Originally Posted by
Nik
1. Caveat
These kind of discussion are always dangerous, because both sides had the use of tactical nukes factured into their OPERATIONAL plans. For the Nato, it ws the automated use planned if certain phaselines in the FuldaGap were reached by the soviets, for the soviets it was the opening strikes against keypoints like traffic hubs, troops concentrations, airfields and communication centers. You cannot just delete those strikes out of the picture, because they in turn influenced the planning of conventional.
2. Caveat
Which timeframe are we talking about? The 50ties? The 60ties or 70ties? What do we assume as the strategic outset? An surprise attack by one party out of the blue sky or a deteroiation of the geostrategic situation with both sides preparing for war?
Strategic Nato Planning
The Lissabon Treaties in the 50ties had envisaged a 90 Division army composed by units from the member states. Due to the new nuclear Doctrine of the Eisenhower (massive retalation, i.e. attack with anything and watch the world burn), only the german Bundeswehr reached its planned troop strength, the other member states instead relied on WMD deterrent and a planned build up of reserves. Under Kennedies flexible response doctrine, tactical nuclear capabilities were beefed up, as well as a resurgence in conventional forces, though the american commitment built heavily up the idea of a swift reinforcement by airlifted persoanl (using prepositioned equipment chaces) and a second wave reinforcement by see (the REFORGER Convoys).
Force Comparison
To get reliable troop and equipment numbers is still difficult (the majority of cold war literature tends to concentrate on WMD's), but several things should be taken into account:
- different nomenclauture: Soviet Armies had up to 4 divisions in peacetime, the Corps of the NATO had up to 5 divisions. Soviet divisions in general were smaller than their Nato Counterparts --> just a count of divisions can be lead to wrong comparisons:
- The spear point of any soviet offensive would have been the group of soviet forces in germany, backed up immediatly by units fo the DDR army and units from poland (both soviet and polish), further units would have to transferred from the soviet military districts. Not all divisions stationed in russia were combat worthy, many were simple shells with cadre personal and units.
I have no idea about the troop commitments of the other WP states, on their equipment and their willingness to fight for the soviets, so that is another black mark.
- The Bundeswehr could call up to 30 brigades in the 60ties, and by 1970, the planned force level of 36 brigades in 12 divisions (the majority armor or mechanized infantry).
- Comparing vehicles, especially tanks and IFV from different timeframes is an exercise in futility, as our knowledge is limited and those relative strengths varied from year to year.
Resume: far too undetailled initial post to make this discussion worthwile.