The turmoil in Arab countries that is called the Arab Spring is conventionally said to have been
sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in a small village of Tunisia on December
17, 2010. The massive sympathy this act aroused led, in a relatively short time, to the destitution
of Tunisia's president and then to that of Egypt's president. In very quick order thereafter, the
turmoil spread to virtually every Arab state and is still continuing.
Most of the analyses we read in the media or on the internet neglect the fundamental
contradiction of this phenomenon - that the so-called Arab Spring is composed of two quite
different currents, going in radically different directions. One current is the heir of the world-revolution
of 1968. The "1968 current" might better be called the "second Arab revolt".
Its objective is to achieve the global autonomy of the Arab world that the "first Arab revolt" had
sought to achieve. The first revolt failed primarily because of successful Franco-British measures
to contain it, co-opt it, and repress it.
The second current is the attempt by all important geopolitical actors to control the first current,
each acting to divert collective activity in the Arab world in ways that would redound to the
relative advantage of each of these actors separately. The actors here regard the "1968 current" as
highly dangerous to their interests. They have done everything possible to turn attention and
energy away from the objectives of the "1968 current", in what I think of as the great distraction.
The past didn't go anywhere
What do I mean by a "1968 current"? There were two essential features to the world-revolution
of 1968 that remain relevant to the world situation today. First, the revolutionaries of 1968 were
protesting against the inherently undemocratic behavior of those in authority. This was a revolt
against such use (or misuse) of authority at all levels: the level of the world-system as a whole;
the level of the national and local governments; the level of the multiple non-governmental
institutions in which people take part or to which they are subordinated (from workplaces to
educational structures to political parties and trade-unions).
In language that was developed later on, the 1968-revolutionaries were against vertical decision making
and in favor of horizontal decision-making - participatory and therefore popular. By
and large, although there were exceptions, the "1968 current" was deeply influenced by the
concept of non-violent resistance, whether in the version of satyagraha developed by Mahatma
Gandhi or that pursued by Martin Luther King and his collaborators, or indeed older versions
such as that of Henry David Thoreau.
In the "Arab Spring" we could see this current strongly at work in Tunisia and Egypt. It was the
rapid public embrace of this current that terrified those in power - the rulers of every Arab state
without exception, the governments of the "outside" states who were an active presence in the
geopolitics of the Arab world, even the governments of very distant states.
The spread of an anti-authoritarian logic, and especially its success anywhere, menaced all of
them. The governments of the world joined forces to destroy the "1968 current".
A growing world movement
So far, they have not been able to do it. Indeed,
on the contrary, the current is gaining force
around the world - from Hong Kong to Athens to
Madrid to Santiago to Johannesburg to New
York. This is not solely the result of the Arab
Spring, since the seeds and even the revolts
elsewhere predated December 2010. But the fact
that it has occurred so dramatically in the Arab
world, once thought relatively unresponsive to
such a current, has added considerable
momentum to the growing world movement.
How have the governments responded to the
threat? There are really only three ways to
respond to such a threat - repression, concessions
and diversion. All three responses have been
used, and up to a certain point, their use has
achieved some success.
Of course, the internal political realities of each
state are different, and that is why the dosage of
repression, concessions and diversion has varied
from state to state.
However, the decisive characteristic is, in my
view, the second feature of the world-revolution
of 1968. The world-revolution of 1968 included
in a very major way a revolution of the "forgotten
peoples" - those who had been left out of the
concerns of the major organised forces of all political stripes. The forgotten peoples had been
told that their concerns, their complaints, their demands were secondary and had to be postponed
until some other primary concerns were resolved.
Who were these forgotten peoples? They were first of all women, half the world's population.
They were secondly those who were defined in a given state as "minorities" - a concept that is
not really numerical but rather social (and has usually been defined in terms of race or religion or
language or some combination thereof).
In addition to women and the social "minorities", there exists a long list of other groups who also
proclaimed their insistence on not being forgotten: Those with "other" sexual preferences, those
The '1968 current' refers to a revolution of
the 'forgotten peoples'
who were disabled, those who were the "indigenous" populations in a zone that had been subject
to in-migration by powerful outsiders in the last 500 years, those who were deeply concerned
with threats to the environment, those who were pacifists. The list has continued to grow, as
more and more "groups" became conscious of their status as "forgotten peoples".
As one analyses Arab state after Arab state, one realises quite quickly that the list of forgotten
peoples and their relation to the regime in power varies considerably. Hence, the degree to which
"concessions" can limit revolt varies. The degree to which "repression" is easy or difficult for the
regime varies. But make no mistake about it, all regimes want, above all, to stay in power.
One way to stay in power is for some of those who are in power to join the uprising, casting
overboard a personage who happens to be the president or ruler in favour of the pseudo-neutral
armed forces. This is exactly what happened in Egypt. It is that about which those who are today
reoccupying Tahrir Square in Egypt are complaining as they seek to reinvigorate the "1968
current".
The problem for the major geopolitical actors is that they are not sure how best to "distract"
attention and advance their own interests amidst the turmoil. Let us look at what the various
actors have been trying to do and the degree to which they have been successful. We will then be
able better to assess the prospects of the "1968 current" today and in the relatively near future.
Ex-colonial redemption
We should start the story with France and Great Britain - the fading ex-colonial powers. They
were both badly caught with their pants down in Tunisia and Egypt. Their leaders had, as
individuals, been personally profiting from the two dictatorships. They not merely supported
them against the uprising, but actively counseled them on how to repress.
Finally, and very late, they realized how big a political error this had been. They had to find a
way to redeem themselves. They found it in Libya.
Muammar Gaddafi had also, just like the French and the British, fully supported Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. Indeed he went the furthest, deploring their resignations. He was
obviously deeply frightened by what was happening in the two neighboring countries. To be
sure, there was not much of a true "1968 current" in Libya. But there were plenty of discontented
groups. And when these groups began their revolt, he blustered about how hard he would repress
them.
France and Great Britain saw their opportunity here.
'The 1968 current is expanding, despite recession, despite concessions, despite co-option'
Despite the degree to which these two countries (and others) had engaged in profitable business
in Libya for at least a decade, they suddenly discovered that Gaddafi was a terrible dictator,
which no doubt he was. They set out to redeem themselves by open military support for the
Libyan rebels.
Today, Bernard-Henri Lévy is boasting of the way in which he created a direct link between
President Sarkozy of France and the structure of the Libyan rebels on the basis of active
intervention to promote human rights.
But France and Great Britain, however determined, were unable to unseat Gaddafi without help.
They needed the United States. Obama was obviously reluctant at first. But, under internal US
pressure ("to promote human rights"), he threw in US military and political assistance to what
was now called a NATO effort. He did this on the basis that, in the end, he could argue that not a
single US life was lost - only Libyan lives.
Just as Gaddafi was unnerved by the ousting of Mubarak, so were the Saudis. They saw Western
acquiescence (and subsequently approval) of his departure as a highly dangerous precedent.
They decided to pursue their own independent line - the defense of the status quo.
They defended it first of all at home, secondly in the Gulf Coordination Council (and in
particular in Bahrain), then in the other monarchies (Jordan and Morocco), then in all Arab
states. And in the two neighboring countries in which there was most turmoil - Yemen and
Syria - they began to pursue a mediation in which everything would change so that nothing
would change.
A current not easily contained
The new Egyptian regime, under attack at home from the "1968 current" and always sensitive to
the fact that Egypt's primacy in the Arab world had diminished seriously, began to revise its
geopolitical stance, first of all vis-à-vis Israel.
The regime wanted to take its distance from Israel, without, however, jeopardizing its ability to
obtain financial assistance from the United States. They became an active advocate of
reunification of the split Palestinian political world, hoping that this reunification would not only
force significant concessions from the Israelis but hamper the development of the "1968 current"
among the Palestinians.
Two neighboring countries - Turkey and Iran - sought to profit
from the Arab unrest by strengthening their own legitimacy as
actors in the Middle East arena. This was not easy for either of
them, especially since each had to worry about the degree to
which the "1968 current" would menace them internally - the
Kurds in Turkey, the multiple factions in the complicated Iranian
internal politics.
And Israel? Israel has been assaulted all around by the prospect
of "delegitimisation" - in the Western world (even in Germany,
even in the United States), in Egypt and Jordan, in Turkey, in
Russia and China. And all the while it has had to face a "1968
current" that has emerged among the Jewish population within
Israel.
And, as all this geopolitical juggling has been going on, the Arab
Spring has become simply one part of what is now very clearly a
worldwide unrest occurring everywhere: Oxi in Greece,
indignados in Spain, students in Chile, the Occupy movements that have now spread to 800 cities
in North America and elsewhere, strikes in China and demonstrations in Hong Kong, multiple
happenings across Africa.
The "1968 current" is expanding - despite repression, despite concessions, despite co-option.
And geopolitically, across the Arab world, the success of the various players has been limited,
and in some cases counterproductive. Tahrir Square has become a symbol across the world. Yes,
many Islamist movements have been able to express themselves openly in Arab states where
they could not do so earlier. But so have the secular left forces. The trade unions are
rediscovering their historic role.
The global spirit of protest
won't be easily contained.
Those who believe that Arab unrest, that world unrest, is a passing moment will discover in the
next major bubble burst (which we can anticipate quite soon) that the "1968 current" will no
longer be so easily contained.
Immanuel Wallerstein is a professor in the department of sociology at Yale University and
author of some 30 books, including The Modern World System - published in four volumes,
with a further two anticipated. Prof Wallerstein's decades of work, critical of global capitalism
and supporting 'anti-systemic movements' have led to him being recognized as a world renowned
expert in social analysis.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al
Jazeera's editorial policy.
Source:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opi...711539134.html 
