Napoleon's Invasion of Russia: The Retreat

[Tiberius Tosi]

Part VII Moscow to Viazma

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The Decision


The opening manuevers outside Moscow. The map is off on scale, but it roughly gives a
decently vague outline of how the situation played out.

As September passed and October began, it became evident to almost everyone except Napoleon that Alexander would not make peace, at least not in 1812. While it may have been obvious to most, to Napoleon it seemed that if he stay in Moscow that Alexander may change his mind and decide to accept peace on French terms, but in all reality Moscow was a hollow victory and it sealed the fate on Alexander's decision to fight Napoleon no matter what the cost. It is worth noting that Napoleon did not at this time truly grasp the poor state his troops were already in. While he did know many thousands had died from starvation, heat stroke, exhaustion, disease, and weather, he did not know how widespread the suffering was. Napoleon held reviews and parades frequently, and at the reviews he only saw his troops in their best uniforms after they had eaten a good meal (commanders were willing to go out of their way and spend personal money if needed to make the soldiers look good before reviews).
While the army deteriorated, little was done. Some commanders, like Davout, ordered that soldiers be equipped with more weather appropriate clothing, and his efforts would undoubtedly save thousands of lives in the next two months. But, for the most part, soldiers of the Grand Army were still wearing the same uniforms they had when they crossed the Niemen. The cavalry was also wasting away every day the army spent in Moscow, as food for the horses was scarce, and little was being done to save these precious horses that were left.
Napoleon had, indeed, studied weather charts for Russia, which gave him the indication that it did not get very cold in Russia until early December, giving him no true sense of urgency to retreat in early October. Napoleon did not take into account a couple of factors, the first being that he studied average temperatures for daytime, not nighttime, when soldiers are most likely to freeze due to colder temperatures and the bodies natural slowing down when sleeping. He also did not take into account how quickly the weather could change in Russia, along with rain patterns, wind, wind-chill, etc. Also the weather in October was unusually warm that year, giving Napoleon the illusion that it would stay warmer longer, giving him more time to retreat and thus making the need to retreat sooner rather than later not all that important.
In the beginning of October, Napoleon saw the need to move out the wounded from Moscow, and on 5 October, the movable wounded were ordered to retreat from the city into friendly territory. However, it was not until the 10 October that these soldiers actually left the city. These fortunate soldiers, who left on 10 October, marched from Moscow to Paris in perfect weather conditions, without meeting any serious enemy resistance, and thus their casualty rate was as low as one could possibly hope for them to be. Even those wounded who were sent out as late as 16 October met only light resistance from enemy cossacks, but traveled in perfectly good weather conditions.
Even as he was sending back wounded, Napoleon saw little need to hasten retreating, until he received his wakeup call on the 12 and 13 October. On the 12 October, dispatches going from Moscow to Paris and vice versa were intercepted by the enemy, meaning that the Russians were now able to completely cut of Napoleon's only line of retreat and communications. On the 13 October, the army was shook when the first snowfall occurred, and Moscow was covered in a thing white sheet of snow.
Napoleon now saw the urgency of retreating, he immediately began preparations for retreat and said, "Let us make haste. We must be in winter quarters in twenty nine days time". Napoleon was by no means not capable of accomplishing this. Smolensk was only about a two week march away, and Vilna only another two weeks from there, both cities presumably having decent amounts of supplies. Minsk was also only ten days march from Smolensk in case the situation got dire enough.
Napoleon stockpiled ten days worth of rations for his soldiers, and the retreat was scheduled for 19 October, although this would later be put off until the 20 October. He kept open the option for returning to Moscow, and turned monasteries into fortresses and ordered horseless cavalry to be put as garrisons there. Instead of sending back the useless horseless cavalry, Napoleon kept them around, arming them with muskets, which they were neither trained how to use nor effective in battle as they were taught cavalry tactics and their nerves broke in the midst of infantry fighting.
Napoleon ordered his soldiers not to march back along the New Smolensk Road, which they had used to enter Moscow, since the forage that could be obtained had already been used up by the army when it entered. Instead, Napoleon broke his army up into three divisions, one under Mortier taking the Old Smolensk Road, one under Eugene heading southeastern in direction, and another under Ney and Davout (under the command of Napoleon) to head south towards Tarutino, where Kutuzov's army was stationed.
Kutuzov had entered Tarutino with only 40,000 men left over from Borodino, but now had a force around 88,000 with 662 artillery pieces plus an additional 28,000 cossacks. As Napoleon weakened every day, Kutuzov grew stronger, and he knew it. Although his force was now large enough to fight Napoleon, it was too inexperienced and it went against Kutuzov's plan of wearing down Napoleon as he retreated from Moscow. Kutuzov's main hope was to encircle Napoleon after he had been worn down enough, and only then would he commit his full force into battle and destroy Napoleon, as it is widely known that Kutuzov greatly feared engaging in battle with Napoleon during his retreat.
Despite his reluctance to engage, Kutuzov was under political pressure to attack Murat's force of 25,000, which was on it's own some distance south of Moscow. What could have been an easy operation and wiped out Murat, turned into a small skirmish after Kutuzov delayed the attack for a day, and then the next day failed to show up. The Russians routed the French, but only inflicted some 2,500 casualties.
As the soldiers left Moscow on 20 October, they took with them something which may well have been the cause of their future troubles: booty. It is estimated that about 8,000 men left their ranks to attend to personal baggage trains and carts which were filled with tonnes of treasure they had looted from Moscow. These carts would slow down the movement of the army, as they had to travel with the army or they would be attacked, and they wasted valuable space and horses. Also, soldiers were weighed down by their packs which were now filled with objects they wanted to take back to their countries to make a fortune with. Napoleon left Moscow with only about 95,000 soldiers capable of fighting, but had around 50,000 civilians traveling with them, that would also slow progress and waste up valuable food.

The Retreat


Napoleon's men begin leaving Moscow

Finally, the retreat began and the soldiers of the Grand Army left Moscow behind them, never to return. The soldiers spirits were high until a terrible rain came on the 22 October, causing progress to slow to a crawl. Napoleon who was marching south along the Old Kaluga Road towards Tarutino changed his mind on the 22 October, and turned and marched his soldiers west across open fields to the New Kaluga Road, where he linked up with Eugene. It seemed that Napoleon was considering an attack on Kutuzov, but changed his mind at the last minute and turned westward, in an attempt to avoid the army and leave it behind him. The French forces under Napoleon marched towards Maloyaroslavets, which was the crossroads that could send them on a westerly path back to Smolensk and Vilna.
The French arrived in the city just before the Russians, and Russian commanders begged Kutuzov to attack the French, and Kutuzov was slow to react as usual. Fighting broke out between the Russians and French at Maloyaroslavets, and an outnumbered French force (technically mostly consisting of Italians on the frontline) held their ground against the Russians. The battle ended when night fell, and by the end of the day Napoleon had some 65,000 men in the area, but that was all he could muster as opposed to the Russian force of 90,000 south of the town.
Napoleon decided not to engage the Russians the next day, even though he probably could have defeated them. Had he defeated them it would have been extremely costly and he would have had to leave the wounded from the battle behind as he retreated. Napoleon had three options at this point: Engage Kutuzov, defeat him and then retreat west towards Smolensk so as not to make the retreat seem like a defeat, take the road west through Maloyaroslavets since the Russians were now positioned south of the town but risk having the Russian army on his tail the entire march back to Smolensk, or to turn northward and take the Old Smolensk Road back to Smolensk and thus most likely ensuring safety but risking lack of food due to the farms by the road being depleted on the march in. Napoleon chose the third option, turning north and taking the Old Smolensk Road.

Re-entering Borodino


Russian cossacks.

Once the Russians learned that the French force near Maloyaroslavets was under Napoleon, they began retreating southward, while Napoleon retreated northward to the Old Smolensk Road. Napoleon met up with Mortier on the Old Smolensk Road and continued westward. Napoleon was in a dangerous situation though, he was only three days march from Moscow, but it had been ten days since he left the city. Such progress wasted valuable food that the army had stockpiled, and supplies were running dangerously short.
Shortly after the army linked up, it suffered a terrible blow to their morale as they marched across the battlefield at Borodino. The dead had never been moved or buried since there was no civil administration in place to take care of such tasks. Bodies were surprisingly well preserved due to nightly frosts. The soldiers were forced to march across the bodies of the tens of thousands of dead that they had left a month earlier. Wounded who had managed to find some food off the bodies of other soldiers were still lingering around the battlefield, and Napoleon ordered, against the wishes of doctors traveling with the army, for them to be taken along and put on wagons.
It was when the army was near Borodino that Napoleon received some grave news, that Smolensk or Vitebsk did not have adequate supplies to sustain the army through the winter, and that they would have to make it back to Vilna if they wished to survive the winter. Napoleon now knew that he must keep the army together until Vilna, but he thought that he himself must go back to Paris as soon as possible in order to prepare an army for the next campaigning season. He did not, however, want to leave the army now in its dire situation, and felt he must wait until in got closer to Vilna to do so.
As the French retreated down the road past Borodino, a new problem began to rise up. Cossacks, who had been a joke on the way to Moscow, were now taking a serious toll on the army. Since the French no longer had as much cavalry to combat the cossacks, they now freely rode by the army just out of muskets range and stalked them until an opportunity arose for them to safely attack a group of soldiers. The French became increasingly demoralized by these frequent attacks.
The lack of cavalry also meant that artillery could no longer be moved as effectively. Smaller guns which served little purpose were tossed to the side of the road, and wagons full of ammunition for artillery were emptied to make room for soldiers' loot. Many artillery crew were now forced to push their own guns, which slowed progress, especially when the roads became muddy, which they almost always were in the beginning stages of the retreat.

Viazma


Fighting at Viazma

As the French army passed through Gzhatsk, the weather was still favorable. Nightly frosts occurred, but nothing to seriously threaten the well being of the army. Napoleon was beginning to believe that the Russian winter would not be nearly as bad as claimed. The army was still held together quite well, but was marching on a single road westward, and was susceptible to attack.
On 2 November, such an attack finally occurred. Miloradovich tried to cut the road, and attacked Davout's corps. Although the attack caused a terrible psychological effect on the French troops, Miloradovich did not have enough infantry to effectively hold the road and split the army in half.
Two days later, on 4 November, Miloradovich had gathered a force of about 25,000 men, and made a second attempt to cut off Davout, this time not trying to cut the army in half but to catch the tail end of it and separate it from the rest of the army, making it easy to destroy. Miloradovich attacked Davout near the town of Viazma from the south, while Platov attacked Davout's rearguard in the back, and cossacks and irregulars hassled his flanks.
Upon hearing the exchanges of fire, Ney, Eugene, and Poniatowski all turned around to go to the aid of Davout. Ney covered the approaches to the town, while Eugene and Poniatowski both turned on the Russian flank. The Russians were beaten back, and the French even managed to capture a few Russian guns. Late in the afternoon, two fresh Russian divisions arrived, but the French managed to retreat through Viazma along the road, and Ney burned the bridges upon the last crossings. The battle could have completely cut off the army from Napoleon and his Guard (which was in the front of the line marching, and did not turn back towards Viazma) if Kutuzov had attacked the French western flank with his forces which sat the day out just south of Viazma. However, Kutuzov was extremely cautious and decided not to act, and therefore the Russian attack failed.
French losses at the Battle of Viazma amounted to about 6,000 dead and wounded, 2,000 taken prisoner. Russian casualties were no more than 2,000. Poniatowski had fallen off his horse during the battle and crushed his knee and shoulder, putting him out of action.

Winter!


The infamous painting showing Napoleon's army retreating in winter of 1812

The 3 November was to be the last day of good weather for most of the French army. On the 3 November, soldiers write in their diaries of picking flowers along the roadside, but the 4 November was to be a different story. On the 6 November, the rain turned to snow, and winter had set in. For the remainder of the retreat, the temperature would continue to drop well below freezing point.
Although the weather was not terribly cold in early November and was certainly not bad enough to be lethal to anyone with winter clothing, the French army had no such thing. Soldiers were not prepared with overcoats or caps to keep their heads warm. Those who had taken clothing or furs from Moscow began wearing them over their uniform, and it became more and more common to see full grown men in women's dresses marching with a gun in hand. Some soldiers wore entire bear furs, but this proved to be overkill and was unnecessary. The most sensible of soldiers found two or three layers of decent clothing and survived just fine. Soldiers who did wear too much often began sweating as they marched, and the sweat would freeze, causing the soldiers to actually be worse off than if he was wearing just his uniform.
Cavalry soldiers were extremely susceptible to freezing to death, as many would remain on their horses despite the cold. Those who walked side by side with their horses were more likely to survive, as the motion of walking kept their blood flowing and kept them warmer. Reports of cavalry freezing and becoming completely stuck to their horses were not uncommon.
As conditions worsened, cohesion in the army broke down. Soldiers began forming small units that would take care of each other, but would utterly reject any loners or stragglers seeking help. Those who could not find an immediate seat around a fire at night were forced to stand behind other soldiers and get as much warmth as possible.
Soldiers even began to throw away muskets as conditions worsened. The metal on the musket would often times stick to soldiers' bare hands and cause flesh to rip away. Soldiers used this as an excuse to throw out their muskets so as not to have to bear the load, but this mostly occurred near the end of the campaign in December.
Many smarter soldiers adapted to either sleeping in a constant state of napping for a short period and waking up, or did shifts with their comrades. Falling asleep too long in such weather made a person very susceptible to freezing to death, and sleeping in short intervals was for more beneficial than the unpleasant side effect of sleep deprivation.
As food became scarce, eating the dead horses became common, as was eating any other animal that could be found. Gunpowder was used to flavor the horse meat. If such luxuries could not be attained, then a common meal eaten by the soldiers consisted of melting snow over a campfire, mixing in flour or any other substance available, and adding gunpowder to add taste to the glue-like gruel. Soldiers would many times walk by cavalry soldiers, cut their horses leg and drain blood into their pans in order to either drink it on the spot or use it to add to their meal to attain some nutrition from it. Some reports say that soldiers could walk by a horse, rip or cut a portion of its body off, and the horses would be so numb and cold that it could not feel it, and the cold would freeze over the blood so quickly that the horse would go on walking and living as if nothing happened. Certainly the horse would die not long after due to freezing, however, but nonetheless it proves the extreme cold that the soldiers suffered through. For example, in just a two day window, 1,200 horses died in early November.
Soldiers ate food raw, which led to disease, diarrhea, indigestion, e coli, etc. Soldiers that died on the side of the road were not buried, as few soldiers wanted to risk the effort of burying a soldier and wasting energy and time. Wounded soldiers on the side of the road cried out to those marching on the road, but compassion was soon a lost trait to soldiers of the Grand Army, as their primary concern soon became only the survival of themselves. Many soldiers left the ranks and risked walking the countryside to find and steal food, as opposed to remaining with the army.
Conditions continued to worsen, but I will discuss the deteriorating situation of the later campaign at a more appropriate time, as this was only the beginning of the soldiers problems.

Part VIII Smolensk to Krasny

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Napoleon's men retreating in Russia. Note the odd, non-uniform clothing they are
wearing.

Napoleon Enters Smolensk


Polish Guard Lancers escorting Napoleon near
Smolensk

While the main army was held up at Viazma and was busy fighting, Napoleon ignored the fighting as merely commanders overreacting to cossack attacks. Napoleon continued onward down the road with his Imperial Guard to Smolensk (although he did consider giving battle after Viazma, but Ney talked him out of this action). Napoleon soon found himself marching through a blizzard on the road to Smolensk, and he realized his timing had been terribly wrong with the retreat. To make matters worse, it was at this time that Napoleon learned of a coup d'etat in France to overthrow him.
It was not until 9 November, with the ground turned to ice and the temperature hovering around 5 F(Fahrenheit, all temperatures used will be Fahrenheit), that Napoleon finally entered Smolensk. What he found there was not at all what he had been hoping for.
Napoleon had ordered, as early as the first days of October, for stockpiles of food to be amassed for the army when it arrived in Smolensk. Despite local authorities and French leaderships best efforts, this was truly an impossible task. There were already 15,000 wounded French soldiers left over from Valutina Gora and the Battle of Smolensk that needed to be fed daily. Also, as Napoleon had ordered troops up from Prussia France, the reserve food had to be used to feed these troops as they passed by. As the land had already been pillaged by the army on the advance, little was left over and locals were unwilling to sell goods, so many times force had to be used to acquire the food just to keep the wounded soldiers alive.
By this time Napoleon's army was already on the brink of collapse. It is estimated that Napoleon had lost around 60,000 men since leaving Moscow, and only about 40,000 were still organized with their original units, meaning the army was less cohesive and therefore much less effective at fighting.
Upon entering Smolensk, Napoleon issued an order to Prince Eugene to advance west to Vitebsk, not by road but by cutting through open country directly to the city. This would not have been a difficult task, had it not been for the weather. All was going well until Eugene's corps came across the Vop River, a small and easily fordable river by any means in normal conditions.
However, since the corps was not moving along any roads, there was no bridge for them to cross, and construction on a bridge was ordered by Eugene. Meanwhile, cossacks took the high ground along the river and set up cannons and began harassing the French troops below. A bridge was indeed built, but it soon collapse from the weight of the soldiers marching across. Hundreds of soldiers plunged into the water below, no doubt suffering from hypothermia when they go out of the river, and many dying before making it out of the water.
Since there was not enough time to build another bridge, and cossacks were getting bolder in their attacks on his men, Eugene ordered his men to ford the river, including his artillery. Men who crossed had water up to their chins, and artillery got stuck in mud along the steep banks of the river. Carts piled up as one cart plunged into the water, the one behind it would stop and be hit by the cart behind that, and so one, creating one big jam of horse and carts.
The men struggled the entire day to get the artillery across, but only twelve cannons could be dragged across, the others were destroyed on the other side of the river. As horses forded the river, they froze while walking, and the cavalry on top of them had to swim the rest of the way. Undoubtedly the most casualties were suffered by the infantry, who had to endure the night with freezing wet clothes and absolutely no shelter. In all about 2,500 men died, which was amazingly about one fourth of the forces Prince Eugene had left.

Smolensk


Marshall Michel Ney

Since the Guard was the first to enter Smolensk, they were naturally the first to try to find food and drink, which were handed out until supplies finally dried up. After the Guard entered the city, the gates to the walled city were shut, and only units marching under their colors with an officer were permitted to enter.
This unfairly discriminated against not only stragglers and those who had left their units, but also those whose units had simply died. Most cavalrymen who were left were a select few, and had no real unit with which they traveled, since the rest had died off some time earlier. These poor men, along with wounded and other infantrymen who were part of wiped out units, were forced to stay outside the city and spend nights out in the open fields.
As these soldiers were not permitted to enter through the main gate, many simply found other ways into the city. Once they were inside, all soldiers only thought of themselves and fights broke out around stores for food and liquor. Store owners were issued flour, but no ovens or baking bread it, so they simply poured the flour into water and boiled it, issuing food not much better than the soldiers had been eating on the march.
The Guard took control of the bazaar in the center of town, and did not allow anyone except those in the Imperial Guard in. This caused other soldiers to attack the Guard anytime they saw them in the city outside of the bazaar.
The army had began to enter the city on 9 November, and by 12 November, they still remained there despite these horrible conditions. The temperature had dropped to about -10 F, and most of the army was still camped outside with no shelter whatsoever in summer clothing.
Even loyalty to Napoleon was beginning to weaken. Napoleon thought that if he seemed well fed (which he most certainly was) and able to carry on with no problem, it would inspire the troops to do likewise. This was taken by most however to be a sign of Napoleon not caring for their suffering.
In all reality, the death of so many men could have been a benefit to Napoleon, as Caulaincourt pointed out. He said that instead of having a massive army of unfit soldiers, they were now left with the best of the best. There was more food for these resilient men, and they undoubtedly should be better fighters than those who had died, and the elite remained who would most likely not abandon or die off easily. Rather this belief was true or not is really a matter of personal opinion.

Krasnoi (Krasny)


Battle at Krasny

Finally on 14 November, Napoleon and the bulk of the army left Smolensk behind them. They marched out to a road filled with knee high snow that turned into sheets of ice as thousands of men marched on it. The French got word that the Russians had overtaken them and blocked the road ahead of them at Krasny. Unrelated but worth noting, Napoleon supposedly ordered his doctor to give him a dose of poison in a syringe, which he wore in a black sachet around his neck so that he could not be captured.
While Napoleon's Guard made it safely to Krasny, the Russians slipped in between his men and Prince Eugene's to block the road. On 15 November, Prince Eugene's men were the first to see the Russian force, under Miloradovich, blockading the road. The Russians asked him to surrender (as they could see how small and tattered his force was), but Eugene refused and force his small force up and opened his artillery on the Russian line.
The French under Eugene bravely held out against a much superior force of Russians until nightfall. Even most French soldiers agreed that they would have routed had night come an hour later. Realizing there was no way through the Russians, almost immediately after nightfall Eugene ordered his men to go around the road in a northerly direction. A scouting party convinced the Russian sentries that they were Russian and to leave and let them go through, and the Russians did so, meaning Eugene's move was completely unnoticed by the Russian force.
As Miloradovich formed up his troops to finish the French the next morning, Eugene's men safely slipped into Krasny behind enemy lines. Knowing that Davout and Ney were still cut off from Krasny by Miloradovich, Napoleon decided it would be in his interest to attack into Miloradovich's back to help them through, as Napoleon was worried Kutuzov would manouvre and cut of Napoleon as well.
On 16 November, Napoleon personally led his Guard out and turned backwards towards Smolensk to confront Miloradovich. Sensing the trap, Miloradovich moved south of the road and let Davout pass through, so he was not surrounded.
The order of the corps from west to east along the road was this: Napoleon, Eugene, Davout, Ney. Napoleon and Eugene had passed through safely on the 15 November, and the road was now open for Davout to link up with the bulk of the French force. But Davout had hurried forward to meet Napoleon and left Ney completely behind him. Napoleon was furious at Davout for this, but he could not wait for Ney or he would risk himself being surrounded.
Meanwhile, Miloradovich had set up another blockade west of Krasy at Ladi. He had also set up a line of troops parallel to the Old Smolensk Road and put the bulk of his artillery here, so as to harass the enemy forces. During all these actions, Kutuzov was sitting even further south of Krasny, afraid of committing troops against Napoleon himself.
Napoleon sent numerous infantry units and the Young Guard to attack the Russian artillery positions south of the road. These French infantrymen who attack the Russian positions suffered some of the worst casualty rates of the war. The Young Guard was almost completely wiped out covering the retreat. Napoleon, Eugene, and Davout managed to break through at Ladi, and broke free of the Russian forces. Ney was not so lucky; he was still lost somewhere along the road far back from Napoleon. The only thing that kept the Russians from completely annihilating Napoleon's army was Kutuzov's reluctance to commit more troops to block the road at Ladi, and to send more artillery to the positions south of the Old Smolensk Road.
The next day, Napoleon gave a speech to his Old Guard and what little remained of the Young Guard, pleading for them to not throw away their weapons as much of the army had, and to continue to fight for him. The Guard joyously showed their support for Napoleon. Other units were not so supportive. When General Gerard gave a speech to his men, one soldiers threw down his weapon and refused to fight. Gerard responded by threatening to shoot him, and when the soldiers refused again, Gerard stuck his pistol in the soldiers mouth and blew his brains away. It was only after this that the soldiers cheered for Gerard and Napoleon, saying they would fight to the death.

Where is Ney?



Count Miloradovich

On 18 November, Ney closed in near Krasny, and he had by now realized that Napoleon had abandoned him. Ney said, "That b------ has abandoned us; he sacrificed us in order to save himself; what can we do? What will become of us? Everything is f---ed!" Ney furiously settled down for the night just shy of the Russian positions near Krasny. He sent scouts to find a crossing north across the Dnieper river, so as to avoid the Russian forces. The scouts reported back that they had found a place, and Ney, in a clever move, lit fires to make it appear to the Russians that they were still positioned where they had stopped for the night, but really marched northwards and crossed the river.
Ney's men bravely crossed the frozen river, despite it cracking and making popping noises as they crawled across. As the wagons began crossing things got much worse. On the north side of the Dnieper River was a steep slope, which the wagons had to travel up once they had crossed. It had become iced over, and many wagons slipped back down onto the river, many times breaking the ice where it crashed. As more wagons piled on the ice, it eventually cracked and gave way. Hundreds of men fell into the water and froze to death. All of his artillery and some poor 300 men could not get across, and had to be left behind.
Miloradovich was absolutely furious the next morning when he learned he had missed a third opportunity of completely cutting off and destroying a French force. But nonetheless, Ney marched west, north of the Dnieper, and parallel to the road in order to meet up with Napoleon eventually. The Russians did not pursue Ney because they didn't know his exact location and crossing the Dnieper was an extremely risky venture. Finally on the 19 November, Ney marching southwards and found Prince Eugene and his men. Ney was back with the main body, and the French army was not together. A very dangerous situation had managed to have been avoided at Krasny, but only because of Kutuzov's reluctance, and the extreme sacrifice of thousands of French soldiers, which could not be replaced.

Part IX The Berezina River

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Battle of Berezina

The State of the Armies


Early crossings of the Berezina. Note the cavalry fording the River, this would
kill many of the horses that Napoleon picked up at Orsha.

While most of the suffering during the Russian campaign is indeed focused on the French, it is important to note that the Russian armies did also suffer terrible losses and survived through absolutely horrific conditions as well. While the French army melted, or froze, away so did the Russian army pursuing it. By the time of the Battle of Krasny, Kutuzov had lost some 30,000 men, and so was only left with an effective fighting force of about 26,500 under his direct command. The Russian army was much more split up than the French, and marched either through open fields, in an attempt to overtake the French army, or through the road that the Grand Army had previously just marched on.
The main army hardly, if ever, engaged the main French lines outside of major battles. For the most part, the two armies would leave each other alone, Kutuzov too scared to attack, and Napoleon too weak and the army too ineffective to risk battle. Most of the harassing of the Grand Army was left to the Russian cossacks, most of whom by this point rode around in the most expensive furs and were covered with gold objects that they had taken off French dead or captured.
The Russian cossacks treated the French prisoners terribly. Prisoners were usually stripped naked, their clothes taken by the cossacks to sell, and then forced to march and were given little or no food. Officers were treated fairly when Russian officers or foreigners were present, but were many times killed and their bodies stripped as soon as the person left. Local peasants were encouraged to come out and attack or harass French prisoners as they marched to their holding location. Most never made it that far, and died off along the marches.
Kutuzov still greatly feared fighting the 30,000 to 40,000 men that Napoleon had left, and it was also part of his grand strategy of wearing Napoleon down further before finally engaging him, preferably after he had been surrounded.
While the Russians had it bad, the French undoubtedly had it much worse, and 16 November made their situation harder and hopes of survival much slimmer. On 16 November, while fighting was taking place at Krasny, a 60,000 strong army under the command of Chichagov captured Minsk, a city that Napoleon had been hoping to retreat to as there was plenty of supplies stockpiled there. With Minsk now in enemy hands and Napoleon lacking the numbers to fight, Vilna was now the closest safehaven. To make matters worse, Minsk was west of Napoleon's current position, so now while Kutuzov, Platov, and Yermolov were approaching behind him, Chichagov was coming from the southwest. Wittgenstein, with 50,000 men, was also north of Napoleon's army, and Marshal Claude Victor and his corps was the only thing standing between Wittgenstein and Napoleon's northern flank.
The French army was slowly being pushed together and surrounded around the 21 November. Victor was being pushed southwards, Napoleon westward, and Oudinot and Dabrowski, both of whom were supposed to stop Chichagov were being pushed east towards Napoleon.
On 18 November, Napoleon sent a dispatch to Dabrowski telling him to capture and hold Borisov, a town along the Berezina River at which bridges could be used to safely cross. The army rested for two days at Orsha, and received rations if men were with their units. This action caused many men to join back up with their actual commanders, and would play a major role in the days to come. Along with the food supplies were a large number of horses and a pontoon bridge. Seeing as there was no possible need for the pontoon bridge if Borisov was held, Napoleon burnt the bridge.
The army safely made it to Dabrowski's position at Borisov. The sight of these properly dressed soldiers cheered the retreating men's spirits, but undoubtedly shocked the men under Dabrowski who had just arrived. This happiness was short lived, when Chichagov attacked and captured Borisov from the rear of the French column.

Battle of Berezina (25 November - 26 November)


A painting showing the carnage of crossing the bridges at the Berezina River

When news of the Russian capture of Borisov reached the upper command, a swift counterattack was made. Dabrowski launched an attack on Borisov before the Russians could even settle in, and they quickly took Borisov back, killing or capturing some 9,000 Russian soldiers, only about 1,000 escaped. But the retreating Russians had the sense to burn the only bridge across the Berezina River in Borisov. When news reached Napoleon that the bridge had been burned, he was furious about his decision to burn the pontoon bridge he had just received at Orsha.
While the temperature was indeed in the negative Fahrenheit in late November, the Berezina had been thawed a considerable amount just prior to the French arriving at the sight. The River was no longer a frozen passageway over which the army could safely cross, but was now an icy river not completely frozen over, making any attempt to walk over it impossible and extremely deadly.
The French army had just all converged upon Borisov, only to find their only hope of crossing the river safely completely gone now. A search for a new crossing soon began, and some of Oudinot's cavalry spotted a good area for crossing near Studzienka. Napoleon was at first reluctant and wanted to cross at Borisov and fight Chichagov, but was talked out of it by Oudinot, and soon the entire French army made for Studzienka on the night of 25 November.
With Wittgenstein, Platov, Yermolov, Miloradovich, and Kutuzov on his tail, Napoleon needed to cross quickly. He sent a feint to the south to trick Chichagov into sending his army south to look for a crossing, while indeed it was going north towards Studzienka. Chichagov bought it, and sent his army south. Even after cossacks reported seeing the entire French army moving north, Chichagov ignored this as the feint, and still firmly believed the Grand Army would cross south of Borisov.
Meanwhile, Wittgenstein, who was approaching from the northwest, was instructed to cross the Berezina and cut off any French attempt at crossing the river. But Wittgenstein ignored Kutuzov's orders, instead wanting to attack the French rear (Victor's Corps) and claim victory for himself.
The Berezina River was only about two meters deep and not considerably wide, meaning that making a bridge should not have been much of a problem. However, the banks of the River were steep and muddy, so the bridge had to be made much longer than the width of the River, as artillery could not get through the banks. Oudinot ordered sappers to work through the night building the bridge, and were spotted by Russians on the far bank (which was quite steep) and came under some fire.
The next morning (26 November), however, Chichagov ordered all Russian units to move south, and the Russians on the banks above left the French alone. Napoleon arrived on the scene just as the Russians had left, and was elated to find that his feint had worked, and the army may have a chance of survival in this otherwise impossible situation they found themselves in.
Polish cavalry were the first to cross, and they reached the west bank of the river and fought of all the remaining cossacks. French artillery was then set up on east side of the river to cover the crossings. The bridge was not completely, however, and pontoneers had to be sent in to neck high water to build the bridge, each paid 50 francs extra. Certainly it was their realization of the dire situation that actually drove them to jump into the icy waters. They worked in 15 minute shifts, but many, if not most, nonetheless died of hypothermia, being hit by floating ice, or slipping under the water and never returning to the surface.
The bridge was completed some time after noon on 26 November. It was a pitiful excuse for a bridge, but it was suitable given the conditions under which it was built. While Napoleon wished for the army to cross all at once, Oudinot wanted to cross immediately with his corps and set up a defensive position on the west bank of the river. Napoleon warned him against this, but did not tell Oudinot not to do so, and Napoleon watched as Oudinot led his men across the bridge. Oudinot's men set up a defensive position facing southwards to fight off Chichagov in case he realized his mistake and attacked. Once on the other side, Napoleon could no longer see Oudinot's men because of the snow, and it was unknown to him of their situation.
Meanwhile, a second bridge was being constructed just south of the first one. This one was to be much sturdier and used for baggage and artillery, but it was not yet completed. Three bridges had originally been planned to be built, but a shortage of supplies made them settle for two. By four o'clock, the second bridge was up and ready.
The Guard crossed the smaller bridge while Oudinot's artillery began crossing the newly constructed one shortly thereafter. The artillery bridge gave out four hours later and sank into the far bank, leaving tons of horses and artillery pieces stranded in the mud, and drowning many others. Work began on the bridge again, and it was opened three hours later, at eleven o'clock. But at two o'clock in the morning on 27 November, the bridge collapsed yet again, but this time in the middle, sending hundreds of men to their death in the river. The pontoneers began work yet again, and the bridge was opened four hours later yet again. Thousands of troops died from these collapsings of the bridges, and many died repairing them as well.

Battle of Berezina (27 November - 29 November)


The crossing at the Berezina

The 27 November was spent trying to get the army across the bridges, but the artillery bridge was becoming a death trap for many. Horses would get their legs stuck in between the logs (the builders didn't have enough resources to cover the bridge with any material, and the material it did was soon kicked off the bridge by those crossing) and quickly caused jams. Horses, artillery, wagons, and men were thrown into the river as shoving matches occurred to try to clear the bridge.
Only men with their units were permitted to cross, and civilians and wounded had to wait until later in the day. Many of these stragglers and those who could not make it across on the 27 November were slaughtered later by Russian forces as they had fallen behind the main body.
As night approached on the 27 November, the situation was this: Oudinot, Napoleon, Dabrowski, Davout, and Ney had made it across the Berezina to the west bank. Victor was still on the east bank covering the retreat, along with thousands of stragglers and civilians. The 4,000 men used as the feint attack had now been overrun in Borisov and were retreating northward under the cover of darkness that night.
Some time during the night, Chichagov had realized his mistake, and sent his men on a 50 kilometer forced march, one they had just previously made going south, looking for the army to attack the main French force on the west side of the Berezina. The Russians attacked Oudinot on the morning of 28 November. Oudinot personally led his men out to fight the Russians, and was hit in the leg by shell shrapnel, which was his twenty-second wound in his life. Napoleon placed Ney in command to hold out as long as possible to get as much of the remainder of the army across the river.
Ney, who could only muster some 14,000 exhausted troops at most, was up against Chichagov's force of 30,000 fresh, well supplied troops. The fighting that ensued was ferocious. The Russians fired their cannons above the heads of the French troops, hitting the tall trees around them and sending showers of wood splinters on them. Dabrowski was wounded by splinters of pine tree, and was replaced. But his replacement suffered the same fate, and he was wounded and another replacement was put into action. This replacement was also wounded, and another was put in place of him. Ney send forth numerous bold cavalry charges, which succeeded in driving back the Russians for periods of time and relieving the exhausted infantry.
Simultaneously, on the other side of the River, Victor was being attacked by the bulk of the Russian army. Victor held, but Wittgenstein occupied high ground with his artillery and spent the entire day raining artillery down upon the massive group of men waiting to cross the river. Panic broke out among the French on the east bank, and a mad rush started towards the bridge. Hundreds of men were trampled or run over by wagons. Many committed suicide by lunging into the Berezina, fearing being wounded. It was not until Victor led a successful counterattack that the shelling finally stopped, but the damage had been done and the panic did not completely calm down.
Wittgenstein mounted a second attack, and Victor sent nearly all the cavalry he had left at the Russians. The Russians routed but nearly all of Victor's cavalry was wiped out in the process. As night fell, Victor still held all the ground he had in the morning, and the army had been spared another day.
It was a bittersweet day for the French. On one hand, the army was intact and most of it was across the Berezina. On the other, thousands of men had died covering the crossing, and those wounded would undoubtedly have to be left behind.
Victor received orders to cross the bridge that night, but it was now jammed with overturned wagons and dead horses and men therefore many of the civilians and stragglers could not get across, so Victor decided to defy that order and cover as many people across the next day as he could.
Victor now remained with very few forces defending the bridges. He warned the stragglers that he would burn the bridges in the morning, but few took his warning and they stayed. Many were too apathetic to their fate and no longer had the will to go on, others wanted to sleep until morning, and many were waiting to be taken prisoner by the Russians.
In the morning, Victor ordered a fire be set to wagons near the bridge, but not the actual bridge itself yet be burned. This was a warning to those stragglers still able to cross the bridge, and a some came and finally crossed, but many either did not care or did not make it in time. Victor was told to burn the bridge at seven, and his men waited on the bridge for the order, but Victor could not stand to see so many stragglers be left to die, and he delayed for an hour and a half before finally giving the order.
The burning of the bridge was a gruesome sight, many hundreds of men were still on or near the bridge trying to cross. Those on the bridge were engulfed in flames, and jumped into the River to swim the remainder of the way, most not making it. Men ran through the flames to the other side and soldiers aided to put the fire out on them, but they were so badly burned that they had to be left behind.

The Aftermath


Claude Victor

The Russians were appalled when they finally arrived at the bridges on the afternoon of 29 November. There were thousands of soldiers dead and dying in the River. Many Russians spent the remainder of their day putting those who were slowly freezing to death out of their misery by shooting them in the head. Estimates of those left behind vary widely, but Chichagov reports that 9,000 stragglers were killed and 7,000 were taken prisoner, which is probably closest to the truth.
French losses in the battle were about 25,000, of which only about a third or a half were caused by battle related wounds. The remainder died of drowning, hypothermia, freezing to death, being trampled to death by men, being crushed to death by wagons, burning to death from the bridges, starvation due to lack of supplies, mercy killings by Russians, and suicide. Russians losses were around 15,000, almost all being battle related.
Berezina, despite its high cost of life, proved that Napoleon was still a magnificent leader capable of the most amazing feats. It saved the entire French army from total annihilation. The French army fought against a vastly superior numbered force of Russians, who were well fed and equipped, and whom surrounded the French, and managed to not give up any ground, and inflicted more casualties (battle related) upon the enemy than they suffered. Berezina would prove to be the last great feat of the Grand Army in the Russian campaign.

Part X The Demise of the Grand Army

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Chart showing the advance and retreat of the French army and the number of men present. It is difficult to read but this graph can be found on almost any website discussing the invasion of Russia.

Make for Vilna


Armand Augustin Louis de Caulaincourt. Although a
foreign minister (to Russia, he accompanied Napoleon
throughout the Russian campaign and rode with
Napoleon back to Paris.

During the Berezina, Napoleon's plan was still to defeat Chichagov and turn southeast towards Minsk and supply his army there. But seeing his army in its desperate state after crossing the Berezina, Napoleon quickly realized that the army had given its final fight, and now the only chance of safety lay in Vilna. He sent a dispatch to Hugues-Bernard Maret in Vilna telling him to prepare supplies for the army. In his letter he wrote:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

It will take two weeks to bring them back to their colors, but where can we find two weeks? The cold and hunger have dissolved the army. We will soon be in Vilna, but can we make a stand there? Yes, if only we can survive the first eight days, but if we are attacked during that first week, it is doubtful whether we will be able to hold on there. Victuals, victuals, victuals! Without that there is no horror that this undisciplined mob will not visit upon the city. It may be that this army will only be able to rally itself behind the Niemen. In that case, it is possible that I may believe my presence to be necessary in Paris, for the sake of France, the Empire, and the army itself

Napoleon ordered that Maret evict all foreign diplomats from Vilna, so as they would not see the horrid condition that the army was presently in. The ramifications in Germany and other parts of Continental Europe would be disastrous if word of the armies fate got out, and rumors were already spreading, mostly out of St. Petersburg. If the support of Prussia, Austria, and many of the German states were lost, then Napoleon would be pushed back to France and have to refight many of the same enemies he had defeated in years prior.
If Napoleon was able to return to Vilna with an army that could fight in the future, the venture would not appear to be such a failure, as it was, and his allies would be more likely to stay with him and therefore against Russia in the next years campaigning season.
Therefore, Maret was instructed to boast the news of the victory at the Battle of Berezina. Maret sent thousands of Russian prisoners and captured guns on a parade through the major cities of Germany and Northern Europe until they reached Paris. This would all have little effect though once the true scale of Napoleon's defeat was learned later.
The new men from Oudinot and Victor were dying out in huge numbers, suffering the same Darwinism that the bulk of the army had undergone for months. These men soon were in as bad of conditions as the rest of the army which had been campaigning for months.
On 3 December, the army finally found some supplies at the town of Molodechno, and was fed and received mail from home. The next day they found more food, but could not stop to take advantage of all the food and eat it, as the Russians were close behind them. Carts were so scarce that soldiers had little to put the food in, so much was simply left behind. However, it was around this time that Kutuzov realized his army was in too poor of a state to fight the French, so he too slowed his army down and found supplies. With the Russians off the armies' tail, Napoleon now made the decision he had been delaying for so long.
On 5 December, Napoleon finally decided to leave for Paris, seeing as he was no longer fully needed to see out of the retreat of the army to Vilna, as they were so near. It was more important for Napoleon to return to France and raise more armies for the next year than to see out the retreat of what little he had left. Napoleon held a meeting with his marshals, at which he supposedly apologized for staying in Moscow too long. That night he boarded his carriage, and set off for Moscow.
The departure caused mixed reactions among the army. The officers and most junior officers understood why he left, but the average soldier was greatly discouraged to see their Emperor leave. This soon broke from their mind, as there were more important things to worry about.

The State of the Armies


Civilians and soldiers struggling to retreat

The 55,000 or so men who survived and crossed the Berezina mostly celebrated the day after their crossing, thinking that surely the worst was over and the Russians would not be able to pursue as they had before. Celebrations erupted as men found their old units and reunited, but these were very short-lived.
The next two days, 30 November - 1 December, saw a great temperature drop, to almost -22F. The soldiers who had fell in the river mostly froze to death while sleeping during those two nights, as many had clothes so layered that the bottom layers were still wet from the water.
Hundreds of wagons were left behind at the river, many of them carrying coats and other clothing that soldiers had been saving for later, but were now long lost. As the temperature dropped, soldiers without shoes quickly stole boots from the dead. Those who were not so lucky so as to find boots, simply suffered from losing toes or sometimes their entire foot or leg. It was not an uncommon sight to see men pulling off toes or other extremities.
Those soldiers who were lucky enough to have plentiful clothing or fur coats quickly became targets by others without proper clothing. If a soldier did not have weapon, they were usually killed or at the least attacked and left for dead by others.
Conditions were no better for the Russians, as most units had lost about two thirds of their effective fighting force, although some of these were deserters and not from deaths, as was the same with the French. Fighting over food and clothing soon turned to outright murder, looting occurred during the night, and pity on those dying was something long lost by almost all soldiers.
It is around this time and later that reports of cannibalism begin to appear. However, it does not appear that anyone was murdered for the purpose of being eaten, mostly because it was easy to find a dead body anyways. Soldiers report seeing dead men with strips cut out of them by other soldiers, in case they absolutely needed to resort to eating it later.
Through all this there are, as in most disastrous times in history, acts of extreme selflessness. Stories of soldiers giving up their last alcohol to those who needed amputations after Berezina are recorded, as are reports of men helping carry wounded men from Borodino all the way back to Vilna.
On 6 December another drop in the temperature occurred, this time reaching -36F. Men froze to death while walking, first appearing to be drunk they would swing from side to side, and then fall to the ground never to get back up.
At one point Chichagov's men caught up to the rear of the French line, and as the Russian's marched down the middle of the road, the French marched on each side of it. Neither side even attempted to fight, each side too tired, too frozen and ill fed, and their weapons hardly functioned if they even had a weapon at all.
Nonetheless, the first remnants of the Grand Army stumbled in to Vilna on 7 December.

Vilna


The French army upon the retreat into Vilna

Reinforcements arrived in Vilna on 6 December from Prussia, under General Loison. These men took up positions in Vilna when the weather reached its coldest, and, not learning from the previous mistakes of the Grand Army, had not acquired winter clothing. Loison lost at least half of his fresh division within one day, and other sources say his 10,000 strong force dwindled to 2,000 in the first night. By the time the army reached Vilna on 9 December, supposedly not a single soldier remained in his post, most dead and those who lived had deserted.
Men began arriving in Vilna on 7 December, but the bulk of the army arrived on 9 December. As the army poured into the city men began looting houses and kicking out citizens to take up residence. The city was fairly well prepared, with monasteries arranged for each corps to take up housing in, and artillery to be placed on the outskirts of main roadways so that any shells and powder could be dropped off there so as to make the artillery units as efficient as possible again.
The officer corps fell into shambles with the departure of Napoleon, and despite some officer's best efforts, cooperation was almost nonexistent. Many of the military and civil administration that were supposed to prepare Vilna had left once they learned Napoleon was heading back to Paris, so the city administrations were not running to their full potential. Murat tried calling a meeting with the top generals, but few showed up because they were too busy attending to their own comforts once inside the city.
As the army poured in the main road on 9 December, it became so jammed that men and horses were trampled to death in the streets of Vilna. Once inside the soldiers ignored notices that told them to go to their respective monastery based on their corps, and simply found the nearest houses or stored and looted them.
Men settled down for the night, finding alcohol and food and eating and drinking as much as possible. Many became so intoxicated they passed out in the streets, never to wake up. Those who were near starvation ate as much as they could, and in turn their stomachs went into overdrive and they ate themselves to death (a problem similar to many holocaust survivors). As the men settled down for the night, they assumed they would be safe inside the city and would wait out the winter there, but their fate was to be far different.

Leaving Vilna


Michel Ney with his men fighting to defend the bridge at Kovno

The next day, Murat decided that Vilna was indefensible and the army needed to retreat as soon as possible. But instead of sending out orders through the civil administration who could have posted the orders and informed the entire army of this action and when each corps should depart, Murat simply sent out an order to as many officers as he could to retreat immediately.
As the order went around, some ignored it wishing to stay in Vilna, others did not believe it, and those who wanted to go along with it simply weren't ready and organized enough to depart yet. Many soldiers went into a state of what can only be described as madness after being given only one night of comfort before being told to go out into the frozen wilderness and march more. Many soldiers would remain behind in Vilna.
A panic insued as soldiers tried to leave, many stealing horses and wagons to take supplies with (this would prove worthless very quickly however). Road jams popped up everywhere and more men were trampled to death as men rushed around the city, either leaving or looting.
Just outside Vilna, at the village of Ponary, the Kovno road leads up a long incline to the top of a hill. In most years, the local administration would put sand on the road to make it easy for wagons and horses and even people to walk up the snow covered hill. But the French had no even considered doing this. After the first initial lines of infantry marched up the snow covered hill, the snow became compacted and quickly turned to sheets of ice. Men and horses struggled for hours to make it up the hill, but most wagons were abandoned and horses with broken legs were killed (or eaten).
When a fresh artillery battery arrived they immediately headed to Murat and asked him what his orders were, Murat responded, "Major, we are f--ed! Get on your hose and run!"
Wagons carrying wounded men had to be left behind, and the wounded sat at the base of the hill and either were transported back to Vilna or in some cases they froze to death. Those who had kept their guns had a distinct advantage, as they used their bayonets as ice picks to crawl their way up. Some went around the hill, and got their wagons through that way, but most did not bother and just left their baggage.
A free for all erupted around a particular wagon, which was carrying Napoleon's personal loot from Moscow. It was abandoned at the base of the hill, and as soldiers recognized it they ripped it opened and looted thousands of gold and silver coins and jewelry. Some struck it rich and lived out the rest of their lives off Napoleon's and other's loot, but for most they could not get to it in time, as cossacks soon showed up and happily squandered most of the loot.
As the army continued its retreat towards Kovno, the temperature lingered around -35F. The army entered the city on 12 December, and as with Vilna most men went straight to the stores and ransacked them. Ney, who was still in the rearguard, found himself in a dangerous position when crossing the Niemen into Kovno, as he was almost entirely encircled. As men flooded across the bridge, the usual fights broke out and casualties occurred, but since the river was frozen over the crossing was relatively easy.
As they fought their way back retreating under fire, Ney personally went to the front lines and fought with his men. Once across, he fired a last shot, threw his musket into the river and retreated with his men. Ney arrived in Kovno the next day. As the Grand Army crossed the Niemen, it sealed its fate politically, and the Grand Army was dead.

The Beginning of the End


Napoleon after the abdication

As Napoleon rode back to Paris, he went over the campaign again and again with Caulaincourt. Napoleon realized his mistake and said he should have stopped at Vitebsk, or at least left Moscow two weeks earlier and crushed Kutuzov at Tarutino. Napoleon boasted at every stop in Warsaw that he would return the next spring with a force of 300,000. Little did he realized the army had crossed over the Niemen into the Duchy of Warsaw already, and the damage was done. With such an action, there was little hope of Napoleon being able to keep his position in Europe he had previously had. Certainly he would be forced to face much of his old enemies in another war.
Napoleon addressed a letter to Murat in Vilna saying he was looking forward to returning and was quite pleased with the situation, the same day that Kutuzov was entering the city. Alexander entered the city four days later, but was surprisingly quite displeased with the situation. Kutuzov had let the Grand Army get away, and Alexander stated that every victory, tactical or strategic, that had been under Kutuzov was because it was forced upon him. But, nevertheless, for Kutuzov the campaign was over. Pursuing across into Poland would have been politically risky and militarily disastrous. He needed time to rest his army until spring and bring up fresh reinforcements.
The Russians in Vilna behaved no better than the French, and even while Alexander was there looting, attacks, and murder were prevalent. As winter progressed conditions remained horrible for both armies.
As news of the French retreat across the Niemen spread through Prussia, a wave of hatred for the French swept the nation. A defection took place in the Prussian army, and realizing it was no longer safe in Kovno, Murat retreated the army in Konigsberg. In the south, Schwarzenberg retreated from Poland in Austria, realizing the dangerous political situation brewing in northern Europe. The French had now entirely left Poland and East Prussia by the end of January.

Conclusion


Napoleon on his deathbed in St. Helena

The extent of the loss of life in the Russian Campaign of 1812 was extensive to say the least, but hard to exactly figure. The Grand Army crossed the Niemen in June with 550,000 to 600,000 men, and this number operated east of the Niemen, although not always on the front line. Of that number, only about 120,000 men remained by December, with about 30,000 wounded having retreated before that, 100,000 or so prisoners taken by the Russians, of which only about 20,000 survived. Therefore it can be estimated that about 400,000 soldiers of the Grand Army died during the invasion of Russia, of which only about a fourth were of battle casualties.
Losses on the Russian side are equally as difficult to figure as on the French. It is assumed that around 400,000 soldiers and militia died during 1812, only about 110,000 of these from battle. The number of civilians killed is almost impossible to figure, but certainly is many thousands. In all, it is safe to say probably a million or so people died in the invasion of Russia.
For France, the losses were even worse than they seemed. Of the 120,000 men that left in December, 50,000 of these were Prussian or Austrian soldiers, who would soon form alliances against France. In all only about 35,000 truly French soldiers remained by the end of the campaign. This totaled with the 150,000 or so horses lost during the campaign from all over Europe and 1,000 or so cannons truly shows the devastation the campaign had on the French army.
The death of so many horses, which were short from years of warfare to begin with, would plague Napoleon in 1813, as he had almost no cavalry that year and would contribute to his losses, particularly at Leipzig.
Certainly while these numbers may be high one may be prone to say that they are not that high, but that is when compared to today's populations. In 1812, France had a population of no more than 30 million, and today the loss of French soldiers in the Grand Army would be comparable to around 800,000 men being lost. Certainly these numbers do not compare with WWI, but these are still staggering nonetheless.
The Russian campaign would ultimately lead to the demise of Napoleon. The political landscape at the beginning of 1813 was the most prone to change it had been since the French Revolution. Prussia and Austria both declared war on France in 1813, and Sweden joined in as well. Napoleon would fight brilliantly throughout 1813, outnumbered and outmatched, fighting with newer recruited soldiers against vastly superior armies with veteran troops. But the sheer weight of Europe was too much for Napoleon, and Napoleon was forced into exile on 6 April, 1814. On 15 March, 1815 he landed in France and reclaimed power, at which time nearly every nation in Europe declared war solely on Napoleon. Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo and forced to remain the rest of his life at St Helena until his death on 5 May, 1821.
Any attempt to predict how history would have played out had Napoleon won against Russia is near impossible. Indeed, after the defeat of France, many authors theorized on the future of France if Napoleon had won, most ending in the world being brought under French rule in the most comical, and sometimes racist, of circumstances. Certainly Napoleon's power in Europe would have been cemented, but for how long would be the real question. Alexander would have remained in power, and with such a vast empire and the risk of nations revolting against French hegemony ever prevalent, Napoleon may not have been able to carry out his planned invasion of India or Egypt, and Britain probably could have carried on despite the Continental System. But speculation is up to anyone who has information on the campaign and an imagination, so I will not delve any deeper into this subject.
The Russian campaign was more or less a prelude to Napoleon's mind frame of 1813-1815, when indecision replaced the once extremely decisive Emperor Napoleon di Bounaparte. Many believe it was overconfidence, and past luck that made him extremely optimistic in his view on things, believing that events would turn in his favor simply because they always had in the past. While Napoleon had in the past, as he himself stated later on St. Helena, always played luck as a factor in his decision making, it seems that in Russia he was exclusively relying on it. Hoping that things would turn out the way he wanted them to, Napoleon set his beliefs in stone, that the Russians would sue for peace upon one major defeat. It was far too late by the time Napoleon realized his mistake, and it was truly his fault and his alone. Napoleon's ideas on what he wanted to achieve from the campaign were up in the air, his way of accomplishing it relied on the Russians doing what he wanted them to do, that is give battle, and how far he should carry out the campaign in one season changed continuously from time to time. Had Napoleon stopped short of Moscow, or had he even left Moscow just two weeks earlier, the army would most likely have been saved, and he would have even had time to crush Kutuzov at Tarutino before he received reinforcements. Had Napoleon been younger, it has been speculated, perhaps his mental mind frame for the campaign would have been far different and more realistic, but again this is all speculation.
Napoleon's invasion of Russia was his own doing, and his own undoing. It was his confidence and his belief that things would go his way because they always had, that led him to carry out the Russian campaign in such a reckless manner. The war was started as a result of a failed foreign policy by Napoleon, and he was equally as to blame for the war as Alexander was. Rather it was ambition, love of war, or truly his fear of a Russian invasion, Napoleon was indeed the aggressor in the Russian campaign, unlike most of campaigns in which he was the "target of conquest", and this coupled with his retreat across the Niemen caused the whole of Europe to turn on him. Napoleon, who had once been the master of Europe, now, in one bad campaign, had turned all his enemies loose on him and was in too irreversible of a position to save his Empire.
The Russians on the other hand, were as equally to blame for the war as Napoleon. They began the buildup of forces, and though they had reason to do so, these were mostly exaggerated. Alexander had planned an invasion of Northern Europe in which Poland and Prussia would join Russia and Alexander be hailed as the liberator, but as fate did not allow such an opportunity to arise, Russia took the role as the innocent defender in the war. Throughout the campaign, commanders feared fighting Napoleon, even up to the very end when Napoleon's army was in such a fragile state that even the slightest of battles could have sent it into nonexistence. Kutuzov's reluctance to fight Napoleon is claimed to be a strategy by many historians, but in all reality could very well have been out of his own fear of losing, as the costs of defeat were so high. In the end, Napoleon, not Kutuzov or Alexander, was his own greatest enemy in the invasion of Russia, and it was his imperfections that led to the loss of the Russian Campaign and the end of the French Empire.

[spanish_emperor]

ah, i was wondering when the next part would arrive

[Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart]

Flavouring foods with gunpowder, Il have to try that someday.
Otherwise, I love these articles of yours, you put so much detail into them. +rep

[Tiberius Tosi]

Added Part VIII.

[Salem1]

Loving this, keep it up

[The Noble Lord]

Such a waste that was, instead of invading Russia he should have invaded Constantinople and give re-birth to the new Byzantine Empire and advanced towards India. But Napoleon was stupid and narrow-minded, he didn't see that his salvation was the continental bloc with Russia and he would've been a winner of any future confrontation. Instead, he died a broken man on St Helena.

[hindov]

I think that this image with Michel Ney covering the retreat deserves to be posted

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Adolphe_Yvon_(1817-1893)_-_Marshall_Ney_at_retreat_in_Russia.jpg

[Tiberius Tosi]

Updated to Part IX (are my roman numerals right lol?). Anyways, the next part will be my last. Enjoy.

[OG Grenadier]

Originally Posted by hindov

I think that this image with Michel Ney covering the retreat deserves to be posted

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Adolphe_Yvon_(1817-1893)_-_Marshall_Ney_at_retreat_in_Russia.jpg

Indeed, the hearts of the men swelled with pride, that Ney would fight on foot beside them.

[Tiberius Tosi]

Finished, enjoy!

I will eventually fix grammatical errors which plague these articles and find pictures for the missings ones. Anyways, thank you to those of you who read some of these, and those of you who skimmed over it, and those of you who at least looked at pics lol.