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China, Britain and France: A comparative analysis of the East and West's leading Imperial powers 1644-1911
by Dante Von Hespburg
Painting of Qing Matchlock Banner soldiers battling against British Line Infantry, Battle of Chinkiang (Author unknown, Image sourced from Wikipedia)
The following is a short academic article outlining an introductory look at the differences and similarities between the Chinese (particularly Qing) and British and French empires. It will, I believe, spark both choruses of agreement (as any writer hopes!) and howls of 'shame'. Both are good for any article (I said optimistically). My hope though is that it will encourage the reader to dwell on the shared and connected histories of China and the 'West'. The research, debate and understanding are in this modern era more important than ever as the globe's centre of power takes a shift away from the Atlantic and towards the Pacific, which arguably is its 'historic' place (though thinking more China-India admittedly). I am writing of course from a western (and particularly British) perspective and the historical analysis here will alas reflect that (bias is something we can strive to mitigate, but can never avoid) despite a conscious effort to centre the discussion on China. I do not claim this is an exhaustive analysis, nor is China's history my scholarly speciality, but more I hope this to be an introductory piece to a further series of investigations, out of which I hope some discussion can be generated. In particular, I hope for discussion around the merits of an outward looking power versus one that turns in on itself which perhaps is I would hazard politically relevant today, through a role reversal from East to West.
The premise on which this article is based is that the Chinese empire's underlying cultural ideology of Confucianism directed its social and political self-conception towards a universal ruler exercising a 'Mandate of Heaven'. The empire's large-scale and continuous geographic context forced the promulgation of this ideology and supported it in creating an inward-looking Confucian state obsessed pragmatically and ideologically with the creation and maintenance of stability and unity, perhaps above all else. Thus, China, while sharing similarities with Imperial Britain and France as will be discussed, was set apart because of this underlying ideology creating a system at odds with the two 'western' powers' own outward-looking and aggressive ideology of global economic-cultural enforcement through free trade and the 'mission to civilize'. The European powers' shared geographical context provided the forced competition and impetus necessary for this more extrovert cultural outlook. While the Chinese empire's geographic dominance and lack of equivalent external rivals saw it turn to an inward facing ideological stance to counter its main perceived threat, that being itself, in the form of the potential for inner turmoil and the issues of governing effectively such a sweeping geographic entity. This article will argue this through an analysis of cultural, economic and political differences through and by showing how cultural ideology and geographical context created and sustained these differences. Lack of space and source constraints will centre the analysis on the Qing era (1644-1911) of China. This period has been singled out due to the Qing's increased interactivity with the world, particularly with Britain and France, which can thus more succinctly and openly highlight their differences and similarities. Britain and France in this time period too went through a transition of unprecedented globalisation in the mimicking of Spain's earlier (and first) 'Global maritime Empire'.
Qing China was a vast continuous land-centric empire. Its early unification in the third century BCE and imposition of Han culture over China (Waites, 2009, p.123) created the ideological concept of its geographical unification as a single entity. Britain and France in contrast were global maritime empires, whose geographical background, despite the example Rome was one of a patchwork of vying coexisting sovereign states in Europe. The competition of the area drove its main powers to actively, or reactively against rivals, seek access to resources beyond the continent to try and gain an upper-hand, or to make sure the playing field remained even by copying the other states.
Chinese imperial unity relied on the permanency of Confucianism within the state apparatus. Confucianism advocated a strict social hierarchy with responsibilities to both social superiors and inferiors (Weiming, 2016). Conquest Dynasties like the Qing assimilated Confucian doctrine and its perceptions of the 'Mandate of Heaven', instead of overturning local beliefs as the British and French tended to do in Africa and to a lesser extent in India. This was perhaps a pragmatic step given that Lord Macartney notes during his embassy to China in 1793 that the Qing rulers were still aware of their foreign origins, seen through the 'precautions' (Macartney, 1962, p.2) of favouring their own Manchu countrymen for higher offices. Though this was an outside perspective of the empire as foreigners were only allowed 'snapshots' of (Waites, 2009, p.129), Macartney as an ambassador experienced the emperor's court firsthand and so must have gleaned some practical workings and moods and thus can be seen as relatively reliable in this regard at least.
The Reception -A caricature of Lord Macartney's reception by the Qialong Emperor by James Gillray (Image sourced from Wikipedia). Interestingly the image belies the reality in which the Embassy for the British was an absolute disaster. While Macartney's account and the Qianlong Emperor's letter are perhaps the most important historical documents for Chinese-Western relations from the 17th Century,the actual Embassy failed in all its aims, and a series of ridiculous faux-pas marred the proceedings- firstly Macartney due to his own hubris and the slowness of Chinese officials directly sailed up-river towards Beijing to land, a big 'no-no' in contemporary Chinese etiquette. Several more issues dogged the meetings, the weirdest of which was Macartney's stipulation that he (as Representative of the King) would only kow-tow to the Emperor if the Emperor and his officials did the same to a portrait of the British Monarch- apparently the request was so ridiculous that the translators left it out completely when passing on Macartney's words to the Emperor.
Thus the rebellion that had established the Ming dynasty with its peasant origins (Chan, 2008) would be an anathema to Britain and France, as shown practically in their reaction to the French Revolution, a popular uprising partly due to monarchical incompetence (Wu, 2016). Britain and royalist France started a series of 'Coalition Wars' (1792-1815) to reinstate the former dynasty, de-legitimizing the uprising's success through their non-acceptance and eventual reversal of it, something that in China just did not happen, as the Mandate of Heaven made a fallen dynasty naturally illegitimate in Chinese historiography as they had clearly lost divine favour.
The European Coalition Wars also relate to the European specific context of interstate rivalries. With multiple states in competition for resources, a maritime global empire was necessary to influence the balance of power due to the dangers and difficulties of wide-scale European conquest against other states with similar armies and tactics (Lawrence, 2009, p.20). Even if a European state was not particularly interested originally in imperialistic adventures, if it wanted to be one of Europe's Great Powers, it would have to mimic its rivals and acquire overseas colonies merely to 'keep up' in terms of economic, political and military power. Britain and France had done this to stay competitive with Spain, both eventually toppling that Empire of its crown position in Europe and then Britain doing the same to France later after 1815 through the creation of more-successful overseas colonies and the undermining of their rivals' global possessions. Qing China already had a large territory and when stable, no immediate threats (Waites, 2009, p.129), making global colonies an unnecessary excess, particularly as there was no driving political need from inter-state rivalry. This combined with issues of keeping control over an already vast continuous empire, let alone a discontinuous one and colonies on the strict hierarchical Chinese model of direct state control made overseas colonies a stretch too far.
European colonies were thus economic acquisitions with a competitive edge. Both France and Britain colonized India in an attempt to control luxury goods instead of allowing their 'rival' a monopoly (Raynal, 1770[1776], p.2). China's conquests lacked these motivations. Qing expansion into Mongolia in 1690 was preliminarily satisfied by the Mongolian Khan merely swearing allegiance to the Emperor (Perdue, 1996, p.763), perhaps due to the prestige inherent in the victory and its reflection in honouring the ancestors of those involved. This was uniquely important in Confucianism, the mention of 'My Ancestors' merit...reached their distant shores' (Qianlong Emperor, 1793[1957]) contained in the Emperor's own summarisation of Lord Macartney's embassy implies the British are there due to his ancestor's splendour, not the Emperor's own. While perhaps a formality on an official document, it also may show the importance of legacy and need to sustain it, which is also, mirrored through any acts of greatness, such as conquest.
Britain and France had an array of colony ruling arrangements. British India was governed chaotically with directly and indirectly ruled areas all under an Empress, who was only a Queen of Britain (Porter, quoted in Lawrence, p.109). The Qing by comparison directly unified China with its border conquests administratively under 'one family' as its Emperor framed it in 1755 (Dunnell, 2004, p.77). Geographically the distances involved in both maritime and land-based conquests were huge. Due to the difficulty of logistics, the Qing even had to lure the Mongolians closer to China to conquer them (Perdue, 1996 p.764).
Qing Empire, 1765 (Image sourced from Wikipedia) - Continuous empires in many ways had far greater logistical and communication difficulties than discontinuous empires as water-borne travel typically tended to be faster, though just as risky.
Britain and France, 1750 (Image sourced from Eric Ross, Al Akhawayn University, Morocco) - Unlike the Qing they followed the European 'Great Power' tradition set down by Portugal and Spain in acquiring global maritime empires as a basis for prestige and economic purposes (mostly to fuel or mitigate 'Great Power' rivalries). The key departure from Portugal and Spain's example was the 1842 adoption in Britain of the concept of 'free trade' over the previous mercantilist model, which would eventually influence and invigorate similar pushes in other European empires.
Similarly, while British India retained local elites and arguably up to a point saw these indigenous social elites as equal to Britain's own upper class, as highlighted by George V's participation in the Maharaja of Nepal's 1911 hunt (Figure 10.6 in Lawrence, 2009, p.105). this could be perceived as merely a conciliatory gesture rather than a Qing styled elite incorporation, particularly as Dadabhai Naraoji, an Indian politician and member of India's local elite argued that equal treatment 'without distinction of race or creed...was never carried out' (Naraoji, D. (1901 [1917]), p.2). The replacement of Indian forms of rule with a bureaucratic civil service modelled on British ideals in which Indians had a very small voice (The Indian Civil Service) is another blow to the idea that any kind of equality in race-relations was sought. Thus while both British and Qing conquerors held the highest offices, the British exported and imposed their own system while the Qing adopted the Chinese one.
Furthermore, China's basis in Confucianism and the belief in the Mandate of Heaven created an external hierarchy of foreign states, imitating the internal social one with the 'enlightened' Chinese emperor at the pinnacle (Waites, 2009, p.135). This system indicates that like Britain and France a belief in the superiority of Chinese culture over others existed, seen in the Emperor's remark to George III that by sending an embassy he was 'inclining his heart towards civilization' (Qianlong Emperor, 1793[1957], p.1). This remark also highlights the key differences underlying a shared west-east attitude of cultural superiority. The Qing Empire was far less pro-active and aggressive in disseminating their notions of superiority. Tributary state governments were not changed or interfered with, unlike those under the spheres of Britain and France. Britain indeed from the Qing's perspective was considered a 'tributary state' during Macartney's embassy to China and yet the Emperor noted 'your country has its own customs...you would certainly not copy Chinese ones' (Qianlong Emperor, 1793[1957], p.3), a stark contrast to Britain and France's global mission to export their own civilisation as highlighted earlier.
The fact is the Qing tributary system was not a 'western'-styled imperial relationship, but more had echoes of that, while being the only mechanism accepted by Qing China to regulate and perform international interactions. This was due to an emphasis in China on cultural superiority and the ideas of China as the 'Middle Kingdom' of the earth- its centre. It was truly an 'empire of the mind' in this regard, and was incredibly frustrating to European empires who saw imperial superiority as being based not on theoretical or cultural concepts, but on economic and military power that was tangible and had actual practical limitations. This was a hang-over of their own geographic conception of having co-existing Great Powers with firm areas of influence. But yet in dealing with China up until 1839 at least, they had to conform to the Chinese system and play by its rules or risk being ignored (and thus losing out to their fellow European rivals who were courting China too for economic access). This system thus did not even share an economic purpose with the loosest British and French colonial relationships, as showcased in a schedule for protection treaties in 1880 Kenya which more than expanding influence actually ceded 'rights to land' (Kenya Land Commission, 1934) to Britain. Qing emperors actually gave greater value back through gifts to their Tributaries than the value of tribute received. This is showcased with the Emperor stating he gave the British a 'generous return, wanting to preserve my...power' (Chinese Record, 1957), which places the tributary system as a tool for showcasing the emperor's Confucian virtue and to aid internal stability through confirmation of his pinnacle position by foreigners, broadcast to his subjects. China thus lacked the real-terms basis of economic gain for it to have a true informal empire on the European model, such as Britain's over South America or China, where military pressure was leveraged for permanent economic concessions (Darwin, 1997, p.2)
Confucian-based imperialism was thus passive compared to its European equivalent. From the mid-1800s the ideology of 'free trade' had influenced Britain and France, as shown by their dropping of tariffs to '12-15' percent in 1875 from a highly protectionist stance in 1820 (Table 9.2 in Mackie, pp.51-52). This change indicated free trade's incorporation alongside the civilizing mission as Palmerston, British foreign secretary in the mid-1800s framed, 'Commerce is the best pioneer of civilisation' (Lynn, 1999, p.6). The impetus for this policy came not from government but opposition MPs like Richard Cobden influenced by and in return representing 'the manufacturing population' (Cobden, 1841). Qing China had no similar political system for the outlet of new or radical ideas. The Confucian hierarchy prevented it as the Emperor's position was absolute, as seen in Macartney's account of the ritual prostrations of the court in 'worship and adoration' of their sovereign (Macartney, 1962, p.1). The demand to respect virtuous betters meant institutional challenge by subjects in the manner of Cobden was impossible, nor would it be in the interests of the Emperor to weaken his authority by heeding such calls. This ideological stasis was reinforced by China's elite being tied to the state and Confucian system as a bureaucratic nobility whose social position was dependent on acquisition of a state given degree. While a degree was also required for British administrators in the Indian Civil Service, these were typically already from the wealthy upper classes (Mackie, 2009, p.89) thus having an independent power-base, not reliant on state support for status as the scholar-gentry's meritocracy was in Qing China (The Metropolitan Museum, 2004). This made China's elite unlikely to advocate policies, which changed the state structure on which their status relied.
Meanwhile state-independent British elites could act freely in influencing policy and even directing imperialism. The basis of property for social status (Waites, 2009, p.131) removed the direct consequence of losing position by 'taking on' the state policy for elites, unlike in China. Thus, a working relationship formed in Britain as Joseph Warren in 1772 states that laws are made by the 'consent of each branch' (Warren, 1772[1992], p.1),as one 'elite' group - be it gentry, Parliament, Industrialists or Monarchy - could check the power of the others from being too absolute (Wittfogel, 1957, p.14). Thus a group of private sub-imperialists where nurtured while China's Confucian state would have sought their 'pulverization' (Wittfogel, 1957, p.17). Their advocacy of aggressive ideologies to further their own interests through expanding the empire as is seen with the Scottish merchant William Jardine's lobbying of Palmerston to 'open up' China, who in turn 'immediately wrote to the Prime Minister...to discuss a military expedition' (Su, 2004, p.46). This resulted in the forced opening of Chinese markets to international trade and incorporation into the west's global imperial system. (All through opium no less).
An 1842 Sketch of British soldiers occupying the ground above Canton during the First Opium War.(Image sourced from Wikipedia). This preliminary conflict between Britain and Qing China saw an unexpected and heavy defeat inflicted upon the Chinese by the British who they had previously underestimated, in no small part due to the constructs of 'barbarians' in the Mandate of Heaven. It would take though the Second Opium War for a real change in attitude among China's political elite with the end of their 'Great Power' status confirmed to themselves and the European powers through Britain and France drawing China into their systems of informal empire. The Qing's (unsuccessful) attempts to reform along western lines after this were the death knell for the older traditional Confucian-based order as it gave way to China being forced into a distinctly 'Western' global order of extroverted politics and economics.
The lack of Chinese primary sources handicaps this analysis from providing a fuller range of differences particularly as a source is an individual perspective and not indicative alone of any larger picture. While the analysis is not exhaustive and is period specific, it can generally highlight how underlying differences of ideology and geography created pervasive differences between China on the one hand, and France and Britain on the other. A Confucian directed society alongside the pragmatic need for stability over a vast land-based empire created an inward-looking state for which imperialism was foremost a culturally based enterprise for supporting domestic ideology and stability. In contrast Britain and France from geographically enforced competition and later ideologically based ideals of free trade created a globally aggressive state and private led imperial system whose rationalisation was the creation of new markets through the 'civilisation' of indigenous peoples. China's own ideology was unable to provide the tools to compete with this. After 1842 a series of unsuccessful reforms to 'modernize' along western lines heralded the end of the traditional Confucian state and a move towards participation in the globalized western system. This though of course is not the end of the tale, fast-forward to our current global economic and political situation, and that same former 'globalized western system' is potentially seeing its rejection, or at least an appraisal of it in the largest 'western' states. At the same time, China under the Communist party has fused tradition, communism and capitalism in a seemingly potent mix, and is using this same globalized system to not merely retake its perceived historical place as a 'World Power' but also as a tool to realign the power balance between itself and the 'West' in far more favourable terms. Potentially placing China as the next 'world leader', is this a case of the conquered becomes the conqueror where ideology is concerned? That is a question for a whole other debate, but it is fair to say that while the British and French 'Western' globalized ideology destroyed Qing China's traditional basis, China has done a sterling job of adapting and fusing this victor to its traditional roots. In doing so, it redresses what might in the future be seen as a 'blip' of momentary power imbalance between West and East.
The modern dimension:
In this final part, I will actively suspend my attempted neutrality of discussion and include some of my own opinion as to why this 'great game' of ideologically based systems has a key bearing on the 'here and now'. The 'Western' globalized model of free trade and a 'mission to civilize' has formed the basis of what is commonly known as 'globalisation' and the modern neo-liberal model. It is the economic model that encountered resistance in 1870 from newly revitalized 'imperial tariff regimes', has adapted and evolved and since the fall of the Soviet Union and China's increasing engagement with it during the early 1990s seemed to have won out. Culturally the 'mission to civilize' is also still alive and kicking from a western perspective. It may have been dressed up, made politically acceptable to modern sensibilities and re-branded, but the concept of interfering with a foreign state's institutions and structures, of spreading democracy and western values is very much alive. Indeed the very thing was attempted (and failed) in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 'post-war' rebuilding programmes, and the 'west' still regards itself as having a moral imperative from a political angle to, rightly or wrongly, intervene in another country's domestic affairs if what is happening there openly contradicts 'western' values. Of course this often is used as a cover for a more pragmatic economic or political goal, but the fact an intervention can still be successfully 'sold' to an electorate on those moral grounds speaks volumes I think to the concept of a 'civilizing mission's' active appeal even today.
However, this western globalized system having won out and enjoyed at least two decades of unchallenged global hegemony (and around two centuries of being the largest global ideological system), appears to be potentially floundering now. In our current 21st century context we are seeing either a new evolution of capitalism (not uncommon as there have been roughly four key changes or 'phases' to updating the capitalist model to 'make it work' in its context at the time) or its change beyond recognition in the face of globalization's negative domestic consequences. These particularly being wage decline, the decline of the middle class (who ironically were responsible for capitalism's growth and predominance in the first place), growing wealth divides and the 'Fourth Industrial Revolution' of automation, made possible and competitive by the globalized market. This is in a context where, according to the Bank of England, out of the 33 million strong UK workforce, just shy of 15 million may be out of a job by 2030, due to the increasing pace of automation. Globalization and the very economic and cultural system the 'west' - epitomized here by Britain and France - sought to create and enforced upon foreign powers may be facing decline or collapse. Its traditional guardians found in the UK, the US and EU are scaling back (rightly or wrongly) both their real-term influence, and their 'wills' to enforce the system, which is no longer 'certain' both domestically and in regard to other rising challengers. The 'west' currently has no answers to the growing negative aspects of the system they created, meanwhile former dependencies who saw their indigenous ideologies overturned, like China or India, are on the rise. Though still facing the same issues of how to deal with the problems globalization has created they are arguably managing more successfully due to their unique economic and geographical contexts and the fact they have managed to fuse their traditional cultural models with the imported one. China's ambitious 'New Silk Road' project speaks volumes for this - blending the concept of inter-connected free trade driven and directed by the state, all harking back to reclaim a history deemed lost due to western intervention. Moreover their unique blend of traditional central state intervention and communist trappings laid over a 'western' capitalist model allows their state far more lee-way in addressing growing problems quickly. Just recently the state has 'back-doored' itself into China's investment market, much to the dismay of western investors, to provide 'stability' and 'certainty' in market decisions and growth, over what they see as western 'volatility' in the finance sector. Against the backdrop of the 2008 financial crash and the myriad of ways the 'west' has chosen to deal with it, who is to say they are wrong here?
Can a state-led and regulated globalized model be the next evolution as driven by China? Perhaps. The west in general is moving towards greater state regulation of the market to deal with its issues- whether this can be successful or not is again for another article (and one I shall write, I promise!). But currently what is assured is the 'west' is not making any large scale globalizing gestures of its own- indeed the current debate in many states seems to be whether to fully partake in the globalized system at all, let alone how to keep their historical place as 'leaders' of the system they founded. This will be I feel one of those periods of time where it will be a fantastic piece of history to look back on and study ... but is potentially going to be incredibly difficult to live through.
Bibliography:
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