually outnumbered him on the day
This is completely false, Ney even without d'Erlorns force outnumbered by a huge margin the tiny Dutch Force at the crossroads.
Wellington did NOT deploy his force there untill very late in the day and Ney botched that operation with delay in attack.
Quote:
At Waterloo, Napoleon detached Ney's horse artillery before the famous cavalry charges, and when asked for infantry reinforcements, actually gave Ney more cavalry instead.
Napoleon did this to add potency to Ney's attack I thought? And Napoleon did eventually reinforce Ney with infantry as they captured La Haye Saint.
Quote:
Grouchy was fooled by the desertion of the Saxons who looked remarkably like the whole Prussian army retreating on Namur and Liege.
Another of his errors, which is why Waterloo could be blamed solidly on Ney and Grouchy.
Quote:
If Napoleon's plan at Ligny had succeeded, then Wellington would not have stood at Waterloo, but would have instead retreated on Antwerp. Napoleon did not have time to pursue Wellington because he needed to get back to face the Austrians and Russians.
That begs the qustion, if Blucher had been eliminated by Napoleon completely and Wellington did fall back, who's to say the British and Austrians would not lose heart?
They were in the game for balence of power in Europe? If Napoleon kept 1792 borders (which he clearly stated in early 1815) why would they press on
Quote:
As mentioned in an earlier post, a decisive French victory at Waterloo was very unlikely due to Wellington's caution and ability to retreat, and the Prussian's resiliance which allowed them to continue fighting after heavy defeats. The best outcome for Napoleon would have been a decisive Ligny (with d'Erlon delivering the killing blow) followed by a rapid march south to pick up Davout's 125,000 being trained around Paris.
Thats exactly what I was saying, Grouchy comeing to Waterloo would not result in a defeat sufficient enough to end the entire war.
Quote:
The outcome of the war would then hinge on Napoleon's ability to quickly defeat the Austrians and German Allies before the Russians arrived from the German interior. A decisive Austrian defeat was the only prospect for breaking the Allied Coalition, but Napoleon really needed another Ulm to achieve this, so I think my money would have been on the Allies
The Austrians would need less I think, Maybe a decisive Lingy and Brunes stoping actions in Italy would be enough.
Russia was starting to become the problem, Czar Alexander even threatend the British and Austrian Governments at the C.o.V. and forced borders to be drawn more on their terms and even offered them to kick the Russians out, or at least try to.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Emp.P.;
Quote:
First of all the British army did a lot more than skirmish in the Iberian peninsula, secondly they did, under Moore, face Napoleon and performed well at Corunna.
Do you mean the RETREAT at Corunna? Where Moore and his men fled to their ships and left thousands of dead behind?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
I was surprised to see the battle at Corunna labelled a British defeat.The retreat was horrendous as you could imagine if you travelled that road even today. Even so the British held off the French at Corunna and were able to embark safely enough.All armies have to retreat sometimes and the British had the advantage of beong able to do so by sea.
The relatively small British army in the Peninsular accomplished much more than merely beating the French in most battles.Crauford's training turned the Portuguese infantry into a splendid fighting force,equal to the British line.Eventually Wellington was able to persuade the Spanish to cooperate properly and incorporate them into his command.The result was a much improved Spanish army which was capable of defeating the French almost alone as at San Marcial. Ok,they had won at Bailen some years before but that was the French commander's fault for getting his army in such a ridiculous position.
My argument is therefore that without British involvement in Spain and Portugal the French would have easily occupied Portugal and been able to defeat the various Spanish juntas in detail.The guerrilla war would have continued of course but needed less French troops to contain it.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Juvenal,
Quote:
Indeed, Wellington's Army was an unknown quantity and Wellington himself did not trust it. In the event it too fought well, witness the Netherlanders holding out alone at Quatre Bras and the bravery of Bijlandt's brigade against d'Erlon's attack at Waterloo.
How funny, your other post you said Ney was outnumbered!
Quote:
Napoleon's 1815 Army was not of mediocre quality. It had an unprecedented proportion of veterans thanks to the release of French POWs. The actual problem was loyalty. It was riven with fears of betrayal by Royalist sympathisers. Indeed, one of Gerard's division commanders defected to the Allies on the eve of Ligny with his whole staff!
Not of mediocre quality?
"
The uniforms were in tatters. The 29th Line Infantry Regiment (in Durutte's division of d'Erlon's corps) served through the campaign with policemen's caps on their heads. The 14th Light Infantry had been wearing for the last two years (1813-1815) their old canvas trousers, regardless the time of year. In more than 20 infantry regiments the men were without shoes. "
source: http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/BA...UATRE_BRAS.htm
Quote:
That is a silly quote. Wellington was extremely successful given the small size of his force and the distrust of the Spanish. Also there were many substantial battles. Most of the Peninsula campaign happened outside the time of the invasion of Russia anyway.
Wellington was a medocre commander.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Jihada,
I
Quote:
was surprised to see the battle at Corunna labelled a British defeat.The retreat was horrendous as you could imagine if you travelled that road even today
And what of it? We are to comend them because the roads were tough?
Are you jesting?!
Napoleon faced much worse roads in the Friedland campaign! And remeber why the Britsh were retreating! Not because supplies, or a lost battle but merely because NAPOLEON WAS APPROACHING!
And we are to commend these men for running like cowards instead of standing and fighting battle as their allies have done so many times?
Quote:
Even so the British held off the French at Corunna and were able to embark safely enough.All armies have to retreat sometimes and the British had the advantage of beong able to do so by sea.
They were luck they had their ships or surely they would have been destroyed.
Quote:
The relatively small British army in the Peninsular accomplished much more than merely beating the French in most battles.
While most of the French army was off in the East? And on top of that most of the Armies in Spain did not even cooperate with each other.
And do not mix your words, the British army in Spain was small yes. But you convienantly leave out the fact that this small cohort was assisted by an entire country, and the average size French force was fighting a Insurgency the likes of which has not been seen before!
This is rediculous! As if the Britsh actions during the Napoleonic wars deserve praise!
HA!
One who wishes to see the competence of British Infantry in the time period need only look at The engagment at Fuengirola.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Redalvilgeshki
Emp.P.;
Do you mean the RETREAT at Corunna? Where Moore and his men fled to their ships and left thousands of dead behind?
Yes that is exactly what I meant. It matters not that the British retreated, they outfought the numerically superior French and won a tactical victory.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Redalvilgeshki
Wellington was a medocre commander.
Yes, of course..... :doh:
What is with the rash of Russian-named posters suddenly attacking Britain's part in the Napoleonic Wars? :hmm:
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Yes that is exactly what I meant. It matters not that the British retreated, they outfought the numerically superior French and won a tactical victory.
It matters not!?
Since when did it matter not?!? It has incredible importance!
Even to our times its importance is great! Hitler tied down one of his most elite armies in the hell that was Stalingrad, rather then retreat! There are countless other instances!
Quote:
What is with the rash of Russian-named posters suddenly attacking Britain's part in the Napoleonic Wars?
Hahaha I'm not Russian and that is not a Russian name, I acctually just randomly typed letters into line hahahaaaaaa I;m actually a Italian-Arab American.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Redalvilgeshki
Hahaha I'm not Russian and that is not a Russian name, I acctually just randomly typed letters into line hahahaaaaaa I;m actually a Italian-Arab American.
I don't think you realise what I'm getting at. It seems a real coincidence that there are two Russian names slagging off Britain all of a sudden. My money says you're the same person (both posters have very few posts) and you sir are merely trolling.
:thumbsdow
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
1. Please stay on topic.
2. It's not a Russian name....It's a bunch of random letters, and this is my only account and I am not bashing the British, I am merely bring the reality of their competence during the Napoleonic Wars up to light
3. Stop saying I'm trolling because I'm not, there has not been a single word of my posts that has not been devouted to the argueing my valid points.
When you say someone is trolling and they obviously are not it merely makes you look, how could I say it?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Redalvilgeshki
Napoleon faced much worse roads in the Friedland campaign! And remeber why the Britsh were retreating! Not because supplies, or a lost battle but merely because NAPOLEON WAS APPROACHING!
And we are to commend these men for running like cowards instead of standing and fighting battle as their allies have done so many times?
They were luck they had their ships or surely they would have been destroyed.
Moore had about 30,000 men and his mission was to support the Spanish armies massing along the river Ebro. Before he could reach them, the Spanish were defeated, leaving Moore facing Napoleon's 150,000 field army alone (out of 300,000 plus French troops in Spain at that time).
Moore's error wasn't that he retreated, but rather that he didn't retreat until it was almost too late, perhaps not wanting to believe that the Spanish armed forces had fragmented into regional factions.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Redalvilgeshki
Quote:
Originally Posted by Juvenal
Ney's orders were to capture Quatre Bras and push north, he needed d'Erlon for this since Wellington actually outnumbered him on the day
This is completely false, Ney even without d'Erlorns force outnumbered by a huge margin the tiny Dutch Force at the crossroads.
Wellington did NOT deploy his force there untill very late in the day and Ney botched that operation with delay in attack.
Ney started his attack at 2pm against Perponcher's Netherlands division (although he didn't know the strength of the Allied forces), advancing with three infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade.
Picton's British division (and van Merlen's Dutch cavalry brigade) arrived at 3pm stopping the French attack. Ney resumed it when Jerome's division arrived, but the Allies received the Brunswick division around 4pm, then von Alten's division at 5pm and finally Cooke's division, giving them enough numerical superiority to counter-attack, ending the day in possession of the field.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Redalvilgeshki
Quote:
Originally Posted by Juvenal
At Waterloo, Napoleon detached Ney's horse artillery before the famous cavalry charges, and when asked for infantry reinforcements, actually gave Ney more cavalry instead.
Napoleon did this to add potency to Ney's attack I thought? And Napoleon did eventually reinforce Ney with infantry as they captured La Haye Saint.
Ney's cavalry attacks in the afternoon failed for lack of infantry and horse-artillery. Napoleon's release of the Guard cavalry instead of Bachelu's division seems ill-judged. He did indeed later release Bachelu's division and Tissot's regiment to Ney, but by this time the cavalry was largely spent and couldn't support the attack effectively.
The capture of La Haye Sainte occurred later, and was undertaken by d'Erlon's Corps, with somewhat more support from Ney's cavalry who had had time to reform.
Ney admittedly misjudged what he thought were signs of an Allied retreat in the centre, but it was Napoleon who decided what troops Ney could use, and when he could use them.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Redalvilgeshki
Quote:
Originally Posted by Juvenal
That is a silly quote. Wellington was extremely successful given the small size of his force and the distrust of the Spanish. Also there were many substantial battles. Most of the Peninsula campaign happened outside the time of the invasion of Russia anyway.
Wellington was a medocre commander.
Evidence?
Wellington beat Junot, Massena, Marmont, Victor, Sebastiani, Jourdan, Soult, Ney and Napoleon. In what way was this mediocre?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
@Juvenal and Redalvilgeshki
For what its worth my view on the success and failure of the 1815 campaign in Belgium is slightly different to yours.
As far as I can see Napoleon did everything right, and if the campaign had taken place in 1808, 1812 or perhaps even 1813 he would probably have won. But this was 1815 and the world had changed, his enemies knew more about his techniques and were more capable of matching them.
I also place a lot of weight on the arguement that Soult was not as effective as a Chief of Staff as Berthier had been in the earlier campaigns. Anyone who has actually read some of Napoleon's dispatches from the campaign will be able to vouch for the fact that many of them are unecessarily verbose, ambiguous and just downright vague. However, apparently this was not some new development in Napoleon's style of command, his orders and dispatches were always like this, he tended to dictate them verbally, sometimes several at a time using multiple clerks and consequently he tended to repeat himself, lose the thread of his intentions and even miss bits out. In effect they were more of a brain-dump than a structured set of instructions.
The difference in 1815, was that Soult just dispatched them directly to the Corps commanders in their raw state, whereas Berthier used to sit a rewrite them, or add his over summary of Napoleon's intentions as a guidance note before they were dispatched. Napoleon's Corps commanders simply were not used to recieving such ambiguous instructions and being expected to interpret them themselves, and inevitably errors occured.
The other big difference was undoubtely that the Prussian Army command was no longer the passive, bungling organisation that it had been in 1806, and its soldiers were no longer the inexperienced hoch-poch of new levies and men from newly acquired former French puppet states that it had fielded in 1813. The Prussian command staff were more than equal to Napoleon's by 1815, and understood his strategies and tactic's, and the German soldier was as resolute and committed as his French counter-part.
Finally, I also believe that Napoleon expected his former Dutch troops, now forming part of the United Netherlands Army to defect en-masse to his colours, and indeed, its actually quite surprising that they didn't. Several of the Dutch regiments and many of the Dutch brigade and Corps commanders were former French Army officers and some Dutch Regiments were formed by men formerly serving in the Imperial Guard. Logic would have suggested that these men would have defected to the French as soon as opportunties arose, and I believe that much of the the dithering on the road to Quatre Bras, and in the early part of that battle, before the British began to arrive en-masse was deliberately intended to give the Dutch a chance to change sides before the fighting alienated them. Why else were the lancers of the Guard used as the spearhead of this advance, other than because Napoleon knew they would be recongised as the sister regiment of the former Dutch Lancers of the Guard and that the officers would be known personally by their Dutch counter-parts.
In practice, of course there were no defections even amongst the former Imperial Guardsmen, and the delays simply gave the British time to get troops to Quatre Bras, but it was a worthwhile gamble which might have paid off.
Neys Cavalry attacks did not fail due to lack of artillery support, they had artillery support, and infantry support. The myth that they were unsupported is part of the English myth and completely false. Both British and German eyewitness accounts repeatedly refer to their squares coming under close range cannister and musketry fire between each cavalry attack. Even Mercer states that he was forced to parade back and forth in front of his guns between each cavalry attack to re-assure his men that the French skirmishers were incapable of hitting a barn door even at close range, and he gives a detailed account of one skirmisher with a large moustache grinning at him as he repeatedly reloaded and tried to shoot him off his horse.
Indeed, Halketts brigade were so badly mauled by close range artillery and musketry fire that their squares began to fall apart and were only rallied and brought back under control by their officers after the timely arrive of Detmers Netherlanders who by then were mostly drunk on the gin they had been plied with all day by the locals villagers and rushed forward in column formation to fill the gaps in Halkets line and drive the French artillery and infantry back over the crest of the ridge.
If there was a failure it was in the fact that Napoleon did not expliot the success of the French cavalry attacks in sufficient strength, with La Haye Sainte taken and the French infantry and artillery in command of the ridge line he should have thrown in the last of his reserves and smashed the British centre completely, instead he held them back, and eventually depleted them by detaching many to counter the Prussian advance on Plancenoit.
The cavalry actually did their job, and did it rather well, effectively pinning the allied right and centre in position and preventing Wellington actively commanding his own army for several hours, but with only the dreg's of D'Erlons Corps to expliot the advantage there simple were not enough French troops on hand to punch through the allied line, and the Germans and Dutch simply refused to break even under close range cannister fire.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ebusitanus
Neither the British, nor the Portuguese nor the Spaniards could have won the Peninsular Campaign on their own.
Success of failure in peninsular war was decided on the fields of Borodino and Leipzig. It all depended in how much resources Napoleon could divert into Spain to fight British and how often he could come there himself. Fortunately for the British he could not. This is not no mention the fact that it is Spanish guerrillas who “held 350,000 French for years” – not British 30,000 coprs.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Didz
@Juvenal and Redalvilgeshki
For what its worth my view on the success and failure of the 1815 campaign in Belgium is slightly different to yours.
As far as I can see Napoleon did everything right, and if the campaign had taken place in 1808, 1812 or perhaps even 1813 he would probably have won. But this was 1815 and the world had changed, his enemies knew more about his techniques and were more capable of matching them.
I also place a lot of weight on the arguement that Soult was not as effective as a Chief of Staff as Berthier had been in the earlier campaigns. Anyone who has actually read some of Napoleon's dispatches from the campaign will be able to vouch for the fact that many of them are unecessarily verbose, ambiguous and just downright vague. However, apparently this was not some new development in Napoleon's style of command, his orders and dispatches were always like this, he tended to dictate them verbally, sometimes several at a time using multiple clerks and consequently he tended to repeat himself, lose the thread of his intentions and even miss bits out. In effect they were more of a brain-dump than a structured set of instructions.
The difference in 1815, was that Soult just dispatched them directly to the Corps commanders in their raw state, whereas Berthier used to sit a rewrite them, or add his over summary of Napoleon's intentions as a guidance note before they were dispatched. Napoleon's Corps commanders simply were not used to recieving such ambiguous instructions and being expected to interpret them themselves, and inevitably errors occured.
The other big difference was undoubtely that the Prussian Army command was no longer the passive, bungling organisation that it had been in 1806, and its soldiers were no longer the inexperienced hoch-poch of new levies and men from newly acquired former French puppet states that it had fielded in 1813. The Prussian command staff were more than equal to Napoleon's by 1815, and understood his strategies and tactic's, and the German soldier was as resolute and committed as his French counter-part.
Finally, I also believe that Napoleon expected his former Dutch troops, now forming part of the United Netherlands Army to defect en-masse to his colours, and indeed, its actually quite surprising that they didn't. Several of the Dutch regiments and many of the Dutch brigade and Corps commanders were former French Army officers and some Dutch Regiments were formed by men formerly serving in the Imperial Guard. Logic would have suggested that these men would have defected to the French as soon as opportunties arose, and I believe that much of the the dithering on the road to Quatre Bras, and in the early part of that battle, before the British began to arrive en-masse was deliberately intended to give the Dutch a chance to change sides before the fighting alienated them. Why else were the lancers of the Guard used as the spearhead of this advance, other than because Napoleon knew they would be recongised as the sister regiment of the former Dutch Lancers of the Guard and that the officers would be known personally by their Dutch counter-parts.
In practice, of course there were no defections even amongst the former Imperial Guardsmen, and the delays simply gave the British time to get troops to Quatre Bras, but it was a worthwhile gamble which might have paid off.
Neys Cavalry attacks did not fail due to lack of artillery support, they had artillery support, and infantry support. The myth that they were unsupported is part of the English myth and completely false. Both British and German eyewitness accounts repeatedly refer to their squares coming under close range cannister and musketry fire between each cavalry attack. Even Mercer states that he was forced to parade back and forth in front of his guns between each cavalry attack to re-assure his men that the French skirmishers were incapable of hitting a barn door even at close range, and he gives a detailed account of one skirmisher with a large moustache grinning at him as he repeatedly reloaded and tried to shoot him off his horse.
Indeed, Halketts brigade were so badly mauled by close range artillery and musketry fire that their squares began to fall apart and were only rallied and brought back under control by their officers after the timely arrive of Detmers Netherlanders who by then were mostly drunk on the gin they had been plied with all day by the locals villagers and rushed forward in column formation to fill the gaps in Halkets line and drive the French artillery and infantry back over the crest of the ridge.
If there was a failure it was in the fact that Napoleon did not expliot the success of the French cavalry attacks in sufficient strength, with La Haye Sainte taken and the French infantry and artillery in command of the ridge line he should have thrown in the last of his reserves and smashed the British centre completely, instead he held them back, and eventually depleted them by detaching many to counter the Prussian advance on Plancenoit.
The cavalry actually did their job, and did it rather well, effectively pinning the allied right and centre in position and preventing Wellington actively commanding his own army for several hours, but with only the dreg's of D'Erlons Corps to expliot the advantage there simple were not enough French troops on hand to punch through the allied line, and the Germans and Dutch simply refused to break even under close range cannister fire.
An excellent post.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
Indeed, Wellington's Army was an unknown quantity and Wellington himself did not trust it. In the event it too fought well, witness the Netherlanders holding out alone at Quatre Bras and the bravery of Bijlandt's brigade against d'Erlon's attack at Waterloo.
Obviously there are individual units who perform well however having 20% overall losses was enough for Wellingot's army to turn it into "a near run thing". My original argument is that Wellington’s army was far inferior to Russian or Austrian and actually Prussian army and I demonstrated this by Waterloo-Borodino battle comparison.
Being brave but dull like British cavalry officers is not enough. As I said earlier Wellington’s army had significant flaws and cannot be put in a line with Prussian, Russian and Austrian armies. Amongst the reasons are – weak artillery, slow manoeuvring, excessive dependency on supplies, rigid cavalry organisation and, inability to concentrate strategically.
If Blucher would not be a talented general and after Ligny chose to retreat rather than saving Wellingt’s a… For Wellington the campaign would be over in the same way as it ended for British corps in Spain in 1809 as soon as Napoleon came there. Humiliating evacuation with out even a decisive battle! He would refuse to fight against Napoleon one on one – would retreat towards Antwerpen and evacuate to England leaving Prussians, Russians and Austrians to spill their blood for England as they did in 1814.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
Purchasing of commissions appears ludicrous to modern eyes, but the system did work. It ensured that the British class system was replicated in the Army, the officer class already being accustomed to command in civilian life. Don't forget also that the British retained a small professional army with no conscription, so the weakness of little promotion "from the ranks" was not overwhelming.
- You are missing the qualitative measure of this practice. It may have been worked but it was far inferior system to promotion thought merit or exam and cadets training.
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Originally Posted by
Juvenal
The "vast experience" of the Austrian's and Russians did not prevent them being beaten as late as 1814.
- the same way it didn’t prevent Red Army and US / British to taste occasional set backs and defeats in 1944 and 1945. However all that matters is strategic perspective. And we all now that the result of 1814 - the birth of Bistro cafes in around the world due to Cossacks having lunch in Paris.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
Napoleon's 1815 Army was not of mediocre quality. It had an unprecedented proportion of veterans thanks to the release of French POWs. The actual problem was loyalty. It was riven with fears of betrayal by Royalist sympathisers. Indeed, one of Gerard's division commanders defected to the Allies on the eve of Ligny with his whole staff!.
"Digby Smith is of the opinion that it's impossible to know the number of Guard survivors from Russia still present in its ranks in 1815, but points out that of the 400-600 officers and other ranks who'd got back, many must have succumbed in Germany. The Grenadiers' and Chasseurs' composition in 1815 is perhaps relevant to the fiasco of the last fatal charge at Waterloo." (Austin - "1815: the return of Napoleon" p 314)
In the ranks of Young Guard served volunteers, Corsicans, and even deserters. Some went out with girls and/or got drunk. Several battalions of Young Guard were under general Lamarque serving in Vendee. He complained that they were filled with recruits and deserters who neither knew how to maneuver nor shoot. (Lasserre - "Les Cent jours en Vendйe: le gйnйral Lamarque et l'insurrection royaliste, d'aprиs les papiers inйdits du gйnйral Lamarque." published in 1906.)
The state of the Guard gives you the idea about the rest of the French army.
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Originally Posted by
Juvenal
Originally Posted by Kolyan
The campaign in Spain "was to the Napoleonic wars what North Africa was to the WW2, an arena of British failure, redeemed by victory only when the enemy broke one of the great laws of war: NEVER INVADE RUSSIA."
- 'The Economist' Oct 3rd 2002, London
Originally Posted by Juvenal
That is a silly quote. Wellington was extremely successful given the small size of his force and the distrust of the Spanish. Also there were many substantial battles. Most of the Peninsula campaign happened outside the time of the invasion of Russia anyway.
It is a silly quote if you take it literally. Don’t! Looking at the broader perspective Wellington’s coprs in Spain is a mere 20,000 troops on the field with excellent supply system, and superb intelligence thanks to Spanish delivering info from intercepted French couriers. This doesn’t stand the comparison with conditions which French faced in Spain. And again this was due to Spanish guerillas.
To me one of the most important quality factors is determined by ability of the Army to take significant losses and carry on fighting. Historically there were only two armies who could do that in Napoleonic Wars – French and Russian. The most bloodied battles in terms of percentage lost involved these two armies and defiantly not British.
In terms of casualties ratio and overall troops involved British-French Peninsular war battles are pitiable skirmishes compared to horrors of French-Russian battles of 1807 and 1812. I can also mention that Eilau and Borodino were the bloodiest battles of Napoleon wars with the least gains.
Many Peninsular war “substantial battles» were with a losses expressed in few hundreds. These are skirmishes in 1807, 1809, 1812 or 1813 war terms. These types of “substantial battles” are not even described and documented in 1812 war in Russia history as there was a constant daily rearguard action through the war with casualties mounting to hundreds of KIA, MIA, WIA.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
First of all the British army did a lot more than skirmish in the Iberian peninsula.
-For this see my post above.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
secondly they did, under Moore, face Napoleon and performed well at Corunna.
I recommend this website http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/battle_of_corunna.htm for the decryption of the events.
To summarise as well put by Redalvilgeshki:
“….why the Britsh were retreating! Not because supplies, or a lost battle but merely because NAPOLEON WAS APPROACHING!”
Not sure what you mean that they faced Napoleon - they did not:
“The retreat was more properly a flight.”
- C. Robinson
And mind you this without a battle (not to mention a few minor cavalry clashes). By the time the “battle” of Corunna itself Napoleon was not in Spain but British stil continued to run outnumbering Soult 4 to 3. Crunna itself cannot even be called a battle with around 900 losses for the Brits and similar or slightly more for the French.
The expedition reached England having lost some 8,800 men. "The people of Portsmouth looked on in horror at the spectacle that was emerging from the harbour. The British expeditionary force had returned home, but there was no grand parade through the streets, no pomp or colour, no tale of victory. What appeared seemed rather to be the mere wreckage of an army." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" p 140)
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
Next point is your figures for Waterloo are very wrong.
Wellington had 53580 infantry, 13350 cavalry and 157 guns for a force of 73200.
Napoleon had 53400 infantry, 15600 cavalry and 246 guns for a force of 77500.
Grouchy was detached with 24000 infantry, 3500 cavalry and 96 guns, for 30000 men.
So Napoleon did (barely) outnumber Wellington.
My source is http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/BATTLE_OF_WATERLOO.htm
which mentions 75,000 (including staff and medical) has 9 references and as far I know Adkin, Mark (2001). The Waterloo Companion. Aurum which mentions 72,000 for the French. I have never come across 77,000 especially from Mark Adkin. Anyhow taking the average of (77+73 (excluding staff and medical+72)/3 =74,000 French versus 72,500 (or 73,200 as per your source) Wellington’s.
After the detachment of around 15,000 (or more?) to Palnaceloit French would have 74-15= 59,000 french versus 72,500 for Wellington. So who is outnumbered?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
Oh and Ney DID commit infantry to support the cavalry attack, just he ordered them in too late. Bachelu's division and Tissot's brigade numbering 6500 men were sent in.
Didz put a detailed post about these events. There was simply not enough infantry because it was fighting Prussians at Planceloit.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
Yes that is exactly what I meant. It matters not that the British retreated, they outfought the numerically superior French and won a tactical victory.
British tactical victory you say? Numerically superior? huh?
In contrast to the media, politicians, and many military men in 1809, today some British historians consider Corunna as victory. They like to portray hard-fought retreats and withdrawals like Corunna or Dunkirk as triumphs. For example Summerville writes: "In short the British ... were not in a position to exploit their success with an offensive, the redcoats secured their embarkation, and thus claimed the Battle of Corunna as a victory."
The truth is Moore choose to get out, and do it very very fast. This is not a victory in battle, they just succeeded in a hasty retreat. They ran away. When the dust settled, it was the French army that held the battlefield and Corunna itself, not the British. According to napoleon-series.org (2005) > it was a French victory.
In list of battles they write: "Here in this list rance is mentioned as victor because it occupied the place at the end. In February 1998 there was quite a dispute in the discussion forum about who's victory this was (most voted for France). "
For the French it was their victory. They sent the redcoats skulking off to the sea.
After the victory at Corunna, Soult took the great naval base of El Ferrol. He captured 8 battle-ships, 3 frigates, several hundred prisoners and enormous equipment stockpiles, incl. 20,000 British muskets.
http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/battle_of_corunna.htm
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
My money says you're the same person (both posters have very few posts) and you sir are merely trolling.
Keep your money in the pocket. If you look closely you will see that to be the same person that "person" should operate here on the forum 24 hour non-stop with out sleeping. I am acutally on the other side of the Wolrd to Redalvilgeshki.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
It seems a real coincidence that there are two Russian names slagging off Britain all of a sudden.
What is intresting to me is really the argument itself and not the nationality of the author. I hope its the same to you.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
Success of failure in peninsular war was decided on the fields of Borodino and Leipzig. It all depended in how much resources Napoleon could divert into Spain to fight British and how often he could come there himself. Fortunately for the British he could not. This is not no mention the fact that it is Spanish guerrillas who “held 350,000 French for years” – not British 30,000 coprs.
Destinies of the various allied nations were very much intertied during these years. Spain fought on alone many times during these years when either the British left the Peninsula (La Coruña) or where in Portugal close to Lisbon. Victories on Spanish soil gave more than once courage to open hostilities for other nations that had signed peace before.
You like to focus on your Russians and I will not be the one to say they were not momentuos in taking down Napoleon but without the other nations involved Russia would not have made it on its own either. Those 350.000 soldiers in Spain were not in Russia, Prussia or Austria, right? We can turn this as easily around.
When I say that neither of the Spanish, British or Portuguese could have won the Peninsular Campaign on its own I mean it. Without Brtish support Spain could never have sustained itself all these years, being able to set up field army after field army, give hope to the guerrilas due to the field battles won by Wellington, etc, etc...
You talk about Borodino and Leipzig like some self contained events in a vacum. We can all start playing what-if games. Had Napoleon not been tied down significantly in Spain how many more troops could he have used against Russia?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
Didz
As far as I can see Napoleon did everything right, and if the campaign had taken place in 1808, 1812 or perhaps even 1813 he would probably have won. But this was 1815 and the world had changed, his enemies knew more about his techniques and were more capable of matching them.
Yes, Napoleon's plan was good, but it was also very risky and from what he is recorded as saying during the campaign, he seemed unwilling to believe the Allies could stand against him... for example the famous "petit dejeuner" remark to Soult. Was he just trying to increase morale, or was he actively deluding himself?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Didz
I also place a lot of weight on the arguement that Soult was not as effective as a Chief of Staff as Berthier had been in the earlier campaigns. ...many of them are unecessarily verbose, ambiguous and just downright vague. ...this was not some new development in Napoleon's style of command, his orders and dispatches were always like this, he tended to dictate them verbally, sometimes several at a time using multiple clerks and consequently he tended to repeat himself, lose the thread of his intentions and even miss bits out. In effect they were more of a brain-dump than a structured set of instructions.
The difference in 1815, was that Soult just dispatched them directly to the Corps commanders in their raw state, whereas Berthier used to sit a rewrite them, or add his over summary of Napoleon's intentions as a guidance note before they were dispatched. Napoleon's Corps commanders simply were not used to recieving such ambiguous instructions and being expected to interpret them themselves, and inevitably errors occured.
Yes, an excellent point, Soult was not effective as Chief of Staff to Napoleon. He would have been much better as a wing commander, perhaps instead of Grouchy. But the problem was that there was no good candidate for Chief of Staff, someone who knew Napoleon intimately was needed.
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Originally Posted by
Didz
The other big difference was undoubtely that the Prussian Army command was no longer the passive, bungling organisation that it had been in 1806, and its soldiers were no longer the inexperienced hoch-poch of new levies and men from newly acquired former French puppet states that it had fielded in 1813. The Prussian command staff were more than equal to Napoleon's by 1815, and understood his strategies and tactic's, and the German soldier was as resolute and committed as his French counter-part.
Yes, they were definitely resolute, but they were not the equal of the French in battle as Ligny and Plancenoit demonstrated. But they had been equally resolute in 1814 recovering from the Six Days campaign, and in 1813 attacking Möckern outside Leipzig. Just because Peter Hofschröer admires them doesn't make them supermen. By the way, I'm not being jingoistic here, I just think that, thanks to their meritocratic system, the French had the advantage of a more experienced and effective officer corps, with more scope to show individual initiative.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Didz
Finally, I also believe that Napoleon expected his former Dutch troops, now forming part of the United Netherlands Army to defect en-masse to his colours, and indeed, its actually quite surprising that they didn't. Several of the Dutch regiments and many of the Dutch brigade and Corps commanders were former French Army officers and some Dutch Regiments were formed by men formerly serving in the Imperial Guard. Logic would have suggested that these men would have defected to the French as soon as opportunities arose, and I believe that much of the the dithering on the road to Quatre Bras, and in the early part of that battle, before the British began to arrive en-masse was deliberately intended to give the Dutch a chance to change sides before the fighting alienated them. Why else were the lancers of the Guard used as the spearhead of this advance, other than because Napoleon knew they would be recongised as the sister regiment of the former Dutch Lancers of the Guard and that the officers would be known personally by their Dutch counter-parts.
In practice, of course there were no defections even amongst the former Imperial Guardsmen, and the delays simply gave the British time to get troops to Quatre Bras, but it was a worthwhile gamble which might have paid off.
That is absolutely fascinating, but is there any evidence for it at all? Don't forget that the Netherlanders were at Quatre Bras in contravention of Wellington's orders and Napoleon didn't know Wellington's dispositions anyway, he merely knew Wellington's habits and expected him to concentrate to the rear, allowing Ney to march to Brussels while this was occurring.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Didz
Neys Cavalry attacks did not fail due to lack of artillery support, they had artillery support, and infantry support. The myth that they were unsupported is part of the English myth and completely false. Both British and German eyewitness accounts repeatedly refer to their squares coming under close range cannister and musketry fire between each cavalry attack. Even Mercer states that he was forced to parade back and forth in front of his guns between each cavalry attack to re-assure his men that the French skirmishers were incapable of hitting a barn door even at close range, and he gives a detailed account of one skirmisher with a large moustache grinning at him as he repeatedly reloaded and tried to shoot him off his horse.
Indeed, Halketts brigade were so badly mauled by close range artillery and musketry fire that their squares began to fall apart and were only rallied and brought back under control by their officers after the timely arrive of Detmers Netherlanders who by then were mostly drunk on the gin they had been plied with all day by the locals villagers and rushed forward in column formation to fill the gaps in Halkets line and drive the French artillery and infantry back over the crest of the ridge.
Ney's first attack was with Milhaud's Corps and the Heavy Guard cavalry. There was no horse artillery, but the French foot artillery on the ridge did manage to bombard the British at long range between charges.
For Ney's second attack, Napoleon released Kellermann's corps and the light cavalry of the Guard. Was there any horse artillery? I can't find any references to its use at this point.
For Ney's third attack, Napoleon released Bachelu's division and Tissot's regiment (presumably because d'Erlon's Corps had partly reformed), Pire's horse artillery also took part and this was I believe the first time the French were able to use canister, firing at the British Guards from the hollow way behind Hougomont. Bachelu then decided to withdraw in the face of fire from duPlat's and Adam's brigades and because the French cavalry in the valley, although spent, restricted the frontage on which he could advance.
Notice that not a single British square was broken, and more importantly no British gun was spiked, a clear sign that French horse artillery didn't make it to the plateau since they carried the special headless nails used for this purpose.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Didz
If there was a failure it was in the fact that Napoleon did not expliot the success of the French cavalry attacks in sufficient strength, with La Haye Sainte taken and the French infantry and artillery in command of the ridge line he should have thrown in the last of his reserves and smashed the British centre completely, instead he held them back, and eventually depleted them by detaching many to counter the Prussian advance on Plancenoit.
The cavalry actually did their job, and did it rather well, effectively pinning the allied right and centre in position and preventing Wellington actively commanding his own army for several hours, but with only the dreg's of D'Erlons Corps to expliot the advantage there simple were not enough French troops on hand to punch through the allied line, and the Germans and Dutch simply refused to break even under close range cannister fire.
As you have said yourself in other threads, cavalry rely on the psychological effect of their presence to break formed infantry. The British squares never broke, so there was therefore no success. Yes, Wellington was prevented from manoeuvring, but I don't think he had any intention of doing so at that time. He was compensating for the perceived unreliability of his army by keeping it concentrated behind the ridge. He was certainly not about to emulate Harold at Hastings.
It was perfectly possible for the French cavalry to pin Wellington's centre without suffering heavy casualties had that been their intention.
EDIT: After La Haye Sainte was taken, Napoleon waited until Plancenoit was recaptured before throwing in his last reserve to support Ney. This was the gamble that lost him his army. Wellington's reserves were still sufficient to stop the Guard, while Napoleon had nothing left with which to prevent the collapse that occurred when Ziethen's Corps broke through d'Erlon's line.
You might argue that Napoleon should have used the Guard earlier, but how could he leave Plancenoit in Prussian hands in his rear?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
Yes, Napoleon's plan was good, but it was also very risky and from what he is recorded as saying during the campaign, he seemed unwilling to believe the Allies could stand against him... for example the famous "petit dejeuner" remark to Soult. Was he just trying to increase morale, or was he actively deluding himself?
Well over the entire campaign he conducted two maneouvres from a central position. The first pinned the Wellington's army at Quatre Bras whilst he defeated the Prussians at Ligny, the second pinned the Prussian's at Wavre whilst he attacked the Wellington at Waterloo.
Either could have given him victory, but neither actually did, and on both occassions victory was denied him by the Prussian Army staff and soldiers who pulled a miracle out of the hat to negate the benefits he should have gained.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
Yes, an excellent point, Soult was not effective as Chief of Staff to Napoleon. He would have been much better as a wing commander, perhaps instead of Grouchy. But the problem was that there was no good candidate for Chief of Staff, someone who knew Napoleon intimately was needed.
Yep! that was the crux of the problem. Berthier was gone and there was nobody to replace his skills.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
Yes, they were definitely resolute, but they were not the equal of the French in battle as Ligny and Plancenoit demonstrated. But they had been equally resolute in 1814 recovering from the Six Days campaign, and in 1813 attacking Möckern outside Leipzig. Just because Peter Hofschröer admires them doesn't make them supermen. By the way, I'm not being jingoistic here, I just think that, thanks to their meritocratic system, the French had the advantage of a more experienced and effective officer corps, with more scope to show individual initiative.
Never mind what Hofschoer thinks, he's just a historian trying to sell a book. The thing that I admired about the Prussian soldiers in 1815 is what they actually did, and if you read Hofschoers books you can see that the Prussian Army in the 1815 campaign pulled off some amazing feats of military skill, which quite honestly I don't think either Wellington's or Napoleon's armies were capable of matching in that campaign. They may have lost the battle of Ligny for example, but they denied Napoleon the fruits of that victory.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
That is absolutely fascinating, but is there any evidence for it at all? Don't forget that the Netherlanders were at Quatre Bras in contravention of Wellington's orders and Napoleon didn't know Wellington's dispositions anyway, he merely knew Wellington's habits and expected him to concentrate to the rear, allowing Ney to march to Brussels while this was occurring.
Actually, Napoleon probably knew Wellingtons dispositions in detail well before he planned his campaign. By some quirk of political expediency all the village prefects in Belgium were still ex-French soldiers who had been appointed to their positions by Napoleon as a reward for their years of loyal service in the French Imperial Guard.
These men were actually responsible, amongst other things, for allocating billets, food and fodder to regiments of the Allied Army.
Mercer gives a detailed account of the hostile attitude of the prefect he had to deal with in his billet area. These men were in constant touch with the French authorities reporting on the cantonments and strengths of the Allied Army in the Netherlands, so Napoleon had an almost complete map of the dispersal of Wellington's Army. Ironically, these reports were delivered to the very same Frenchman, that Wellington was relying upon to betray the positions of the French Army prior to the campaign, and the excuses given by this guy for not providing Wellington with the information succeeded in leaving Wellington completely in the dark about where and when Napoleon would strike.
Fortunately, Wellington had refused to allow any of the Prussian Army to cross the Belgium border and occupy cantonments inside the United Netherlands, as he was suspicious that they might not be willing to leave again after the campaign. Consequently, French intelligence on the French army was less detailed and Napoleon failed to realise that Zeitens Corps was deployed across the French line of advance.
As for the Dutch conspiracy theory, it is just that, a conspiracy theory. However, if you actually plot the movements of the French Army north along the road from Charlerio to Quatre Bras, there are some really weird goings on along that road. Not least the fact that for some reason the advance was led by the Lancers of the Imperial Guard, with explict orders to Ney not to commit them to battle, and the fact that the French halted and camped for an entire night in front of the first Dutch troops they met, and that even after Zietens Corps appeared on the scene the battle that ensued was little more than a sporadic skirmish that allowed the Prussians to simply march across the line of the French advance screened by the Dutch.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
Ney's first attack was with Milhaud's Corps and the Heavy Guard cavalry. There was no horse artillery, but the French foot artillery on the ridge did manage to bombard the British at long range between charges.
That actually doesn't make sense, if you think about it. The French artillery on the opposite ridge would not have been able to bombard the Allied squares between their own cavalry charges. Even if the gunners had been able to see through the opposite ridge to know when specific squares were not being attacked, artillery at this period used richocet fire and would have being bouncing shot through their own cavalry to get them over the crest into the target. As Mercer and several other officers relate the French cavalry were reforming for each attack less than 50 paces from their positions, so lobbing shot over them was hardly an option either.
Incidently, your point about the guns being spiked might have been a valid one had they been there. But the whole abandon the guns and run to the squares thing is just another bit of the English Myth. Its true that Wellington ordered this to happen, but in practice the gunners ignored his orders and limbered up and withdrew their guns to the rear as soon and the French cavalry attacks begun. Only Mercer's battery stood its ground, and they refused to leave their guns at all. Wellignton was livid about this after the battle, even attempting to prevent the Royal Artillery Officers being issued with Waterloo medals and pensions, however, he was not prepared to admit that his orders were opening disobeyed and so the myth persists that the artillery did as they were told. To be honest, I have some sympathy for the Royal Artillery on this point as Wellignton's order may have been sensible form a tactical viewpoint, but it wasn't very practical from an artillery viewpoint. Quite apart from the obvious risk that the artillery could have their guns spiked if they left them behind, the fact is that the guns are not the most vulnerable part of a battery, the limbers are and there is no drill for withdrawing and recalling the limbers without the guns. Certainly the limbers could not have been withdrawn inside the squares, and as evidenced by the carnage inflicted on the boys of the French batteries by the Union brigade leaving them standing in the path of the French cavalry would have led to a massacre. I suspect that most battery commanders assumed that Wellington's suggestion (he was not entitled to issue orders to the artillery) was a dumb idea and did what they thought was best to preserve their batteries.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Juvenal
For Ney's second attack, Napoleon released Kellermann's corps and the light cavalry of the Guard. Was there any horse artillery? I can't find any references to its use at this point.
All French cavalry divisions had attached Horse Artillery, even the attack by the Imperial Guard later in the day was accompanied by horse artillery which advanced between its columns. The main source of the unsupported cavalry myth, is actually based upon evidence from the British brigades deployed to the west of the spur overlooking the area the French refer to in their accounts as 'the valley'. I've walked this area of the battlefield and I'm not surprised to hear that the French guns had trouble reaching the crest of the ridge at this point. Its deceptively steep, in fact when we climbed it we needed to use our hands to support ourselves. I'm sure the horse artillery could have mounted it had they been allowed to do so without hinderance, but in fact, there is an area of dead ground at the foot of the slope which was being used by the French cavalry as a rallying area between attacks and was crammed with men and horses, plus the slope itself was rendered even more formidable by the piles of dead horses brought down by the grapeshot fired from Mercers battery. No French artillery was going to mount that slope, and so most did so to the east of the spur (presumably avoiding the sunken road, which was occupied by French skirmishers) and ended up facing the German and Dutch squares rather than the British. The only support the troops to the west of the spur had to deal with were the French skirmishers sent forward from Hougoumont.
The other thing to bear in mind is the the main strength of the French cavalry attacks west of the spur followed the line of the valley rather than mounting the ridge directly and so this section of the line was under much less pressure than that between the spur and La Haye Sainte.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
this has turned out to be a very vicious and bloody discussion. Most of whats going on here seems to be Britain-Bashing! Let me give you some simple and accurate points:
-BRITISH MONEY was the only reason Austria, Russia, Portugal, Spain, Prussia and all the other countries stayed in the war afetr their numerous humiliating defeats.
-Napoleon was turned back in Russia due to the Russian Winter, and his stretched and attacked supply lines failing, not so much the Russian army.
-Wellesly was by all means not a mediocre commander, in fact only Boney himself could be suprerior. He beat all that was sent agianst him in India and in the Penninsula, was the only one who actually beat Napoleon, and he himself was NEVER DEFEATED.
-British troops played the largest part in the Penninsula. Spanish troops were usually cowardly, ill-led, and turned up late, disorganised or not at all for battles. Nor were they grateful to the liberating British. There actually were Spanish atempts to make Britain pay tolls for the supplies and weapons they were shipping into spain. Britain supplied the Spanish troops with their much pay, supplies, powder and weapons. The Spanish guerillas achieved far more than the Spanish soldiers ever did, and they were given weapons and supplies by the British as well.
Although the Portugeese troops were quite good after being trained by the British, they to were supplied by Britain, and British officers sometimes commanded them. So the British played a bigger part in the Penninsula then anyone else.
-British troops were the best trained and equipped, and they could fire and reload their muskets faster than anyone else. British soldiers were the only ones that could defeat and break French column attacks, and they were the only ones that beat the old Guard.
-British troops were usually outnumbered by the French, but still managed to beat them. Other nations armies outnumbered Napoleon, but were still completely beaten by him.
-The Royal Navy.
-Thus we can conclude that Gret Britain played the biggest part in defeating the French, and Napoleon could not have been beaten without the British.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
I'd like Wellington's detractors to find one battle he lost and even one sizeable engagement apart from sieges lost by the British in Spain/Portugal. Maya and Roncesvalles perhaps, although more tactical retreats and followed by victories.Fuengirola I don't know but I'll look it up.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fuengirola
Yes very interesting but hardly typical of the Peninsular battles.The British themselves did not form the majority of the force and which was formed of French deserters and Spanish. Hardly a solid reason to base criticism of Wellington and the British army in Spain.Quoting this little engagement with one British battalion involved as evidence of military inefficiency is the most laughable post I ever read on these forums.
This topic has alreay been done to death in so many threads,probably a sneaking suspicion by the detractors a la Peter Hofschroer that Britain was the major power to topple Napoleon.
http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showt...=288675&page=8
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
-Thus we can conclude that Gret Britain played the biggest part in defeating the French, and Napoleon could not have been beaten without the British.
I think you have over compensated on one or two of your points, but I have to agree with your conclusion. If nothing else the Royal Navy, and the revenue from trade that it protected ensured that Napoleon was eventually defeated. It would be difficult to argue otherwise.
As far as Wellington is concerned there is no doubt that he made a few mistakes, but generally as one French Marshall commented the British infantry were very bad soldiers and were just too stupid to realise that they were defeated and so on many occassions they compensated for the mistakes of their commanders simply by refused to accept that they were beaten.
As far as the Hofschoer controversy is concerned my understanding, having read the books and the background behind the court cases that followed, is that Hofschoer makes no real accusation that Wellington was a poor general, in fact quite the opposite.
The issue that upset the British historical establishment, and in particular the Wellington Society was focussed simply on his suggestion that Wellington had mislead Blucher into fighting at Ligny by misrepresenting the readiness of the Allied Army to come to his aid. Hofschoer makes a very good arguement to support this accusation, and for what its worth I think he may be correct.
The difference perhaps between those who sought to discredit Hofschoer and myself is that even if he is right and Wellington did lie to Blucher, it doesn't in my opinion make Wellington any less of a General. In fact, given that Wellington was both a General and a diplomat, and a significant driving force behind the maintenance of the coalition I think it is to Wellington's credit that when things went pear shaped he was prepared to do what was necessary to keep the Prussian's in the game and buy himself the time necessary to pull the fat out of the fire.
Who knows what might have happened if he had told the truth and given Gneisenau the perfect excuse to force Blucher to pull the Prussian Army out of theatre of operations in order to preserve it to protect the fatherland. As it was Blucher was able to counter Gneisenau's objections by quoting Wellington's promises, and by the time it became apparent that the British were not going to come to Prussia's aid the die had been cast and it was too late to withdraw.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
My source is http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/BATTLE_OF_WATERLOO.htm
which mentions 75,000 (including staff and medical) has 9 references and as far I know Adkin, Mark (2001). The Waterloo Companion. Aurum which mentions 72,000 for the French. I have never come across 77,000 especially from Mark Adkin. Anyhow taking the average of (77+73 (excluding staff and medical+72)/3 =74,000 French versus 72,500 (or 73,200 as per your source) Wellington’s.
After the detachment of around 15,000 (or more?) to Palnaceloit French would have 74-15= 59,000 french versus 72,500 for Wellington. So who is outnumbered?
Didz put a detailed post about these events. There was simply not enough infantry because it was fighting Prussians at Planceloit.
Hmm so let's see you claim a composite website is a better source than an intensively researched book? :laughter: So I can use Wikipedia versus your scientific text book? :hmm:
Yes Didz put in a very detailed post. You claimed there were NO infantry in Ney's attacks, myself and Didz said you were wrong. :doh:
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
I´m sure there is a middle ground between having the British being demigods without whom Napoleon would be now in Argentina and those who find the British useless. The post of HMS Empire is like those of Kolyan but on reverse.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ebusitanus
I´m sure there is a middle ground between having the British being demigods without whom Napoleon would be now in Argentina and those who find the British useless. The post of HMS Empire is like those of Kolyan but on reverse.
I think HMS Empire was exaggerating for effect.
But I agree with you Ebusitanus, there is a middle ground. Wellington was clearly not a "mediocre" general, but many British generals were.
Britain clearly did not commit as many soldiers as Austria(often overlooked as France's most frequent and steadfast enemy), Russia or Prussia, but those committed played a decisive role in Iberia and Waterloo.
We know Britain did not win alone but without British soldiers the Spanish and Portuguese may never have defeated Napoleon. Without British money the likes of Austria, Russia and Prussia could not have armed and funded forces. Without the Royal Navy Napoleon would have had more resources and more freedom of movement.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
-British troops were the best trained and equipped, and they could fire and reload their muskets faster than anyone else. British soldiers were the only ones that could defeat and break French column attacks, and they were the only ones that beat the old Guard.
Woooooooooow.
Wasnt it a Neatherlander Regiment that threw back the Guard?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Redalvilgeshki
Woooooooooow.
Wasnt it a Neatherlander Regiment that threw back the Guard?
Neanderthals? :laughter:
Errr NO. It was the British Guards under Maitland, and the British Brigades of Adam and Halkett. Most credit belongs to the 52nd Light Infantry. The Dutch fought Donzelot's force on the flank of the Guard.
You just don't want to give Britain any credit do you? :thumbsdow
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
The Attack of the Old Guard:
Never happened. The final attack at Waterloo was made by the 3rd and 4th Regiments of Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the Imperial Guard. Both official and unofficial correspondence refer to these units as the 'Middle Guard.' This was because their ranks were filled with soldiers who, although exemplary, were not considered good enough for entry into the true Old Guard (1st and 2nd Regiments of Chasseurs and Grenadiers). In some cases entire line units had been admitted into their ranks because they had defected from the Bourbon army to accompany the Emperor on his triumphal return to Paris. The 39th and 59th Ligne Regiments are two examples.
The Middle Guard was very poorly equipped: musket slings were often made out of string. Very few of the soldiers wore the famous bearskins. Instead, a vast mixture of shako and forage caps were to be seen, one observer swearing that not more than 20 of the troops could be found dressed alike!
It would seem that the crack British guardsmen were hit by the Guard Chasseurs, whose repulse was actually caused by the devastating flanking fire of the British 52nd Light Infantry Regiment. The fire was even more deadly because of the formation the French guardsmen were in. Eyewitnesses indicated that they marched upon the enemy in a modified hollow square! Evidently the French Guard feared attack by nearby Allied cavalry.
https://www.hexwar.com/secure/games/...mon/myths.html
I'm sure many myths exist concerning most historical events but I do wonder why so many people concentrate on the Waterloo battle.Whatever the truth of the various events it represents a decisive battle and led to 99years of relative peace,at least in Europe.However,it is certain that Wellington was not being too immodest when he said...
It has been a damned serious business - Blücher and I have lost 30,000 men. It has been a damned nice thing - the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life...By God! I don't think it would have done if I had not been there
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
-BRITISH MONEY was the only reason Austria, Russia, Portugal, Spain, Prussia and all the other countries stayed in the war afetr their numerous humiliating defeats.
Agree. British payed for Napoleonic Wars and let others to bleed for them. It does not add to British military glory though.
When Alexander I asked British government to send an army into the main theatre in Central Europe they refused (I think it was 1813). Why? Fighting Grande Army with Napoleon in charge is a different affair to fighting an isolated, undersupplied, lacking intelligence, demoralised and exhausted by Spanish guerrillas French corps.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
-Napoleon was turned back in Russia due to the Russian Winter, and his stretched and attacked supply lines failing, not so much the Russian army.
Many invaders often found it as an excuse for their failures in Russia. Applying the same logic I can say that Britain would not last long during Napoleonic Wars if the water ditch between British Islands and Europe would not be there.
A few points regarding 1812 war in Russia though:
At the begging of the War two Russian armies were outnumbered 3 to 1 and by a number of rearguard actions and skilled and fast manoeuvring managed to evade a destruction with Bagration outplaying Junot. Also Barclays and Bagration decide to conduct a scorched earth policy. As a result they joined at Smolensk and there was nothing Napoleon could do with that - Jena-Auerstedt never happened to Russian army in 1812.
What does that have to do with weather?
Had the Russian army the qualities of the British …oops… unfortunately they cannot move that fast so they would be defeated before Smolensk.
Moving further – Kutuzov takes command. He is forced by the Tsar and nobles to stand and fight at Borodino. Now the situation is not that bad they are only outnumbered 6 to 7 but French have more experienced troops. The result is the bloodiest battle of the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon failed to achieve Austerlitz in 1812. And for Russian army it was a moral victory – they held the ground retreating only 1-2 km and slaughtering third of the Napoleonic Army and 47 of his generals taking unprecedented losses but maintaining order, cohesion and discipline. BTW At the end of the day Napoleon ordered to retreat to his initial position while Kutuzov order to prepare for another battle. Had the Russian army be destroyed there Austerlitz style Tsar would be devastated and maybe he would forced to sign peace. What does that have to do with weather?
Put Wellington’s army in the same shoes… well look above in this topic - I already compared Waterloo-Borodino battles and my point is no way they could do the same as Russians did at Borodino. This would end in a devastating British defeat for a few reasons mentioned above and there would not be any Prussians around to help.
With half of the army lost but not defeated Kutuzov decided to surrender Moscow while making this a trap for Napoleon. A trap he failed to see. Russians burn Moscow and deny napoleon from winter quarters. Also Kutuzov dispatched Cossacks and hussars to harass supply lines. Also Russian peasants start to fight the invader. Also he plays a personal tricks on Murat and Napoleon like he delays his answer on peace negotiations and so on. Also he conducts a brilliant (below is why) manoeuvre to the South-East and sets up a Tarutino camp denying Napoleon moving south into untouched provinces.
What does that have to do with weather? You say failing supply lines? They did not fail by themselves – it was Kutuzov’s leadership, Russian army and Russian nation effort.
After 3 weeks Napoleon realizes what’s happening and starts retreating South-West into untouched Russian provinces. Not for long. Kutuzov anticipated this and blocks (thanks to Tarutino camp) Napoleon’s way at the minor battle of Maloyaroslavets. Again casualty ratio is enormous on both sides and judging by Russian resistance Napoleon refuses to fight another Borodino and is forced to retreat by using the old destroyed road to Smolensk he used two month ago forcing his army to starve. He is retreating harassed by partisans and light cavalry and his marshals defeated at the battles of Krasni and Vyazmya. At that time it was a lovely sunny autumn with no below 0 temperatures almost up until Smolensk.
What does that have to do with weather?
From that point Kutuzov refused to engage the remains of the French army as he was convinced they will die out anyway. Hence he did not want to spill any blood of his soldiers in pointless engagements. The overwhelming majority of the Grande army was killed / demoralised / lost combat value before retreat from Smolensk.
What does that have to do with weather?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
-Wellesly was by all means not a mediocre commander, in fact only Boney himself could be suprerior. He beat all that was sent agianst him in India and in the Penninsula, was the only one who actually beat Napoleon, and he himself was NEVER DEFEATED..
Refer to my points above fighting Grnad army in Europe with Napoleon in charge and fighting French in Peninsular campaign. – two different wars. “beat Napoleon” if you are referring to Waterloo – I think it’s a well established fact even on this English speaking forum that it was Blucher who beat Napoleon at Waterloo with skilled manoeuvring and initiative. Wellington failed to concentrate at the start of the campaign and all he could do is to hold for 5 hours for Blucher to arrive. Very passive and mediocre performance. However overall he was a very cautious and good general. But “only Boney himself could be suprerior” – c’comon don’t be a victim of British propaganda. Try to look at the broader perspective.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
-British troops played the largest part in the Penninsula. Spanish troops were usually cowardly, ill-led, and turned up late, disorganised or not at all for battles. Nor were they grateful to the liberating British. There actually were Spanish atempts to make Britain pay tolls for the supplies and weapons they were shipping into spain. Britain supplied the Spanish troops with their much pay, supplies, powder and weapons. The Spanish guerillas achieved far more than the Spanish soldiers ever did, and they were given weapons and supplies by the British as well.
Although the Portugeese troops were quite good after being trained by the British, they to were supplied by Britain, and British officers sometimes commanded them. So the British played a bigger part in the Penninsula then anyone else..
War in Spain was first of all a partisan war led by Spanish nation who sacrificed the most and had the highest casualties and caused the overwhelming majority of the casualties to the French occupaniary force. Then there was a Spanish and Portugese regulars, then there were British with half (?) of them actually being German. War in Spain is a war of Spanish nation against the invaders. The British field “army” of around 20,000 very cautions of its own losses always avoided bloody engagements mostly dealing with manoeuvring, skirmishing and minor engagements with a losses reported in hundreds could not possible cause any significant losses to huge French occupational army. These were Spanish guerrillas who menaced French army.
The average casualties suffered by the French army during
the Invasion of Russian (1812) were 2,000-3,000 men per day.
"... the French forces in the Peninsula lost approx. 100 men per day ... " (- David Gates)
I wonder how many of that 100 were caused by British? 5? 7?
Could the Spaniards harm the French in a same way without British money and Wellington's British-Portuguese army ? To high degree probably yes. One has only to look at the example of Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan to realize that armies - with facilities and innovations beyond anything that Napoleon could ever have dreamt of - were strained by the type of warfare that he encountered in the Peninsula.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
-British troops were the best trained and equipped, and they could fire and reload their muskets faster than anyone else. British soldiers were the only ones that could defeat and break French column attacks, and they were the only ones that beat the old Guard..
Old guard you say?
"Digby Smith is of the opinion that it's impossible to know the number of Guard survivors from Russia still present in its ranks in 1815, but points out that of the 400-600 officers and other ranks who'd got back, many must have succumbed in Germany. The Grenadiers' and Chasseurs' composition in 1815 is perhaps relevant to the fiasco of the last fatal charge at Waterloo." (Austin - "1815: the return of Napoleon" p 314)
Again you should look at the broader - perspective ability to reload faster than anyone is good but what is it good if you cannot keep up with a Grande Army in speed? What if you don’t have sufficient artillery which has very low ammunition provisions and is not in particular accurate, what if your excellent heavy cavalry becomes a disorganised mob after a first charge? And what is it good to have best trained and equipped troops if cannot move a 20km without being out of supply and the situation requires you so? What if you face a Napoleon himself and the Prussians are not coming to help?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
-British troops were usually outnumbered by the French, but still managed to beat them. Other nations armies outnumbered Napoleon, but were still completely beaten by him..
You can’t compare peninsular war to main theatres of Napoleonic wars. Refer to the above why.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
-The Royal Navy..
Yes Royal Navy. The best Navy in the World. British army doesn’t become the best because its Navy is the best.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
HMS Empire Broadsword
-Thus we can conclude that Gret Britain played the biggest part in defeating the French, and Napoleon could not have been beaten without the British.
Great Britain greatest contribution was in gold and not in its soldier’s blood and enemy casualties.
in five years I shall be master of the world:
there only remains Russia, but I shall crush her."
- Napoleon in 1811
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
Hmm so let's see you claim a composite website is a better source than an intensively researched book? :laughter: So I can use Wikipedia versus your scientific text book? :hmm:
Yes Didz put in a very detailed post. You claimed there were NO infantry in Ney's attacks, myself and Didz said you were wrong. :doh:
Yes. I was not aware of the fact that there was infantry in the area. Always keen to learn something new. However it does not change the logic of my argument moreover Didz's detailed description confirms that my argument is correct - the badly needed infantry was fighting Prussians hence the attack was not very effective because Napoleon was outnumbered.
The website i mentioned has over 10 references. Surprisingly the summary (don’t have the book itself now) of the book you mentioned talks about 72,000 French before the battle at 11-00am. http://www.napoleon-series.org/ also mentions 72,000.
The Campaigns Of Napoleon, The Mind And Method Of History's Greatest Soldier.; David G. Chandler; Scribner; New York, 1966; ISBN: 0-02-523660-1 also mentions 72,000.You have a petty argument I must say.
However, still not happy with a source? fine - let it be your way. 77,000- 15,000 = 62,000 French versus 73,200 Wellingtion’s (as per your source). So who is outnumbered?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Jihada
...but I do wonder why so many people concentrate on the Waterloo battle.
Because we live in the English-American dominated world and British participated in the battle
Because waterloo is the last battle for Napoleon
Because up until Waterloo British never faced Napoleon himself.
Because it was very easy to twist this German victory into British and create a myth of British super army
Because centuries later it was easy support the myth of the super army saying that all these useless Europeans fought him for years and lost badly (I am almost quoting HMS Empire Broadsword) but as soon as Napoleon faced the real army (British of course!) he lost badly.
Because British used mass media very well for propaganda purposes to grossly overestimated the importance of the Battle claiming that British saved Europe - like Napoleon was going to use his poor 100,000 1815 style army de nord to defeat 450,000 – 500,000 Russians, Austrian and Prussians.
As you see possibilities for enjoyable British speculations around Waterloo are countless.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Rolica,Talavera,Fuentes d'Orno,Vimiero,Salamanca,Vittoria,Busaco,Oporto.That's just the bigger peninsula battles won. Add to that the amazing victories in India with tiny armies against huge odds
Wellington was a genius of both offence and defence. His preferred defensive tactics were because it played to his army's strengths, good but limited artillery, poorish and limited cavalry, and man for man the best line and light infantry in Europe. At least 3 of the above Wellington was the attacker. In the Waterloo campaign, after the initial surprise he played it (including bending Blucher to his needs)masterfully. Anyway if Ligny and Quarte Bras had gone worse for the allies he would have pulled back on Antwerp, and reassembled his Army, some of the best of which was on the way to America.
In the meantime the Royal Navy would have resumed the blockade and France would have starved in the face of the Russian steamroller.
Whilst we're at it lets get some numbers right for the makeup of his army at Waterloo
British;
31,253 British
6,387 KGL (ie British Army)
15,935 Hanoverians (de facto British Army)
29,214 Dutch-Belgians
6,808 Brunswickers
2,880 Nassauers
1,240 engineers etc
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
Yes. I was not aware of the fact that there was infantry in the area. Always keen to learn something new. However it does not change the logic of my argument moreover Didz's detailed description confirms that my argument is correct - the badly needed infantry was fighting Prussians hence the attack was not very effective because Napoleon was outnumbered.
Actually thats a misunderstanding and I should have been clearer in my original post.
What I said was:
Quote:
If there was a failure it was in the fact that Napoleon did not expliot the success of the French cavalry attacks in sufficient strength, with La Haye Sainte taken and the French infantry and artillery in command of the ridge line he should have thrown in the last of his reserves and smashed the British centre completely, instead he held them back, and eventually depleted them by detaching many to counter the Prussian advance on Plancenoit.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
As you see possibilities for enjoyable British speculations around Waterloo are countless.
I think your right. Probably the most that Napoleon could have hoped to achieve by victory at Waterloo would have been the defeat fall of the British Government. The political consequences would have been enormous, and Britains allies would have lost faith in Wellington and his leadership. The coalition might well have fallen apart, and that would have left Napoleon with some interesting diplomatic possibilities, even if militarily he might not have been ready to take on the other European powers in 1815.
One obvious possibility would have been a deal with Prussia, who were interested in their own Empire building at the time and might have been satisfied with a lions shared of the former Confederation states and a couple of northern channel ports in return for peace. That would have effectively set up a buffer state between France and most of its major enemies, and bought France time to rearm.
I believe it was you who later interpreted this statement as 'the badly needed infantry was fighting Prussians hence the attack was not very effective because Napoleon was outnumbered.' But that was not the impression I mean't to give.
The fact, is that as the French cavalry assault developed, La Haye Sainte was taken, French infantry from D'Erlons Corps and from Hougoumont managed to secure the ridge line and occupy the sunken road. French horse artillery were dragged up the ridge to fire cannister into Halketts squares and the situation was looking decidedly grim. The squares of Halkett's brigade broke and began to disband only being saved by the timely intervention of the Netherlands Division who temporarily drove the French back over the crest and gave Halkett's officers a chance to restore order.
However, at that point, when Ney sent an urgent request to Napoleon requesting more infantry to exploit the situation and break through the enemy centre, Napoleon actually had the entire Imperial Guard still in reserve and ready for commitment. He could and in my opinion should have committed at least the middle guard at that decisive point in the battle. Instead his only reply was 'Infantry! And where do you expect me to find infantry? Do you want me to manufacture some?
When in fact he was standing within a few hundred yards of about 13,000 of the best infantry in his army who were sitting on their packs in assault column formations waiting to be committed to the fight.
That I think was the point that Napoleon lost the battle, and that was his big mistake. The only explanation is that Napoleon did not grasp the fact that the decisive point had been reached, despite the fact that throughout the day his aim had been to break through the Allied centre, at the very point that his goal was within reach he allowed himself to be distracted, and when he did finally commit these reserves he didn't even send them against the weakened centre of the Allied line but against the British Brigades to the right where the French cavalry had been the least successful.
In fact, at around the time that Ney requested more infantry, Wellington was on the point of admitting defeat. Many of the British regiments had already sent their colours to the rear to avoid the embarrassment of having them captured by the French, and Wellington was praying for either darkness (so that his army could escape) or the Prussian's. He sent a number of desperate messages to Blucher stating that unless the Prussian Army did something soon he would have no choice but the abandon the field and try to extricate what he could of his army. However, the Prussians had their own problems. The first of their Brigades were indeed at the edge of the battlefield, but their artillery and cavalry were still wading through knee deep mud trying to reach the front and without cavarly and artillery support their infantry could make little progress across the open ground guarded by Domon's Cavalry. To make matters worse the tracks they had followed had led the first brigades to appear behind the French flank, which whilst tactically advantageous, unfortunately mean't that Wellington and his staff could not even see them from the Waterloo ridge, and so there was still confusion and doubt as to whether they were really there. Wellington was perhaps wondering if Blucher was not being as equally diplomatic in his assurances of imminent support as he himself had been during the battle of Ligny.
Certainly reading the description of this stage of the battle one can see quite clearly why after the battle Wellington said that 'it was a damned close run thing.' , and personally I'm convinced that had those 13,000 guard infantry even begun to advance on the Allied centre then it would have been the last straw that tipped the balance and either Wellington and/or his soldiers would have decided the battle was lost. As it happens by the time they did advance, Wellington was satisfied that the Prussian had indeed arrived and he was even able to move some of his troops from his left to reinforce his right as the Prussians relieved the pressure.
In simple terms, Napoleon had left it too late and the opportunity had passed.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Jihada
The Attack of the Old Guard: Never happened.
Absolutely right. The Old Guard never attacked at Waterloo, their only contribution was to delay the Prussian pursuit so that Napoleon and most of the army could escape. Amazingly not a single French Eagle was captured during the French retreat.
Another interesting piece of trivia is that the British 1st Foot Guards were renamed the 'Grenadier Guards', supposedly in honour of having defeated the Grenadiers of the French Imperial Guard at Waterloo, but in fact they didn't. The battalions that attacked their sector of the front were from the Chasseurs of the Guard, so by rights they ought to be the 'Chasseur Guards':laughter:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
As you see possibilities for enjoyable British speculations around Waterloo are countless.
The most plausible benefit that Napoleon could have hoped to gain by victory at Waterloo would have been political rather than military. If he was lucky the public outcry in Britain over the defeat of its army and its best general would have brought down the government and possibly resulted in a request for peace.
Even if that didn't happen the loss of credibility amongst the other coalition members would have provide Napoleon with a number of diplomatic opportunities. Not least the chance to do a deal with Prussia, who were very interested in build their own empire at the time and might have settled for a large slice of the former Confederation states and a couple of northern channel ports in return for peace.
If that happened then Prussia would have acted as a buffer state between France as many of its other enemies, perhaps buying Napoleon time to re-arm.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
However, still not happy with a source? fine - let it be your way. 77,000- 15,000 = 62,000 French versus 73,200 Wellingtion’s (as per your source). So who is outnumbered?
I think your figure for the French is missing the Imperial Guard. Or at least it seems to match the figures I have for the French Army excluding the guard. I have a total strengths of French: 123,665, Allied: 82,300, Prussian: 117,622. However, these figures are based on paper strengths at the start of the campaign. Its worth noting that the French had fought at least five battles before they reached Waterloo, and had suffered in excess of 13,000 casualties at Ligny and Quatre Bras. Also its a fact that most non-British Allied units were over-stated on paper as they were paid a bounty per head by the British which led to some creative accounting, and that the Prussians must have suffered considerable losses both at Ligny and the earlier battles not to mention stragglers and desertions during the march to Waterloo.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Laird of Ravescroft
some of the best of which was on the way to America.
? (Just curious really, have I missed something?)
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
Yes. I was not aware of the fact that there was infantry in the area. Always keen to learn something new. However it does not change the logic of my argument moreover Didz's detailed description confirms that my argument is correct - the badly needed infantry was fighting Prussians hence the attack was not very effective because Napoleon was outnumbered.
Surprisingly the summary (don’t have the book itself now) of the book you mentioned talks about 72,000 French before the battle at 11-00am.
?
As Didz says above that is NOT what he said. You were told that the infantry of Bachelu and Tissot were commited, just too late to be of use. Had they been committed earlier the attack may have succeeded.
Not sure what you are talking about regarding the summary but I have the actual book mate and those are Adkin's figures.... :yes:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Didz
Another interesting piece of trivia is that the British 1st Foot Guards were renamed the 'Grenadier Guards', supposedly in honour of having defeated the Grenadiers of the French Imperial Guard at Waterloo, but in fact they didn't. The battalions that attacked their sector of the front were from the Chasseurs of the Guard, so by rights they ought to be the 'Chasseur Guards':laughter:?)
I also read, many years ago, so I do not recall the source, that the credit given to the "Grenadier" Guards was deliberately given to them rather than the more desrving 52nd Light Infantry because it was considered that only a Guard unit could be capable of beating another Guard unit. Thus the poor Oxfords were snubbed and their part deliberately overlooked in order to make the 1st Guards look better. :disgust:
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
I also read, many years ago, so I do not recall the source, that the credit given to the "Grenadier" Guards was deliberately given to them rather than the more desrving 52nd Light Infantry because it was considered that only a Guard unit could be capable of beating another Guard unit. Thus the poor Oxfords were snubbed and their part deliberately overlooked in order to make the 1st Guards look better.:disgust:
I'm not sure about that to be honest.
Randall Turner and I were discussing the attack of the Imperial Guard before Christmas and there seems to be a lot of confusion about exactly what was happening on the left flank of their attack. Certainly, the 52nd Light Infantry did advance right shoulder forward to attack a French unit, but whether this was the same unit engaged by the 1st Foot Guards is less certain, also its worth adding that the 52nd were not the only regiment to take part in this maneourve the 95th moved up on their flank, and on the the other flank troops from Halkets German and Detmers Netherlands Divisions were also engaged. So, it becomes a problem trying to determine who was firing at whom really. The only thing that is almost certainly true is the the 1st Foot Guards didn't drive off the Chasseurs completely unsupported, there was musket shot flying in all directions, and the classic 'English Myth' version of 'Up Guards and at 'em' is almost certainly an after dinner elboration of events.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Didz
I'm not sure about that to be honest.
Ranald Turner and I were discussing the attack of the Imperial Guard before Christmas and there seems to be a lot of confusion about exactly what was happening on the left flank of their attack. Certainly, the 52nd Light Infantry did advance right shoulder forward to attack a French unit, but whether this was the same unit engaged by the 1st Foot Guards is less certain, also its worth adding that the 52nd were not the only regiment to take part in this maneourve the 95th moved up on their flank, and on the the other flank troops from Halkets German and Detmers Netherlands Divisions were also engaged. So, it becomes a problem trying to determine who was firing at whom really. The only thing that is almost certainly true is the the 1st Foot Guards didn't drive off the Chasseurs completely unsupported, there was musket shot flying in all directions, and the classic 'English Myth' version of 'Up Guards and at 'em' is almost certainly an after dinner elboration of events.
It is pretty well established that the 52nd hit the 4th Chasseurs in the flank. :hmm:
Col Colbourne
Quote:
I ordered our left hand Company to wheel to the left, and formed the remaining Companies on that Company.....This movement placed us nearly parallel with the moving Columns of the French Imperial Guards. I ordered a strong Company to extend in our front [as skirmishers], and at this moment Sir F. Adam rode up, and asked me what I was going to do. I think I said, 'to make that column feel our fire.'
According to this site there is a French source which also specifically mentioned the 52nd as the battalion which broke the Middle Guard's attack.
http://www.waterloocommittee.org.uk/the%20secret.html
Mark Adkin, Andrew Roberts and Albert Nofi also all state that the 52nd hit the 4th Chasseurs flank.
I found reference to a French source in Ensign Leeke's book, as well as his testimony that the 52nd did indeed flank the Guard.
http://books.google.co.nz/books?id=E...age&q=&f=false
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Yup.
Under Packenham I think. They got whipped at New Orleans in a suicidal frontal attack against Andrew Jackson's entrenched forces.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Laird of Ravescroft
Yup.
Under Packenham I think. They got whipped at New Orleans in a suicidal frontal attack against Andrew Jackson's entrenched forces.
Sorry. Should have checked my dates. Read instead....On their way back from America, after the disasterous New Orleans expedition (Dec 1814- Jan 1815)
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
It is pretty well established that the 52nd hit the 4th Chasseurs in the flank. :hmm:
I'm not sure how, or who, has established that, pretty well or otherwise, but the issue Ranald and I were discussing was the suggestion that the guard advanced in square. Thus, for a start, there would have been no flank, 4th Chasseurs or otherwise.
According to Barbero the first two battalions to march up the ridge were those of 1/3rd Grenadiers and the 1/4th Grenadiers. But they weren't met by the 1st Foot Guards, in fact they hit the remnants of Halketts Brigade and the Dutch, suggesting that they may have chosen to take the line to the right (east) of the central spur, or if not then very close to its western slope. Neither side in this confrontation seemed to have a stomach for the fight and both Halketts men and the French Grenadiers began a half-hearted exchange of musketry whilst flinching away form each other as fast as their officers would allow them to. Halketts units had had enough and began to disband again, but the French seemed reluctant to grasp their chance of victory. Behind Halkets crumbling line only the children of the Brunswick Battalion and the three battalions of the 1st Duke of Nassau Regiment under Von Kruse stood between the French and victory. They were still in formed in square because they were petrified with fear and their officers dare not risk asking them to move for fear that they would run. Wellington further down the ridge with Maitland saw the danger and sent Major Kelly to "See what's wrong there."
He arrived just as Sir Colin Halkett received a French Musket ball in the face. leaving Colonel Elphinstone in command and completely at a loss what to do. In desperation Elphinstone turned to Kelly and begged him for advice. Two sergeant's from the 73rd ran up to them in a panic reporting that every officer in their regiment was dead or wounded and they had nobody to command them. Everyone had already sent their colours to the rear for fear of losing them. there seemed to be little hope that Halketts (now Elphinstones) Brigade could hold its ground and so Kelly took the initiative and ordered them to fall back to the hedge bordering the nearby road.
Unfortunately, this was the signal that most of the men had been waiting for as an excuse to abandon their posts and the withdrawal quickly degenerated in the rout that went far beyond the hedge line Kelly had indicated they should reform behind. I suspect that many of the men simply took the opportunity to make themselves scarce. Macready was damning in his criticism of Kelly's order pointing out that he could not conceive what the enemy was about during our confusion, and that fifty cuirassiers would have been able to annihilate the entire brigade if they had had a mind to.
In fact, the reason the French were not advancing was thanks to the Prince of Orange. Who at that point was the only Allied Officer in the area still with a horse and therefore able to see over the intervening hedges what the French were doing. He immediately called out to one of Kruse's Nassau battalions and drawing his sword led it forward in a bayonet charge against the 1/3rd Grenadiers. For a moment the Grenadiers paniced, but after the intial shock began firing into the German column at close range with fearful effect. The Prince of Orange was wounded and the Nassau regiment disbanded and it sound like they quit the field complety. Apparently Von Kruse was forced to send his last battalion (a militia one) forward to plug the gap in his line.
Meanwhile some of Halketts men had rallied and moved back into line, but now at last the Grenadiers heartened by the rout of the Nassau Regiment began to advance again, not with the bayonet but slowly and steadily firing and reloading as they came on. The officers were scampering back and forth in front of them screaming at them to advance but they refused to stop firing prepfering to move forward slowly and steadily despite the encouragement for them to charge.
Halketts Brigade ignored them concentrating of reforming their line and holding their fire until the last possible moment. When they did fire the French at first merely halted and their was a breif fire fight at close range before the French simply seemed to melt away into the smoke and their firing gradually stopped leaving Halketts Brigade more perplexed than victorious.
What had actually caused their dissappearance was not the fire of Halketts men but an attack by Chasse's 3rd Netherlands Division, and most importantly the Horse Artillery of Captain Krahmer who had galloped forward out of the smoke and dropping into position of Halketts flank had proceeded to blast the two Grenadier battalions with close range cannister from his eight 6 pdr guns.
Meanwhile, on orders from Wellington Detmers Dutch Brigade moved forward and replaced Halketts in the line and began firing steady volley's into the smoke in the general direction that the Grenadiers had disappeared. As they did so they perceived through the smoke that they seemed to be facing the flank of at least one of the French coilumns and General Chasse ordered them forward with the bayonet. Most of these men were still drunk from all the Juniper Brandy they had been plied with by the villagers of Brain l'Alleud and on the order to advance they rushed forward with quite comical enthusiasm shako's raised on their muskets screaming 'Oranje boven!" and 'Vive le Rio" scaring the French Grenadiers to death and tumbling them back down the slope in disorder. [Incidently, it occurs to me that ths column which Detmers men charged might not have been that of the Grenadiers. The timing coincides with the attack of the 3rd Chasseurs on Maitlands Brigade, and its possible that as the Dutch were firing into the smoke they might have noticed the 3rd coming forward on their right and helped the British Guards defeat it. Maitlands Brigade was deployed further to the rear than Halketts so the 3rd would have had to march past the flank of Detmers Brigade to reach them exposing their flank to just such an attack.]
Meanwhile Maitlands Guard Brigade was still lying amongst the wheat on the reverse slope of the ridge as the artillery supporting them rained death and destruction on the 3rd Chasseurs to their front. Some accounts report that the first volley from the Guards topple the French down the slope of the ridge, but Barbero claims that the Guards were lying on the reverse slope of the ridge behind their artillery and that the fire fight did not begin unto the French reached the crest.
The first men to crest the rise were the skirmishers screening the advance closely followed for the first of the supporting French horse guns, with the 3rd Chasseurs column appearing soon afterwards. The British artillery were firing shot rather than cannister into them (its possible that all the cannister in the ready ammunition had been expended by now) and eyewtinesses report seeing daylight through their formation every time a gun fired as whole files were carried away at once. As soon as the Chasseurs reached the top of the ridge they did exactly what the Grenadiers had done, they halted, and began to firing independantly at the troops in front of them, right under the mussles of the British artillery. At this point someone ordered the Guards to their feet and the sudden appearance of the Guards right in front of them followed by their first volleys of close range platoon fire resulted in their formation immdeiately starting to fall apart General Michel was killed, as was Colonel Malet a veteran who had begun his career as a drummer boy. Major Angelet receive his twelth wound.
Wellington turned to Maitland and said "Now Maitland, now is your time!" The order was given and the Foot Guards lowered their bayonets and began to advance. To their great relief and amazement the French did not wait for them to get any closer, but as soon as they began to advance the French began to fall back becoming more and more disordered until they broke and fled back down the slope chased by the Foot Guards.
Maitlands men were in the process of chasing the French down the slope when the last French Battalion the 4th Chasseurs loomed out of the smoke on their flank. Maitlands first reaction was to form front to flank, but in the confusion his order was not understood, or ignored and instead the instinctive reaction of the battalion officers was to form square. Not surprisingly the conflicting orders coupled with the imminent arrival of a French column caused total chaos and the Foot Guards began to disband.
In desperation the British officers chased their men back up the ridge pursued by the column of the 4th Chasseurs and only with some difficultly managed to get their men to halt beyond the crest and reform. Turning at bay they could hear the drums of the 4th Chasseurs close on their heels beating the pas de charge. Once again the British artillery opened fire, and once again on reaching the crest the 4th Chasseurs halted and attempted to form into line. Accoring to Lt Sharpin of the 4th Chasseurs the regiment (it consisted of both battalions) struggled to form line for a full 10 minutes under appalling fire whilst responding as best it could to the British fire being poured into them.
It was a this point that Colbourne' 52nd Light Infantry swung out of line right shoulder forward and begun to fire into the French formation from its flank. General Adam his superior galloped up demanding to know what he was doing, to which he simply replied "Making that column feel our fire." leaving the General to fume at his impudence. The 95th came up alongside the 52nd and added their fire to the slaughter and when Colbourne perceived that the French were begining to fall apart he order an advance with the bayonet and French disbanded and ran for the rear.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Laird of Ravescroft
They got whipped at New Orleans in a suicidal frontal attack against Andrew Jackson's entrenched forces.
Very few of the troops at Waterloo had served in America (I think the 44th Foot had) or indeed anywhere before. Most of the troops at New Orleans were colonial garrison units which simply returned to the West Indies after the battle. However, it was actually a worse mess than you seem to suggest. The attack at New Orleans was not suicidal, it was actually pointless and impossible, mainly because the British had left their scaling ladders behind on the beach and had no way of reaching the defenders. They were also 12 hours late making their attack due to a cock-up by the Royal Navy and so instead of attacking under cover of darkness they were caught in march column standing in a marsh in broad daylight under artillery fire with no hope of crossing the enemy ditch. In short it was a a complete :wub:-up.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Didz
I'm not sure how, or who, has established that, pretty well or otherwise, but the issue Ranald and I were discussing was the suggestion that the guard advanced in square. Thus, for a start, there would have been no flank, 4th Chasseurs or otherwise..
Most Historians. As I said Adkin, Roberts, Nofi, and many others. Of course maybe they are all wrong... :whistling
If you had been discussing the formation of the Guard then you should have been aware that the British reported the Guard to have advanced in column and not the squares which we know they actually used. You see this even in Colbourne's own quotation. Therefore the British believed they were flanking the Chasseurs and received a nasty surprise when the "flanked" unit fired and inflicted ~150 casualties.
I can see no debate as to the role of the 52nd, I don't know why you have doubts once again Didz! I think your mistrust of historians borders on paranoia! :tongue:
And by the way Barbero has been shown time and again to be a poor source, he makes so many mistakes.
For instance you say Barbero credits the Prince of Orange with organising the defence against the Guard, when he was in fact wounded over an hour earlier ~6.15 near La Haie Sante and was at a medical station (according to eye witnesses) in the rear when the Cumberland Hussars rode past before 7.30, the time of the Guard's attack.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
And by the way Barbero has been shown time and again to be a poor source, he makes so many mistakes.
On the contrary, he applies a historian's filter to the often misleading first-person accounts and provides the most balanced account of The Battle available to English-speaking peoples. He's not as detailed as Hofschroer or some of the British historians, but his lack of an agenda makes his book invaluable.
I'd take his numbers, for instance, as the best approximation for troop strengths available. And whatever Adkin says, those numbers _have_ to be an approximation.
Oh, and Didz, dammit, it's Randall, not Ranald. :doh:
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
We already established a month or so ago that Barbero contradicted himself regarding the attack of d'Erlon's corps for example. Doesn't matter if he has no agenda, it's how thorough his research is. As I said above he appears to believe the Prince of Orange was still commanding on the field one hour after being wounded and carted off to the medics at the rear.
Of course Adkin's figures are an approximation, no one can give you figures correct to the man! ;)
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
We already established a month or so ago that Barbero contradicted himself regarding the attack of d'Erlon's corps for example. Doesn't matter if he has no agenda, it's how thorough his research is. As I said above he appears to believe the Prince of Orange was still commanding on the field one hour after being wounded and carted off to the medics at the rear.
Of course Adkin's figures are an approximation, no one can give you figures correct to the man! ;)
I followed that thread, and I'm unimpressed. It looked to me as if you guys took one sentence from a 260 page book and chewed over it like a dog worrying an old shoe! :tongue: The book is a goldmine of plain speak from an authority giving his reading audience a overall feel for Napoleonic warfare and Waterloo in particular. If you think objectivity isn't important, partner, honestly I'd have to doubt your worldview. Bias is everything, it's crippling to interested hobbyists trying to puzzle out how and why "stuff happened". Misplaced emphasis is the bugbear of nationalistic histories. If you don't agree that Barbero's lack of same makes his book invaluable, we're going to have to agree to disagree.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Didz
I'm not sure how, or who, has established that, pretty well or otherwise, but the issue Ranald and I were discussing was the suggestion that the guard advanced in square. Thus, for a start, there would have been no flank, 4th Chasseurs or otherwise.
It was a this point that Colbourne' 52nd Light Infantry swung out of line right shoulder forward and begun to fire into the French formation from its flank. .
I just realised you contradicted yourself. First you say there was no flank, then you say there was!
Two other things, Barbero and Adkin appear to be at odds as to whether the Guard deployed skirmishers.
There is also doubt that Wellington ever said "Now Maitland, it's your time". Adkin says he did, but there are accounts that say the words were never uttered..... :hmm:
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Randall Turner
The book is a goldmine of plain speak from an authority giving his reading audience a overall feel for Napoleonic warfare and Waterloo in particular. If you think objectivity isn't important, partner, honestly I'd have to doubt your worldview. Bias is everything, it's crippling to interested hobbyists trying to puzzle out how and why "stuff happened". Misplaced emphasis is the bugbear of nationalistic histories. If you don't agree that Barbero's lack of same makes his book invaluable, we're going to have to agree to disagree.
I never said objectivity isn't important Randall! :doh: I said
Quote:
Doesn't matter if he has no agenda, it's how thorough his research is
I am saying that I believe his research to be full of holes, which bias or not undermines him as a source of information.
Personally I find Adkin's Waterloo Companion to be a goldmine. It is extremely well laid out (though the index isn't complete!) and has a ton of information. Have you not read it?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
I never said objectivity isn't important Randall! :doh: I said
I am saying that I believe his research to be full of holes, which bias or not undermines him as a source of information.
Personally I find Adkin's Waterloo Companion to be a goldmine. It is extremely well laid out (though the index isn't complete!) and has a ton of information. Have you not read it?
Of course! But it's not the be-all, and one of the problems it has is that unlike Barbero, the author is just a wee bit too much of a "company man" and altogether too certain where certainty isn't warranted. I'd echo what this Japanese reviewer said (from Amazon.com) - history is an elusive field.
http://www.amazon.com/review/R10RT5Q...R10RT5QSXW3285
start review:
"While this book is still very interesting to own and is far from being a piece of "garbage"(see above praises), after reading different writings about the battle of Waterloo, different analysis, I am not confident anymore about the exactitude of its content. In spite of all the chrome, there is simply better material out there that goes deeper into the analysis and avoids the pitfalls of secondary data.
This mix of good material with data that can be challenged certainly shakes the confidence I had in the book. While it is a good book, its usefulness in my library will be limited.
I would recommend to read in parallel "The Battle: A New History of Waterloo" by Barbero (The Battle: A New History of Waterloo) which offers a slightly different perspective and challenges through careful analysis of first hand accounts and data some of the more common knowledge.
History is a very elusive field, not easy to address. The Waterloo companion lost a bit its way. "
end review.
Of course, I picked the review that called out Barbero's book, because I'm biased. :)
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Shouldn't this thread be in the historical section?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Randall Turner
I would recommend to read in parallel "The Battle: A New History of Waterloo" by Barbero (
The Battle: A New History of Waterloo) which offers a slightly different perspective and challenges through careful analysis of first hand accounts and data some of the more common knowledge. . :)
I will but from what I have seen and had reported on here it sounds garbage, he gets so much wrong.
What do you mean by "company man"? :hmm:
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
I will but from what I have seen and had reported on here it sounds garbage, he gets so much wrong.
What do you mean by "company man"? :hmm:
Sticks to the company line. Take, for example, the situation we were discussing earlier, the Imperial Guard advance on the Anglo-Allied line. Barbero throws out the British first-person accounts of the French advancing in column and takes the position that they were advancing in hollow square. He also goes to some lengths to point out that the units that actually engaged were not Old Guard, but Middle Guard, and that in name only - they were line troops just a few weeks ago, and weren't cohesive units, ie, were newly formed. Adkin sticks to the conventional British accounts, and doesn't feel obligated to discuss the relatively ad-hoc nature of the attacking French units. That sort of thing completely outweighs any transposition of battalions that might or might not have occurred in his account.
Perhaps you can enlighten me on what other points you feel that he gets wrong? I'm willing to go out on a limb and bet they're nit-picks. I've no doubt his book has been raked over by British hobbyists in an attempt to discredit his less-flattering depiction of the British. Not that he's overly critical, mind - he's fair. But too many British hold Waterloo as a distinctly British national treasure and don't take kindly to what others may see as more even-handed accounts. It seems to me that in their protestations of Brit-bashing they don't realize that by glorifying their part in The Battle, they're denigrating the contributions of other participants. And look, I'm not ethnically French - "Turner" is English as the day is long. But the blatant bias in other works (not specifically Adkin) simply gets old, and worse, it makes it impossible to put together a coherent picture of how things worked. Which is what's really important to us, right?
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Randall Turner
Sticks to the company line. Take, for example, the situation we were discussing earlier, the Imperial Guard advance on the Anglo-Allied line. Barbero throws out the British first-person accounts of the French advancing in column and takes the position that they were advancing in hollow square. He also goes to some lengths to point out that the units that actually engaged were not Old Guard, but Middle Guard, and that in name only - they were line troops just a few weeks ago, and weren't cohesive units, ie, were newly formed. Adkin sticks to the conventional British accounts, and doesn't feel obligated to discuss the relatively ad-hoc nature of the attacking French units. That sort of thing completely outweighs any transposition of battalions that might or might not have occurred in his account.
Perhaps you can enlighten me on what other points you feel that he gets wrong? I'm willing to go out on a limb and bet they're nit-picks. I've no doubt his book has been raked over by British hobbyists in an attempt to discredit his less-flattering depiction of the British. Not that he's overly critical, mind - he's fair. But too many British hold Waterloo as a distinctly British national treasure and don't take kindly to what others may see as more even-handed accounts. It seems to me that in their protestations of Brit-bashing they don't realize that by glorifying their part in The Battle, they're denigrating the contributions of other participants. And look, I'm not ethnically French - "Turner" is English as the day is long. But the blatant bias in other works (not specifically Adkin) simply gets old, and worse, it makes it impossible to put together a coherent picture of how things worked. Which is what's really important to us, right?
Err Randall you've not been reading the same book mate because Adkin goes to great lengths to state that the Middle Guard attacked, not the Old. He also states the British were wrong in thinking they were in column, they were in squares. He gives a great amount of credit to the Prussians, Dutch, Belgians and Germans and does go into great detail about the quality and/or lack of in the French army.
I suggest you re-read it!
My nit-picks with Barbero? If it is true that he thinks the Prince of Orange was present at the Guard's attack, that is a big boo-boo.
I don't recall the exact details but I remember Didz stating that Barbero's account of d'Erlon's attack was contradictory. A historian contradicting himself, doesn't sell me on being accurate, call me a sentimental old fool......... :laughter:
I think this is what I was referring to
Quote:
Well its seems that D'Erlon's formation was not quite so consistent as Barbero initially suggests. I notice that its one of the features of Barbero's writing style that he makes a grandiose universal statement and then proceeds to contradict himself in the later detail of the chapter, and the issue of D'Erlons attack formation is no exception
with respect to Didz
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
Err Randall you've not been reading the same book mate because Adkin goes to great lengths to state that the Middle Guard attacked, not the Old. He also states the British were wrong in thinking they were in column, they were in squares. He gives a great amount of credit to the Prussians, Dutch, Belgians and Germans and does go into great detail about the quality and/or lack of in the French army.
I didn't mean to imply he misrepresented the engaging units as Old Guard. But..
I don't recall Adkin reference to advancing in hollow square, but it's not in front of me, I'm at work. I also don't remember him discussing the "raw" nature of the Middle Guard units in any detail. Can you double-check those for me? I'd have to recheck it out from the library.
I also don't remember Barbero referring to Prince Billy being present at the I. Guard attack, but see "at work" above.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
call me a sentimental old fool..
You can't be much older than me, partner. I think Didz and I are both 55.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Randall Turner
I didn't mean to imply he misrepresented the engaging units as Old Guard. But..
I don't recall Adkin reference to advancing in hollow square, but it's not in front of me, I'm at work. I also don't remember him discussing the "raw" nature of the Middle Guard units in any detail. Can you double-check those for me? I'd have to recheck it out from the library.
I also don't remember Barbero referring to Prince Billy being present at the I. Guard attack, but see "at work" above.
You can't be much older than me, partner. I think Didz and I are both 55.
Pages 419-420 are specifically about the formation of the Guard. All the maps show the Guard in square formation. Pages 391-404 are about the Guard's attack and there are numerous references to their square formations.
Pages 205-206 detail the deficiencies in the Middle Guard.
I'm younger than you both but I feel old :tongue: Anyway it was a quote of Billy Connolly :thumbsup2
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
Pages 419-420 are specifically about the formation of the Guard. All the maps show the Guard in square formation. Pages 391-404 are about the Guard's attack and there are numerous references to their square formations.
What the.. Hey, Didz, it's your job to keep track of Waterloo stuff, howcome you were so surprised at Barbero's hollow squares if Adkin also references them?
I do need to re-read this, iirc I got it to check something else re: Ney's attack back when. I distinctly remember it as Anglocentric, but maybe it's run together with another book.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
As Didz says above that is NOT what he said. You were told that the infantry of Bachelu and Tissot were commited, just too late to be of use. Had they been committed earlier the attack may have succeeded.
Not sure what you are talking about regarding the summary but I have the actual book mate and those are Adkin's figures.... :yes:
Through this thread I made a dozen main arguments and a dozen minor arguments analyzing the performance / quality of the British army during Napoleonic wars.
The way you decided to challenge my views is to take two of my comments which support only one minor argument and ignore the other 25plus. Moreover, proving that my comments are wrong doesn’t not invalidate my point that Napoleon was outnumbered. Pathetic challenge but I will respond here as well.
Ok. So it was the timing as per Didz which failed Ney’s attack. This doesn’t invalidate my point that Napoleon was outnumbered. Oopss. You didn’t like the website I gave you supported by 7 references ?!? –Ok. I already gave you another three references with one of them being a book, another ne being the summary of your own book and another one being on of the most respected websites. You still don’t like it? Ok – never mind- I accepted your source and used your own source for a simple calculation to ask you who was outnumbered and still got a reply from you saying that you have the whole book rather than a summary.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Kolyan
–Ok. I already gave you another three references with one of them being a book, another ne being the summary of your own book and another one being on of the most respected websites. You still don’t like it? Ok – never mind- I accepted your source and used your own source for a simple calculation to ask you who was outnumbered and still got a reply from you saying that you have the whole book rather than a summary.
I have no idea what you are talking about. :doh:
Why are you giving me an online summary of a book I own? I already posted the figures. I suggest you read it yourself rather than relying on a flawed website.
If you wish to discuss a salient point I shall but I'll not get bogged down in arguing with your rabid anti-British views.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
Koylan is the biggest Britain-Basher and much of what he says is wrong, exxadurated or just made up! By Viitoria, there were over 50,000 British troops in Spain. Earlier, ther had been around 25,000, which made the victories at Rolica and Talavera even more impressive. Wellington also often had to put up with incompetent and arrogant Spanish commanders who turne d up late for battle and their lazy, disorganised Spanish troops. Only later in the war when Spain had been given British trainng, money, weapons and powder, did they start to become an more effective fighting force.
The guerillas helped Wellsely more than the regular Iberian troops ever did, and they got much of their weapons, supplies and help from GB.
And in fact French troops in the Penninsula were usually good quality troops, under experienced and very able French commanders, who had beaten the Prussians, Russians, Austrians and whoever else countless times. They just werent good enough to beat Wellington and the British.
The British did definately NOT avoid big battles. Just go and read any account of the War, and you see the battles.
Nor were they afriad of taking losses. At Badajos in 1812, The British stormed breaches in the fortress walls and captured the city, taking over 5000 losses, mostly in the two breaches. Badajos was probably the strongest fortres in the whole war, and it was taken by British blood, bravery, and a refusal to be beaten. And that was just one of the many seiges. So dont EVER assume that Britain was afraid of takind losses or big engagements.
Dont underestimate the effect of British money and supplies to the other countries. If not, then they all would have been utterley conquered and defeated, without Britians money and supplies to keep their armies going. And can i point out, that none of the loans from Britain were ever paid back.
So not only did Britain fund the war for Russia and Austria and Prussia, it drove the French back from Lisbon in Portugal to Toulouse in France, helped by a few Spanish and Portugeese regular troops (trained, led, supplied and paid for by Britain) and a lot of brave guerillas (supplied, armed and paid by Britain).
There is no...British propaganda about the Napoleonic War. In fact, the Army's massive contribution is often overlooked and forgotten, as the Royal NAvy gets much of the credit for Trafalgar and all the other engagements. So GB gets far less credit than it deserves for the Napoleonic War, even from itself, and definately not from the other Aliied countries, who would have been conquered if not for British money and support, and a second front opened by the British in Spain.
Here is some more proof that Wellington was a first-rate genral: At the battle of assaye, in 1803, 14,000 British troops and Sepoys under the IEC defeated over 100,000 Maratha troops. Britain had 19 small cannons, the Marathas had over 100 heavy guns. Wellesly was hopelessly outnumbered in every way. But he advanced his excellent Highland infantry, up a slope, under fire from all the Marathas heavy guns, and into the hordes of Maratha infantry, who where annihalated by the Scots. So Wellington beat over 100,000 Marthas with over 100 heavy guns with 14,000 Scots and Sepoys and 19 pea-shooters. Skill or what.
Let me give you a quote of Napoleon "Give me control of the (English) Channel for 6 hours, and I shall rule the world." Britain was more important than Russia, as it was funding the rest of the allies, and it was blockading France. In the end, it was British troops, skill, ships and money, not anything else, that playd the biggest part in defeating France, KOYLAN.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
Most Historians. As I said Adkin, Roberts, Nofi, and many others. Of course maybe they are all wrong... :whistling
Well in fact it would only take one to be wrong, because historian's all copy each others work. So if one gets it wrong they all jump on the same band-wagon. Its very rare that a historian like Hofschroer actual does some original research and comes up with a different perspective and twist in the tale, and when that happens the usual reaction from the others is to try and tear his reputation to shreds and show he's wrong.
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Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
If you had been discussing the formation of the Guard then you should have been aware that the British reported the Guard to have advanced in column and not the squares which we know they actually used.
I think its rather amusing when you read Barbero's account of the Imperial Guard attack, because having made the bold statement that the Imperial Guard attacked in square, not in column, right at the start of his narrative, he obviously has trouble reconciling this statement with the events and testimony that happen afterwards. He constantly refers to the French as being in column, and the British and Dutch as attacking those columns in the flank, and then when he thinks the reader might have forgotten his faux pas he reverts to referring to them as in square again. Its actually quite amusing.
As to the question of whether they were in square or not, I am still waiting for someone to tell me where this information comes from. Barbero doesn't give any sources for this assumption, though I'm assuming it must be from the French testimony as the allied eyewitnesses are unanimous in their claims that they were in column.
Personally, I remain unconvinced. I still maintain that infantry cannot advance in square, therefore, the nearest the guard might have been to being in square is some sort of hollow column as depicted in Lachouque's book 'Waterloo'. The problem I see with this idea is that the advantages of using that formation over a standard column are so trivial as to be pointless, whilst the disadvantages are obvious, and I find it hard to see why the French would bother.
However, it might explain why upon cresting the ridge, none of the French battalions were in a position to make a bayonet charge:hmm:
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Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
You see this even in Colbourne's own quotation. Therefore the British believed they were flanking the Chasseurs and received a nasty surprise when the "flanked" unit fired and inflicted ~150 casualties.
Possibly, although there is a much more plausible explanation for those who have walked the battlefield. That is that the last and most westerly column in the attack was probably following the line of the cart track from La Belle Alliance to the Nivelles road. Its the most logical route to take across the open ground if you want a guide through the battle smoke leading to the main British position opposite and most French assault forces used it as a path across the battlefield. The problem is that when it reaches the spur that juts out of the centre of the British ridge it avoids the steepest part of the slope by veering to the west and skirts the foot of the slope until it mounts the plateau at a slighter incline behind Hougoumont. I firmly believe that this is the feature of the battlefield that many French writers refer to as 'the valley', because when you walk along it, it certainly feels like you are walking along a valley, with the steep sides of the spur on your right, and the rising ground on which the Chateau and estate of Hougoumont would have stood on your left.
When Ian Fletcher and the rest of us walked into this Valley, he was following the path taken by the 3rd Chasseurs and so to our surprise he veered off the track to the right and climbing over a fence proceeded to scramble up a quite steep slope into the positions which would have been occupied by Maitlands Brigade. I found I had to use my hands to support myself when clambering up this slope, and I wasn't carrying a musket and a 60 lb pack, it was certainly much steeper than I expected it to be from what I had read.
It also felt wrong, as though we had veered off course. The natural thing would have been to continue to follow the track up valley, where a much more gentle slope rises to the crest of the allied ridge just behind Hougoumont. Indeed I'm convinced that many of the cavalry squadrons which attacked that section of the British line did just that, attacking up the valley, isolating Hougoumont from the main allied line and then circumventing the chateau along the Nivelles Road to rejoin the assault.
So, it wouldn't be beyond the realms of plausiblity if the left most column of the Imperial Guard, having seen its predecessor mount the steep slope to the right of the valley didn't continue to follow the line of the cart track up the valley and follow the same line taken by their cavalry earlier. Perhaps, they planned to swing right and move up alongside the 4th once they had made some ground, but the net result would have been that as the 52nd put right shoulder forward and swung into line across the cart track they would not have been swinging across the flank of the 3rd but actually across its path.
Just a theory, but a bit more plausible than the square idea.
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Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
I can see no debate as to the role of the 52nd, I don't know why you have doubts once again Didz! I think your mistrust of historians borders on paranoia! :tongue:
I don't have doubts that the 52nd engaged the Imperial Guard, the issue was whether they helped to defeat the same column as Maitlands Brigade did. From Barbero's account it seems that Maitland engaged and defeated the 3rd Chasseurs on their own. However, they were caught in disarray by the appearance of the 4th Chasseurs and were stumbling back up the slope to their original positions when the 52nd swung into action, how much part Maitlands Brigade took in defeating the 4th Chasseurs is less certain, it depends on how long it took them to restore order.
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Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
And by the way Barbero has been shown time and again to be a poor source, he makes so many mistakes. For instance you say Barbero credits the Prince of Orange with organising the defence against the Guard, when he was in fact wounded over an hour earlier ~6.15 near La Haie Sante and was at a medical station (according to eye witnesses) in the rear when the Cumberland Hussars rode past before 7.30, the time of the Guard's attack.
Well there you go....and then you wonder why I mistrust historians. The fact, is that they get things wrong, and because they all copy each others work rather than using primary sources even an obvious mistake like the one you higlight gets repeated until it becomes part of the myth.
Again, I have no idea what Barbero's source is for the Prince of Orange story, possibly its 'silly billies' personal journal. Perhaps he imagined that this was what he would have done, had he not been wounded earlier, or perhaps one of the officers of the Nassau Regiment thought that the mounted officer leading them was the Prince of Orange. Who knows, but it does go to show how wrong historians can be over quite simple things.
Assuming of course that he is wrong, its just as likely that the historian who claimed that the Prince of Orange was wounded at 6:15 was wrong, and that everyone has just accepted it as fact ever since.
[On a more general note - I'm always a bit doubtful about any historian who starts quoting times of events during the battle. As far as I know very few officers, and even fewer soldiers had watches at Waterloo, and every eyewtiness account I've read has described the timing of events in relation to other events, so the only way to get a feel for the sequence is actually to plot them on a chart and cross-reference when things happened in relation to each other. Trying them to put times on these events is even more hit and miss and tends to rely upon the one or two occassions when Wellington consulted his watch.
To use your event as an example, we seem to be expected to beleive that as the Cumberland Hussars quit the battlefield, one of them noticed the Prince of Orange sitting in the aide station and decided it would be a good idea to get his watch out of his pocket and make a note of the time just in case someone asked later.
As a case in point according to the evidence of Captain Seymour at the court-martial of Colonel Hake the commander of the Cumberland Hussars. He was sent by Uxbridge to persaude the Colonel not to quit the field at 5 pm, not 6 pm, therefore either the Prince of Orange was wounded an hour earlier even than you were told, or the Cumberland Hussars took an hour to gallop 400 yards.]
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
Randall Turner
Oh, and Didz, dammit, it's Randall, not Ranald. :doh:
Oops! sorry mate, I've corrected it.
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Originally Posted by
Randall Turner
I followed that thread, and I'm unimpressed. It looked to me as if you guys took one sentence from a 260 page book and chewed over it like a dog worrying an old shoe! :tongue:
I also have to say that as far as I was concerned the debate about the attack of D'Erlon's Corps was inconclusive. It hinged eventually on the very simply question of who the Inniskillen Dragoon's charged, and so far I've been unable to find any primary evidence to confirm it either way.
If as some accounts claim the Inniskillen charged Quiots Brigade, then clearly they were not attacking La Haye Sainte as many historians claim, and Barbero is probably right.
If on the other hand Quiots Brigade were attacking La Haye Sainte, as most historians seem to agree, then who the hell were the two columns that the Inniskillen claim they charged between the Royals on their right who hit the 105e and the Greys on their left who hit the 45e. Perhaps, if Trooper Penn had kept hold of the eagle he captured then we would have had some clear proof one way or the other, but so far it seems that none of the Inniskillen came away from their charge with any trophies to prove who they were fighting.
[QUOTE=emperorpenguin;6546870]I just realised you contradicted yourself. First you say there was no flank, then you say there was![/quoted]
The contradiction really lies in the history of the event, so I'm merely quoting it. Clearly if the guard were in square then there was no flank to be attacked, on the other hand most historians seem agreed that the 52nd attacked the 4th Chasseurs in the flank.
Its just one of those inconsistencies that historian's seem willing to completely overlook.
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Originally Posted by
emperorpenguin
Two other things, Barbero and Adkin appear to be at odds as to whether the Guard deployed skirmishers. There is also doubt that Wellington ever said "Now Maitland, it's your time". Adkin says he did, but there are accounts that say the words were never uttered..... :hmm:
It would be extremely unusual if the guard did not deploy skirmishers, but it probably hinges once again on the issue of what formation they were really in. The other oddity about the sqaure thing is of course that when in square all officers and NCO's are positioned inside the square in its centre. And yet, we know that the guards advance was actually led by its officers, and there are eyewitness accounts of the French columns being preceded by scampering officers including their Generals urging them to charge. Its a minor point but odd nevertheless.
As for the 'Now Maitland, now is your time!' issue, my understandiing was that the doubts were centred on the whether Wellington shouted 'Up Guards and at 'em' rather than a personal piece of advice offered to a sub-ordinate officer. I've had a look through Siborne and certainly Wellington was with Maitland at the moment the French were advancing up the slope, so it seems unlikely that nothing was said between them at the time. (Letter 105) but Maitland does not mention what was actually said. (Letter 106) Lt-Colonel Lord Saltoun 1st Foot Guards mentions the 'Up Guards and at 'em' question but says that he never heard Wellington say it, nor has he ever met anyone who did, but he suggests that Siborne leaves it in the account as it sounds good. Funnily enough (Letter 109) Captain Powell 1st Foot Guards actually attributes Lt. Colonel Lord Saltoun with shouting 'Now's the time my boys.' as the signal for the 1st Foot Guards to advance with the bayonet. So, it seems that some encouragement was shouted but probably not by Wellington, and not quite as quoted.
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Originally Posted by
Randall Turner
What the.. Hey, Didz, it's your job to keep track of Waterloo stuff, howcome you were so surprised at Barbero's hollow squares if Adkin also references them?
I'm not surprised, just a bit doubtful. What I'm missing in all these accounts is the evidence, I've yet to discover why these historian's are convinced that the guard attacked in a hollow column/square. Tactically, it makes little sense, it doesn't fit in with the eyewitness accounts, nor does it match the detail of the events which occurred during the attack. e.g. skirmishers being out, and formations being led by their commanders. I'm not prepared to argue that Adkin and co are wrong, I'm just curious why they believe it to be the case. To me historical accounts have to make sense, and this is one detail that simply doesn't make sense at the moment, possible because I don't have enough information. The other issue was of course the formation of D'Erlon's Corps, which without doubt Barbero over stated in his account. I'm certainly prepared to accept that some of D'Erlons columns were actually nested battalions in line, but by his own tesimony in the detail is clear that not all of them were, the question then becomes which were and which weren't and he doesn't actually resolve this point.
Likewise, reading the various accounts of the attack of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo its pretty clear that at various times during the day specific battalions of the guard did form square, at various points. But I've yet to read any primarly evidence that confirms that they chose this formation to attack in. The other thought that occurs to me is that even if they didn't attack in square, there would have been plenty of reason for them to adopt a square formation once they were in contact anyway. From reading the first hand accounts it sounds like the position they found themselves in on cresting the ridge was pretty damned confusing with enemy infantry and artillery appearing and disappearing in a seemingly random series of attacks from multiple directions. The knee-jerk reaction of any battalion under such stress would almost certianly be to form square, and I beleive I read at least one account of the 4th Grenadiers being ordered to form square on the crest of the spur in the centre of the allied position.
Personally, I'm prepared to be convinced either way but I want to know what evidence there is, rather than accepting some historians word for it. From what I've read the situation during the guards attack was far more complicated and chaotic that most historians are prepared handle, and most have dumbed it down to make it easier to record, unfortunately, as always the 'devil is in the detail' and I don't think anyone has actually got to the truth yet.
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Originally Posted by
Didz
As to the question of whether they were in square or not, I am still waiting for someone to tell me where this information comes from. Barbero doesn't give any sources for this assumption, though I'm assuming it must be from the French testimony as the allied eyewitnesses are unanimous in their claims that they were in column.
Remember, Didz, when we were investigating this a few months ago, it was from a comment by a French general (whose name I have forgotten). We dug it up out of the "Napoleon Series" forums, where they were having this same debate. The comment was rather vague, though, if I remember corrrectly. I can live with "not sure". <shrug> Actually, I'm okay with "not sure" on a lot of issues, you guys as a group seem more intent on dotting every "i". I feel it's more important to get the overall gestalt.
Edit: looking back through our PM's you can get the url to the relevant thread, and you decided this was the pertinent passage (by Petit):
"Il était 7 heurs du soir environ, les corps de la garde avaient horriblement souffert, lorsqu'on fit marcher les 4e et 3e régiments de Chasseurs et les 4e et 3e régiments de Grenadiers. Ils passéront sur la gauche de la route où ils formés en carrés sur bataillon à l'exception des deux 4e régiments qui, vu leur faiblesse, ne firent que chacun un carré."
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Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...
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Wellington also often had to put up with incompetent and arrogant Spanish commanders who turne d up late for battle and their lazy, disorganised Spanish troops. Only later in the war when Spain had been given British trainng, money, weapons and powder, did they start to become an more effective fighting force.
The guerillas helped Wellsely more than the regular Iberian troops ever did, and they got much of their weapons, supplies and help from GB.
...helped by a few Spanish and Portugeese regular troops (trained, led, supplied and paid for by Britain) and a lot of brave guerillas (supplied, armed and paid by Britain).
This garbage has been debunked already so many times that it hurts to see how people who pride themselves in their historical knowledge bungle this up again and again.
Its surprising how people debate about wether this or that regiment should have done this or that in some odd battle when the most basics are still rim filled with XIX Century Chauvinistic crap passed as "history". Cowards, lazy, heroic guerrillas, no good regulars, etc, etc... Those fellow would do good to read even once in a wgile a good book about that conflict instead of parroting these steroypes.
Not more coward, lazy or unprepared than the loosers of Jena, Austerlitz or Wagram and then without surrenders and armistices.
Between Koylan and HMS we still have a long way to go.