A simplified map of Europe in 1812, almost all states in Brown,
Green, or Purple supplied troops for the Grand Army
The Treaty of Tilsit
Napoleon and Alexander discuss the future of Europe after the Treaty of Tilsit
With the Treaties of Tilsit in 1807 between France, Prussia, and Russia following Napoleon's victory at Freidland, peace and cooperation between East and West seemed hopeful. With the signing of the Treaty, Russia withdrew her forces from Central Europe, and signed a military alliance with France. With the signing of the treaty, Russia was also required to declare war on Britain and adhere by the Continental System.
Ironically, although Tilsit was supposed to secure a relatively lasting peace between France and Russia, it would be Napoleon's undoing in the end. The Treaty did succeed in securing good relations between France and Russia, but these were short-lived. The treaty added insult to injury for the Russians to the point of uncooperation with France.
The most immediate insult of the treaty was Napoleon's action of establishing The Duchy of Warsaw, a state which was essentially a Polish puppet state, but with a name so as not to suggest the full re-establishment of Poland. Russia was distrustful of the new state for two reasons: Napoleon could now garrison troops along the immediate border with Russia, and Napoleon could re-establish Poland and use her against Russia.
France's new border with Russia led to suspicion and uncertainty on the Russian side not only militarily, but also politically. When the Duchy of Warsaw was established the Napoleonic Code was implemented there. Russia, whose population was about 95 percent serfs, feared the idea of social reforms implemented with the Code spreading from Poland into Russia. Russian leaders were also fearful that this would lead to an increase in peasant uprisings.
Another grievance of Tilsit, one which was much slower to be realized the full effect of, was the enforcement of the Continental System. The Continental System would wreak havoc on the Russian economy, who imported many basic supplies from nations like Britain because of a lack of industry.
The problems caused at Tilsit to Russia were not enough to make her even consider jumping back into war. They were, however, insulting enough to cause ill will that would eventually snowball into war between France and Russia five years after the signing of the Treaty.
Testing Tilsit
Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France
The first real test to the strength of the alliance created at Tilsit would come in 1809 when Austria declared war on France. While Napoleon was busy campaigning in Spain to combat the deteriorating situation there, Austria seized the opportunity to "liberate" Germany, as they believed Napoleon to be too bogged down in Spain to fully engage them in Germany.
Russia, who was militarily allied to France, was obligated to attack Austrian forced. Russia did send an army, but unenthusiastically and at as slow a pace as possible. In the end, Russia never engaged in an open battle with Austrian forces. Russia's reluctance to aid France showed its true colors towards Napoleon and foreshadowed the break to come.
After the failure of Austria to liberate Germany, and Prussia's refusal to fight, European liberals gave up on the hope of Austria or Prussia being able to save them from Napoleonic French rule. After the peace was signed, many liberals and anti-Napoleonic military leaders fled to Russia, hoping Tsar Alexander I to be their only last hope at destroying Napoleon's grip on Europe. It is important to note that many military leaders fled from Prussia and Germany into France and would later fight against France in 1812.
Following the war, Napoleon was looking for a way to cement the alliance between France and Russia, which he strongly believed could still be held. The answer came in marriage, Empress Josephine was no longer of childbearing age and Napoleon still did not have n heir to the throne. Although Napoleon did indeed love Josephine dearly, he claimed that divorce was in the interest of France, and therefore his interest.
In November of 1809, Napoleon instructed Caulaincourt to request Alexander's sister's hand in marriage. Alexander responded enthusiastically, but he did not give an answer. When asked again, Alexander said he required two weeks to ask for his mother's approval. After two weeks passed, he asked for another week, then ten days, and so on until in February of 1810, he told Napoleon his sister was too young for marriage.
Napoleon, irritated and suspicious that Alexander would never give his sister's hand in marriage, began talks with Austria and married Marie-Louise. When Alexander heard the news, he assumed that Napoleon had been in talks with Russia and Austria simultaneously. Marriage, which had the original intent of cementing France and Russia's relationship, only moved Napoleon and Alexander farther apart.
Also adding to distrust was Alexander's belief that he could make the Duchy of Warsaw into a state of his own. Alexander believed that Poland was willing to join Russia against France, and he sent agents to Poland to incite anti-Napoleonic and pro-Russian propaganda.
Continental Issues
Tsar Alexander I of Russia (Rein 1801-1825)
1810 saw a dramatic decline in relations between the two powers. While the issue of marriage was a moderate personal insult, the Continental System would cause major political discontent in 1810.
Sensing that Britain was near economic collapse, Napoleon decided to take a more aggressive approach to the Continental System to bring her to the table much sooner. This further hurt Russia economically, but to add insult to injury Napoleon began giving permission to smugglers to import goods from Britain into France, at which point the goods would be transported across Europe on land, including to Russia, and sold at inflated prices.
Alexander felt that these actions left him few choices but to abandon the Continental System, which he did on December 31, 1810. Alexander opened ports to American vessels and put a heavy tax on French goods. Napoleon responded by annexing the Hanseatic ports and the Duchy of Oldenburg (whose ruler was related to Alexander), and offered German lands as compensation. However, the damage was already done.
The Buildup of Forces
Barclay de Tolly, Russian Minister
of War at the time of Napoleon's
invasion
By 1811, Russia felt war was nearly inevitable; while France felt while it was plausible it was certainly avoidable. Alexander thought Napoleon was trying to instigate a war in which Russia would be the aggressor, so as to not turn any of his allies and client states against him. Alexander swore by a defensive war, unless his impossible dream of turning Poland to his side could work, in which case he felt Prussia would also join him and he would be in Germany without having fired a shot.
While hoping for the latter, Alexander was planning for the former. He ordered a front line of 106,500 troops to be garrisoned along the east bank of the Niemen, supported by 134,000 behind it and a force of 44,000 to the south all to be reinforced by an additional 80,000 men to be trained an sent to aid when their training completed.
However, the number of men and positions changed just prior to the invasion. Prior to the invasion estimates put Russian numbers anywhere from 356,000 to as high as 716,000 with about 180,000 to 251,000 men in the immediate front line. However, the actual fighting force was probably closer to the lower estimates in both cases. The position of the forces was as follows: Barclay de Tolly in the north concentrated around Vilna, the second army under Bagration South and somewhat East of Grodno in order to either prevent a flanking move by Napoleon or be used as a strike force, and a third smaller army under Tormasov south of the Pripet Marshes. This force was backed up by two reserve corps under Ertel and Zakomelsky totaling a number slightly less than 100,000 men.
Mikhail Barclay de Tolly was the Russian Minister of War and was in charge of the forces until Alexander unexplainably decided to take control of the forces in 1811 and set up his headquarters in Vilna. Alexander's presence could have brought cohesion and order to the situation and it would have been logical that he would have been the ultimate decider of the Russian strategy. However, Alexander was a poor military leader, and while he heard out all his commander's propositions, he never decided on a course of action and therefore left his commanders uncertain as to what to do when war broke out. Alexander's presence also impeded the order of the military, as balls and parties were frequent in Vilna and this let many commander neglect what the situation of their troops was. Alexander would eventually leave Vilna prior to the invasion but his presence nonetheless had an overall negative impact on the army.
While Alexander was preparing for a possible defensive war, it appeared to Napoleon, who was tracking troop movements, that Russia could be preparing for an offensive war. All this led to a more dangerous buildup of suspicion and troops increases.
It is important before moving on, to digress a bit and stress that France did not want war, and Russia felt it was being forced into war by France. Up to the point of the Grand Armies' invasion, Napoleon saw Russia as a necessary ally on his war against Britain and that peace was nearly impossible without an alliance with Russia. Napoleon's belief would play a major part in his overall strategy of the campaign and would be one of the reasons for his defeat.
Preparation of The Grand Army
Joachim Murat, in charge of four French cavalry
divisions totaling 40,000
By late 1811 war was inevitable, it would have taken the complete backdown by Napoleon or Alexander to stop the conflict from happening. Late that year, Napoleon undertook military preparations and somewhat reorganized the Grand Army for the conflict to come.
With the great scale of troops that would be needed, many raw recruits would be entering the ranks. To minimize the negative effect that this would have on the army, Napoleon added a fifth and sixth battalion to each existing regiment and shuffled veterans and recruits throughout all six battalions.
Napoleon paid attention to every detail of the Army, from bridging equipment to supply routes to calibre of weapons and even things as insignificant as the lettering on soldiers badges. He neglected, however, to pay attention to his soldiers outfitting pertaining to the climate and the bad condition of French weaponry, from poorly made muskets to uselessly small calibre artillery pieces.
Contrary to what most believe, Napoleon did have adequate supplies for his Army at the outset of the invasion. He had amassed fifty days rations for 400,000 men and 50,000 horses. The real problem with supplies would arrive after the Army had advanced some distance into Russia, for a number of reasons. It is important to note that Eastern Prussia and Poland, which were under the Continental System, had less food to supply to the Army due because they could no longer export food and therefore had not planted on many fields they had in previous years. This combined with a drought meant that the Grand Army would have to forage for more food, spreading the Army out more and more in search of supplies.
The size and makeup of the Grand Army was daunting to say the least. The theoretical paper strength of the Grand Army was 678,000 men and 157,878 horses, with soldiers from France, Prussia, Austria, Wurttemburg, Illyria, The Papal States, Spain, The Duchy of Warsaw, etc.
It is important to remember that the Army did not move as one force or singular blob, for that would cause inconceivable supply problems. The Army was spread out over a large distance and this would only increase as the war went on, as soldiers were left behind and skeleton forces for garrisoning, keeping supply lines protected, guarding communications, and so on.
While the theoretical strength of the Grand Army was 678,000, this was actually the number of men in Poland and Germany. Out of the original number, 590,687 in theoretical were to be a part of the actual invasion but it is generally accepted that only 450,000 was the strength when it invaded. Of the 450,000 it is likely that no more than three fourths and possibly as low as two thirds crossed the Niemen River into Russia. Disease, desertion, and unfit troops were all a cause of this, and it was difficult if not almost impossible for a soldier to catch up to his unit once he had falled behind a substantial length.
The size of the force had many problems, the greatest and most obvious being supplies (I will discuss this in greater depth when I get to the actual invasion, if I ever get there). Another problem, however, was the quality of troops that had to be recruited to fill the quota. Many soldiers were too young or too old, and in general unfit to march such great distances. Many soldiers recruited into he cavalry had never ridden a horse before and improper riding gave the horses sores that hampered their speed and eventually would kill them. As the invasion went on, Darwinism took effect and these soldiers were the first to die along the roadside.
Also important is the relatively small and poor quality of horses in the Grand Army. Horses in this time period cannot be underestimated as they carried supplies, artillery pieces, ammo, and served as the eyes and ears of the army through cavalry. Also, Napoleon organized all his cavalry into one force of 40,000 to be used for scouting, which while good for its purpose had the negative effect of leaving many armies with too few cavalry units to adequately charge on the battlefield. Indeed past the first few stages of the war, the cavalry would have served better if integrated back into their respective corps, instead of acting as their own corps.
The multinational makeup of the army (less than half the soldiers were French) would impede progress and cohesion. Language barriers were always an inconvenience to commanders on the battlefield and issuing orders was many times a slower process than need be because of language. But probably more important was the low sense of pride from some nations as a result of them fighting under another nation's flag. Oddly enough, this had the opposite effect on some soldiers. One Italian soldier described himself as feeling like a Roman Legionnaire, fighting side by side with a man of another nationality all under one single nation.
One factor that would almost never change during the course of the invasion was the soldiers' trust in Napoleon. Even during the retreat when soldiers were in the most desperate of situations which they knew were caused by Napoleon, they still looked to him for salvation and hoped if anyone, he would be able to lead them to victory. Even when tortured by Cossacks, few troops would speak ill of Napoleon and stories of soldiers cursing Napoleon were the exception, not the norm.
The massive size of Napoleon's army would greatly affect its ability to fight against the Russians, but it must be stressed again that the actual size of the fighting army was much less than the numbers usually given, and that the Army was spread out by corps over a large expanse of land, never traveling and never fighting all concentrated in one area.
Goals of the War
Louis-Nicolas Davout,
Commander of French 1st
Corps totaling some
70,000 men
The French and Russian goals and means of achieving their respective objects were both very confusing from the outset. Neither side really had a concrete way of achieving what they wanted.
Napoleon's goal in the war was not to conquer Russia, nor to dethrone Alexander and establish a puppet state, but was merely to return to the conditions after the Treaty of Tilsit between France and Russia.
To many this may seem like a poor goal, as it was obvious even to Napoleon that Tilsit had failed, no matter how much he had wished it hadn't. But, there was a great reason as to why Napoleon wished in securing a quick peace and defeating Britain. With the birth of Napoleon II on March 20, 1811, Napoleon began wishing to cement France's security in the near future so as not to have his son inherit any major was or threats when he took the throne. Napoleon also faced the problem of staying away from France for too long, as the longer he was gone, the greater the risk was of him being overthrown. In fact a failed Coup did take place while Napoleon was gone. Spending years in Russia to conquer it was not in Napoleon's interest, and overthrowing Alexander could have led to unrest which he would have to put down. The best option to Napoleon then, was to force Alexander into peace and afterwards defeat Britain.
However, achieving this goal was to prove more difficult than expected. Napoleon had assumed that when he invaded Russia would not dare retreat too far and abandon large amounts of Russian soil, and would therefore give battle to the French. Once the Russians were promptly defeated, he believed Alexander would sue for peace and negotiations could then begin. While with most nations this strategy may have worked, it was to be a different story against Russia.
Alexander and the Russian generals were much more conflicted as to what they wanted to accomplish in the war than Napoleon was. There were essentially two basic plans, either to only defend Russian soil and make Napoleon appear as an aggressor, or to invade into Poland and Germany at the outbreak of war and be seen as a liberator. It cannot be stressed enough that of the proposed Russian strategies at this point, none involved Russia retreating back and wearing down Napoleon's army through scorched earth tactics. The closest to this was a strategy that Barclay de Tolly had proposed in 1807, in which the Russian army would reatreat to a pre-determined defensible location until French forces were cut off from supplies and communication, at which time the Russians would give battle and drive the French back. No strategy banked on the Russian winter, and any strategy that involved retreating was only to be used after all of Russia's armies had been first defeated and was a last resort. This confusion as to the Russian strategy would leave commanders clueless as to what to do when the Grandy Army crossed the Niemen, and commander had no choice but to retreat.
Part II Niemen to Vitebsk
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
A rather poor map showing the roads, or lack thereof, in Western Russia.
The Niemen
French forces crossing the Niemen.
Three pontoon bridges can be
seen going across the river.
All the planning and preparations finally led up to the French invasion across the Niemen River into Russia on the 24 of June. Napoleon spent most of the 23 of June in his tent in a somber and quiet mood. Napoleon also dispatched officer's to read his proclamation to his soldiers, it read:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Quote:
Soldiers! The Second Polish War has begun. The first ended at Friedland and Tilsit: at Tilsit Russia swore an eternal alliance with France and war on England. She is now violating her promises. She refuses to give an explanation of her strange behavior unless the French eagles retire beyond the Rhine, thereby leaving our allies at her mercy. Russia is tempting fate! And she will meet her destiny. Does she think that we have become degenerate? Are we no longer the soldiers of Austerlitz? She has forced us into a choice between dishonour and war. There can be no question as to which we choose, so let us advance! Let us cross the Niemen! Let us take the war onto her territory. The Second Polish War will be glorious for French arms, as was the first; but the peace that we will conclude will be a lasting one, and will put an end to that arrogant influence which Russia has been exerting on the affairs of Europe over the past fifty years.
The soldiers, already anxious for battle, were overjoyed by this speech. Even officers who hated Napoleon stated they could not help but feel a strong sense of pride in what they were about to do.
At six o'clock that evening, Napoleon mounted his horse and reconnoitered the riverbank until the first crossings were made at ten o'clock. Even though this action took place on the 23, the 24 is still held as the day Napoleon's actual invasion began. At that time three bridging companies crossed the river but were soon spotted by Russian hussars.
One Russian hussar officer shouted in French asking who they were, to which a company officer shouted back that they were French. The Russians responded by shouting and asking what they were doing here, to which a French officer responded "F--k, we'll show you", at which time they opened fire. Rather the story was fabricated or not, the French crossing was known about sometime before daybreak due to shots being fired the previous night on the far bank of the Niemen by bridging companies.
Three pontoon bridges were put in place and by daybreak the Grand Army was successfully crossing with no resistance. The soldiers treated the occasion as a grand parade, and wore their full dress uniforms. by the end of the day, enough of the Grand Army had crossed the Niemen so as they were safe from a Russian counterattack. However, the Russians had no intention of attacking at this point
The Russian Panic
A painting of the rearguard of the Russian army retreating
While Napoleon and his men were marching into Russia and taking residence on their soil, Alexander was busy attending a ball in Vilna, a short distance away. Even after Alexander received news of the invasion and left, many officers stayed and danced the rest of the night.
Alexander held a hasty council of war the next day to address the situation. Bagration proposed an attack, but that was out of the question since Russian forces were extremely spread out. It was feared that Napoleon would be able to reach the Russian lines around Vilna before the Russian army could be amassed at a single location. This problem of forces being too spread out also threw out any option of organizing a defense of Vilna. There was no option left but to withdraw.
Barclay de Tolly shortly thereafter ordered a general retreat of his first army in the north, and sent a letter to Bagration in the south asking him to do likewise with the second army. Barclay also asked for cooperation between them, as the two had a quite public dislike of one another.
Alexander quickly made the decision to leave for Moscow and put Barclay in command. Alexander issued a proclamation to his soldiers and countrymen, but it had little effect on the confused population.
The Russian soldiers had assumed they had massed along the Niemen in order to push back and fight the French at the first sign of a crossing. The order to retreat confused and demoralized the soldiers, as they were abandoning Russian ground without putting up a fight. The Russian population also saw Alexander's leaving Vilna as a sign of cowardice and a loss of nerves. Alexander also offered peace at this point, now under the condition that Napoleon leave Russia, no longer demanding withdraw from Prussia and Poland.
The following morning, upon hearing reports of French cavalry reaching the outskirts of Vilna, Alexander made a hasty and less than noble exit from Vilna.
The French Enter Vilna
Dead horses lined the roadside after the storm upon entering
Vilna.
On the afternoon of June 28, Napoleon rode into Vilna with the bridges still burning from the hasty Russian retreat. Napoleon took up residence in the same palace that Alexander had occupied less than two days prior.
Although the campaign seemed to be going well, Napoleon was furious that he had not engaged the Russians, which was his primary goal after all. One minor battle had been won against the Russians in the north, but it was not enough to make a serious impact.
Upon reaching Vilna, the troops were already in bad condition. The roads from Kovno, where they crossed the Niemen, to Vilna were in terrible condition. Supply wagons were left behind and the marches on poorly made roads were tough on the new soldiers. To make matters worse, the area from Kovno to Vilna had little population, so the soldiers couldn't take much supplies and food from the locals. The weather was hot and humid, and veterans from Spain claimed it was better there.
When the soldiers reached Vilna, many could not find residence in the city and slept in the countryside outside (the French army did not use tents as standard equipment, so soldiers either found or built shelter, or braved the weather). A terrible freezing rainstorm rolled in that night and wreaked havoc on those who couldn't find shelter. Many artillery units reported a 25 percent loss of horses that night alone. In all, it is estimated that the storm could have killed as many as 40,000 men and horses in all. The psychological effect of seeing men dead and dying along the roadside were tremendous. Russian roads, which were almost all dirt, became nothing more than mudpools for days, and progress slowed tremendously.
Napoleon, who was in a furious state of anger at this point by the state of his army, did see one glimmer of hope. He had driven a wedge between Barclay in the north and Bagration in the south. However, due to slow communications caused by the bad weather and roads, his orders arrived too late and any opportunity was missed.
Jerome's Folly
Bagration, commander of the
Second Russian Army in the south
When Jerome Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother and commander of a combined force of 3 army corps, entered Grodno in the south, Bagration retreated his army north and east in an attempt to link up with Barclay in the north. Davout, commander of I Corps, in a clever move, marching his troops southeast of their position in Vilna, to Minsk and cut off Bagration's chance of linking up with Barclay.
With Davout in front of him in Minsk and Jerome behind him, Bagration was trapped, with the only direction to retreat being south. Bagration then foolishly decided rested his army for three days at Nieshviezh. Jerome could have used this opportunity to destroy Bagration's army, but his inability as a commander made him unable to get troops up to the front and Bagration slipped away to the south.
Although Napoleon openly vented his frustration on Jerome, it was in many ways his fault for appointing Jerome, who had no military experience, to such a high command in the first place. Also, Napoleon had given Davout complete control over operations in the south, but failed to inform Jerome of this, which caused Jerome to dismiss many orders Davout gave him. Rivalry and dislike between officers like this would continue to plague the Grand Army throughout the entire campaign.
It is important to note that the same occurred on the Russian side. Bagration did not retreat as quickly as he should have because it was Barclay who had ordered him to retreat.
Drissa
Russian infantry. Soldiers in Russia were unlike
those of France, as they were conscripted for a
period of 25 years, essentially making them
soldiers for life.
The Russian army retreated into Drissa on July 11, where Alexander was also currently at. Drissa was a pre-fortified position that the Russians intended to use as a fallback point. Alexander penned a proclamation to Russia saying that Drissa would produce a victory on the scale of Poltava. But the following day, Alexander and Barclay ordered a retreat from Drissa, after realizing Napoleon was surrounding the position.
Reality had set in on Alexander, and he left Drissa soon thereafter, saying to Barclay as he left, "Farewell, General, once more farewell, au revoir. I commend my army to your keeping. Do not forget that it is the only one I have".
Vitebsk
Napoleon addresses the Old Guard.
While Alexander's presence hurt the Russian army, Napoleon's absence from the front lines was devastating to the Grand Army. Until July 16, Napoleon remained in Vilna. Many historians believed he stayed so long because he was expecting Alexander to sue for peace, and believed if he delayed his departure, that his hope may come true. However, it did not.
When Napoleon heard of the Russian abandonment of Drissa, he attempted to outflank Barclay's army and prevent a linkup with Bagration. Napoleon moved too slow and Barclay slipped away, but did not link up with Bagration.
Murat, however, caught up to Barclays rearguard with his cavalry crops and began attacking. He could not break the Russian lines though, as he had no infantry or artillery support.
The next day, Barclay took up position outside Vitebsk and offered battle. Napoleon himself went to the front to reconnoiter, but most of his units were still arriving so he felt he could not commit to battle that day. Had Napoleon attacked, the Russians would have most likely been routed. However, Napoleon delayed the battle for a day.
The following morning, the Grand army, which consisted of the corps of Ney, Eugene, Murat's cavalry, and the Guard (not the entire Grand Army), prepared for battle. They dressed in their finest parade uniforms and polished the brass on their uniforms. Napoleon called the rising sun that morning the "sun of Austerlitz".
The Army formed up and prepared to give battle, and, the Russian army was not there. Barclay had slipped out in the middle of the night and the army escaped. Napoleon, who could have crushed the Russians the day before, now had no enemy.
Barclay had made the right decision in not giving battle. Had he fought, he probably would have lost, and along with it Russia's only major army (Bagration had a smaller army and could not had fought alone). Had he won, he would only have defeated a part of Napoleon's Grand Army, and would have sustained heavy casualties which could not be replaced. Napoleon had yet again lost another chance at destroying the Russian Army, which now lived to fight another day.
Part III Smolensk
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
A map showing movements prior to the Battle of Smolensk.
Barclay and Bagration Meet
Bagration and Barclay meeting
On August 1, the Russian army trudged into Smolensk after retreating from Vitebsk earlier. The Russian army was confused about their retreat from Vitebsk, but that day Barclay issued a proclamation to the army that soon Bagration's army would join them in Smolensk, which lifted spirits. The next day, Bagration rode in to Barclay's camp, and the army soon followed after. Barclay then issued a proclamation stating that the Russian army was now ready to take on the French.
While the joining of the two armies greatly increased the size the Russians could field at one location, it did have a few downsides. Although Barclay outranked Bagration in the chain of command, many assumed that Bagration would take real control of the army due to his overwhelming personality. The two had also disliked each other at best. Although Bagration formally gave command to Barclay of his army, there was still tension between the two for control.
Even with a large force concentrated, Clausewitz pointed out after the war that the strength of the Russian army at this point was a strategic one rather than a tactical one. He argued that no matter what, a pitched battle would certainly have resulted in a loss for the Russians. Although the army knew the French were weakening with every day, and that retreat was still in all reality the best option, they were overwhelmed by their confidence in their new combined force. The army had heard reports of victories in the south and the north, and could not figure why a pitched battle would not be in their interest.
The Rudnia Offensive
Russian Infantry uniforms in 1812
Now that Bagration had finally joined Barclay, Bagration was pushing for a battle, and Barclay had no excuse for retreating, as fighting was universally wanted throughout the army and Russia.
Barclay, however, still knew that giving battle would be pointless and unnecessarily costly for the Russians, but was being overwhelmed with pressure to give battle. On 6 August he held a council of war arguing for further retreat, but was outnumbered by war hawks and it was decided that Russia should take the offensive.
On the following day, 7 August, three Russian columns were sent out to attack Murat's cavalry and Ney's corps, encamped near the Rudnia River. The offensive could have been successful, but it was carried out slowly and with little enthusiasm by Barclay, who had no real desire to fight. Although in the end this may have actually benefited Barclay, as a victory would have raised Russian morale and desire to fight, which would impede any attempts by Barclay to make the army retreat which he felt it would have to do anyways.
That night, Barclay received intelligence, later proven to be wrong, that a French force was moving north to the town of Poriechie to attack him. Barclay sent orders to Bagration to move his forces north, and Bagration followed reluctantly. However, the orders never reached Bagration's cavalry, so instead of moving north the next day, they moved westward as previously ordered.
The cavalry, who had moved westward, ran in to French forces under Murat and were quickly routed back. A little later that day, Barclay realized that the French had indeed not moved to Poriechie, and we has now dangerously exposed along is western flank. Bagration was given the order to move towards his previous position, which he followed.
Following the completion of this order, Bagration received his third order from Barclay, instructing him to carry out the original plan of attacking the French along the Rudnia River. Bagration was so angry by the confusion of the army that he ignored Barclay's order and marched in his current direction towards Smolensk. This disobedience by Bagration would, in the end, save the Russian army.
Napoleon's Smolensk Maneuver
Fighting outside Smolensk
When Napoleon heard of Barclay and Bagration's forced moving towards Poriechie, he formulated a plan to cross the Dnieper River west of Smolensk, and take the city from behind unoccupied. The plan was to cross at Rassasna, and the march east and north, striking Smolensk from behind in the south while being unoccupied. This plan would not only take the city without a fight, but would also successfully surround the Russian army and cut off any attempt at retreat they may have.
Napoleon's plan would have been a huge success and probably would have destroyed the Russian army had it not been for one thing: Bagration's insubordination. If Bagration had followed Barclay's orders and pushed westward with the offensive, Smolensk would have been left practically unguarded and the Russian army would have been cut off and surrounded.
With all of Barclay's shifting of forces, many units were lost and confused. Had Napoleon launched a frontal attack on the Russians, it probably would have destroyed all of Barclay's army, followed shortly thereafter by the destruction of Bagration's army, since the two were now split and Barclay's being in such bad order. However, this would have, in Napoleon's defense, been an unwise decision only knowing what he did. For all Napoleon knew, the Russian army was still unified and still marching north west out of Smolensk, and a frontal attack would have been costly had that been the situation. Napoleon's plan of outflanking Smolensk would have also worked perfectly.
On 14 August, Davout's, Murat's, and Ney's (including Prince Eugene's) corps all marched across the Dnieper River at Rassasna.
Upon reaching Korytnia, just south of Smolensk, Murat's cavalry met a small resistance by a Russian force place there by Bagration. The Russians retreated in good order, but lost about 2,000 men and 7 guns. However the main force was reinforced the next day and had their retreat to Smolensk covered, so as the prevent any furthur charges on the column by Murat's cavalry.
On the evening of 15 August, Napoleon's birthday, he was greeted in Korytnia with a 100 gun salute. But, it would not be a happy birthday for Napoleon. He entered Korytnia only to find that his billiant outflanking had failed. What was supposed to be an undefended city was now a occupied by Bagration's army, with Barclay's army moving to reinforce it.
The Worthless City
Dmitry Dokhturov
Smolensk was, to both sides, a completely worthless objective. To the Russians, it was a relatively small city of 12,600 citizens, with no economic or strategic importance. The only thing it did have was a renowned icon of the Virgin Mary, which the army would take with it for some time afterwards. The city was not worth defending, but Barclay, being under immense pressure to fight, felt that he must give a battle the army and Russia so badly wanted.
The French had even less to gain by taking the city. Smolensk was surrounded by a large brick wall 25 feet in height, and 15 feet in thickness, with a dry ditch in front, and 30 towers around the walls. Napoleon's aim was still to defeat the Russian army only, and taking Smolensk added difficulty to the task, as well as would cost the French unnecessary casualties, as city fights were always a costly task. Napoleon believed, however, that the Russians would come out in defense of their holy city and give open battle with the French. Carl von Clausewitz claims this to be Napoleon's greatest error of the entire campaign.
Napoleon did have options other than attacking Smolensk, though. Napoleon could have moved to the east and searched for another crossing across the Dnieper River, which probably would have forced the Russians out of the city. Napoleon did send scouting parties to look for crossings (as the main highway to Moscow was on the north side of the River, while Napoleon was on the south), but his real intention was to attack the Russians at Smolensk.
Barclay's Preparations
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
A map of the Battle of Smolensk, I placed in spoilers due to its rather large size
For a while I must digress a minute to further clarify the situation at Smolensk in relation to its geography. Smolensk was essentially cut in half by the Dnieper River, one half on the north and one on the south. The main highway that led to Moscow was located along the northern bank of the Dnieper, running parallel to the river from there for some time. On each side of the Dnieper, south and north, the city slopes upwards from the River to their respective sides. This meant that artillery could fire downwards on a force crossing the bridges in the city. Napoleon, who was again located south of the city, could have moved east, crossed the River, and then cut off any Russian chance of retreat. Barclay's main force was located north of the Dnieper River, and Napoleon's south, while the Russians controlled all of Smolensk, north and south.
Although he knew it was a hopeless battle, Barclay did all he could to lessen the negative effect the outcome of the battle would most certainly yield. He send Bagration west, along the Moscow highway to cover any crossings across the Dnieper that Napoleon may use, so as to keep the Russian line of retreat open. He also placed only 30,000 men, under Dokhturov, on the southern half of the city. The rest of Barclay's forces and all of his artillery were placed along the northern half of Smolensk, with the artillery mostly being placed along the northern slope.
The Battle of Smolensk
French forces nearing the walls of Smolensk
On the morning of 17 August, French forces began an assault on the suburbs of the city, outside the walls. The Russians under Dokhturov counterattacked and effectively pushed back French forces. Napoleon saw this and hoped it was the prelude to a Russian assault outside the city.
Most of the morning consisted of French artillery firing upon Russian positions in the southern half of the city, and at noon there was a lull in the action. Napoleon was still waiting for the Russians to counterattack outside the city. But at around 2 o'clock, Napoleon finally realized that no Russian attack would occur, so he gave the order for an assault on the city itself.
Around 200 French guns of the Grand Army opened fire and three corps consisting of some 50,000 men charged the city in a grand spectacle. The Grand Army was attacking southern Smolensk from all three sides, and soldiers of the Grand Army along the southern slopes cheered on their comrades from above. Hand-to-hand bayonet fighting broke out between French and Russian forces in the suburbs, but the French eventually pushed back the Russian defenders. Every Russian attempt at a counterattack in the Smolensk suburbs failed, and the determined French force reached the city walls, only to find they had no ladders to scale the walls.
The soldiers bravely descended into the ditches surrounding the walls, and attempted the lift each other over the walls on the shoulder of another, but to no avail. French batteries which were firing on Russian positions occasionally fell short and hit the walls, killing French soldiers below with the fragments of the walls.
By the afternoon, shells thrown by French mortars had caught many of the wooden houses in Smolensk on fire. As the day dragged on, little progress was made by the forces of the Grand Army, as they were still mostly stuck at the walls of Smolensk. By nightfall, the city was mostly engulfed in fire from the shelling that day. Napoleon called the sight a grand spectacle and compared it to the eruption of Vesuvius, but Napoleon had nothing to be happy about.
The Abandoning of Smolensk
Smolensk near nightfall. The fires in the city can cleary be seen
By the end of the day, Napoleon had lost around 7,000 troops and Barclay around 11,000. Barclay had achieved nothing more than the satisfaction of saying he defended the city against Napoleon for a day. Realizing that he could not stay in the city much longer, as it would only be a day or two before Napoleon made a crossing upstream, Barclay gave the order to evacuate the city and fire to be set to any stores or shops that could supply the army with food. The icon of the Virgin Mary was removed from the city and taken with the army.
The order for the city to be abandoned caused an outcry from soldiers, officers, and civilians alike. Bennigsen, for example, stormed into Barclay's headquarters shouting every insult he could think of and demanding that he be placed under Bagration's army, as he no longer wished to serve under a German coward who was selling Russia.
Rather they liked it or not, the last of the Russian army left Smolensk two hours before dawn. On the way out of the city, Dokhturov's men set fire to the bridges in Smolensk. Shortly after dawn, the 2nd Polish Infantry managed to make a breach in the walls and entered the city, only to find the city ablaze and littered with corpses. They opened the main gate to the city, letting the French forces in, and the city was Napoleon's.
Fighting at Lubino - Valutina Gora
Jean-Andoche Junot
Barclay spent the remainder of the day in the suburbs north of Smolensk, using artillery to prevent French forces from rebuilding the burnt bridges, but he withdrew at nightfall. Since the Moscow road ran parallel to the river for several miles, Barclay had to march north, off the road, so as to avoid harassment from French guns along the other bank of the river. This slowed progress, and to make matters worse, Barclay split his force into two, which actually slowed progress further. After traveling north enough, Barclay headed east, parallel and north to the Moscow road, and then finally south to link back up with the road at Lubino.
Ney, in the mean time, repaired the bridge and started following the Moscow road in pursuit of Barclay. With progress so slow for Barclay, Ney actually caught up to Russian forces at Valutina Gora, and engaged with what was believed to be the Russian rearguard. Ney would have routed the Russian force there had it not been for the timely arrival of reinforcements from Barclay, who personally led him men.
While the Russians and French both threw more and more reinforcements into battle at Valutina Gora to try to knock the other back, Junot with a force of Westphalians was across the river on the southern bank watching the action unfold. Napoleon ordered him to cross behind Russian lines, and hit them from the back. Junot, who was usually fearless and obeyed commands, had been complaining of heat stroke and replied to Napoleon with incoherent correspondence. Murat, who was busy fighting the Russians on his own front, rode up to Junot and told him to attack the Russian flank, but he did not.
By now about 30,000 Russians and 50,000 French were engaged in what had been a small engagement not too long ago. The Russians only committed so many soldiers to battle because in reality they were so disorganized that any French breakthrough would have cut the army down the middle and spelled the end of Barclay and Bagration's forces.
The battle, which had by this point turned into a bloodbath, only ended because of nightfall, by which time about 9,000 French and 9,000 Russians lay dead on the field. The exhausted soldiers of the Grand Army lay down and slept next to their fallen comrades, as they were too tired to build camps.
The next day the Russians had retreated and the French remained at their current location. Napoleon rode to the front, and personally presented those soldiers who had shown their valour the previous two days with awards and medals.
Conclusion on Smolensk
Napoleon awarding a Polish soldier a medal after the Battle of Smolensk
Smolensk, and all the fighting around it, was again full of missed opportunities that so plagued the Grand Army during the entire campaign. What could have possibly been the end of the Russian army and the war, turned into a pointless battle. Had Napoleon found a crossing east of Smolensk, the Russian's would have had to meet him in open battle and would have almost undoubtedly been defeated. The Russian's, while showing their grit and determination in the defense of Smolensk, unnecessarily lost men that could not easily be replaced, all the while achieving absolutely nothing.
Napoleon had also destroyed a city that could have solved some, if not much, of his supply problems. Instead of gaining a city full of supplies, he found the city almost entirely abandoned and none of the much needed supplies were gained from the city.
Action at Lubino-Valutina Gora could have again broken the back of the Russian army, but Junot's reluctance to charge at the Russian flank made the battle a stalemate. Napoleon had twice, two days in a row, misjudged the Russian army and let it slip away when he had the opportunity to destroy it.
The effect on morale of the Grand Army was undoubtedly terrible. They had spent almost four days of fighting, two of which days were large scale battles, and saw little triumph of victory. They did not drive the Russians out of Smolensk, but rather entered it to find it abandoned, burnt, and littered with dead and dying bodies. All this and only a day later engaged in another battle with the Russians, in which the fighting only ended because of nightfall, and they had fought again only to see the Russians slip out in the middle of the night. No gallant victory was achieved, no proud moments, but death surrounded Smolensk and in vast numbers.
Part IV Buildup to Borodino
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Napoleon's Next Move
French forces outside Borodino
After his failure at Smolensk, Napoleon was completely lost as to what to do next. Napoleon failed to force the Russians into a decisive battle, and now did not know if he would have another chance. He had assumed that by this point in the campaign, Alexander would have sued for peace and given up.
Moscow, which was only 8 days march away from Smolensk, was Napoleon's most likely chance at forcing the Russians into battle. He believed there was no way that the Russians would let him take their most prized city without a full scale battle. While Napoleon realized that marching on Moscow was extraordinarily risky, he said "We are now committed too far to draw back, peace lies before us; we are only eight days' march from it; so close to the goal there can be no discussion. Let us march on Moscow!".
Napoleon's repeated policy of following the Russians deeper and deeper into Russian territory in order to get just one more battle and one more chance at peace would ultimately be what drove him so far into Moscow, not his desire to capture the country as a whole. So, now Moscow was Napoleon's last hope at victory and peace.
Barclay's New Position
Count Rostopchin, Governor of Moscow
As the Russians retreated from Smolensk, their tactics of retreating somewhat changed. As they were now being closely pursued by the French, and their rearguard was always threatened, they began to quicken their pace. Because of this, the Russians were forced to leave behind supply wagons and baggage trains.
The Russians responded by searching every nearby town along the road for food and supplies, and afterwards would burn the buildings, so as not to leave any supplies to the pursuing army. The pursuing French were awed by this, who had never really seen an army use such tactics, and felt it was a shameful way to fight.
Barclay was now himself looking for suitable ground on which the fight the forces of the Grand Army, however Bagration disapproved of most of the sites he picked. When Barclay urged for a stand at Usviate, Bagration criticized it as terrible ground. When Barclay argued for a stand near Dorogobuzh, Bagration objected a accused Barclay of treason and threatened to have him demoted, even though he was not really in a position to do so.
Finally, on the 26 August, Barclay and Bagration agreed to give battle outside Viazma, and the Russians soldiers began to dig in there. Viazma was only three to four days march from Moscow, and for the citizens of Moscow, the likelihood of a French occupation of the city became a reality.
This whole series of events came as a complete shock to the populace of Moscow, as the governor, Count Rostopchin, had turned every skirmish into a major Russian victory and the propaganda he issued made it seem as though the Russians were winning. For example, on the 17 August, Moscow was celebrating at the supposed Russian victory over the French at Smolensk, which was far from the truth. When the French army closed in on Moscow, a general panic ensued, with citizens burying or hiding their valuables. Churches were crowded with people praying for safety, and much of the wealthier began to evacuate the city as a precaution.
Rostopchin himself began evacuating the treasuries of the city and churches and valuables from the Kremlin. He claimed that before the French take the city, he would burn it to the ground and the French "will find only a heap of dust where the ancient capital of Russia stood".
Anyone who spoke French or even German instead of Russian in the city was attacked by angry mobs. Supposed French spies were rounded up and executed on the spot. Rostopchin's actions certainly didn't help settle the disorder just prior to the French occupation.
Alexander, who had by this point taken up residence in his summer hour on the Kamenny Island, was being swarmed by letters from military commanders and politicians alike calling for the removal of Barclay from command. Alexander had stood by Barclay after his initial retreat, after Vitebsk, and still hoped to keep him in command after Smolensk. However, public opinion had already decided who it wanted to be commander: Kutuzov.
On 17 August, the same day as Smolensk, Alexander held a meeting with senior generals to discuss Barclay's replacement, and Kutuzov was promptly decided upon. However, Alexander was slow to act on this, and instead kept searching for another commander. He looked into appointing Bennigsen to the position, or even inviting Bernadotte of Sweden to command the army. Although he probably would have preferred Bennigsen above all, he was powerless to choose anyone besides Kutuzov. Alexander wrote to Barclay informing him of his replacement, but also told one of Barclay's aides, "The public wanted him, so I appointed him, but as far as I am concerned, I was my hands of it".
When Kutuzov arrived at the armies location at Tsarevo-Zaimishche, he was greeted by joyous shouts from the army. Many felt the old veteran of the Turkish wars would immediately send them into battle against the French, and defeat them. Barclay, who at first accepted his new position under Kutuzov, now asked Alexander to remove him of his command altogether.
While Kutuzov was indeed a decent leader and commander, he had many faults. The greatest of these was his distrust of officers below him. He would fail to inform generals of what orders he had given to others, and left many in the dark altogether on what the overall plans were. In battles, he would tell a commander of a lower rank one thing, and not inform his superior, and many times when the superior found out, they would simply move the men back where they were to begin with.
Another fault of his was the way he gave orders. Instead of using the proper chain of command, he would give orders to whoever happened to be there, so many times officers of lower ranks would issue orders to their men that were supposed to be ordered to an entire division. He also changed his mind often, and failed to inform those who needed to be told of the change in plans.
Although Kutuzov is many times portrayed as a Russian hero that was in many ways "all-Russian", he gave orders in impeccable French. He also had a taste for foreign wines and foods, and indeed was more of a western European in many aspects than a Russian.
The Battlefield
A map of Russian (white) and French (red) positions at Borodino on the morning of 7 September
While Barclay had chosen his place he wanted to fight the French, Kutuzov estimated that the Russians were too outnumbered and decided to fall back and wait for reinforcements. Barclay, on the orders of Kutuzov, found another ideal location to give battle, near the village of Borodino. On 3 September, Kutuzov gave his approval of the spot, and the building of earthworks began.
Kutuzov positioned his troops mostly along the Kolocha River, except south of Borodino, where they bent southward along the Kamionka and Semeonovka creeks. The general outlay of the forces was this, Bagration in the south defending the two creeks, with Tuchkov even further south with a small force guarding the Old Smolensk road to prevent any attempt at outflanking the position. Barclay was in the north guarding the Raevsky Redoubt and the New Smolensk Road, and extending extremely far north along the bank of the Kolocha River.
While the Raevsky Redoubt guarded the Russian center adequately, the south was rather exposed. Kutuzov ordered three V-shaped fleches to be built at the position, and had cannons placed on the earthworks. In addition to this, he built a pentagonal shaped redoubt at Shevardino, but this was very far ahead of the main Russian lines. The Shevardino Redoubt would puzzle Russian commanders, as they were not sure if it was merely an outpost for tracking French movements at the opening of the battle or the true Russian frontline. Kutuzov never informed the commanders of its role, and it is likely that Kutuzov did not know which he wished to use it for.
Kutuzov was expecting an attack along the New Smolensk Road, where the bulk of his forces and defenses were located. He felt that if they attacked here, victory would surely be within reach. However, he understood that if the French tried to outflank the Russian position along the Old Smolensk Road to the south, the Russian line could easily fold up and be defeated.
Seeing his exposed flank, Kutuzov sent a corps under Tuchkov to defend the road, and place them in wooded position to ambush any flanking force, but did not inform Barclay or Bennigsen. When the two complained the Kutuzov, he listened but did nothing, and did not tell them of Tuchkov's position along the road. This greatly worked against Kutuzov, as when Bennigsen was riding along the lines later that day, he found Tuchkov's corps, and repositioned it, bringing it out in the open along the road. As the 7 of September approached, the Russian lines were dug in deep, and strong in the center but exposed along the flank.
Napoleon's Plan
Fighting around the Shevardino Redoubt
Although they arrived on near Borodino on the 5 of September, the Grand Army was in no position to yet attack the lines. Napoleon spent the 6 September scouting the Russian defenses, and he noticed the extremely strong center position along the New Smolensk Road. On 5 September, two days before the battle, Napoleon ordered an attack on the Shevardino Redoubt, and small fighting took place around the redoubt. The Shevardino redoubt changed hands multiple times, but the Russians finally gave up trying to capture it by 11 o'clock at night. The Russians lost 5,000 men and 5 guns, but captured 8 French guns and killed some 4,000 French, which allowed Kutuzov to claim the fighting a victory for Russia.
The 6 September was spent scouting the field. It was on this day that Napoleon spotted the Russian weakness in their lines.
His orders were finally issued, Davout and Ney were to attack he fleches, while Poniatowski would hit the left wing in a sweeping flanking move, and then all three with support by Junot would roll up in a northward direction and destroy the Russian army, ideally pinning it against where the Kolocha and Moskva Rivers joined in the north.
Opposing Forces
French artillery on the eve of Borodino
It is always difficult to estimate the true number of soldiers engaged in a battle, and Borodino was no exception. On the French side, the generally accepted number of soldiers was about 134,000, but certainly this could easily be larger than the force was because officers would inflate their numbers during roll call. Most Russian historians put he French force at no more than 126,000. The French had around 584 artillery pieces, but many of these were of uselessly small calibre, and had much shorter range than their Russian counterparts. It is estimated that three fourths of the French guns were of such small calibre that they could only be used in close support of infantry attacks.
No matter what the correct estimate is, it is known that the French were outnumbered. Early accounts by Russian historians put the force at no more than 112,000, but this is almost certainly false. Modern estimates range from about 154,800 to 157,000. But, this force included 10,000 militia, who did not fight, and 30,000 cossacks. But on the flip side it is usually worth noting that the French numbers include the Imperial Guard, some 25,000 men, who saw no action and fired no shots during the course of the battle. The Russians had around 640 artillery pieces, but it is worth noting that 300 were kept in reserve and fired few shots.
The King of Rome
Napoleon II
The day before the battle, after Napoleon returned from his scouting of the Russian lines, he was presented with a gift from Paris. It was a portrait of his son, Napoleon II, holding a miniature orb and sceptre. Napoleon was extremely taken by the portrait, and placed it on a stool outside his tent for all to see. The soldiers, veterans in particular, were taken by the painting, and it certainly raised morale for those who saw it, and for Napoleon himself.
Napoleon, who had not been feeling well the previous days, wrote to his wife, "I am very tired. Bausset delivered the portrait of the king. It is a masterpiece. I thank you warmly for thinking of it. It is as beautiful as you are. I will write you in more detail tomorrow. I am tir. Adio, mio bene. Nap." The letter certainly gave an insight into Napoleon's state prior to and during the battle. He had been feeling ill, and would continue to feel bad the day of the battle.
Napoleon was feeling uncertain about the outcome of the following days battle, and said to a sentry at his tent, "Fortune is a fickle courtesan, I has always said so, and now I am beginning to experience it." The sentry explained to him that the army understood its position, and that it knew defeat certainly meant its destruction, for if the Russians did not kill them, their stagnation would starve them to death. Napoleon replied, "Poor army, it is much reduced, but what is left is good; and my Guard is intact."
Part V The Battle for Moscow (Borodino)
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Modern reenactors on location at Borodino
Pre-Battle
Russian artillery at the Raevsky Redoubt
Napoleon awoke the day of the battle, 7 September, at three o'clock in the morning, and rode to the Shevardino Redoubt, capture just in the latter part of the previous day, to inspect his forces. The forces of the Grand Army were busy moving into position, but cheered their Emperor as he rode by.
As the army prepared to fight, officers read to them the proclamation written the night before by Napoleon. It read:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Quote:
Soldiers! This is the battle that you have looked forward to so much! Now victory depends on you: we need it. It will give us abundance, good winter quarters and a prompt return to our motherland! Conduct yourselves as you did at
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Quote:
Austerlitz, at Friedland, at Vitebsk, at Smolensk, and may the most distant generations cite your conduct on this day with pride; let it be said of you: "He was at that great battle under the walls of Moscow!"
Napoleon took up position on the western end of the Shevardino Redoubt, with his Imperial Guard, Young and Old, drawn up beside and behind him. Napoleon would remain in his chair in this position for the remainder of the battle.
Kutuzov took position in the village of Gorki, just east of Borodino along the New Smolensk Road. It was here, not along the Old Smolensk Road and the three fleches, that Kutuzov believed the main action would take place. Kutuzov, unlike Napoleon, could not view the battlefield from his position. He issued a statement to his men before the battle that read:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Quote:
Boys, today it will fall on you to defend your native land; you must serve faithfully and truly to the last drop of blood. I am counting on you. God will help us! Say your prayers!
The Opening Stages
Kutuzov at Borodino
At around six o'clock, hundreds of French and Russian guns began exchanging fire with one another. As the guns fired, the battlefield immediately began filling with smoke and dust. French guns pounded the Russian earthworks, wreaking havoc upon the men ad horses inside, and kicking up clouds of dirt as the round shot hit. Russian artillery responded by firing round and canister shot on the exposed French infantry, who were still waiting for their marching orders. The veterans of the Russian army had to remind their recruit comrades not to put their leg out to stop a slowly moving round shot, as the sheer weight and slow movement of the roundshot could rip a mans leg off. The canister shot, which was composed of hundreds of small metallic balls in the range of about a few centimeters (and which most resembles a shotgun of today, but out of a cannon), would prove disastrous to exposed French and Russian infantry.
After a half an hour of continuous bombardment, French troops were finally given their orders to advance upon the Russian lines. From Borodino, in the north, to Utitsa, in the south, soldiers of the Grand Army slowly made their way towards the Russian lines. The Battle of Borodino had finally at last begun.
In the north, Prince Eugene successfully crossed the Kolocha River and captured Borodino. As the soldiers charged forward trough the city, they became carried away and broke rank and order. The Russians mounted a swift counterattack and routed the disorderly troops. Prince Eugene pulled back to prepare for another assault.
In the south, Davout launched a frontal assault along the three fleches, although they were only aware that there were two at the time. Further south of Davout, Poniatowski began his flanking maneuver and attacked the village of Utitsa, quickly capturing the town.
The fighting between Davout's men and Bagration's along the fleches quickly devolved into hand-to-hand combat. In the end, the French drove the Russians out of the front two fleches, only to discover there was a third. As the French occupied the V shaped fleches, it exposed their front to Russian artillery fired, and trapped them along the front earthworks. The Russian guns opened a devastating barrage of canister shot, mowing down rows of trapped French soldiers. After a murderous artillery barrage, the Russians under General Neverovsky counterattacked the fleches and drove the French out. The French quickly formed up for another assault.
Only an hour after the battle began, Kutuzov received requests for reinforcements in the south, or else it would quickly collapse. Kutuzov ordered the number of troops in the south to be increased from 18,000 to some 30,000, supported by 300 pieces of artillery; as opposed to the French who had 40,000 men and 200 artillery in the same area.
The fleches repeatedly changed hands over the course of the morning through assaults and counterattacks, usually devolving into intense bayonet fighting. The sheer depth of the armies on each side prevented retreats when forces became outnumbered and lost momentum. This was uncommon because units tended to fall back rather than engage in hand-to-hand combat to the last man. The boxing match over the fleches continued until around 10 o'clock, when the French captured all three fleches.
Bagration is Dead?
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Bagration after being hit in the leg. He would later die of his wounds.
After the French captured all three fleches, Bagration began to rally his troops for a final counterattack to retake the fleches. Bagration successfully led his men and retook the fleches, but he was hit by a bullet in the leg right after the successful counterattack.
Bagration slipped off his horse and fell to the ground. He was carried away, against his wishes, by a group of soldiers to the back of the frontline. An aide-de-camp of Barclay's spotted Bagration and began speaking with him. Bagration said to him, "Tell the general that the fate of the army and its preservation is in his hands. So far all is going well, but let him look after my army, and may God help us all." Although a long time rival of Barclay, Bagration could not help but finally admit Barclay's competence as a commander and his own respect and trust he had in him.
Like a children's game of telephone, news spread of Bagration's wound, but it quickly turned into rumors of his death. As the already tired, and now leaderless, Russian soldiers heard the news, the French launched another assault on the fleches. This time, the assault pushed the Russians all the way back to the Semeonovka creek, near the rear of the Russian lines.
Ney and Murat, who had spearheaded the attack, now saw a gap in the Russian lines. Both commanders, realizing their own men to be too exhausted to carry out any additional attacks, sent dispatches to Napoleon requesting reinforcements, particularly the Guard, to drive through the Russian lines.
Napoleon, who was usually very proactive in battles and very much a part of them, did not respond. While Napoleon had a clear view of the battlefield at the beginning, smoke and dust not blocked his view of the events occurring, and he felt he could not trust the commanders' judgments. He dismissed the dispatches without saying a word, and continued to view the battlefield through his telescope.
The Leaderless Armies
Napoleon at Borodino
It is now that I will need to digress a bit to discuss the state of either armies’ leadership, or lack thereof, during the Battle of Borodino. On the French side, Napoleon was feeling ill the day of the battle and did not respond to any commanders requests, and hardly issued any new orders. In a sense, Napoleon's presence hindered the French, as the army was truly composed of about 6 commanders (Eugene, Ney, Davout, Murat, Junot, and Poniatowski) all acting as equals and independent of one another. Cooperation between the commanders did occur, but coordinating attacks in this manner was so time consuming that usually the opportunity had been missed before the plans were carried out.
The Russian army was also practically leaderless, but in a much different manner. Rather because of a combination of stress and being overwhelmed by the events, or because he though it the best strategy, Kutuzov issued almost not new orders and merely reacted to what lower commanders requested. When a commander requested reinforcements, Kutuzov would comply without so much as assessing the overall battlefield and where the actual best placement of the reinforcements was. Kutuzov would sometimes comply with a request and not inform the commander, so the commander was unsure if the troops had been moved and had to waste time sending a dispatch to find out. At one point, he turned to Karl von Clausewitz and said, "Karl, whatever you say I will do." Like the French, the Russian commanders were forced to work along and independent of one another.
Lucky Breaks
Uvarov's cavalry charge, his along with Platov's would trick Napoleon into halting
all advancements
Upon hearing of Bagration's wound, Kutuzov sent commanders to try to ease the situation at Semeonosvkoie. Luckily for Kutuzov, Bennigsen and Toll both took great initiative in steadying the troops and calming the panic among the Russian lines in the south.
Shortly after Bagration was wounded, in the north the French opened up a frontal assault on the Raevsky Redoubt, the center of the Russian defenses. The French occupied the Redoubt after a series of musket volleys and bayonet charges. It would turn out a lucky series of events would save the Russians from total collapse following the occupation of the Raevsky Redoubt.
Barclay had left the front lines to go to Gorki, but General Lowenstern took command of the situation and swept a battalion of men into battle against the French. General Yermolov, who happened to be riding by with reinforcements to head southward, saw the fighting and immediately sent him men into action. The French retreated into the Redoubt, but with no men covering their flanks could not hold for long.
It was around this time that General Platov made a request to Kutuzov, asking that his 5,500 cossacks and Uvarov's 2,500 regular cavalry that were sitting idle in he north, cross the Kolocha River north of any French positions and swing around behind their line. Kutuzov gave him the go, and about 8,000 cavalry supported by 36 artillery pieces crossed the Kolocha. As soon as the cavalry crossed the river, French infantry who had been posted there opened fire on the horsemen. The cossacks ran out of range, and the regular cavalry, who had taken the blunt of the volley, fled in disorder. The cavalry charge retreated, and seemingly waste, but it would have some very unexpected consequences in the outcome of the battle.
Some time between 11 and 12 o'clock the French attacks stopped to a standstill. The Raevsky Redoubt was back in Russian hands, Poniatowski had been halted in his flanking move, and while the fleches and Semeonovkoie had been taken, new Russian lines formed up behind the village. No French commander was in a position to attack with enough strength to break through decisively, and Ney, Murat, and Davout called for reinforcements. Napoleon was reluctant to send in his Guard, so he decided only to send in the Young Guard and the artillery of the Guard forward.
However, just as Napoleon was about to send his Young Guard into action, he spotted Platov's cavalry on his northern exposed flank, and halted all troop movements out of fear of being hit from the side. While the Russians were nearly beaten, their defenses almost all breached and their troops tired, Napoleon hesitated and gave them time to bring up fresh reinforcements to the front and patch up their defenses. For two whole hours the French infantry did not move, and Russian artillery harassed them the entire time, firing volleys of round shot at the soldiers. The artillery would wreak havoc upon the idle infantry, and in particular the cavalry, which had hardly moved the entire day. All the French soldiers could do was stand there and hope for the best.
The Final Assault
French cavalry charge against the Raevsky Redoubt
It was not until two hours later, at 2 o'clock, that the Grand Army began massing for a last assault on the Raevsky Redoubt. While nearly 200 French guns pounded the earthworks, Eugene drew up infantry divisions from other commanders. At around 3 o'clock the infantry began their climb up the hill towards the Raevsky Redoubt.
French cuirassiers were the first inside the Redoubt, and were met with a deadly volley of fire. The infantry arrived to find the cuirassiers mostly dismounted, fighting hand to hand with the Russian defenders. Brutal hand-to-hand combat broke out, as it did many times at Borodino, and the French broke through the frontline. French cavalry charged forward in pursuit of the fleeing Russians, only to find Barclay had formed a second line of squares, leaving the cavalry powerless to fight.
Barclay mounted a small cavalry counterattack, as Kutuzov had removed his cavalry without informing him, and pushed the French back to the Redoubt. Nonetheless, the Russian line was breaking, and all that was needed now was one final push by French reinforcements. But none would come. The men would fight for several hours near the Raevsky Redoubt, while in the south Poniatowski pushed the Russians back past Utitsa. The fierce fighting continued, until around 6 o'clock, when the Russians finally retreated, but in good order.
The Aftermath
Napoleon at Borodino
The battlefield at Borodino was littered with some 45,000 dead Russians and some 28,000 French. Supposedly around 35,478 horses were also buried the next year by Russian officials on the site. Some historians claim it was the greatest massacre in European history until the first day of the Somme in 1916 (although this claim is arguable). French artillery had fired somewhere around 70,000 rounds during the course of the day, and cavalry and infantry had fired 1,400,000 musket-shots. This averages at 100 cannon shots and 2,300 musket-shots per minute.
The Russian army was now completely useless, it had lost half of its fighting strength and could not give battle again before Moscow. The soldiers that had died were the Russian armies' best, as now mostly cossacks and militia remained, with some elements of the Russian infantry. However, while it was an ineffective fighting force, it still existed, and so on a strategic level the Battle of Borodino was a major loss for Napoleon.
In the Raevsky Redoubt, bodies were piled as high as 6 to 8 men on average. Since a disproportionately high number of men died from artillery, as compared to other battles, mangled bodies were a common sight on the battlefield. Below I will include several quotes from people at the battle, most need little explanation and while they are only slightly relevant I will put them in spoilers, so those who want to read them can and those who do not do not have to:
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One could see some (horses) which, horribly disemboweled, nevertheless kept standing, their heads hunt low, drenching the soil with their blood, or, hobbling painfully in search of some pasture, dragged beneath them shreds of harness, sagging intestines or a fractured member, or else, lying flat on their sides, lifted their heads from time to time to gaze on their gaping wounds.
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They (the wounded) lay one on top of the other, swimming in pools of their own blood, moaning and cursing as they begged for death.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
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Around the eagles one could see the remaining officers and non-commissioned officers along with a few soldiers, hardly enough to guard the flag. Their uniforms were torn by the ferocity of the struggle, blackened by powder and sullied with blood; and yet, in the midst of these tatters, of this misery, of this disaster, they maintained a proud look and even managed, at the sight of the Emperor, a few cheers; but they were rare and contrived, for in that army, which was capable of clear-sightedness as well as enthusiasm, each one was assessing the overall position
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
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The number of dead testified to the courage of the vanquished rather than to the scale of the victory
Kutuzov, realizing that he was in no position to fight again for some time, retreated not towards Moscow, but south towards Kaluga. Kutuzov made the decision that the Russian army was more valuable than the whole of Moscow, and so he abandoned the city and left it to the fate of the French. As Kutuzov retreated south, Napoleon was at the gates of Moscow, and victory seemed sure if he could capture and hold the city.
Part VI The Occupation of Moscow
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Road to Moscow
A painting of the Moscow fire started by the Russians
Napoleon was now faced with a two choices, to pursue what was left of Kutuzov's army and destroy it, venturing further into enemy territory with even less supplies than he already had, or to occupy Moscow, which was plentiful in supplies and loot for the soldiers to take. Napoleon chose the latter, feeling that once Moscow was taken, either Alexander would sue for peace and once an agreement was reached the Russians would supply Napoleon's army, or if need be he could sit out the winter in Moscow, and resume campaigning in the spring and march on St. Petersburg. Napoleon's choice of entering Moscow was probably the better of the two, but as fortune would have it, none of what he had hoped for in Moscow would be there.
As the Russian army retreated through Moscow, a general panic followed. Citizens began shouting insults at the cowardly soldiers, some threw supplies to them so the French could not have them, and there are even reports of civilians dragging wounded soldiers off wagons and hoping on so as to escape the city. The Governor of Moscow, Count Rostopchin, barely escaped being lynched by a mob of angry civilians, and he only did so by turning over to them a suspected French spy. One can only assume the mob began butchering him as Rostopchin left on his carriage.
Rostopchin, who was furious at the abandonment of the city, vowed to leave nothing for the French. He worked tirelessly making sure soldiers burnt down any food store or supply, and removed all of the hand pumps used for fighting fires. As most of the buildings were made of wood in Moscow, the fires quickly began to spread to other areas and districts of the city. This was extremely rare behavior and seen as dishonorable even by many Russians, as it was usually customary for all local government officials to remain in their posts and see to it that the city runs as smoothly as possible, even when occupied by a foreign nation.
As the Russian rearguard was nearing the middle of the city, still far from leaving, Murat's cavalry entered the city, and cut off a good portion of the army inside the city. Miloradovich, seeing that if they engaged the French they would be surrounded and killed, sent a dispatch to Murat telling him that if he did not engage, the Russians would hand over the city peacefully. Since Napoleon wanted the city as undamaged as possible, Murat accepted, and the French cavalry retreated, allowing the Russian army to continue its evacuation.
As French soldiers occupied Moscow, they assumed that the war was over, and supplies would be plentiful. Many radical Russians were even beginning to believe that peace was inevitable and that they were beaten. Many generals started talks of how to escape to Spain to join the English in fights against the French there. The next day, on the 14 September, French infantry moved into the city and began looking for supplies.
The Moscow Fire
Napoleon leaving Moscow due to the fire
On the day of the occupation, only about a third of the 200,000 population of Moscow remained in the city. This consisted of those with no means as to escape, or those who thought they could loot at free will when everyone else left the city. Many of these civilians accidentally added to the already spreading fire by starting fires of their own, as did many careless French soldiers.
By the night of 15 September, a large portion of the city was on fire, and the morning of the 16 September, the fire had spread dangerously close to the Kremlin, where Napoleon was staying, and he was forced to evacuate. The fire was spreading around the city, burning mostly the 6,500 some wooden houses in Moscow. As the fire spread, it engulfed buildings, trapping soldiers inside and killing them.
By the night of 16 September, the fire hit its peak. At night, it was possible easily read a book outside the city using only the firelight from the city, and heat could be felt in all parts of the city, even those far away from the fire. Napoleon described it as, "...the most grand, the most sublime, and the most terrific sight the world ever beheld!"
As the fire raged, the city turned into a free for all. Soldiers and civilians alike ran for shelter far from the fire, and others turned to mass looting. The fire broke down all discipline in the ranks, and most officers had fled the city anyway, so soldiers were free to do as they pleased. Some soldiers write in their personal journals that they were doing the Russians and everyone a favor by looting, as they did not wish to see such fine pieces of art or such expensive furs to go to waste.
Even generals could not help but loot. Prince Eugene, who remained in the city, stole artwork from the mansion he was staying in. He too, used the excuse of needing to save such fine and irreplaceable objects from destruction as his reason for looting. The streets became filled with anything that could make soldiers some money when they returned. This heavy baggage that they acquired would later have a deadly consequence on the army in the winter, but I will discuss more of that at an appropriate time.
Not all soldiers were having a good time looting during the fire, those closer to the fire were in imminent danger at all times. A hospital containing wounded Russian soldiers also caught of fire, and those strong enough were forced to throw themselves out of the windows and fall to their death. The more severely wounded who could not move, suffered some of the most unimaginable deaths. It is estimated 2,000 Russian soldiers died in the hospital due to the fire.
Civilians were beaten up and had loot stolen from them by soldiers, and then were forced to carry the soldiers loot around for them. Women were raped in the streets, and those with no loot were simply beaten up and many times killed because the soldiers were angry they had nothing to offer.
Finally, after days of inferno, on the 18 September the flames had burnt themselves out, and Napoleon and other officers re-entered the city. Order was restored in the city slowly but surely. About 70% of the city was burnt or destroyed, and little supplies remained. Napoleon was baffled at the sight, and could not understand why the Russians would do this to their own city. With Moscow burned to the ground, Alexander would now never surrender Russia to the French, and any delegation sent was promptly rejected.
Napoleon's Indecision
Napoleon instructing Lauriston to go to
St. Petersburg and get peace at all costs
Napoleon had never really meant to stay in Moscow, although sitting out the winter in Moscow had been an option, this was now completely out of the question, as most of the supplies that could have lasted the army the winter were lost in the fire. Taking Moscow was a hollow victory for Napoleon, it had achieved little and now Napoleon had no good options ahead of him. He could go after Kutuzov again, and risk winter setting in and the army running out of supplies, or he could retreat.
Contrary to what many believe, Napoleon did look in to retreat almost immediately upon re-entering the city. The only problem was, there was no place they could retreat to until Vilna that had the supplies to last the army the winter. Napoleon considered leaving a small garrison in Moscow, and attacking St. Petersburg, but the plan was shot down by most of the generals in Napoleon's staff. With no viable military option, Napoleon hoped for the best in negotiations.
What Napoleon failed to see was that since Moscow, any hope of Alexander requesting peace was gone. The blame for the fire fell back on Napoleon, but he did not grasp that. Moscow had pushed the war to a new height, and now there was no turning back on the Russian side. With each passing day, winter was also drawing nearer, and the Russian position was becoming stronger. Napoleon sent so many peace delegations and dispatches to St. Petersburg that it seemed he was desperate. Before giving Alexander enough time to respond, which he stopped doing anyways, Napoleon would send another dispatch or another delegate.
The Need for Retreat
Napoleon in Moscow
In all reality, the lack of supplies left in Moscow is a bit of an exaggeration. Napoleon did indeed probably have enough food and supplies left for his men in Moscow to make it through the winter (although a vast amount of men would have, indeed, died). The problem was with horses, there was not nearly enough food for the cavalry, who were already drastically reduced because of supply problems and in terrible condition. Without horses, Napoleon could not keep his communication open, nor could he track enemy movements, and horses used to carry artillery would be limited or ineffective giving him less artillery on the field, or use cavalry effectively on the battlefield in general.
Another pressing matter was Napoleon's flanks. While Napoleon's force was indeed the main force, two other forces had been launched at the time of the invasion, one in the far north near Lithuania, and one in the far south near the southern border of Poland. Both of these forces had been stopped far westward of Napoleon's position, and if one or both were beaten, Napoleon was threatened with the Russians encircling him or at the least cutting of his supply and communications line.
The most pressing however, had to be the weather. Russian winters are notoriously cold, and since campaigning in the winter in the Napoleonic Era was rare, winter clothes were not a standard issue in those days. Some generals did make outfit adjustments for their corps, and these would help tremendously, but most soldiers were still wearing the same uniform they had crossed the Niemen in, and these most certainly were in terrible condition to say the least.
Weather had already played an important and deadly role in the campaign. At Vilna, a storm had killed thousands of horses, and the heat caused thousands of soldiers to die. Just eight weeks in to the campaign, having fought only a few major battles, the army had been reduced in half (although not half had died, this estimate is figured from the strength Napoleon could muster at Borodino, the loss of life was certainly not half), most certainly this occurred mostly from weather and disease (and desertion, the Russian countryside was filled with rogue units of French or stragglers).
Napoleon was making the mistake that many make, and that was he felt that by waiting he was somehow keeping his options open. In all reality, Napoleon had only one option and that was to retreat. As October began, Napoleon was still discussing other options than retreat and valuable time was being wasted, and the Russian winter was getting closer and closer.
"Then conquer we must, if our cause it is just" - Star Spangled Banner
Last edited by Tiberius Tosi; August 15, 2009 at 04:23 PM.
Very nice article Tiberius, very nice. It does give the good picture of the events that led to the invasion and why it happened. To me personally it was Napoleon's biggest mistake and he would've been better off if he marched on Constantinople.
Nice article again .
King Nikola I Petrovic-Njegos, Master and King of Montenegro accepting the surrender of Turkish forces in Skadar in April 1913, during the First Balkan War.
Under the proud patronage of the great Tzar
The personality of the general is indispensable, he is the head, he is the all of an army. The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions but by Caesar. It was not before the Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to tremble but before Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which penetrated to India but Alexander. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne. Prussia was not defended for seven years against the three most formidable European Powers by the Prussian soldiers but by Frederick the Great. --- NapoleonBonaparte
Added part III, which includes from the Russian Rudnia offensive to Lubino-Valutina Gora, which includes The Battle of Smolensk. Sorry, I got kinda lazy on the pictures this time, I'll add them in later.
"Then conquer we must, if our cause it is just" - Star Spangled Banner
Preface to a book from 1759: "The following Version of Tibullus was begun and completed several Years ago, when the Author was in the Army. A military Man, even in the most active Campaign, has many Hours of Leisure; and as these cannot be spent more rationally than in some literary Pursuit, he employed that Part of his Time, which was not devoted to his Profession, in perusing the Classics."
My ancestors owned those Frenchies. Rule #1, never march on Moskow. My peeps are too stupid and stuborn to just give up.
Btw. Good stuff.
"Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." - James Madison
Barclay split his force into two, which actually slowed progress further
Can you tell me why splitting the force would result in a slowed progress?
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as he no longer wished to serve under a German coward who was selling Russia.
i thought barclay was scottish
+rep me if you like barca!
The personality of the general is indispensable, he is the head, he is the all of an army. The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions but by Caesar. It was not before the Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to tremble but before Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which penetrated to India but Alexander. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne. Prussia was not defended for seven years against the three most formidable European Powers by the Prussian soldiers but by Frederick the Great. --- NapoleonBonaparte
Last edited by spanish_emperor; July 23, 2009 at 12:03 AM.
Can you tell me why splitting the force would result in a slowed progress?
Well, north of the Moscow road there were numerous small country roads, and as the roads intersected one another, a jam resulted at many of the crossroads when the two forces of the army were joining up. This was especially true when they hit a couple of bottleneck ravines. Also some units got confused as to their route because the force was so split, and many got flat out lost. For example, forces under Osterman actually ended up turning back towards Smolensk for some time before finally realising their mistake. The Russian army also had to march much futher north than they would have, had they marched along one or two roads as a combined force. Instead one part of the army had to detour far north, so as to avoid congesting the roads, only to find the roads they needed to take south already flooded by the other part of the army also trying to move eastward and south to link back up with the Moscow Road. Hope that helps a little bit?
The splitting of the force was actually the reason the Russians were forced to fight at Lubino-Valutina Gora. As much of the force was still lost and spread out and split apart, the French could easily have defeated the entire Russian army.
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i thought barclay was scottish
Well, honestly and truely he was neither Scottish nor German. While his family was indeed of Scottish decent, and his name is a Scottish clan, he was born in modern day Lithuania, and his father was even the mayor of Riga. He grew up in a German speaking family, not a Russian speaking one. While he was technically Russian, he had more of a German cultured background as opposed to a Russian one, and Bagration's insult played off that, as the Russian populace and those Russians in the upper ring of the military command were growing suspicious of German officers.
"Then conquer we must, if our cause it is just" - Star Spangled Banner
Last edited by Tiberius Tosi; July 23, 2009 at 01:52 AM.
July 18, 2009, 01:43 AM
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