Napoleonic Cavalry vs. Infantry

[Didz]

Hmm! Ok...I've found another reference to the use of squares prior to the Napoleonic era. This time at the Battle of Poltava 1709.

At this elventh hour, Creutz charged with his cavalry on the right wing but came up against fresh Russian infantry: they formed squares and beat him off.

Also another version of the Blenhiem incident:

At 4:30 the Allied centre began a deliberate advance. In desperation Tallard ordered his remianing cavalry to charge, thereby earning a temporary respite, for the advance was checked. An hour later, however, the Allied attack again moved inexorably up the ridge, and 80 fresh squadrons rapidly routed the weary remnants of Tallards 60, who vainly tired to stem the tide with pistol and carbine fire. The issue was soon decided: French squadrons broke and fled before the impact of cold steel, and the nine infantry battalions gallantly died where they stood. Tallards centre disintegrated in a flash.

Rossbach 1757

Seydlitz had been observing the course of the infantry fight, and launched his reformed cavalry from Tagewerben in a new charge as soon as he saw that the confusion had become general. He allowed a bullet wound in his arm to recieve only the briefest of attention before pressing on again with the pursuit. Two Swiss regiments in French employ, Regiments 'Diesbach' and 'Planta' compelled Frederick's attention by standing rooted like 'a wall of red bricks' in the midst of the chaos, but dusk found the rest of the French army scatterred in every direction.

Its not clear from this latter extract whether the Swiss were in line or square, but the implication of the wall comment is that they were in line. Having said that the situation was not usual, in that the rest of the infantry were in paniced flight, so the cavalry were operating in a target rich environment, and as witness the charge of the Union Brigade at Waterloo, given the choice cavalry always singles out the point of least resistance and by-passes any troops who are formed and ready to recieve them.

[CBR]

It is not entirely clear what formation was used in the Rossbach example. Duffy in "Prussia's Glory" have an eyewitness saying "I saw only about 4 regiments of infantry which were able to retreat in closed-up formation under continuous fire" That seems to have involved the Diesbach regiment.

Some Prussian officer uses the word column for the French retreat. It might just be a generic term for the overall mass of troops or that a lot of units were not in line at that point.


CBR

[Didz]

So, anyway the bottom line seems to be that the square formation of some discription was known by most European armies over the period of the early 18th Century prior to the start fo the Napoleonic War. But, its value as a standard and universal defence against cavalry had either not been recognised or was not deemed necessary.

However, by the height of the Napoleonic War, the square, or some alternative dense formation, was pretty much the standard response of any infantry threatened by cavalry attack, and infantry forced to face cavalry in line were considered to be at a considerable disadvantage.

Nevertheless, there are examples of infantry forced to face cavalry in line who drove the cavalry off, the main deciding factors being a mixture of luck and good judgement, or bad judgement on the part of the cavalry commander.

Steady infantry in line with loaded muskets, attacked by cavalry to their front, seem to have survived. The main reason this did not happen very often is that very few Napoleonic cavalry officers were dumb enough to attack steady infantry with loaded muskets head on. Whether, Marlboroughian and Frederican cavalry officers were, might be a reason why the square was not cosidered essential. Having said that, from what I've read the French cavalry at Minden had little choice but to attack the Anglo-German infantry head-on, as there was no room to maneouvre anywhere else.

By contrast if one looks at the examples of infantry in line being routed by cavalry, such events are almost always accompanied by some sort of surprise or confusion which enabled the cavalry to close without taking a full battalion volley in the face at close range. And as you rightly point out the risks of that occuring were higher during the Napoleonic period simply because armies deployed in a much more flexible and open formation. Thus providing a lot more opportunities for enterprising cavalry officers to expliot.

Success or failure still hinged on a psychological bettle of wills between the infantry and cavalry, and I've not come across any examples fo cavalry closing with steady infantry and routing them simply though the application of cold steel. If the infantry didn't panic the cavalry usually kept their distance, or at worst, got blasted with musketry before falling back.

[JaM]

Check any sources about infantry line - especially discussions about 2-3-4 ranks - 2 rank formation was especially mentioned as too thin to survive cavalry charge... 3 rank formation was preferred...

[plug_spork]

Originally Posted by emperorpenguin

Philip Haythornthwaite states that cavalry would only charge infantry in line formation if the latter were wavering.
Charging a solid line of bayonets and musket fire would be a pretty stupid thing for cavalry to do.

I think Marshal Ney might have learned that at Waterloo. What was the number 11,000 french cavalry charging the British line. The squares came in quite handy that day.

In regards to infantry line vs. square - do not forget the American Revolution. American militia were over run by British cavalry charges on many occasions, and in fact American Continental line was little better prepared for a head on cavalry charge. Often they would break just seeing British cavalry forming up. I imagine the same happened in India and other theaters outside of Europe. I'm sure it is too complicated for the game engine to factor this in for different factions througout the world so the charge bonuses and speed of square formation remains the same from one unit to the next.

[Didz]

Originally Posted by JaM

Check any sources about infantry line - especially discussions about 2-3-4 ranks - 2 rank formation was especially mentioned as too thin to survive cavalry charge... 3 rank formation was preferred...

Yep! already covered in depth earlier I think (though thinking about it perhaps it was another thread). The British at Waterloo spent almost the entire battle in a four deep line, partly because of the lack of space to deploy on a wider front (at least at the start of the battle) and partly because of the fear of the French cavalry after their expereinces at Quatre Bras.

Even more interestingly I was watching a TV programme a few days ago when Mike Loades was discussing the way an Anglo-Saxon shield wall functioned and he demostrated the need for a minimum four deep formation to absorb shock by riding a horse directly at a group of volunteers.

The first group in two deep line flinched as the horse closed at a gallop the guys in the front rank literally pushing the people behind them out of the way and in doing so creating a gap into which the horse naturally charged. However, when he did the same thing with the volunteers in a four deep line the guys in the front rank could not physically push the six men behind them out of the way and were unable to create a gap big enough for the horse to enter. As a result the horse baulked right in front of the shield wall and two of the guys rushed forward and just pulled Mike off it.

So, a four deep line was certainly preferrable provided your flanks are secure. It's also much faster to form square from a four deep line as the divisions don't have as far to march to get into position.

However, troops in a two deep line could still stand against cavalry if they were lucky, kept calm and the cavalry commander was stupid. But in doing so they have to rely upon a single effective close range volley to bring down sufficient horses to halt the enemy charge, if that fails then they are pretty much screwed, and most cavalry commanders would make sure they never got a chance.

[CBR]

Originally Posted by Didz

Success or failure still hinged on a psychological bettle of wills between the infantry and cavalry, and I've not come across any examples fo cavalry closing with steady infantry and routing them simply though the application of cold steel. If the infantry didn't panic the cavalry usually kept their distance, or at worst, got blasted with musketry before falling back.

I'm gonna keep this short as it will take a considerable amount of time going through several books to find quotes (it did not help that the browser closed down and I lost the first quote!)

From "1809 Thunder on the Danube" volume 2 p49:

The Austrian commander, seeing the negative turn of affairs, had formed his men in a square and was attempting to withdraw behind some hedges and other obstacles. Heimrodt instantly decided to attack and calling on the closest thirty or forty dragoons, charged at Becke's square. The remaining men of his two squadrons hurried to join him. Although outnumbered (500 infantry to at most 160 light dragoons), the Badeners fell on the Austrians in a fury. Becke's men got off an ineffective volley, but the square contracted under the ferocious attack and the inexperienced infantrymen, jammed together and disordered, could no longer fire. Heimrodt's horse and several others were pierced by bayonets as the dragoons pressed in but several Badeners were able to create a gap in the square by grabbing Austrian muskets and shoving them them aside. With a hole made, the defence collapsed...

Based on what I have read in other books this is IMO a perfect case of how cavalry defeats a square: infantry delivering poor firepower and a cavalry commander with enough guts to close in to fight it out.

Brent Nosworthy in "Battle tactics of Napoleon and his enemies" also discusses it and the various viewpoints from contemporary sources. He provides a few quotes of cavalry charging in to defeat squares, one being Marbot describing how the the infantry blundered by delivering a full salvo that only emptied a few saddles, and before they could reload the cavalry came in at full speed "and the shock was so violent that they were overthrown in heaps"

Marmont apparently suggested a new way of training the horses as the old practice was to charge friendly infantry only to pull up just before contact. That meant horses got accustomed to stopping when they should have kept on moving forward. He was apparently not alone in thinking that the training of cavalry horses hurt their performance when charging infantry.


CBR

[Didz]

That an interesting quote as it reinforces several of the points I made earlier.

e.g.
Point 1. A square is not a square when its moving. In this instance its quite clear from the example that the Austrian's were trying to move their square. Presumably because they were nervous about its exposed position and were hoping to gain the additional benefits of having a hedge between themselves and the cavalry. The problem was that in moving the square would have lost unit cohesion, and in particular in crossing the obstical itself would have had to have broken ranks. This was clearly a big mistake and Heimrodt obviously saw the opportunity and grabbed it.

Point 2. The battle is won before the cold steel meets. What happened next was clearly confused and has been coloured by natural desire to make the most of the victory. But the clues are pretty obvious. What we are told is that the square contracted in on itself. but in fact a square cannot contract in on itself and still be a square, assuming that it was a square anyway when it was charged. What appears to have happened is that as the cavalry closed with the Austrian's they realised they were undone and paniced. The men closest to the cavalry tried to escape by pushing their way into the middle of the group so that the entire force imploded into one confused mob of men, all trying to save themselves by squeezing into the middle. Under such conditions, their last possible chance of survival was lost as they could not fire, even if they had wanted to.

Point 3 Horses do not charge into solid objects: What obviously happened next was that the intial Badener charge 'baulked' at the solid mass of infantry. The horses simply could not and would not ride over the mass of Austrian infantry clustered before them. It seems from the text that at least some of the Austrain infantry must have begun to recover their wits and turn to face the cavalry to present their muskets and bayonets, and their was probably some sparring going on around the fringes of the mob. Given time the Austrian's would probably have settled into a rallying square and the opportunity would have been lost. However, what we are told happened is that some of the cavalry grabbed the Austrians muskets and pulled them aside, to create a gap for their colleagues horses to enter. Personally, I think this is a bit of dramatic license by the author of the report.

Its possible that during the sparring going on between the cavalry milling around the edge of the mob and the infantry on the outer edges of it that some cavalrymen did grab the muskets of their opponents, a badly aimed thrust at the rider might easily leave the musket within reach of a hasty grab. Although it seems odd that the cavalryman would have a hand free to do so given that he would have a sword in one hand and the reigns in another, and certainly not something that could be done from a moving horse.

It's possibly more likely that the men who grabbed the muskets were those who had already been unhorsed, either by the earlier firing or by having their horses bayonetted along the fringes of the mob. An dismounted cavalryman would have little choice if attacked by a man with a bayonetted musket but to grab the end of the weapon, as their swords would lack the reach to deal with the attack any other way.

Likewise an Austrian dealing with a dismounted cavalryman might well feel confident enough to press home his attack, leaving the safety of the mob to try and push his bayonet home, thus exposing himself and his colleagues to a counter attack by a mounted friend of his victim. Either way, what we are told is that the man was pulled out of the mob by his musket.

It's equally likely that at some point the Austrian realised he was in trouble and dropped his musket to run back to the safety of the mob, effectively spreading even more panic and compromising the outer defence.

Even so, of itself it seems unlikely that the grabbing of muskets, or even the disarming of a few Austrians would make a large enough hole in a solid mass of men for a horse to expliot.

I personally, think that the musket grabbing, (assuming for the sake of arguement that it occurred at all), was an incidental issue. I suspect that what was actually happening, perhaps beyond the sight of the cavalrymen, was that the Austria unit was still disbanding from the rear. Perhaps even being compounded in this activity by officers who were still trying to carry out their original orders to retire and reform beyond the hedge.

The panic having begun and men having forced their way into the middle of the mob, all command and control had been lost and these men transmitted their panic to those around them causing the men at the back of the formation to to start disbanding and seek safety on the far side of the hedge.

As the mob began to fall apart from the rear (the standard process of disbandment), the pressure keeping the men in the forefront of the fight began to slacken and that combined with the general chaos resulted in some of the men facing the cavalry to decide to try and make a break for safety too.

A couple of muskets might well have been grabbed but I thnk the real opportunity arose when the number of Austrian's who decided to try and escape over the hedge reached a critical level and those facing the cavalry no longer felt safe, or inclined to stand and continue to face the enemy.

Probably, the best test of this theory would be if we knew the level of casualties from sword cuts in the Austrian unit.

We know from a similar incident at Gilly that in circumstances where a unit is literally overrun by cavalry that casualties are likely be around 75%-80% (614 casualties out of 800 men in the case of the 28th Regiment). If the casualties to the Austrian's were a lot less than this, then the most likely explanation is that most of the Austrians managed to run early enough to avoid being cut down, and that is only likely to have been possible if the unit gradually disbanded over a few minutes, with the unlucky minority keeping the cavalry busy long enough for their friends to escape.

[CBR]

The grabbing muskets bit were most likely not that important but it does speak of up and close fighting between the units as we are also told about horses being pierced by bayonets. As a gap is mentioned for the infantry to finally collapse also shows there was a formation and not just a mob of men, although either panic or pressure from horses meant the ranks became compressed.

The overall number of POW were about 800 so the battalion was pretty much totally destroyed. This was a small action where the Austrian cavalry had been routed so there were no other units for support.


CBR

[Didz]

Yes, we get the same thing happening at Waterloo with French cavalry riding right up to the edge of the squares and either trying to poke the men in them with lances or firing their pistols into them. The object was to try and cause panic or get the infantry to discharge their muskets.

However, I still feel its being immensely generous to call the Austrian formation in this example a square. The description given in the text itself states that the formation had imploded, which implies that it had lost all structure, sufficient in fact that the men in it were no longer able to use their weapons effectively, and suggesting nothing short of a disorganised mob as I stated before.

That also ties in with the number of prisoners, as it sounds like they pretty much threw down their arms and surrendered en-masse. Indeed the number of prisoners is unusually high given that an Austrian infantry battalion only consisted of 640 men at full strength, and the writer only claims that there were 500 men present to begin with.

Is the 800 POW's you quoted for the entire battle, or did this battalon persuade their friends to join them?

Changing the subject slightly one of my favourite stories about Austrian squares was that from the Battle of Dresden in 1813. On the second day of the battle French Cuirassiers approached an Austrian Square and an officer rode forward and demanded that it surrender. The Austrians, were drenched by rain, and could not fire their muskets to defend themselves. Thus the French cavalry were able to advance almost to within reach of their bayonets.

However, the Austrian Colonel refused to surrender. He pointed out quite rightly that whilst his men could not fire to drive off the Frenchmen, neither could the Frenchmen do anything penetrate his square. Thus neither side had the upper hand, as the French had failed to bring their artillery with them. At this Murat was sent for and he asked Austrian Colonel if he would surrender should he manage to bring up a cannon. The Austrian Colonel replied that obviously if the French had a cannon then he would have no choice but to surrender, as further restistance would be a pointless waste of the lives of his men. So, Murat ordered double teams to be hitched to an artillery piece and it was dragged through the mud until it was within 30 paces of the Austrian square, and whilst the gunner stood by with a glowing match at the ready, the Austrian's, honour satisfied laid down their arms and surrendered.

[Randall Turner]

Originally Posted by Didz

So, anyway the bottom line seems to be that the square formation of some discription was known by most European armies over the period of the early 18th Century prior to the start fo the Napoleonic War. But, its value as a standard and universal defence against cavalry had either not been recognised or was not deemed necessary.

However, by the height of the Napoleonic War, the square, or some alternative dense formation, was pretty much the standard response of any infantry threatened by cavalry attack, and infantry forced to face cavalry in line were considered to be at a considerable disadvantage.

Nevertheless, there are examples of infantry forced to face cavalry in line who drove the cavalry off, the main deciding factors being a mixture of luck and good judgement, or bad judgement on the part of the cavalry commander.

Steady infantry in line with loaded muskets, attacked by cavalry to their front, seem to have survived. The main reason this did not happen very often is that very few Napoleonic cavalry officers were dumb enough to attack steady infantry with loaded muskets head on. Whether, Marlboroughian and Frederican cavalry officers were, might be a reason why the square was not cosidered essential. Having said that, from what I've read the French cavalry at Minden had little choice but to attack the Anglo-German infantry head-on, as there was no room to maneouvre anywhere else.

By contrast if one looks at the examples of infantry in line being routed by cavalry, such events are almost always accompanied by some sort of surprise or confusion which enabled the cavalry to close without taking a full battalion volley in the face at close range. And as you rightly point out the risks of that occuring were higher during the Napoleonic period simply because armies deployed in a much more flexible and open formation. Thus providing a lot more opportunities for enterprising cavalry officers to expliot.

Success or failure still hinged on a psychological bettle of wills between the infantry and cavalry, and I've not come across any examples fo cavalry closing with steady infantry and routing them simply though the application of cold steel. If the infantry didn't panic the cavalry usually kept their distance, or at worst, got blasted with musketry before falling back.

I'm still interested in this discussion and am reading it all, but am too busy to spend much time researching or discussing. I'd like to address this summary, though. We need to break down the different circumstances, in particular.

Square(1): Square, for completeness (though this is a bit off-topic) - In general, if a square kept its ranks continuous, it will fend off a cavalry charge. There are instances of squares breaking but they're the exception to the rule.

Square(2): In general, if a square loses a file or group of files, whether through panic, artillery fire, killed horses plowing into the ranks, particularly aggressive cavalry manhandling the bayonet ranks, whatever - the square will usually collapse. All cavalry needs is a "crease" to get past the bayonet wall.

Line(1): A non-contiguous line, ie, a standalone battalion w/o its flanks covered, is an extreme case of a "crease" and in general will always break against cavalry. THIS IS IMPORTANT. It's one of the most common cases, if not the most common, of cavalry vs. line in Total War games.

Line(2): A contiguous line may stand against cavalry, and it may not. When a contiguous line does stand against cavalry, as at Minden or Balaclava, it's celebrated as an exceptional event. As de la Balme states re: Minden, "Had we advanced with only half intervals, the issue would have been very different. The attack would have been made with speed and impetuosity, the horses could not have broken away to the left or to the right, and the English would have been ridden over as at Fontenoy.” Likewise at Balaclava, the "rebuff" of the Russian cavalry was a decision by the Russian commander not to press the attack due to "suspicious circumstances", ie, a two-rank line facing his unit.

Line(3): An advancing line will in general will not be able to maintain contact with its neighbors, and will suffer the fate of a non-contiguous line.

Some further observations on your post, Didz:

Firstly, "surprise" isn't necessary for a charge to succeed. It's necessary to catch the unit before it re-deploys into square. All that's necessary for the charge to succeed is that it find a gap - and a standalone battalion line is one huge gap.

Secondly, I see no mention of the units at Quatre Bras being attacked exclusively from the flank or the rear. Your assumption that such was the case isn't supported by accounts, and it doesn't follow from cavalry breaking squares - ie, cavalry exploiting a gap in a square is by definition attacking from the front, as a square has no flank.

Now, I know you guys like your infantry lines, and I understand what you're trying to get at here when you (and numerous authors) say things like "well formed infantry has nothing to fear from cavalry". Cowboy up and face facts. The only marginally viable scenario for infantry line vs. cavalry is as a static line, OR when some other factor (friendly cavalry, cover, etc) improves the infantry's chance of survival.

There are huge implications following from this. Two are as follows:

Firstly, the British tactic of advancing in line will work sans strong opposing cavalry, and perhaps in the rough terrain of the Peninsula where there aren't any Cuirassiers and the horses are starving (or eaten). It will not work in general without cavalry support, as became obvious to Wellington at Quatre Bras.

Secondly, we have another topic to discuss that we should address. That is playbalance. We need to accept that cavalry is enormously effective in this time period and move on to cost-benefit, environmental, combined arms, mass, and command control issues in order to finish off the Napoleonic battle simulation model.

[JaM]

i ETW game, this will not work - once you press the square button, your infantry turns themselves into anticavalry killing machines, no matter if square is not formed at all... many times you can catch them forming the square, but you will always loose...

[Randall Turner]

Originally Posted by JaM

i ETW game, this will not work - once you press the square button, your infantry turns themselves into anticavalry killing machines, no matter if square is not formed at all... many times you can catch them forming the square, but you will always loose...

Well, at least make them hit the "square" button. I can live with that.

[Didz]

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Square(1): Square, for completeness (though this is a bit off-topic) - In general, if a square kept its ranks continuous, it will fend off a cavalry charge. There are instances of squares breaking but they're the exception to the rule.

Yes….I think thats true. Every instance I’ve come across of a square breaking has been the result of some accident, confusion or simple panic amongst the infantry.

However, I would make the observation that from everything I’ve read, including most recently Barbero’s book the cavalry would not even try and break a solid and steady square, but would merely set-about trying to unsettle it or bring up some artillery.

The only exception I’ve come across is the British Cavalry which as Wellington said had a habit of galloping bald-headed at everything and then just as quickly galloping back again after it got its arse-kicked. But generally speaking Britain had really bad cavalry officers.

One occasion where apparently this actually worked was a Garcia Hernadez where an unlucky shot brought down one of the Kings German Legion Dragoon horses crushing the men forming the corner of a French square and causing the rest of the square to panic as the Dragoons pushed through the gap. The square next to it then also panicked and broke just as a result of the sudden flood of refugee’s trying to force their way into it for safety.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Square(2): In general, if a square loses a file or group of files, whether through panic, artillery fire, killed horses plowing into the ranks, particularly aggressive cavalry manhandling the bayonet ranks, whatever - the square will usually collapse. All cavalry needs is a "crease" to get past the bayonet wall.

That might be overstating it a bit. There are examples of squares being flayed by cannister, bombarded with shot and sniped at by skirmishers and still holding steady. Again there are examples given in Barbero’s book of just such a situation. It largely comes down to luck and discipline. The cavalry need to be in the right place at the right time to exploit such a gap, and the infantry need to panic if they are.

For example: At Quatre Bras the 42nd Highlanders left it so late to form square than when they finished they found they had trapped several French cavalrymen inside. In theory given your statement that ought to have been enough to cause the square to collapse, but in fact the officers and NCO’s simply hunted the French cavalry to extinction and the square held firm. However, the 92nd Highlanders were caught in exactly the same incident and nearly annihilated.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Line(1): A non-contiguous line, ie, a standalone battalion w/o its flanks covered, is an extreme case of a "crease" and in general will always break against cavalry. THIS IS IMPORTANT. It's one of the most common cases, if not the most common, of cavalry vs. line in Total War games.

That would depend upon the cavalry commander. If the cavalry were stupid, and charged the line head on, they would never reach them. However, most cavalry commanders were not that dumb, and if the infantry had their flanks in the air they would make sure they came at the infantry from a flank or the rear, where the infantry could not bring their firepower to bear. OR if that was not possible then they would try and goad the infantry into firing too early (e.g. at a range of more than 50 paces) and having emptied their muskets they would then expect the infantry to panic when they charged.

So, in TW terms one would need to somehow model the morale implications of being threatened by cavalry without being able to meet the charge with a volley of musketry, either because you were reloading, or because they were attacking you from the flank.

The way wargame rules handle that is to give the infantry an morale penalty which will almost certainly cause them to rout if they are charged, but which can be off-set if the infantry can inflict sufficient loss on the cavalry from their volley. Consequently, if the infantry fire too early, or cannot fire at all, then they are pretty much doomed and will break before the cavalry close. However, if the cavalry charge straight into a close range volley there would be a good chance that the cavalry charge would be dispersed.

Even that is a bit too harsh as we do have instances of infantry units managing to form rally squares fast enough to avoid complete disaster, rather than falling apart completely.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Line(2): A contiguous line may stand against cavalry, and it may not. When a contiguous line does stand against cavalry, as at

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Minden or Balaclava, it's celebrated as an exceptional event. As de la Balme states re: Minden, "Had we advanced with only half intervals, the issue would have been very different. The attack would have been made with speed and impetuosity, the horses could not have broken away to the left or to the right, and the English would have been ridden over as at Fontenoy.” Likewise at Balaclava, the "rebuff" of the Russian cavalry was a decision by the Russian commander not to press the attack due to "suspicious circumstances", ie, a two-rank line facing his unit.

I think this is a ‘red herring’ the issue is not so much whether the line in contiguous or not, but whether the infantry are steady and loaded, and whether the cavalry commander is stupid or knows his business. Obviously, if the line is not contiguous then the cavalry have more options, but even if the line is contiguous they could still break it, and likewise the cavalry can still screw up even against an isolated line.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Line(3): An advancing line will in general will not be able to maintain contact with its neighbors, and will suffer the fate of a non-contiguous line.

Lots of If’s, Buts and Maybe’s to that really, not least the nature of the terrain and the quality of the troops. I don’t think its possible to generalise. What really matters is unit cohesion, regardless of whether that unit is a battalion, brigade or division.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Firstly, "surprise" isn't necessary for a charge to succeed. It's necessary to catch the unit before it re-deploys into square. All that's necessary for the charge to succeed is that it find a gap - and a standalone battalion line is one huge gap.

Surprise isn’t essential, but it certainly helps to cause panic, and panic is essential if a charge is to succeed.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Secondly, I see no mention of the units at Quatre Bras being attacked exclusively from the flank or the rear. Your assumption that such was the case isn't supported by accounts, and it doesn't follow from cavalry breaking squares - ie, cavalry exploiting a gap in a square is by definition attacking from the front, as a square has no flank.

Which units are you talking about?

The 42nd and 92nd were attacked from the flank and never saw the lancers coming until it was too late because of the tall crops. Maitlands Brigade was surprised whilst still in disorder after leaving at wood to pursue some French infantry.

I’m not aware of any unit at Quatre Bras that received a French charge frontally in a steady line and failed to drive it off. Even the Dutch militia managed it. Then again both Pire and Kellerman were experienced cavalry officers and so there were very few instances where they actually attacked a steady line head-on at Quatre Bras.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Firstly, the British tactic of advancing in line will work sans strong opposing cavalry, and perhaps in the rough terrain of the

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Peninsula where there aren't any Cuirassiers and the horses are starving (or eaten). It will not work in general without cavalry support, as became obvious to Wellington at Quatre Bras.

There are no examples from Quatre Bras which prove or disprove this theory. The nature of the battlefield itself successfully ensured that the infantry would never be safe facing cavalry in line simply because they could not see them coming. In fact, the cavalry had a huge advantage at Quatre Bras because they could actually see over the crops and plan their attacks whilst the infantry were pretty much blind.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Secondly, we have another topic to discuss that we should address. That is playbalance. We need to accept that cavalry is enormously effective in this time period and move on to cost-benefit, environmental, combined arms, mass, and command control issues in order to finish off the Napoleonic battle simulation model.

This is true but not for the reasons you seem to be implying. The reason cavalry dominates in the Napoleonic period is not because it can smash through infantry lines and slaughter huge numbers of infantry, but because it can pin those infantry into place so that its artillery and infantry supports can defeat them in detail.

Cavalry dominance over a section of a battlefield gave the side that held it a huge advantage enabling its infantry and artillery to maneuver freely whilst stopping the enemy from either countering those movements or even escaping. This was the real danger the Allies were in during the French cavalry attacks at Waterloo, not the idea that suddenly French Cuirassiers would ride over them.

So, one needs to be clear what effective means. If the belief is that cavalry should simply ride rough-shod over infantry and send them flying through the air in grace-arc’s as per MTW2 then that’s just a joke. (Although I suspect thats exactly what we will get.)

What we ought to get is a tactical system which rewards the use of the correct Napoleonic tactic’s, and in particular the effective use of combined arms strategies in which the cavalry provide the threat that pins the enemy in place, the artillery does the killing, the infantry secures the ground, and then the cavalry provide the coupe de gras.

Originally Posted by JaM

i ETW game, this will not work - once you press the square button, your infantry turns themselves into anticavalry killing machines, no matter if square is not formed at all... many times you can catch them forming the square, but you will always loose...

Yep! thats because in ETW there is no morale penalty for getting caught in mid-transition. In practice, a unit caught trying to change formation under fire or being charged ought to take a huge morale hit, which would almost certianly cause them to rout if caught during the process by cavalry. I find the trick in ETW is to wait until the unit is reported as 'shaken' and then charge. Most of the time they will rout soon after the cavalry close.

[CBR]

The square consisted only of 4 companies as the 2 other companies had been deployed as skirmishers and had been routed along with the cavalry support just before the section I quoted.

Also bear in mind that in 1809 the Austrian formation would most likely be in a Bataillonsmasse, if it wasn't in a square formation at the time of being attacked. They are not that different really.

If you must mention Dresden then why not mention the multiple squares that indeed were cut down by cavalry charges? The incident you describe ended IIRC with French using horse artillery to blow the squares to pieces. A wise cavalry commander would spare his men whenever he could and in that particular case the Austrian infantry were all alone so there was no need to hurry and do a unsupported charge.

Dresden is obviously an extreme case when it came to weather as the rain meant only artillery could fire and most fighting was melee. Artillery had to be double-teamed just to get moving and some of the cavalry could only charge at a quick walk because of the mud. Poor infantry quality did help the cavalry I guess, but apart from that it does show the problem infantry faces when it cannot use its muskets to repel the cavalry.


CBR

[Didz]

I only mentioned Dresden because it highlights the logic in the relationship between squares and cavalry so well. As you say the end result was that the Austrian infantry were rendered tactically impotent by the French cavalry and then defeated in detail by the French artillery. The point being that whilst the cavalry prepared the ground for victory, they did not overthrow the squares by direct appliction of cold steel, even though they could not fire at all.

The thing is that Napoleonic wargame rules have been modelling the tactical relationship between infantry and cavalry for decades (I've been Napoleonic wargamer for about 40 years and I'm a relative newcomer), so its not as if CA are starting with a blank canvas and having to do all the research and design the solutions from a position of complete ignorance.

The solutions already exist and have been tested ad-inifinitum on wargame tables all over the world, all CA need to do is buy a decent set of wargame rules and work out how to convert their tactical rules into a format suitable for the Warpath game engine.

My own rules use a combination of 'forced tactical effects' and 'tactical morale penalties' to mimic the tactical realtionships on a Napoleonic battlefield.

So, for example 'Forced tactical effects' include rules like:

a) Infantry in the open who sight enemy cavalry, within charge reach of them and beyond 1/2 charge reach must form square. (The reason for the beyond 1/2 charge reach being that infantry surprised by cavalry have an option to try and face the cavalry in line, it being too late already to form square if the cavalry charge.)

b) Cavalry sighting any enemy within charge reach must deploy into line and as far as possible face them. Giving preference to enemy cavalry.

c) Infantry being charged by cavalry my only move towards them, if in doing so they can successfully reach a neutral cover before the cavalry would reach them.

d) Cavalry being charged by cavalry must attempt to deploy into line to face them and counter-charge if possible.

These forced actions dictate the basic behaviour of infantry and cavalry when they meet on the battlefield. The net result being that cavalry have a sort of zone, or area effect on all infantry in the area, which will have to cease to advance and form into squares or such other formations as are deemed to be a defence against cavalry. Likewise any cavalry in the confrontation automatically face-off against each other and prepare to engage in a battle for cavalry domination of the field of battle.

The main problem I foresee in trying to reproduce this in NTW, is that players will 'howl' in frustration at having their little men do anything that they personally haven't ordered with a click of their mouse. So, rather than have the AI force these movements on them I think it might be better to encourage the player to do the sensible thing by penalizing them for no doing it.

That would simply require infantry to take a huge morale penalty, if deployed in the open in line with cavalry within charge reach (260 paces of them), and likewise to give cavalry a morale penalty if charged by other cavalry and caught 'flat-footed' or in the flank.

My own rules inflict a level 3 morale penalty on 'any infantry lines or columns, and gunners, in the open, being charged by cavalry.' Which is enough to guarantee a rout unless the infantry and gunners can inflict enough casualties on the charging cavalry to offset that penalty.

In percentage terms it would mean that the combined fire from infantry or gunners would need to bring down over 20% of the charging cavalry in a single volley to check the enemies charge. The actual number of casualties depends on how large the cavalry force is, a small squadron would be more easily batted aside, a full regiment, or brigade would be much harder if not impossible.

The outcome is usually pretty 'black and white', either the cavalry is checked, in which case it terminates its charge short of its target in disorder and must withdraw to reform, or the infantry and gunners break and run. There is a very small chance of the results being completely neutral which would result in the cavalry closing with formed infantry in line, and even if that happened, the infantry would now have the full morale penalty and no means of firing. So, the end result is almost inevitably that they rout next turn after a token round of melee.

However, mechanic's aside the main importance of this system is that it rewards players who use cavalry effectively as part of a force of combined arms team. As at Dresden the cavalry pin the infantry into place and prevent them advancing or withdrawing (except very slowly) and then horse artillery, or even infantry can be rushed forward to ruin their squares with superior firepower.

If the infantry try to deploy into line to meet the threat or minimize their casualties, then they instantly incur the morale penalty for being in line when opposed by nearby cavalry and if they break then the cavalry simply charge home and massacre them.

Likewise if they remain in square under cannister fire for long enough, they will eventually incur a sufficient morale penalty to allow the cavalry to attempt a charge anyway, and if they can't inflict the necessary casualties on the cavalry to offset their morale advantage (which is less likely in square than line) then the square will collapse into disorder and the cavalry will scatter them.

The most memorable test I recall of these rules was an NWC refight of the Prussian advance on Plancenoit at Waterloo, where Domon's cavalry brigade supported by its own horse artillery and a brigade of infantry managed to delay the advance of Bulow and Pirch's Corps for some considerable time simple because the Prussian's had insufficient cavalry support for their infantry. The Prussian's found it virtually impossible to make any progress over the open ground as the French cavalry fought a slow fighting withdrawal using every fold in the ground to maneouvre into potential charge positions. Repeatedly, forcing the Prussian columns to halt and form square or withdraw back into the safety of the woods.

In the end it was only when sufficient Prussian cavalry appeared that the Prussian advance was able to progress, but valuable time had been gained for the main French attack on the Allies.